1. 2

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 4

1 JAN 1943

Registry Number N 4/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare

No. communicated L 250/84/1

Dated 21st Dec.,1942.

Received in Registry 1st Jan.,1942.

General:Co-ordination

Average weekly food rations in enemy, enemy occupied and neutral European Countries.

Transmits a copy of a table showing the average weekly food rations in enemy, enemy occupied and neutral European countries.

Last Paper.

W 17695/62/49/1942.

(W 14406/62/49/1942).

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

36508

D

(Action completed.) 23/1/43

(Index.) CWF. 26/5/43

Next Paper.

W135 (W9412)

(Minutes.)

Norway continues to have a higher fats ration than Germany itself and not particularly low rations of bread & potatoes. There is still no evidence of the "catastrophe" this winter, which Norwegians quite often foretell.

Belgium continues to have a reasonably low fats ration, but her meat ration has gone up almost 50% since October.

~~Holland~~ Information about Poland continues to be vague, but it has always seemed probable that food conditions in urban centres there & in occupied Russia may well rank next after Greece and the

the order of arrest.

(2-1) 18/1/21
Copy sent to [illegible] 18 Jan.
Northern Star 5/1/21
Sunday Express 5/1/21
Funds WA 21/1.
F.O. 18/1/21

5/1

See within M.E.O. letter L250/84/1 J-21
" " M.E.O letter L250/84/1 Feb 25
" " M.E.O. letter L250/84/1 March 21.
" " M.E.O. letter L250/84/1 April 21

Ref: L.250/84/1.

AVERAGE WEEKLY FOOD RATIONS IN ENEMY, ENEMY OCCUPIED AND NEUTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

(Grammes - oz. in brackets)

N.C. - Normal Consumer. L.W. - Light Worker. H.W. - Heavy Worker. V.H.W. - Very Heavy Worker. N.W. - Night and Long Hours Workers. Ch. - Children. Ad. - Adolescents.

Bread	Meat	Sugar	Fats	Potatoes	Other Rationed Foodstuffs (Grammes)
GERMANY N.C. 2250 (80) N.W. 2850 (100) H.W. 3650 (129) V.H.W. 4650 (164) Ch. under 3 1100 (39) Ch. 3 - 6 1200 (42) Ch. 6 - 10 1700 (60) Ch. & Ad. 10 - 20 2600 (92)	350 (12½) 550 (19½) 700 (25) 950 (33½) Ch. under 6 200 (7) Ch. & Ad. 6 - 18 400 (14)	225 (8)	200 (7) 220 (8) 300 (10½) 570 (20) Ch. under 3 125 (4½) Ch. 3 - 6 188 (6½) Ch. 6 - 14 265 (9½) Ad. 14 - 18 265 (9½) (all fats)	4500 (157) Miners 6000 (210)	Flour, cakes and pastries instead of break on specified bread coupons, cheese (30) quark (30) Jam (175) ch. 6 - 14 (225) "Nährmittel" (150) ch. under 3 (275) ch. 3 - 6 (212). Whole milk (litres) ch. under 3 (5.25) ch. 3 - 6 (3.50) ch. 6 - 14 (1.75) nursing mothers, men in unhealthy occupations (3.50), artificial honey, children (31), cocoa powder, children (15), eggs (2 per month). Coffee substitute (62) except to ch. under 3. Local rationing of fruit, vegetables, fish, sweets, and skimmed milk.
PROTECTORATE N.C. 2250 (80) N.W. 2850 (100) H.W. 3650 (129) V.H.W. 4650 (164) Ch. under 3 1100 (39) Ch. 3 - 6 1200 (42) Ch. 6 - 10 1700 (60) Ch. & Ad. 2600 (92)	350 (12½) 550 (19½) 700 (25) 950 (33½) Ch. under 6 200 (7) Ch. & Ad. 6 - 18 400 (14)	300 (10½)	164 (6) 184 (6½) 306 (11) 575 (20) Ch. under 6 125 (4½) Ch. 6 - 14 200 (6½) (all fats)	4000 (140)	Flour, cakes and pastries instead of bread on specified bread coupons, "Nahrmittel" (150) ch. under 3 (275), ch. 3 - 6 (212). Whole milk (litres) N.C. (0.9), children and nursing mothers (3.50), artificial honey (31) children (62), jam (175), eggs (1). Coffee substitute (75) N.W. H.W., & V.H.W. (112). Sweets N.C. (50) ch. (75). Local rationing of fish, fruit and vegetables.
ITALY N.C. 1050 (37) L.W. and Expectant mothers 2100 (75) H.W. 2800 (98) V.H.W. 3500 (112) Ad. 9 - 18 1400 (49)	100 (3½) (Southern Provinces) 130 (4½) to 150 (5½) (Rest of Italy) Plus sausage 40 (1½)	N.C. 125 (4½) Ch. under 3 250 (9) Ch. & Ad. 3 - 18 150 (5½)	100 (3½) (all fats)	2500 (87)	In lieu of bread, wheat, flour or maize flour or biscuits or rusks. Pasta and rice N.C. (500), H.W. (650), Southern Italy (625), H.W. (755), cheese (100), jam, ch. & Ad. up to 18 (500) old people (250). Whole milk, expectant and nursing mothers, workers in unhealthy occupations, litre (3.50). Local rationing of pulses, vegetables, fruit, fish and milk.
NETHERLANDS N.C. 1800 (63) H.W. 2700 (95) V.H.W. 3600 (126) Ch. under 4 900 (32) Ad. 14 - 20 2200 (77)	300 (10½) 450 (16) 750 (26)	250 (9)	146 (5) 219 (7½) 438 (15½) 87 (3) Ch. and Ad. 4 - 20 175 (6) (Butter & beef fat)	N.C. 4000 (140) H.W. & Ads. 6000 (210) V.H.W. 8000 (280) Ch. under 4 2000 (70) Extra 1000 (35) to lowest income group	Biscuits, cakes or pastries, ch. under 4, on certain coupons in lieu of bread. Flour (70), pulses, cereal products, alimentary pastes (150), Jam (125) or sugar (62), cheese (75), ch. and ad. (125), rice, ch. under 4 (125). Whole milk (litres), ch. 4 - 14, expectant and nursing mothers (3½), ch. under 4 (5.25). Skimmed milk N.C. (1¾). Whole milk in certain districts. Coffee substitute (60). Chocolate or sweets (100).
NORWAY N.C. 1820 (64) L.W. 2275 (80) H.W. 2730 (96) V.H.W. 3640 (127) Ch. under 2 910 (32)	Locally rationed	200 (7)	N.C. 210 (7½) H.W. 245 (8½) V.H.W. 315 (11) (all fats)	N.C. 3000 (105) L.W. 3750 (131) H.W. 4500 (158) V.H.W. 5250 (184)	Or hard bread (1120) or flour (1400) instead of bread, syrup (45), (27), chocolate, ch. 2 - 14 (25), whole milk, litres, ch. under 5 expectant and nursing mothers and sick persons (5.25) ch. 6 - 15 (3.50) Ad. 16 - 18 (1.75) plus skimmed milk (1.75) N.C. (1.75), pulses (40) sardines, 2 tins per month. Extra rations to fishermen and lumbermen. Local rationing of fish, fruit and vegetables.

/BELGIUM

Bread	Meat	Sugar	Fats	Potatoes	Other Rationed Foodstuffs (Grammes)
BELGIUM N.C. 1570 (55) L.W. 2020 (71) H.W. 2470 (86) V.H.W. 2920 (103) Miners 3820 (134)	210 (7½) 280 (10) 350 (12½) 420 (15) 490 (17½)	230 (8)	N.C. 70 (2½) L.W. 136 (4¾) H.W. 202 (7) V.H.W. 268 (9½) Miners 664 (23½) (N.C. Butter Others Butter & margarine)	3500 (122)	Flour (1160), biscuits and pastes (875), diet foods (1225), gingerbread (1750, pastries (3150) each in lieu of bread, jam (105), artificial honey (52). Whole milk (litres), ch. under 3 and nursing mothers (5.25) ch. 3 - 6 (3.50), ch. 6 - 14 (1.75) skimmed milk Ad. 14 - 18 (1.75) old people (3.50) chicory (23). Coffee substitute (12, sweets, ch. and Ad. under 18 (70). Local rationing of fish, fruit and vegetables.
DENMARK N.C. 2320 (82) H.W. 3020 (106) V.H.W. 3720 (130) Ch. under 6 1230 (41)	Unrationed but restricted	500 (17½) Sea-going fishermen 650 (23)	300 (10½) Sea-going fishermen 450 (16) (butter)	Unrationed	Wheat flour (350) to ch. under 2 in exchange for certain bread coupons.
FRANCE N.C. 1925 (68) H.W. 2450 (87) Miners 4200 (147) Ch. under 3 700 (25) Ch. 3 - 6 and old people 1400 (49) Ch. 6 - 13 1925 (68) Ad. 13 - 21 2450 (87)	N.C. Urban communes 250 (9) Rural communes 180 (6½) H.W. 105 (3½) extra V.H.W. 210 (7½) extra Ad. 13 - 21 87 (3) extra Miners 525 (18½)	125 (4½)/ ch. under 3 300 (9)	N.C. 70 (2½) H.W. 145 (5) V.H.W. 220 (8) (all fats)	Locally rationed	Flour, biscuits and pastries on specified bread coupons instead of bread, fine flour, ch. under 6 old people (60), cheese (50), alimentary pastes (60) Whole milk (litres) ch. under 6 (5.25), ch. 6-14(1.75), expectant and nursing mothers (3.50). Rice, ch. under 3 (75), ch. 3-6 (50). Wine (1 litre), H.W.(2) V.H.W.(3). Chocolate, ch. 3-6 Ad. and old people (30), ch. 6-14 (60). Coffee (10) or mixture (37), adults only, cocoa mixture (60). Local rationing of fruit, vegetables, fish poultry and skimmed milk.
FINLAND N.C. 1750 (61) H.W.Cat. 1 2100 (74) H.W. " 2 2800 (98) V.H.W. 3500 (122) Ch. under 3 1050 (37) Ch. 4 - 12 1400 (49) Hard Bread	By value N.C. 8 F.Marks H.W.12 " " V.H.W.16 " "	175 (6) Consumers who do not get tobacco card 235 (8)	N.C. 125 (4½) H.W. 150 (5½) Ch. under 7 and V.H.W. 175 (6½) Expectant and nursing mothers 250 (9) (all fats)	2500 (88) plus 2500 (88) roots H.W. and V.H.W. 3750 (131) plus 5000 (175) roots	Fresh bread (2300) or flour (1750) or cereal products (1750) instead of hard bread on specified coupons, whole milk, litres, N.C. (1.4) ch. under 3 (7) ch. 3-14, expectant and nursing mothers (4.2) coffee mixture (30) coffee substitute (30), jam (110), dried fruit (55). Local rationing of fish, fruit and vegetables.
SLOVAKIA Bread and Flour N.C.1090 (58) 350 (12½) H.W.1400 (49) 350 (12½) V.H.W.2190 (77) 700 (25)	N.C. 400 (14) H.W. 600 (21)	Urban / Rural N.C.175 (6) 230 (8) Ch. under 10, sick persons and expectant mothers Urban / Rural 300 (10½) / 355(12½)	N.C. 60 (2) H.W. 120 (4½) (margarine) Butter 120 (4½) to consumers who get whole milk(except N.C.)	3000 (105)	Flour (250) ch. under 1 instead of bread. Whole milk, litres, ch. under 1 (5) ch. 1-14, expectant and nursing mothers, sick persons (3.50), N.C. (0.7).
HUNGARY N.C. 1120 (39) H.W. 1960 (68) V.H.W. 3080 (108) Expectant and nursing mothers 3080 (108)	Rationed in Budapest only according to supplies	Budapest 260 (9) Other large towns 130 (4½) Ch. under 12 260 (9) Rural areas 80 (3) Ch. under 12 130 (4½)	N.C. 140 (5) H.W. 224 (8) (fat or fat bacon) Budapest and certain other towns	2000 (70) (Budapest only)	White flour (400) or rice (100). Whole milk, litres, ch. under 3, expectant and nursing mothers (7) ch. 3-14, old and sick persons (3.50) - Budapest only. eggs (2). Local rationing of coffee, salad oil and tinned vegetables.
BALTIC STATES N.C. 1700 (60) N.W. 2200 (77) H.W. 2900 (102) V.H.W. 3700 (130) Ch. under 3 775 (27) Ch. 3 - 6 1000 (35) Ch. and Ad. 6 - 18 2200 (77)	250 (9) 375 (13) 500 (17½) 725 (26) 125 (4½) 125 (4½) 300 (10½)	150 (5½) Ch. under 6 200 (7)	N.C. 180 (6½) N.W. (7) H.W. 260 (9½) V.H.W. 490 (17½) Ch. under 3 100 (3½) Ch. 3-6 160 (5½) Ch. and Ad. 6-18 230 (8)	2000 (70)	Nährmittel (150) ch. under 3 (275), ch.3-6 (212). Coffee substitute (80) except to children under 3. Whole milk, litres, ch. under 3 (5.25), ch. 3-6 (350), ch. 6-14 (1.75) expectant and nursing mothers (3.50). Jam, eggs, fish and cheese distributed from time to time according to supplies available. Jews employed in war industries get N.C. rations, others get less.

/ Consumers in Nord and Pas de Calais, 225 grammes.

/SWITZERLAND.

Bread	Meat	Sugar	Fats	Potatoes	Other Rationed Foodstuffs (Grammes)
SWITZERLAND ✓ N.C. 1750 (62) Ad. and H.W. 2450 (86) V.H.W. 3150 (110) Ch. under 6 1050 (37)	N.C. 350 (12½) L.W. & Ad. 410 (14½) H.W. & V.H.W. 470 (16½) Ch. under 6 175 (6) (points system)	N.C. 140 (5) Ch. under 6 175 (6)	N.C. 200 (7) L.W. & Ad. 260 (9) H.W. & V.H.W. 320 (11½) Ch. under 6 105 (3½) (all fats)	Unrationed	Cheese (150), alimentary pastes (60), rice and cereal products (275), ch. under 6 (400), eggs (1). Coffee (85) or substitute (170). Jam and honey (125) Milk (litres) ch. and ad. (5.0) old people and H.W. (4.2) N.C. (3.5).

SWEDEN Bread 2370 (83) or hard bread 1500 (52) or flour 1850 (65) meat (boneless) 180 (6½) sugar 465 (16½) or syrup 700 (25) fats 325 (11½) rice 50 (2) pulses 65 (2½) cheese 30 (1) barley 80 (3) alimentary pastes 50 (2) eggs 2 per month, potato flour 25 (1) oatmeal 125 (4½) dried fruit 30 (1). Local rationing of milk and fish. Supplementary ration cards for bread, meat and fats are given to workers according to the kind of work they perform.

ROUMANIA (Bucharest only). Bread, N.C. 1750 (62), H.W. 3500 (124), maize flour 1200 (42), H.W. 2200 (77), meat 500 (17½), sugar 150 (5½), fats 125 (4½). Local rationing in other towns.

BULGARIA Bread, N.C. 2100 (74) H.W. 3850 (135) Miners 4725 (165) Ch. under 5, 1050 (37) meat 400 (14) sugar 250 (9) fats, lard and oil N.C. 250 (8), butter Ch. under 5, 100 (3½) flour 250 (9) semolina Ch. under 7, 375 (13) rice 100 (3½). Coffee 5 (-).

GREECE Bread N.C. 1330 (47) H.W. 2205 (77) Athens and Piraeus. Irregular distributions of sugar, olive oil, eggs and dried fruit.

CROATIA Bread, N.C. 1050 (37), H.W. 2100 (74) meat 150 (5½), sugar 75 (2½), fats 100 (3½), milk Ch. under 4 and old people, potatoes, N.C. 2100 (74) Ch. under 2 1050 (37) pulses N.C. 115 (4) Ch. under 2. 57 (2).

SERBIA Bread 1850 (65), flour 125 (4½), meat 125 (4½) sugar 150 (5½), oil ⅛ litre monthly. Belgrade only. Local rationing elsewhere.

POLAND No uniform rationing. Germans get same rations as in Reich; Poles and Jews get much lower rations. (on the average about half as much as the Germans) and quantities vary in different localities.

SPAIN No uniform rationing. Country divided into ten supply zones and rations of meat, potatoes, rice, chick peas, edible oil, etc. are announced from time to time, no period being stated for the quantities indicated. There is an official bread ration for the whole country according to income groups, but in practice there is no uniform distribution.

LUXEMBOURG ALSACE Rations on same scale as in German Reich.

TURKEY Bread N.C. 2100 (73), H.W. 4200 (146), Ch. under 7 1050 (37). Miners, interior workers, 7000 (245) other 5250 (184). National bread card discontinued. Rationing administered by local authorities.

✓ Supplementary cards issued to:- L.W. and Ad. (1) H.W. and V.H.W. (2). Each card entitles holder to pulses 25 (1) cheese 25 (1) meat 60 (2) edible oil or fats 60 (2). Ch. under 6 get half N.C. rations of pulses, cheese, alimentary pastes, and coffee.

ENEMY BRANCH,
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.
21st. December, 1942.

NOTE: Telephone Ex. 3718 for additional copies or further information.

Mrs. D. S. Lackey - T.Q. W

7

I suppose you get a copy of this?

J. S. Lackey

24/12.

W. General Dept.

Div.

Put with or start a new 1943 jacket. (We should get it regularly by post or fortune).

W 4

1 JAN 1943

Ref: L.250/84/1.

INDEXED

AVERAGE WEEKLY FOOD RATIONS IN ENEMY AND ENEMY OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

(Grammes - oz. in brackets)

W 4/4/49
26 JAN 1943

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N.C. - Normal Consumer. L.W. - Light Worker. H.W. - Heavy Worker. V.H.W. - Very Heavy Worker. N.W. - Night and Long Hours Workers. Ch. - Children. Ad. - Adolescents.

Bread	Meat	Sugar	Fats	Potatoes	Other Rationed Foodstuffs (Grammes)
GERMANY N.C. 2250 (80) N.W. 2850 (100) H.W. 3650 (129) V.H.W. 4650 (164) Ch. under 3 1100 (39) Ch. 3 - 6 1200 (42) Ch. 6 - 10 1700 (60) Ch. & Ad. 10 - 20 2600 (92)	350 (12½) 550 (19½) 700 (25) 950 (33½) Ch. under 6 200 (7) Ch. & Ad. 6 - 18 400 (14)	225 (8)	200 (7) 220 (8) 300 (10½) 570 (20) Ch. under 3 125 (4½) Ch. 3 - 6 188 (6⅔) Ch. 6 - 14 265 (9⅓) Ad. 14 - 18 265 (9½) (all fats)	4500 (157) Miners 6000 (210) (Maximum)	Flour, cakes and pastries instead of bread on specified bread coupons, cheese (30) quark (30) jam (175) ch. 6 - 14 (225) "Nährmittel" (150) ch. under 3 (275) ch. 3 - 6 (212). Whole milk (litres) ch. under 3 (5.25) ch. 3 - 6 (3.50) ch. 6 - 14 (1.75) nursing mothers, men in unhealthy occupations (3.50), artificial honey, children (31), cocoa powder, children (15), eggs (1), coffee substitute (62) except to ch. under 3. Local rationing of fruit, vegetables, fish, sweets and skimmed milk.
PROTECTORATE N.C. 2250 (80) N.W. 2850 (100) H.W. 3650 (129) V.H.W. 4650 (164) Ch. under 3 1100 (39) Ch. 3 - 6 1200 (42) Ch. 6 - 10 1700 (60) Ch. & Ad. 2600 (92)	350 (12½) 550 (19½) 700 (25) 950 (33½) Ch. under 6 200 (7) Ch. & Ad. 6 - 18 400 (14)	300 (10½)	164 (6) 184 (6½) 306 (11) 575 (20) Ch. under 6 125 (4½) Ch. 6 - 14 200 (6½) (all fats)	4000 (140) (maximum)	Flour, cakes and pastries instead of bread on specified bread coupons, "Nährmittel" (150) ch. under 3 (275), ch. 3 - 6 (212). Whole milk (litres) N.C. (0.4), children and nursing mothers (3.50), artificial honey (31) children (62), jam (175), eggs (1). Coffee substitute (75) N.W., H.W. and V.H.W. (112). Sweets N.C. (50) ch. (75), pulses (30). Local rationing of fish, fruit and vegetables.
ITALY N.C. 1050 (37) L.W. and Expectant mothers 2100 (75) H.W. 2800 (98) V.H.W. 3500 (112) Ad. 9 - 18 1400 (49)	100 (3½) (Southern Provinces) 130 (4½) to 150 (5½) (Rest of Italy) Plus sausage 40 (1½)	N.C. 125 (4½) Ch. under 3 250 (9) Ch. & Ad. 3 - 18 150 (5½)	100 (3½) (all fats)	500 (17½)	In lieu of bread, flour, biscuits or rusks. Pasta and rice N.C. (500), H.W. (650), ch. under 3 (750). Southern Italy (625), H.W. (755), ch. under 3 (875), cheese (100), jam, ch. and ad. up to 18 (500) old people (250). Whole milk locally rationed, priority given to children, sick, expectant and nursing mothers and workers in unhealthy occupations. Fruit, vegetables and fish locally rationed.
NETHERLANDS N.C. 1800 (63) H.W. 2700 (95) V.H.W. 3600 (126) Ch. under 4 900 (32) Ad. 14 - 20 2200 (77)	250 (9) 375 (13) 625 (22) 125 (4½)	250 (9)	146 (5) 219 (7⅔) 438 (15½) 87 (3) Ch. and Ad. 4 - 20 175 (6) (Butter & beef fat)	N.C. 4000 (140) H.W. & Ads. 6000 (210) V.H.W. 8000 (280) Ch. under 4 2000 (70) Extra 1000 (35) to lowest income group	Cakes or pastries in lieu of bread. Flour (70), pulses, cereal products, alimentary pastes (150). Jam (125) cheese (75), rice, ch. under 4 (125). Whole milk (litres), ch. 4 - 14, expectant and nursing mothers (3½), ch. under 4 (5.25). Skimmed milk N.C. (1¾). Coffee substitute (60). Chocolate or sweets (67).

NORWAY /

Bread	Meat	Sugar	Fats	Potatoes	Other Rationed Foodstuffs (Grammes)
NORWAY N.C. 1820 (64) L.W. 2275 (80) H.W. 2730 (96) V.H.W. 3640 (127) Ch. under 2 910 (32)	Locally rationed	200 (7)	N.C. 210 (7½) H.W. 245 (8½) V.H.W. 315 (11) (Butter or margarine)	N.C. 3000 (105) L.W. 3750 (131) H.W. 4500 (158) V.H.W. 5250 (184)	Or hard bread (1120) or flour (1400) instead of bread, syrup (45), (27), chocolate, ch. 2 - 14 (25), whole milk, litres, ch. under 5, expectant and nursing mothers and sick persons (5.25), ch. 6 - 15 (3.50), Ad. 16 - 18 (1.75) plus skimmed milk (1.75), N.C. (1.75), pulses (40), sardines, 2 tins per month. Extra rations to fishermen and lumbermen. Local rationing of fish, fruit and vegetables.
BELGIUM N.C. 1570 (55) L.W. 2020 (71) H.W. 2470 (86) V.H.W. 2920 (103) Miners 3820 (134)	210 (7½) 280 (10) 350 (12½) 420 (15) 490 (17½)	230 (8)	N.C. 70 (2½) L.W. 136 (4¾) H.W. 202 (7) V.H.W. 268 (9½) Miners 664 (23½) (Butter and margarine)	3500 (122)	Flour (1160), biscuits and pastes (875), diet foods (1225), gingerbread (1750), pastries (3150) each in lieu of bread, jam (105), artificial honey (52). Whole milk (litres), ch. under 3 and nursing mothers (5.25), ch. 3 - 6 (3.50), ch. 6 - 14 (1.75) skimmed milk Ad. 14 - 18 (1.75), old people (3.50), chicory (23). Coffee substitute (12), sweets, ch. and Ad. under 18 (70). Local rationing of fish, fruit and vegetables.
DENMARK N.C. 2320 (82) H.W. 3020 (106) V.H.W. 3720 (130) Ch. under 6 1230 (41)	Unrationed but restricted	375 (13) Sea-going fishermen 500 (17½)	300 (10½) Sea-going fishermen 450 (16) (butter)	Unrationed	Wheat flour to ch. under 2 in exchange for certain bread coupons, oatmeal (250), H.W. and V.H.W. (750).
FRANCE N.C. 1925 (68) H.W. 2450 (87) Engine drivers 3500 (122) Miners 4200 (147) Ch. under 3 700 (25) Ch. 3 - 6 and old people 1400 (49) Ch. 6 - 13 1925 (68) Ad. 13 - 21 2450 (87)	N.C. Urban communes 250 (9) Rural communes 180 (6½) H.W. 105 (3½) extra V.H.W. 210 (7½) extra Engine drivers 270 (9½) extra Ad. 13 - 21 87 (3) extra Miners 525 (18½)	125 (4½)* Ch. under 3 300 (9) Ad. 13 - 21 185 (6½)	N.C. 70 (2½) H.W. 145 (5) V.H.W. 220 (8) (all fats)	Locally rationed	Flour, biscuits and pastries on specified bread coupons instead of bread, fine flour, ch. under 6, old people (60), cheese (50), alimentary pastes (60). Whole milk (litres) ch. under 6 (5.25), ch. 6 - 14 (1.75), expectant and nursing mothers (3.50). Rice, ch. under 3 (75), ch. 3 - 6 (50). Wine (1 litre), H.W.(2), V.H.W. (3). Chocolate, ch. 3 - 6, Ad. and old people (30), ch. 6 - 14 (60). Coffee (10), or mixture (37), adults only, cocoa mixture (60). Local rationing of fruit, vegetables, fish, poultry and skimmed milk.
FINLAND N.C. 1750 (61) H.W. Cat. 1 2100 (74) H.W. " 2 2800 (98) V.H.W. 3500 (122) Ch. under 3 1050 (37) Ch. 4 - 12 1400 (49) Hard Bread	By Value N.C. 8 F. Marks H.W. 12 " " V.H.W. 16 " " (monthly)	175 (6) Consumers who do not get tobacco card 235 (8)	N.C. 125 (4½) H.W. 150 (5½) Ch. under 7 and V.H.W. 175 (6½) Expectant and nursing mothers 250 (9) (all fats)	2500 (88) plus 2500 (88) roots H.W. and V.H.W. 3750 (131) plus 5000 (175) roots	Fresh bread (2300) or flour (1750) or cereal products (1750) instead of hard bread on specified coupons, whole milk, litres, N.C. (1.4), ch. under 3 (7), ch. 3 - 14, expectant and nursing mothers (4.2), coffee mixture (30), coffee substitute (30), jam (125), dried fruit (60), semolina, ch. under 1 (250). Local rationing of fish, fruit and vegetables.
SLOVAKIA Bread and Flour N.C. 1090 (58) 350 (12½) H.W. 1400 (49) 350 (12½) V.H.W. 2170 (76) 700 (25)	N.C. 400 (14) H.W. 600 (21)	Urban / Rural N.C. 175(6) / 230(8) Ch. under 10, sick persons and expectant mothers Urban 300 (10½) / Rural 355 (12½)	N.C. 60 (2) H.W. 120 (4½) (margarine) Butter 125 (4½) to consumers who get whole milk (except N.C.)	3000 (105)	Flour (250), ch. under 1 instead of bread. Whole milk, litres, ch. under 1 (5), ch. 1 - 14, expectant and nursing mothers, sick persons (3.50), N.C. (0.7), eggs (3).

* Consumers in Nord and Pas de Calais, 225 grammes.

Bread	Meat	Sugar	Fats	Potatoes	Other Rationed Foodstuffs (Grammes)
HUNGARY N.C. 1120 (39) H.W. 1960 (68) V.H.W. 3080 (108) Expectant and nursing mothers 3080 (108)	Rationed in Budapest only according to supplies.	Budapest 260 (9) Other large towns 130 (4½) Ch. under 12 260 (9) Rural areas 80 (3) Ch. under 12 130 (4½)	N.C. 140 (5) H.W. 224 (8) (fat or fat bacon) Budapest and certain other towns.	2000 (70) (Budapest only)	Flour (400). Whole milk, litres, ch. under 3, expectant and nursing mothers (5), ch. 3 - 14, sick persons (3.50), old people (2.1) - Budapest only. eggs (2). Local rationing of coffee, salad oil and tinned vegetables.
BALTIC STATES N.C. 1700 (60) N.W. 2200 (77) H.W. 2900 (102) V.H.W. 3700 (130) Ch. under 3 775 (27) Ch. 3 - 6 1000 (35) Ch. and Ad. 6 - 18 2200 (77)	250 (9) 375 (13) 500 (17½) 725 (26) 125 (4½) 125 (4½) 300 (10½)	150 (5½) Ch. under 6 200 (7)	N.C. 180 (6½) N.W. (7) H.W. 260 (9½) V.H.W. 490 (17½) Ch. under 3 100 (3½) Ch. 3 - 6 160 (5½) Ch. and Ad. 6 - 18 230 (8)	2000 (70)	Nährmittel (150) ch. under 3 (275), ch. 3 - 6 (212). Coffee substitute (80) except to children under 3. Whole milk, litres, ch. under 3 (5.25), ch. 3 - 6 (350), ch. 6 - 14 (1.75) expectant and nursing mothers (3.50). Jam, eggs, fish and cheese distributed from time to time according to supplies available. Jews employed in war industries get N.C. rations, others get less.
BULGARIA N.C. 2100 (74) H.W. 3850 (135) V.H.W. 4725 (165) Ch. under 1 875 (31) Ch. 1 - 5 1225 (43)	400 (14)	250 (9)	250 (9) (lard and oil) Ch. under 5 100 (3½) (butter)	Unrationed	Flour instead of bread on certain coupons. Ch. under 1 rusks and biscuits instead of bread, ch. 1 - 5, white bread and flour instead of bread, rice (100) coffee (5). Milk, litres, ch. under 1 (5.25), ch. 1 - 5 (3.50), eggs (3).

ROUMANIA (Bucharest only). Bread, N.C. 1750 (62), H.W. 3500 (124), maize flour 1200 (42), H.W. 2200 (77), meat 500 (17½), sugar 150 (5½), fats 125 (4½). Local rationing in other towns.

GREECE Bread N.C. 1330 (47), H.W. 2205 (77), Athens and Piraeus. Irregular distributions of sugar, olive oil, eggs and dried fruit.

CROATIA Bread, N.C. 1050 (37), H.W. 2100 (74) meat 150 (5½), sugar 75 (2½), oil (50), potatoes, N.C. 2100 (74), ch. under 2, 1050 (37), pulses N.C. 115 (4), ch. under 2, 57 (2). Milk, litres, ch. under 5 (3.50), old people (2.1), eggs, 2 per month.

SERBIA Bread 1850 (65) or flour 1330 (47), meat 125 (4½), sugar 150 (5½), fats (80), oil ⅛ litre monthly. Belgrade only. Local rationing elsewhere.

POLAND No uniform rationing. In the Incorporated Territories, Germans and Poles get same rations as in the Reich; Jews get less. In the General Government, rations for Germans are the same as in the Reich; Poles and Jews get much lower rations (about half as much as Germans) and quantities vary in different localities.

LUXEMBOURG AND ALSACE Same rations as in the Reich.

ENEMY BRANCH,
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.
21st January, 1943.

NOTE: Telephone Ex. 3718 for additional copies or further information.

M.E. 26/5/43

M.E.W. FILE No. L250/84/1
COPY FOR D.D. Maclean Esq.
DATE 22.1.43

11

(a.) 1/2
Ceylon 1/2
Northern Ireland
Southern Ireland 1/2 Depts
Reserve 1/2

Eire 29/1

Ref. L.250/84/1.

AVERAGE WEEKLY FOOD RATIONS IN ENEMY AND ENEMY OCCUPIED COUNTRIES.

(Grammes - oz. in brackets)

N.C. - Normal Consumer. L.W. - Light Worker. H.W. - Heavy Worker. V.H.W. - Very Heavy Worker. N.W. - Night and Long Hours Workers. Ch. - Children. Ad. - Adolescents.

Bread	Meat	Sugar	Fats	Potatoes	Other Rationed Foodstuffs (Grammes)
GERMANY N.C. 2250 (80) N.W. 2850 (100) H.W. 3650 (129) V.H.W. 4650 (164) Ch. under 3 1100 (39) Ch. 3 - 6 1200 (42) Ch. 6 - 10 1700 (60) Ch. & Ad. 10 - 20 2600 (92)	350 (12½) 550 (19½) 700 (25) 950 (33½) Ch. under 6 200 (7) Ch. & Ad. 6 - 18 400 (14)	225 (8)	200 (7) 220 (8) 300 (10½) 570 (20) Ch. under 3 125 (4½) Ch. 3 - 6 188 (6½) Ch. 6 - 14 265 (9½) Ad. 14 - 18 265 (9½) (all fats)	4500 (157) Miners 6000 (210) (Maximum)	Flour, cakes and pastries instead of bread on specified bread coupons, cheese (47) quark (30) jam (175) ch. 6 - 14 (225) "Nährmittel" (150) ch. under 3 (275) ch. 3 - 6 (212). Milk (litres) ch. under 3 (5.25) ch. 3 - 6 (3.50) ch. 6 - 14 (1.75) nursing mothers, men in unhealthy occupations (3.50), artificial honey, children (31), cocoa powder, children (15), eggs (Nil), coffee substitute (62) except to ch. under 3. Local rationing of fruit, vegetables, fish, sweets and skimmed milk.
PROTECTORATE N.C. 2250 (80) N.W. 2850 (100) H.W. 3650 (129) V.H.W. 4650 (164) Ch. under 3 1100 (39) Ch. 3 - 6 1200 (42) Ch. 6 - 10 1700 (60) Ch. & Ad. 2600 (92)	350 (12½) 550 (19½) 700 (25) 950 (33½) Ch. under 6 200 (7) Ch. & Ad. 6 - 18 400 (14)	250 (9)	-5 165 (6) +15 205 (7) -5 305 (10½) -5 575 (20) Ch. under 6 125 (4½) Ch. 6 - 14 200 (6½) (all fats)	3500 (122) (Maximum)	Flour, cakes and pastries instead of bread on specified bread coupons, "Nährmittel" (150) ch. under 3 (275), ch. 3 - 6 (212). Milk (litres) children and nursing mothers (3.50), skimmed milk (litres) N.C. (0.4), artificial honey (31) children (62), jam (175), eggs (1). Coffee substitute (75) N.W., H.W. and V.H.W. (112). Sweets N.C. (50) ch. (75), pulses (30). Local rationing of fish, fruit and vegetables.
ITALY. N.C. 1050 (37) L.W. and Expectant mothers. 2100 (75) H.W. 2800 (98) V.H.W. 3500 (112) Ad. 9-18 1400 (49)	100 (3½) (Southern Provinces) 130 (4½) to 150 (5½) (Rest of Italy) Plus sausage 40 (1½)	N.C. 125 (4½) Ch. under 3 250 (9) Ch. & Ad. 3 - 18 150 (5½)	100 (3½) (all fats)	500 (17½)	In lieu of bread, flour, biscuits or rusks. Pasta and rice N.C. (500), H.W. (650), ch. under 3 (750). Southern Italy N.C. (625), H.W. (775), ch. under 3 (875), cheese, ch. under 3 (140), jam, ch. and ad. up to 18 (500), old people (250). Milk locally rationed, priority given to children, sick, expectant and nursing mothers and workers in unhealthy occupations. Fruit, vegetables and fish locally rationed.
NETHERLANDS N.C. 1800 (63) H.W. 2700 (95) V.H.W. 3600 (126) Ch. under 4 900 (32) Ad. 14 - 20 2200 (77)	200 (7) 300 (10½) 500 (17½) 62 (2)	250 (9)	146 (5) 219 (7½) 438 (15½) 87 (3) Ch. and Ad. 4 - 20 175 (6) (Margarine)	N.C. 4000 (140) H.W. & Ads. 6000 (210) V.H.W. 8000 (280) Ch. under 4 2000 (70) Extra 1000 (35) to consumers below a certain income level.	Cakes or pastries in lieu of bread. Flour (70), pulses, cereal products alimentary pastes (150). Jam (125) cheese (75), rice, ch. under 4 (125). Milk (litres), ch. 4 - 14, expectant and nursing mothers (2.6), ch. under 4 (5.25). Skimmed milk, N.C. (1.3). Coffee substitute (60). Chocolate or sweets (67).

NORWAY /

Bread	Meat	Sugar	Fats	Potatoes	Other Rationed Foodstuffs (Grammes)
NORWAY N.C. 1820 (64) H.W. 2500 (87) V.H.W. Cat.1 2950 (104) -a 35 " " 2 3400 (119) -14 c Ch. under 2 910 (32) Ch. 2 - 5 1140 (40) Ad. 12 - 20 2050 (72)	Locally rationed H.W. 300 (10½)	200 (7)	N.C. 210 (7½) H.W. 245 (8½) V.H.W. Cat.1 280 (10) " " 2 315 (11)	N.C. 3000 (105) H.W. 3750 (131) V.H.W. Cat.1 4500 (158) " " 2 5250 (184)	Or hard bread (1120) or flour (1400) instead of bread, syrup (70), cheese (30), chocolate, ch. 2 - 14 (25). Milk (litres) ch. under 5, expectant and nursing mothers and sick persons (5.25), ch. 6 - 15 (3.50), ad. 16 - 18 (1.75) plus skimmed milk (1.75), N.C. (1.75) pulses (40). Sardines, tins per month (2) H.W. (4). Local rationing of fish, fruit, vegetables and skimmed milk.
BELGIUM N.C. 1570 (55) L.W. 2020 (71) H.W. 2470 (86) V.H.W. 2920 (103) Miners 3820 (134)	210 (7½) 280 (10) 350 (12½) 420 (15) 490 (17½)	230 (8)	N.C. 70 (2½) L.W. 136 (4¾) H.W. 202 (7) V.H.W. 268 (9½) Miners 664 (23½) (Butter and margarine)	3500 (122)	Flour (1160), biscuits and pastes (875), diet foods (1225), gingerbread (1750), pastries (3150) each in lieu of bread, jam (105), artificial honey (52). Milk (litres), ch. under 3 and nursing mothers (5.25), ch. 3 - 6 (3.50), ch. 6 - 14 (1.75), skimmed milk ad. 14 - 18 (1.75), old people (3.50), cereal products (58), pulses (116), cheese (35), chicory (23). Coffee substitute (23). Local rationing of poultry, fish, fruit and vegetables.
DENMARK N.C. 2320 (82) H.W. 3020 (106) V.H.W. 3720 (130) Ch. under 6 1230 (41)	Unrationed but restricted	375 (13) Sea-going fishermen 500 (17½)	300 (10½) Sea-going fishermen 450 (16) (butter)	Unrationed	Wheat flour (200) special distribution, oatmeal (300), H.W. and V.H.W. (900).
FRANCE N.C. 1925 (68) H.W. 2450 (87) Engine drivers 3500 (122) Miners 4200 (147) Ch. under 3 700 (25) Ch. 3 - 6 & old people 1400 (49) Ch. 6 - 13 1925 (68) Ad. 13 - 21 2450 (87)	N.C. Urban communes 250 (9) Rural communes 180 (6½) H.W. 105 (3½) extra V.H.W. 210 (7½) extra Engine drivers 270 (9½) extra Ad. 13 - 21 87 (3) extra Miners 525 (18½)	125 (4½) ✓ Ch. under 3 300 (9) Ad. 13 - 21 185 (6½)	Urban / Rural N.C. 70 (2½) / 55 (2) H.W. 145 (5) / 130 (4½) V.H.W. 220 (8) / 205 (7) (all fats)	Locally rationed	Flour, biscuits and pastries on specified bread coupons instead of bread, cheese (50), alimentary pastes (60). Milk (litres) ch. under 6 (5.25), ch. 6 - 14 (1.75), expectant and nursing mothers (3.50). Rice, ch. under 3 (75), ch. 3 - 6 (50). Wine (litres per month) N.C. (4), H.W. and V.H.W. (5 to 20) Miners (30). Chocolate, ch. 3 - 6, ad. and old people (30), ch. 6 - 14 (60). Coffee (10), or mixture (37), adults only, cocoa mixture (60). Local rationing of fruit, vegetables, fish, poultry, jam, eggs and skimmed milk.
FINLAND N.C. 1750 (61) H.W. Cat.1 2100 (74) H.W. " 2 2800 (98) V.H.W. 3500 (122) Ch. under 3 1050 (37) Ch. 4 - 12 1400 (49) Hard Bread	By Value N.C. 8 F. Marks H.W. 12 " " V.H.W. 16 " " (monthly)	175 (6) Consumers who do not get tobacco card 235 (8)	N.C. 125 (4½) H.W. 150 (5½) Ch. under 7 and V.H.W. 175 (6½) Expectant and nursing mothers 250 (9) (all fats)	2500 (88) plus 2500 (88) roots H.W. and V.H.W. 3750 (131) plus 5000 (175) roots	Fresh bread (2300) or flour (1750) or cereal products (1750) instead of hard bread on specified coupons. Milk (litres) N.C. (1.4), ch. under 3 (7), ch. 3 - 14, expectant and nursing mothers (4.2), coffee mixture (30), coffee substitute (60), jam (125), dried fruit (60), pulses (150), semolina, ch. under 1 (250). Local rationing of fish, fruit and vegetables.
SLOVAKIA Bread and flour N.C. 1050 (37) 350 (12½) H.W. 1350 (47) 350 (12½) V.H.W. 2100 (73) 700 (25)	N.C. 400 (14) H.W. and expectant and nursing mothers 600 (21)	Urban 230 (8) / Rural 175 (6) Ch. under 10, sick persons and expectant mothers 355 (12½) 300 (10½)	N.C. 60 (2) H.W. 120 (4½) (Margarine) Butter, ch. and expectant mothers 125 (4½) Sick persons 60 (2)	3000 (105)	Flour (250), ch. under 1 instead of bread. Milk (litres), ch. under 1 (5), ch. 1 - 14, expectant and nursing mothers (3.50). Sick persons (1.4), N.C. (0.7), eggs (3). Rice, semolina, oatmeal, and biscuits reserved for children.

✓ Consumers in Nord and Pas de Calais, 225 grammes.

Bread	Meat	Sugar	Fats	Potatoes	Other Rationed Foodstuffs (Grammes)
HUNGARY N.C. 1120 (39) H.W. 1960 (68) V.H.W. 3080 (108) Expectant and nursing mothers 3080 (108)	500 (17½) Budapest and environs consumers over 1 year	Budapest 260 (9) Other large towns 130 (4½) Ch. under 12 260 (9) Rural areas 80 (3) Ch. under 12 130 (4½)	N.C. 140 (5) H.W. 224 (8) (margarine & lard) Budapest and certain other towns	-1000 1000 (35) (Budapest only)	Flour (400). Milk (litres), ch. under 3, expectant and nursing mothers (5), ch. 3 - 14, sick persons (3.50), old people (2.1) - Budapest only. Eggs (2). Local rationing of coffee, salad oil and tinned vegetables.
BALTIC STATES N.C. 1700 (60) N.W. 2200 (77) H.W. 2900 (102) V.H.W. 3700 (130) Ch. under 3 775 (27) Ch. 3 - 6 1000 (35) Ch. and Ad. 6 - 18 2200 (77)	250 (9) 375 (13) 500 (17½) 725 (26) 125 (4½) 125 (4½) 300 (10½)	150 (5½) Ch. under 6 200 (7)	N.C. 180 (6½) N.W. 200 (7) H.W. 260 (9½) V.H.W. 490 (17½) Ch. under 3 100 (3½) Ch. 3 - 6 160 (5½) Ch. and Ad. 6 - 18 230 (8)	2000 (70)	Nährmittel (150) ch. under 3 (275), ch. 3 - 6 (212). Coffee substitute (80) except to children under 3. Milk (litres) ch. under 3 (5.25), ch. 3 - 6 (3.50), ch. 6 - 14 (1.75), expectant and nursing mothers (3.50). Jam, eggs, fish and cheese distributed from time to time according to supplies available. Jews employed in war industries get N.C. rations, others get less.
BULGARIA N.C. 1750 (62)-350 H.W. 3500 (124)-350 V.H.W. 4375 (153)-350 Ch. under 1 875 (31) Ch. 1 - 5 1225 (43)	500 (17½)	250 (9)	250 (9) (lard and oil) Ch. under 5 100 (3½) (butter)	Unrationed	Flour instead of bread on certain coupons. Ch. under 1 rusks and biscuits instead of bread, ch. 1 - 5, white bread and flour instead of bread, rice (100), coffee (5). Milk (litres), ch. under 1 (5.25), ch. 1 - 5 (3.50), eggs (1).

ROUMANIA (Bucharest only). Bread, N.C. 1750 (62), H.W. 3500 (124), maize flour 1000 (35), H.W. 2000 (70), meat 250 (9), sugar 150 (5½), fats 125 (4½). Local rationing in other towns.

CROATIA Bread, N.C. 1050 (37), H.W. 2100 (74), meat 150 (5½), sugar 75 (2½), butter (25), oil (50), potatoes, N.C. 2100 (74), ch. under 2, 1050 (37), pulses, N.C. 115 (4), ch. under 2, 57 (2). Milk, litres, ch. under 2 (5.25) ch. 2 to 5 (3.50), old people (2.1), eggs, 2 per month.

SERBIA Bread 2240 (78) or flour 1470 (51), meat 125 (4½), sugar 150 (5½), fats (30), oil ⅛ litre monthly. Belgrade only. Local rationing elsewhere.

POLAND No uniform rationing. In the Incorporated Territories, Germans and so-called "loyal" Poles get same rations as in the Reich; Jews and other Poles get about half as much. In the General Government, rations for Germans are the same as in the Reich; Poles get considerably less while rations for Jews in the ghettos have been reduced to a starvation level.

LUXEMBOURG AND ALSACE Same rations as in the Reich.

GREECE Bread 1260 (44)

ENEMY BRANCH,
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
21st March, 1943.

NOTE: Telephone Ex. 3718 for additional copies or further information.

E. C. Crowe Esq. W. 15

with enc

W 4 / 4 / 49.

M. I. 26/5/43

INDEXED 6 MAR 1943

C.C. 29/3.

Rubber
Cement
Leather
Brushes
French

depts

Enc 25/3

Ref. L.250/84/1.

AVERAGE WEEKLY FOOD RATIONS IN ENEMY AND ENEMY OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

(Grammes - oz. in brackets)

N.C. - Normal Consumer. L.W. - Light Worker. H.W. - Heavy Worker. V.H.W. - Very Heavy Worker. N.W. - Night and Long Hours Workers. Ch. - Children. Ad. - Adolescents.

Bread	Meat	Sugar	Fats	Potatoes	Other Rationed Foodstuffs (Grammes)
GERMANY N.C. 2250 (80) N.W. 2850 (100) H.W. 3650 (129) V.H.W. 4650 (164) Ch. under 3 1100 (39) Ch. 3 - 6 1200 (42) Ch. 6 - 10 1700 (60) Ch. & Ad. 10 - 20 2600 (92)	350 (12½) 550 (19½) 700 (25) 950 (33½) Ch. under 6 200 (7) Ch. & Ad. 6 - 18 400 (14)	225 (8)	200 (7) 220 (8) 300 (10½) 570 (20) Ch. under 3 125 (4½) Ch. 3 - 6 188 (6½) Ch. 6 - 14 265 (9½) Ad. 14 - 18 265 (9½) (all fats)	4500 (157) Miners 6000 (210) (Maximum)	Flour, cakes and pastries instead of bread on specified bread coupons, cheese (30) quark (30) jam (175) ch. 6 - 14 (225) "Nährmittel" (150) ch. under 3 (275) ch. 3 - 6 (212). Milk (litres) ch. under 3 (5.25) ch. 3 - 6 (3.50) ch. 6 - 14 (1.75) nursing mothers, men in unhealthy occupations (3.50), artificial honey, children (31), cocoa powder, children (15), eggs (Nil), coffee substitute (62) except to ch. under 3. Local rationing of fruit, vegetables, fish, sweets and skimmed milk.
PROTECTORATE N.C. 2250 (80) N.W. 2850 (100) H.W. 3650 (129) V.H.W. 4650 (164) Ch. under 3 1100 (39) Ch. 3 - 6 1200 (42) Ch. 6 - 10 1700 (60) Ch. & Ad. 2600 (92)	350 (12½) 550 (19½) 700 (25) 950 (33½) Ch. under 6 200 (7) Ch. & Ad. 6 - 18 400 (14)	250 (9)	170 (6) 190 (7) 310 (11) 580 (20½) Ch. under 6 125 (4½) Ch. 6 - 14 200 (6½) (all fats)	3500 (122) (Maximum)	Flour, cakes and pastries instead of bread on specified bread coupons, "Nährmittel" (150) ch. under 3 (275), ch. 3 - 6 (212). Milk (litres) children and nursing mothers (3.50), skimmed milk (litres) N.C. (0.4), artificial honey (31) children (62), jam (175), eggs (1). Coffee substitute (75) N.W., H.W. and V.H.W. (112). Sweets N.C. (50) ch. (75), pulses (30). Local rationing of fish, fruit and vegetables.
ITALY N.C. 1050 (37) L.W. and Expectant mothers 2100 (75) H.W. 2800 (98) V.H.W. 3500 (112) Ad. 9 - 18 1400 (49)	100 (3½) (Southern Provinces) 130 (4½) to 150 (5½) (Rest of Italy) Plus sausage 40 (1½)	N.C. 125 (4½) Ch. under 3 250 (9) Ch. & Ad. 3 - 18 150 (5½)	100 (3½) (all fats)	500 (17½)	In lieu of bread, flour, biscuits or rusks. Pasta and rice N.C. (500), H.W. (650), ch. under 3 (750). Southern Italy (625), H.W. (775), ch. under 3 (875), cheese (100), jam, ch. and ad. up to 18 (500) old people (250). Milk locally rationed, priority given to children, sick, expectant and nursing mothers and workers in unhealthy occupations. Fruit, vegetables and fish locally rationed.
NETHERLANDS N.C. 1800 (63) H.W. 2700 (95) V.H.W. 3600 (126) Ch. under 4 900 (32) Ad. 14 - 20 2200 (77)	200 (7) 300 (10½) 500 (17½) 62 (2)	250 (9)	146 (5) 219 (7½) 438 (15½) 87 (3) Ch. and Ad. 4 - 20 175 (6) (Butter & beef fat)	N.C. 4000 (140) H.W. & Ads. 6000 (210) V.H.W. 8000 (280) Ch. under 4 2000 (70) Extra 1000 (35) to consumers below a certain income level.	Cakes or pastries in lieu of bread. Flour (70), pulses, cereal products, alimentary pastes (150). Jam (125) cheese (75), rice, ch. under 4 (125). Milk (litres), ch. 4 - 14, expectant and nursing mothers (2.6), ch. under 4 (5.25). Skimmed milk N.C. (1.3). Coffee substitute (60). Chocolate or sweets (67).

NORWAY /

Bread	Meat	Sugar	Fats	Potatoes	Other Rationed Foodstuffs (Grammes)
NORWAY N.C. 1820 (64) L.W. 2275 (80) H.W. 2730 (96) V.H.W. Cat. 1 3185 (111) " " 2 3640 (127) Ch. under 2 910 (32) Ch. 2 - 5 1140 (40) Ad. 12 - 20 2050 (72)	Locally rationed	200 (7)	N.C. 210 (7½) H.W. 245 (8½) V.H.W.Cat. 1 280 (10) " " 2 315 (11)	N.C. 3000 (105) L.W. 3750 (131) H.W. 4500 (158) V.H.W.Cat.1 5250 (184) " " 2 6000 (210)	Or hard bread (1120) or flour (1400) instead of bread, syrup (70), cheese (70), chocolate, ch. 2 - 14 (25). Milk (litres) ch. under 5, expectant and nursing mothers and sick persons (5.25), ch. 6 - 15 (3.50), ad. 16 - 20 (1.75) plus skimmed milk (1.75), N.C. (1.75) pulses (40). Local rationing of fish, fruit and vegetables.
BELGIUM N.C. 1570 (55) L.W. 2020 (71) H.W. 2470 (86) V.H.W. 2920 (103) Miners 3820 (134)	210 (7½) 280 (10) 350 (12½) 420 (15) 490 (17½)	230 (8)	N.C. 70 (2½) L.W. 136 (4½) H.W. 202 (7) V.H.W. 268 (9½) Miners 664 (23½) (Butter and margarine)	3500 (122)	Flour (1160), biscuits and pastes (875), diet foods (1225), gingerbread (1750), pastries (3150) each in lieu of bread, jam (105), artificial honey (52). Milk (litres), ch. under 3 and nursing mothers (5.25), ch. 3 - 6 (3.50), ch. 6 - 14 (1.75), skimmed milk Ad. 14 - 18 (1.75), old people (3.50), cereal products (58), cheese (35), chicory (23). Coffee substitute (23). Local rationing of poultry, fish, fruit and vegetables.
DENMARK N.C. 2320 (82) H.W. 3020 (106) V.H.W. 3720 (130) Ch. under 6 1230 (41)	Unrationed but restricted	375 (13) Sea-going fishermen 500 (17½)	300 (10½) Sea-going fishermen 450 (16) (butter)	Unrationed	Wheat flour (200) special distribution, oatmeal (300), H.W. and V.H.W. (900).
FRANCE N.C. 1925 (68) H.W. 2450 (87) Engine drivers 3500 (122) Miners 4200 (147) Ch. under 3 700 (25) Ch. 3 - 6 and old people 1400 (49) Ch. 6 - 13 1925 (68) Ad. 13 - 21 2450 (87)	N.C. Urban communes 250 (9) Rural communes 180 (6½) H.W. 105 (3½) extra V.H.W. 210 (7½) extra Engine drivers 270 (9½) extra Ad. 13 - 21 87 (3) extra Miners 525 (18½)	125 (4½)ƒ Ch. under 3 300 (9) Ad. 13 - 21 185 (6½)	Urban / Rural N.C. 70 (2½) / 55 (2) H.W.145 (5) / 130 (4½) V.H.W.220 (8) / 205 (7) (all fats)	Locally rationed	Flour, biscuits and pastries on specified bread coupons instead of bread, cheese (50), alimentary pastes (60). Milk (litres) ch. under 6 (5.25), ch. 6 - 14 (1.75), expectant and nursing mothers (3.50). Rice, ch. under 3 (75), ch. 3 - 6 (50). Wine (litres per month) N.C. (4), H.W. and V.H.W. (5 to 20) Miners (30). Chocolate, ch. 3 - 6, Ad. and old people (30), ch. 6 - 14 (60). Coffee (10), or mixture (37), adults only, cocoa mixture (60). Local rationing of fruit, vegetables, fish, poultry, jam, eggs and skimmed milk.
FINLAND N.C. 1750 (61) H.W. Cat. 1 2100 (74) H.W. " 2 2800 (98) V.H.W. 3500 (122) Ch. under 3 1050 (37) Ch. 4 - 12 1400 (49) Hard Bread	By Value N.C. 8 F. Marks H.W. 12 " " V.H.W. 16 " " (monthly)	175 (6) Consumers who do not get tobacco card 235 (8)	N.C. 125 (4½) H.W. 150 (5½) Ch. under 7 and V.H.W. 175 (6½) Expectant and nursing mothers 250 (9) (all fats)	2500 (88) plus 2500 (88) roots H.W. and V.H.W. 3750 (131) plus 5000 (175) roots	Fresh bread (2300) or flour (1750) or cereal products (1750) instead of hard bread on specified coupons. Milk (litres) N.C. (1.4), ch. under 3 (7), ch. 3 - 14, expectant and nursing mothers (4.2), coffee mixture (30), coffee substitute (30), jam (125), dried fruit (60), semolina, ch. under 1 (250). Local rationing of fish, fruit and vegetables.
SLOVAKIA Bread and Flour N.C. 1050 (37) 350 (12½) H.W. 1330 (47) 350 (12½) V.H.W. 2100 (73) 700 (25)	N.C. 300 (10½) H.W. 600 (21)	Urban / Rural 230 (8) / 175 (6) Ch. under 10, sick persons and expectant mothers 355 (12½) 300 (10½)	N.C. 60 (2) H.W. 120 (4½) (Margarine) Butter 125 (4½) to consumers who get whole milk (except N.C.)	3000 (105)	Flour (250), ch. under 1 instead of bread. Milk (litres), ch. under 1 (5), ch. 1 - 14, expectant and nursing mothers, sick persons (3.50), N.C. (0.7), eggs (3). Rice, semolina, oatmeal, and biscuits reserved for children.

ƒ Consumers in Nord and Pas de Calais, 225 grammes.

HUNGARY /

Bread	Meat	Sugar	Fats	Potatoes	Other Rationed Foodstuffs (Grammes)
HUNGARY N.C. 1120 (39) H.W. 1960 (68) V.H.W. 3080 (108) Expectant and nursing mothers 3080 (108)	500 (17½) Budapest and environs consumers over 1 year	Budapest 260 (9) Other large towns 130 (4½) Ch. under 12 260 (9) Rural areas 80 (3) Ch. under 12 130 (4½)	N.C. 140 (5) H.W. 224 (8) (margarine & lard) Budapest and certain other towns.	2000 (70) (Budapest only)	Flour (400). Milk (litres), ch. under 3, expectant and nursing mothers (5), ch. 3 - 14, sick persons (3.50), old people (2.1) - Budapest only. Eggs (1). Local rationing of coffee, salad oil and tinned vegetables.
BALTIC STATES N.C. 1700 (60) N.W. 2200 (77) H.W. 2900 (102) V.H.W. 3700 (130) Ch. under 3 775 (27) Ch. 3 - 6 1000 (35) Ch. and Ad. 6 - 18 2200 (77)	250 (9) 375 (13) 500 (17½) 725 (26) 125 (4½) 125 (4½) 300 (10½)	150 (5½) Ch. under 6 200 (7)	N.C. 180 (6½) N.W. (7) H.W. 260 (9½) V.H.W. 490 (17½) Ch. under 3 100 (3½) Ch. 3 - 6 160 (5½) Ch. and Ad. 6 - 18 230 (8)	2000 (70)	Nährmittel (150) ch. under 3 (275), ch. 3 - 6 (212). Coffee substitute (80) except to children under 3. Milk (litres) ch. under 3 (5.25), ch. 3 - 6 (3.50), ch. 6 - 14 (1.75), expectant and nursing mothers (3.50). Jam, eggs, fish and cheese distributed from time to time according to supplies available. Jews employed in war industries get N.C. rations, others get less.
BULGARIA N.C. 2100 (74) H.W. 3850 (135) V.H.W. 4725 (165) Ch. under 1 875 (31) Ch. 1 - 5 1225 (43)	500 (17½)	250 (9)	250 (9) (lard and oil) Ch. under 5 100 (3½) (butter)	Unrationed	Flour instead of bread on certain coupons. Ch. under 1 rusks and biscuits instead of bread, ch. 1 - 5, white bread and flour instead of bread, rice (100), coffee (5). Milk (litres), ch. under 1 (5.25), ch. 1 - 5 (3.50), eggs (1).

ROUMANIA (Bucharest only). Bread, N.C. 1750 (62), H.W. 3500 (124), maize flour 1000 (35) or barley flour 600 (21) H.W. 2000 (70) or 1200 (42), meat 500 (17½), sugar 150 (5½), fats 125 (4½). Local rationing in other towns.

CROATIA Bread, N.C. 1050 (37), H.W. 2100 (74) meat 150 (5½), sugar 75 (2½), butter (25), oil (50), potatoes, N.C. 2100 (74), ch. under 2, 1050 (37), pulses N.C. 115 (4), ch. under 2, 57 (2). Milk, litres, ch. under 5 (3.50), old people (2.1), eggs, 2 per month.

SERBIA Bread 2240 (78) or flour 1470 (51), meat 125 (4½), sugar 150 (5½), fats (80), oil ⅛ litre monthly. Belgrade only. Local rationing elsewhere.

POLAND No uniform rationing. In the Incorporated Territories, Germans and so-called "loyal" Poles get same rations as in the Reich; Jews and other Poles get about half as much. In the General Government, rations for Germans are the same as in the Reich; Poles get considerably less while rations for Jews in the ghettos have been reduced to a starvation level.

LUXEMBOURG AND ALSACE Same rations as in the Reich.

ENEMY BRANCH,
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
25th February, 1943.

NOTE: Telephone Ex. 3718 for additional copies or further information.

M.I.
26/5/43

E.E. Crane Esq.

will do reports

W 4/4/49

1 MAR 1943

INDEXED

E/C 573

Ref: L.250/84/1.

AVERAGE WEEKLY FOOD RATIONS IN ENEMY AND ENEMY OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

(Grammes - oz. in brackets)

N.C. - Normal Consumer. L.W. - Light Worker. H.W. - Heavy Worker. V.H.W. - Very Heavy Worker. N.W. - Night and Long Hours Workers. Ch. - Children. Ad. - Adolescents.

Bread	Meat	Sugar	Fats	Potatoes	Other Rationed Foodstuffs (Grammes)
GERMANY N.C. 2250 (80) N.W. 2850 (100) H.W. 3650 (129) V.H.W. 4650 (164) Ch. under 3 1100 (39) Ch. 3 - 6 1200 (42) Ch. 6 - 10 1700 (60) Ch. & Ad. 10 - 20 2600 (92)	350 (12½) 550 (19½) 700 (25) 950 (33½) Ch. under 6 200 (7) Ch. & Ad. 6 - 18 400 (14)	225 (8)	200 (7) 220 (8) 300 (10½) 570 (20) Ch. under 3 125 (4½) Ch. 3 - 6 188 (6½) Ch. 6 - 14 265 (9½) Ad. 14 - 18 265 (9½) (all fats)	3500 (122) Miners 4500 (157) (maximum)	Flour, cakes and pastries instead of bread on specified bread coupons, cheese (47) quark (30) jam (175) ch. 6 - 14 (225) "Nährmittel" (150) ch. under 3 (275) ch. 3 - 6 (212). Milk (litres) ch. under 3 (5.25) ch. 3 - 6 (3.50) ch. 6 - 14 (1.75) nursing mothers, men in unhealthy occupations (3.50), artificial honey, children (31), cocoa powder, children (15), eggs (Nil), coffee substitute (62) except to ch. under 3. Local rationing of fruit, vegetables, fish, sweets and skimmed milk.
PROTECTORATE N.C. 2250 (80) N.W. 2850 (100) H.W. 3650 (129) V.H.W. 4650 (164) Ch. under 3 1100 (39) Ch. 3 - 6 1200 (42) Ch. 6 - 10 1700 (60) Ch. & Ad. 10 - 20 2600 (92)	350 (12½) 550 (19½) 700 (25) 950 (33½) Ch. under 6 200 (7) Ch. & Ad. 6 - 18 400 (14)	250 (9)	165 (6) 205 (7) 305 (10½) 575 (20) Ch. under 6 125 (4½) Ch. 6 - 14 200 (6½) (all fats)	3500 (122) (Maximum)	Flour, cakes and pastries instead of bread on specified bread coupons, "Nährmittel" (150) ch. under 3 (275), ch. 3 - 6 (212). Milk (litres) children and nursing mothers (3.50), skimmed milk (litres) N.C. (0.4), artificial honey (31) children (62), jam (175), eggs (1). Coffee substitute (75) N.W., H.W. and V.H.W. (112). Sweets N.C. (50) ch. (75), pulses (30). Local rationing of fish, fruit and vegetables.
ITALY N.C. 1050 (37) L.W. 1750 (62) Expectant mothers 2100 (75) H.W. 2450 (86) V.H.W. 3150 (110)	100 (3½) (Southern Provinces) 150 (4½) to 150 (5½) (rest of Italy) Plus sausage 40 (1½)	N.C. 125 (4½) Ch. under 3 250 (9) Ch. & Ad. 3 - 18 150 (5½)	100 (3½) (all fats)	500 (17½)	In lieu of bread, flour, biscuits or rusks. Pasta and rice N.C. (500), H.W. (650), ch. under 3 (750). Southern Italy N.C. (625), H.W. (775), ch. under 3 (875), cheese, ch. under 3 (140). Milk locally rationed, priority given to children, sick, expectant and nursing mothers and workers in unhealthy occupations. Fruit, vegetables and fish locally rationed. Jam locally rationed with priority for children and old people.
NETHERLANDS N.C. 1800 (63) H.W. 2700 (95) V.H.W. 3600 (126) Ch. under 4 900 (32) Ad. 14 - 20 2200 (77)	N.C. 125 (4½) N.W. Cat. 1 175 (6) " " 2 225 (8) H.W. 300 (10½) V.H.W. 500 (17½)	250 (9)	146 (5) 219 (7½) 438 (15½) 87 (3) Ch. and Ad. 4 - 20 175 (6) (Margarine)	N.C. 4000 (140) H.W. & Ads. 6000 (210) V.H.W. 8000 (280) Ch. under 4 2000 (70) Extra 1000 (35) to consumers below a certain income level.	Cakes or pastries in lieu of bread. Flour (70), pulses, cereal products, alimentary pastes (150). Jam (125) cheese (75), rice, ch. under 4 (60), oatmeal, ch. under 4 (60). Milk (litres), ch. 4 - 14, expectant and nursing mothers (2.6), ch. under 4 (5.25). Skimmed milk, N.C. (1.3). Coffee substitute (60). Chocolate or sweets (67). Eggs reserved for ch. and ad.

NORWAY /

Bread	Meat	Sugar	Fats	Potatoes	Other Rationed Foodstuffs (Grammes)
NORWAY N.C. 1820 (64) H.W. 2500 (87) V.H.W. Cat.1 2950 (104) " " 2 3400 (119) Ch. under 2 910 (32) Ch. 2 - 5 1140 (40) Ad. 12 - 20 2050 (72)	Locally rationed H.W. 300 (10½)	200 (7)	N.C. 210 (7½) H.W. 245 (8½) V.H.W.Cat.1 280 (10) " " 2 315 (11) Butter or Margarine or other fat (20% reduction)	N.C. 3000 (105) H.W. 3750 (131) V.H.W.Cat.1 4500 (158) " " 2 5250 (184)	Or hard bread (1120) or flour (1400) instead of bread or pulses in exchange for certain bread coupons, cheese (30), chocolate, ch. 2 - 14 (25). Milk (litres) ch. under 5, expectant and nursing mothers and sick persons (5.25), ch. 6 - 15 (3.50), ad. 16 - 18 (1.75) plus skimmed milk (1.75), skimmed milk N.C. (1.75). Local rationing of fish, fruit and vegetables.
BELGIUM N.C. 1570 (55) L.W. 2020 (71) H.W. 2470 (86) V.H.W. 2920 (103) Miners 3820 (134)	210 (7½) 280 (10) 350 (12½) 420 (15) 490 (17½)	230 (8)	N.C. 80 (3) L.W. 146 (5) H.W. 212 (7½) V.H.W. 278 (10) Miners 674 (24) (Butter and margarine)	3500 (122)	Flour (1160), biscuits and pastes (875), diet foods (1225), gingerbread (1750), pastries (3150) each in lieu of bread, jam (105), artificial honey (52). Milk (litres), ch. under 3 and nursing mothers (5.25), ch. 3 - 6 (3.50), ch. 6 - 14 (1.75), skimmed milk ad. 14 - 18 (1.75), old people (3.50), cereal products (58), pulses (116), cheese (35), chicory (23). Coffee substitute (23). Local rationing of poultry, fish, fruit and vegetables.
DENMARK N.C. 2320 (82) H.W. 3020 (106) V.H.W. 3720 (130) Ch. under 6 1230 (41)	Unrationed but restricted	375 (13) Sea-going fishermen 500 (17½)	300 (10½) Sea-going fishermen 450 (16) (butter)	Unrationed	Groats (310) H.W. (425) V.H.W. (540). Semolina reserved for children under 2.
FRANCE N.C. 1925 (68) H.W. 2450 (87) Engine drivers 3500 (122) Miners 4200 (147) Ch. under 3 700 (25) Ch. 3 - 6 & old people 1400 (49) Ch. 6 - 13 1925 (68) Ad. 13 - 21 2450 (87)	N.C. 120 (4½) H.W. 225 (8) V.H.W. 330 (11½) Engine drivers 390 (14) Miners 525 (18½) Ad. 13 - 21 205 (7½)	125 (4½)† Ch. under 3 300 (9) Ad. 13 - 21 185 (6½)	Urban Rural N.C. 70 (2½) 55 (2) H.W.145 (5) 130 (4½) V.H.W.220 (8) 205 (7) (all fats)	Locally rationed	Flour, biscuits and pastries on specified bread coupons instead of bread, cheese (50), alimentary pastes, ch. under 6 and old people (60). Milk (litres) ch. under 6 (5.25), ch. 6 - 14 (1.75), expectant and nursing mothers (3.50). Rice, ch. under 3 (75), ch. 3 - 6 (50). Wine (litres per month) N.C. (4), H.W. and V.H.W. (8 to 12). Chocolate, ch. 3 - 13, ad. and old people (30). Coffee (10), or mixture (37), adults only, cocoa mixture (60). Sweets, ch. under 13 and old people (30). Flour, ch. under 6 and old people (60), grape sugar, ch. under 3, ad. 13 - 21 and old people (60), ch. 3 - 13 (120). Local rationing of fruit, vegetables, fish, poultry, jam, eggs and skimmed milk.
FINLAND N.C. 1750 (61) H.W. Cat. 1 2100 (74) H.W. " 2 2800 (98) V.H.W. 3500 (122) Ch. under 3 1050 (37) Ch. 4 - 12 1400 (49) Hard Bread or Flour	By Value N.C. 7 F. Marks H.W. 10 " " V.H.W 14 " " (monthly)	60 (2½) Consumers who do not get tobacco card 120 (4½)	N.C. 125 (4½) H.W. 150 (5½) Ch. under 7 and V.H.W. 175 (6½) Expectant and nursing mothers 250 (9) (all fats)	2500 (88) H.W. and V.H.W. 3750 (131)	Fresh bread (2300) instead of hard bread or flour. Milk (litres) N.C. (1.4), ch. under 3 (7), ch. 3 - 14, expectant and nursing mothers (4.2), coffee mixture (30), coffee substitute (60), jam (80), dried fruit (60), pulses (150), semolina, ch. under 1 (250). Local rationing of fish, fruit and vegetables.

† Consumers in Nord and Pas de Calais, 225 grammes.

Bread	Meat	Sugar	Fats	Potatoes	Other Rationed Foodstuffs (Grammes)
SLOVAKIA Bread and Flour N.C. 1050 (37) 350 (12½) H.W. 1350 (47) 350 (12½) V.H.W. 2100 (73) 700 (25)	N.C. 400 (14) H.W. and expectant and nursing mothers 600 (21)	Urban 230 (8) Rural 175 (6) Ch. under 10, sick persons and expectant mothers 355 (12½) 300 (10½)	N.C. 60 (2) H.W. 120 (4½) (Margarine) Butter, ch. 125 (4½) and expectant mothers Sick persons 60 (2)	3000 (105)	Flour (250), ch. under 1 instead of bread. Milk (litres), ch. under 1 (5), ch. 1 - 14, expectant and nursing mothers (3.50). Sick persons (1.4), N.C. (0.7), eggs (2). Rice, semolina, oatmeal, and biscuits reserved for children.
HUNGARY N.C. 1120 (39) H.W. 1960 (68) V.H.W. 3080 (108) Expectant and nursing mothers 3080 (108)	500 (17½) Budapest and environs consumers over 1 year	Budapest 260 (9) Other large towns N.C. 130 (4½) Rural areas N.C. 80 (3) Ch. under 12 130 (4½)	N.C. 140 (5) H.W. 224 (8) (margarine & lard) Budapest and certain other towns	1000 (35) (Budapest only)	Flour (400). Milk (litres), ch. under 3, expectant and nursing mothers (5), ch. 3 - 14, sick persons (3.50), old people (2.1) - Budapest only. Eggs (2). Local rationing of coffee, salad oil and tinned vegetables.
BALTIC STATES N.C. 1700 (60) N.W. 2200 (77) H.W. 2900 (102) V.H.W. 3700 (130) Ch. under 3 775 (27) Ch. 3 - 6 1000 (35) Ch. and Ad. 6 - 18 2200 (77)	250 (9) 375 (13) 500 (17½) 725 (26) 125 (4½) 125 (4½) 300 (10½)	150 (5½) Ch. under 6 200 (7)	N.C. 180 (6½) N.W. 200 (7) H.W. 260 (9½) V.H.W. 490 (17½) Ch. under 3 100 (3½) Ch. 3 - 6 160 (5½) Ch. and Ad. 6 - 18 230 (8)	2000 (70)	Nährmittel (150), ch. under 3 (275), ch. 3 - 6 (212). Coffee substitute (80) except to children under 3. Milk (litres) ch. under 3 (5.25), ch. 3 - 6 (3.50), ch. 6 - 14 (1.75), expectant and nursing mothers (3.50). Jam, eggs, fish and cheese distributed from time to time according to supplies available. Jews employed in war industries get N.C. rations, others get less.
BULGARIA N.C. 1750 (62) H.W. 3500 (124) V.H.W. 4375 (153) Ch. under 1 875 (31) Ch. 1 - 5 1225 (43)	500 (17½)	250 (9)	250 (9) (Lard and oil) Ch. under 5 100 (3½) (butter)	Unrationed	Flour instead of bread on certain coupons. Ch. under 1, rusks and biscuits instead of bread, ch. 1 - 5, white bread and flour instead of bread, rice (100), coffee (5). Milk (litres), ch. under 1 (5.25), ch. 1 - 5 (3.50), eggs (4).

ROUMANIA (Bucharest only). Bread, N.C. 1250 (44), H.W. 2500 (88). Two breadless days. On one day potatoes 1000 (35), on other day maize or millet flour 1000 (35), H.W. double, meat 250 (9), sugar 150 (5½), fats 125 (4½). Local rationing in other towns.

CROATIA Bread, N.C. 1050 (37), H.W. 2100 (74), meat 150 (5½), sugar 75 (2½), butter (25), oil (50), potatoes, N.C. 2100 (74), ch. under 2, 1050 (37), pulses, N.C. 115 (4), ch. under 2, 57 (2). Milk, litres, ch. under 2 (5.25), ch. 2 - 5 (3.50), old people (2.1), eggs, 2 per month.

SERBIA Bread 2240 (78) or flour 1470 (51), meat 125 (4½), sugar 150 (5½), fats (80), oil ⅛ litre monthly. Belgrade only. Local rationing elsewhere.

POLAND No uniform rationing. In the Incorporated Territories, Germans and so-called "loyal" Poles get same rations as in the Reich; Jews and other Poles get about half as much. In the General Government, rations for Germans are the same as in the Reich; Poles get considerably less while rations for Jews in the ghettos have been reduced to a starvation level.

LUXEMBOURG AND ALSACE Same rations as in the Reich.

GREECE Bread 1260 (44)

ENEMY BRANCH,
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.
21st April, 1943.

NOTE:- Telephone Ex. 3718 for additional copies or further information.

N 4 / 4 / 49

INDEXED 29 APR 1943

M.I.
26/5/43

Central
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Nehyfna

dispatches

2.

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 135

4 JAN 1943

24

Registry Number } W 135/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare.

No. T 550/12.

Dated December 31st, 1942

Received in Registry } Jan: 4th, 1943

W: Co-ordination.

Norwegian relief purchases

Transmits copy of telegram to Washington No. 6771 Arfar of December 30th stating that the Norwegians have said that the United States Authorities have given permission for transfer of one million dollars for relief purchases in Sweden. Enquires whether this is confirmed.

Last Paper.

W 4 (W 16492/62/49 1942)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

We should welcome this, but it would be a major departure from U.S. policy hitherto — See my minute on W 17357.

N. Dept. Strong ii Sav.

N.A Dept.

Lee Wichins

Copy of rel from W/ton no 69 Arfar para.

(Action completed.)

19 | 1 | 43.

(Index.)

AWF 30/3/43

Next Paper.

W 157

25

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

W 1735

4 JAN 1943

(T 550/12)

[CYPHER]

LIMITED ~~ARFAR~~ DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON

No. 6771 Arfar
30th December, 1942.

D. 12.05 a.m. 31st December, 1942

ddddddd

IMPORTANT

Norwegians here have informed us verbally that United States authorities have given permission for transfer of one million dollars for relief purchases in Sweden.

2. To avoid misunderstandings please let me know urgently whether this is confirmed.

W 16492 3. Have you anything to report in answer to my telegram No. 6444 [Arfar of 5th December: 7550/19/28a]?

Copy also for W L Fraser Esq Treasury

M.E.W. FILE No. T 550/12
COPY FOR J Maclean Esq F.O.
DATE 31/12/42

W135/4/49.

[CYPHER] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Viscount Halifax
No. 69 Arfar
6th January, 1943.

D. 8.34 p.m. 7th January, 1943.
R. 2.20 a.m. 8th January, 1943.

Copy also to Treasury ddddddd

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/12
COPY FOR D. Maclean Esq
DATE 13.1.43 F.D

Your telegram No. 6771.

Stopford is informed by United States Treasury that licence recently given to Norwegian Government to transfer two million dollars specifically precluded use of these funds for relief purposes without written permission of United States Treasury.

2. We have not been able to go fully into points in your telegram No. 6444 pending conclusion of interchanges between President and Prime Minister on relief policy. State Department tend always to use financial concessions to Belgians as argument in favour of admitting supplies through blockade for Norway. In view of distinction that we have always drawn between admitting food for relief through blockade and permitting the financing of movements of goods inside blockade area this may surprise you. Fact remains that State Department has never in its heart accepted this distinction and regards facilitating by any means of any relief supplies from any quarter as a single political instrument influencing relations of United States Government with all European Governments concerned.

3.

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 157

4 JAN 1943

27.

Registry Number W 157/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare. Communicated.

No. T 550/12

Dated

Received in Registry Jan: 4th, 1943

W: Co-ordination.

Relief for Norway.

Transmits copy of letter to His Majesty's Counsellor, British Legation, Reykjavik of December 28th explaining the position as regards the purchase of goods in neutral countries for despatch as relief to occupied territory.

Last Paper.

W 135 (W 17357/62/49 1942)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

This is as foreshadowed in W 17357.

N. Dept.

Stores 8 Jan

6/1

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
19/1/43	Ans. 30/3/43

Next Paper.

W 220 (W 3808/

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

Copy to:
D. Maclean Esq.,
Foreign Office.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W. 1.

T550/12

28

W 157

28th December 1942.

4 JAN 1943

Sir,

With reference to your despatch No. E.W.15 of November 30th concerning a proposal that funds collected in Iceland should be remitted to Sweden and there spent on the purchase of food for Norway, I am to explain the present position as follows.

While the purchase of goods in neutral countries for despatch as Relief to occupied territory is not, subject to certain restrictive conditions, excluded per se by existing principles of blockade policy, the financial aspect of such transactions is extremely complicated at the present time for reasons connected with the necessity to maintain financial pressure upon the enemy and to conserve neutral exchange for essential war purposes. Consequently funds under control of the United Nations can only rarely be remitted for such purposes to neutral European countries, and then only when the British and American authorities jointly responsible for the blockade are convinced that very exceptional circumstances make this advisable.

It is therefore the opinion of H.M. Government that the collection of funds by "public" subscription with the intention of using them in the manner indicated above is undesirable and should be discouraged.

I am to add that the particular proposal now in question is open to strong objection on grounds of exchange control alone, moreover in its blockade aspect it would require the agreed approval of H.M.Government and the United States Government, and H.M.Government would not in the circumstances be willing to seek the United/

His Majesty's Counsellor,
British Legation,
REYKJAVIK.

United States Government's assent.

Copies of this despatch are being sent to the Foreign Office and to the Treasury.

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

W. A. C.

L.F. Copy. T550/12

30

British Legation,
Reykjavik.

E.W. No 15. November, 30th 1942.

Sir,

I have the honour to report that some time ago a fund known as the Norway Fund was started in Iceland under the sponsorship of Icelanders themselves with the intention of presenting it as a gift to the Norwegians after the war. The Fund has been gradually accumulating and now amounts to Kr. 310,000 (about £11,900).

2. When the Fund was first started the Committee announced that they had been informed by the Norwegian Government that no money was required now. A Communist suggestion that the money be used to buy munitions for the Norwegians was turned down by the Committee. Recently there have been several reports, coming through Sweden, that the Norwegians are starving and several of the Icelandic papers have suggested that the Fund should be used to buy food in Sweden and have it sent to Norway. The Committee is now considering whether this is possible.

3. I have not been approached either officially or unofficially in this matter but as similar proposals in other countries have been put forward to assist the starving peoples in subjugated Europe, and as such proposals have come under your purview, because they are more liable to benefit our enemies than to relieve our friends, I venture to bring the foregoing facts to your knowledge.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant

(sgd.) Roland Ross.

The Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
W.1.

1. 1943 4

GENERAL

W220

5 JAN 1943

31

W 2201 220 1e. 49

Lord Halifax.

Washington

No. 6298.

Dec: 30.

Jan 5.

Relief for Norway.

Refs to Wilton 6225 (W 17619/6394/G)

President was not impressed by Secret plan and thought it would not remain secret long but agreed that secret plan should be acted upon to start with and his plan meanwhile subjected to further discussion

Last Paper.

(W 17619/6397/G)

References. 1942

(Minutes.)

Lord Halifax has since received the text of the Prime Ministers reply to the President (last paper in W 17619/6397/G). It looks as though this will satisfy the President.

Even remembering that he is alleged to have been swayed by a personal appeal from Princess Martha, it is difficult to understand his desperate anxiety about Norway, where, according to Mr. Lee's estimate, the food situation is by no means catastrophic. We must ask Mr. Lee about this when next in touch.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Mr. H. Trouteck (Mr. Lee)

Foreign Office

Jan. 7th

Dr Warner

Political Dept

N. American Dept

2pp

a.a.

257 16/1

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

W.

16/1/43

Next Paper.

W.023.

22107 1/41 F.O.P.

[Cypher]

PRISEC

32

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

5 JAN 1943

Viscount Halifax
No. 6298 D. 2.49 a.m. 31st December, 1942.
30th December, 1942. R. 10.35 a.m. 31st December, 1942.

:-:-:-:-:-:-:

IMPORTANT

My telegram No. 6225.

When I took Hailey to see the President he referred to his message to the Prime Minister personal and secret No. 243. It appeared that he did not know about secret plan but was not much impressed with it and thought that it was to be administered by the Swedish Red Cross and therefore would not remain secret long. I told him that our people were pretty satisfied that it could be kept secret and would not so obviously run into all the consequential danger as his plan would. I suggested that we start with our secret plan and examine the implications of his plan meanwhile.

2. The President agreed the urgent thing was to get something going quickly and said he did not much mind what was done as long as this was achieved. I will see that he is put right about the part of Swedish Red Cross in the secret plan.

3. Please let me know what progress is being made.

O.T.P.

F. O. REGISTRY

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No. W 220/220/G

33

Draft.

Mr Trouthbeck
enclosing
from
Mr Le Rougetel.

7th Jan 1942.

Most Secret.

[Dear Jack]

I enclose a copy of Washington telegram No. 6298 about relief for Norway.

As regards the main question, we must await the result of the Prime Minister's reply to the President of January 1st, of which the Ambassador has been informed. No 10 were asked to send you a copy. ~~of the reply.~~

The last paragraph seems to relate to the Secret plan, we should be grateful for if you

~~your advice~~

You will advise us
how to reply.

Yours ever

(Sd.) Jean de Rougetel

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

35

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

7th January, 1943.

(W 220/220/G)

Most Secret.

[Dear Jack]

I enclose a copy of Washington telegram No.6298 about relief for Norway.

As regards the main question, we must await the result of the Prime Minister's reply to the President of the 1st January, of which the Ambassador has been informed. No.10 were asked to send you a copy.

The last paragraph seems to relate to the secret plan and we should be grateful if you will advise us how to reply.

Yours ever,

(Sd.) Ian Le Rougetel

J.M. Troutbeck, Esq., C.M.G.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

5

36

1943

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION

W 236

6 JAN 1943

Registry Number } W 236/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare

No. communicated

Dated 5th Jan.,1943.

Received in Registry } 6th Jan.,1943.

General:Co-ordination

Supplies for Yugoslav civil population.

Transmits a copy of a note from the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires No. 3 of January 2nd requesting that 440,000 Swiss francs may be released for the purchase of condensed milk and quinine for the Yugoslav civil population.

Last Paper.

W 220

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See within letter from Mr. Trouteck (M.E.W.) to Mr Mackiewicz T550/25 Jan 6.

MEW have replied to this by saying that the question of Swiss francs for relief will be immediately discussed with the U.S. Govt., (as it must be). As for the other funds they have referred the Chargé d'Affaires to the Foreign Office, & I expect Sanitary dept will be leaving it this.

It is our policy to allow relief from within the blockade e.g. Switzerland, but are now under contract not to enter into any new commitment without U.S. consent. MEW's draft telegram to Berne is attached. As it is entirely in line with our views,

I

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
W.O. 14/1/43	AWF 30/3/43

Next Paper.

W 354 (W4550)

I agreed it, as have the Secy,
await further

Sarkies ~~Secretary~~ 8/1.
W.A. ~~Secretary~~ MB.
9/1

S Marlen
8/1

A
11/1.

See within copy of letter from Lord Selborne
to Gregoire Chargé d'Affaires Russie

Covered by my minute above

A
14/1

T 550/25 E Wkn W 38

EMBASSY
XXXXXXXX

Copy for D. Maclean Esqre (F.O) with compliments
R.
5/1/43

P.No. 3

Very Urgent.

for urgent
Preservation

W 236
6 JAN 1943

The Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Minister of Economic Warfare and has the honour to bring the following matter to his notice :

The Yugoslav delegate to the International Red Cross in Switzerland, Dr. Svetozar Meacanin, has informed the Yugoslav Government in London of the possibility of purchasing condensed milk (possibly including also cheese) to the value of 300,000 Swiss francs, and quinine to the value of 140,000 Swiss francs, all for the Yugoslav civil population.

The Yugoslav Government approved the sums in question and the Yugoslav Ministry of Finance has sent the amount of 440,000 Swiss francs through Barclay's Bank, London, to the Yugoslav Legation in Berne.

To a request from Treasury Chambers to specify the purpose for which this amount was sent, the Ministry of Finance gave the appropriate information by its letter of the 17th December. Treasury Chambers, by a letter of the 19th December, made the following reply :

"Many thanks for your letter of 17th December, regarding Swiss francs.

"As you know, this position is rather a complicated one and we cannot reply to your request until we have so more information in the matter, which is expected shortly. In any case we should ask you to discuss details of your purchases with the Ministry of Economic Warfare."

By this reply, Treasury Chambers have prevented the sending of other, regular and special, credits sent on the same day to the Yugoslav Legation, Berne and the Yugoslav Consulate General, Geneva, i.e. besides the sum of 440,000 francs for the milk (and possibly cheese) and the quinine, sums also of 65,000 francs and £216 for the Yugoslav Legation in Berne and 45,640 francs for the Yugoslav Consulate General in Geneva. These other sums represent the regular credits for the Yugoslav diplomatic and consular representation.

The Yugoslav Government is deeply concerned as to the transmission of the sum of 440,000 Swiss francs for milk and quinine, having regard to the extremely urgent need for the Yugoslav civil population to be supplied in time with medical supplies, which it is intended to purchase with this amount. The Government is also most anxious about the other sums, representing credits for diplomatic and consular representation in Switzerland.

In making this communication, Monsieur Milanovitch would be very grateful if the necessary steps may kindly be taken for the release of the sum of 440,000 Swiss francs, especially in view of the fact that the Yugoslav Legation in Berne has stated that unless this sum can be transmitted

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in time it may happen that the medical supplies will be purchased by other quarters, as well as the release of the other sums the sending of which was prevented by the letter of the 19th December last.

London, 2nd January, 1943

Copy for J. Hackett, Esq. Foreign Office with Mr. Quennell's compliments

T550/25

40

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

INDEXED

5th January, 1942.

W 23b/4/49

Dear Monsieur Milanovitch,

I have received your letter P.No. 3 of the 2nd January asking if the necessary steps may be taken for the release of 440,000 Swiss francs for the purchase of condensed milk (possibly including cheese) and quinine to be purchased in Switzerland for the Yugoslav Civil population.

The question raises certain difficulties but I will do my best to let you have a reply as speedily as possible. I fully recognise your anxiety in the matter.

The question of the release of Swiss francs for Yugoslav diplomatic and consular representation in Berne and Geneva, is not a question with which this Ministry can deal, and I would, therefore, suggest that you should approach the Foreign Office on this point.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
(sgd) SELBORNE.

Monsieur Vladimir Milanovitch,
Yugoslav Charge d'Affaires,
Royal Yugoslav Embassy,
195, Queen's Gate, S.W.7.

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Telephone:
GROSVENOR 4060.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE,
W.1.

T590/25

YOUR REFERENCE

W236/4/49

6th January, 1943.

Dear Maclean

INDEXED

You have already received a copy of the Yugoslav Charge d'Affaires' letter P No. 3 of the 2nd January, about a proposal to send milk and quinine to Yugoslavia.

Subject to your concurrence and that of Fraser, to whom I am sending a copy of this letter, we propose to telegraph to Washington in the sense of the attached draft.

Yours ever

T.M. Cromwell

D. Maclean, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

T550/25

Draft telegram to

H.M.R. WASHINGTON
No. Arfar

Cypher.

L.A.D.

For Foreign Office and Treasury concurrence

IMPORTANT.

My telegram No: 6444 /Arfar of 5th December: European Relief/

I am becoming increasingly embarrassed by absence of reply to my telegram and must beg you to impress upon the U.S. authorities the urgent need for a statement of their views.

2. The latest approach has been from the Yugoslav Government who have asked for the release of 440,000 Swiss francs for the purchase in Switzerland of milk (and possibly cheese) to the value of 300,000 francs and quinine to the value of 140,000, for the Yugoslav civil population. In view of past assurances to the Yugoslav Government (the latest one contained in a letter from the Prime Minister to the Yugoslav Prime Minister of July 12th) that we have no objection to the despatch of foodstuffs from within the blockade area provided that they are not of a type imported through the blockade, I should find it very difficult to refuse the application for milk and cheese. I trust therefore that the U.S. Government will agree to our releasing/

releasing the necessary Swiss francs for this part of the purchase. This would not, of course, be additional to the lump sum for all Allied relief purchases mentioned in paragraph 6 of my telegram under reference.

3. I should, of course, have to refuse the application for quinine for reasons well known to you, but would like to say that there would be no objection to quinine substitutes.

4. In replying th the Yugoslav Government as above I would propose to add that we are hoping to agree with the International Red Cross a list of goods, with quantities, which may be bought in Switzerland and exported as relief to occupied territories and that in the meantime I can give no assurance that unlimited further quantities of milk products or indeed of any particular commodities will be permissible.

5. I attach great importance to being able to reply to the Yugoslav Government without undue delay.

6

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 354

7 JAN 1943

Registry Number } W 354/4/49

FROM Belgian Ambassador (conversation)

No.

Dated 5th January,

Received in Registry } 7th January, 1943.

W: Co-ordination.

Relief for Belgium.

During a conversation with the Secretary of State, the Belgian Ambassador complained of the replies given by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare to Mr. Edmund Harvey's questions about Belgium. He feared that Ministry of Economic Warfare formed their judgement too much upon information from newspapers published in Belgium. The Secretary of State replied that the Ministry of Economic Warfare very carefully weighed all sources of information before coming to a conclusion. The Belgian Ambassador left a number of memoranda on the situation in Belgium.

Last Paper.

W 236.

References.

(Print.)

K.C.D. PRINTED

(How disposed of.)

Dft/Sir R. Campbell
No 8 Jan 5
Copy sent to the King.

(Minutes.)

See within note communicated by Belgian Ambassador. Jan 5.

Circulated King Cabinet Dominions

Mr Frost's answer of December 8th is in W 16649. The answer of July 31st, to which he referred and which is really the key document on the subject, is in W 10252; it will be seen that it by no means minimised the sufferings of the Belgians. I doubt if there is much point in asking them to substantiate their indictment that conditions in Belgium have not greatly changed since July 31st, particularly in view of what the S. of S. said to the Belgian Ambassador. I see no action beyond copying this first enclosure to Mr Frost, after:

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
W&P 18/1/43	ARF. 30/3/43

Next Paper.

W 376.

Central

Cabinet Secret first.

Maclean
11/1

17/1

But I agree with the Ambassador that, if only for the propaganda point of view, it would have been better to gild the pill with some sympathetic phrases

JMK
13/1

11/1

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W354/4/49

A.E.

Draft.

Sir L. Oliphant,

No. 8

(copy with Parker)
December 8
Hansard

W16649

KCJ

JAN 30
F.O. REGISTRY

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

5th January, 1943.

W 354
7 JAN 1943

Sir,

During the course of our conversation this afternoon, the Belgian Ambassador said that to his regret he was compelled to make a criticism on behalf of his Government. The Belgian Ministers had taken strong exception to the language used by the Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Economic Warfare in reply to Mr. Edmund Harvey's questions about Belgium (copy attached). The Ambassador contended that the impression given by those replies was erroneous. The position had certainly deteriorated since the summer and was, according to information received by the Belgian Government, definitely worse than last winter. He feared that the Ministry of Economic Warfare formed their judgment too much upon information from newspapers published in Belgium, which of course merely contained German propaganda.

2. I said that I felt sure that the Ambassador was wrong in this conclusion and that in fact the Ministry of Economic Warfare very carefully weighed all the sources of information open to them before coming to a conclusion. I would of course report what His Excellency had said, but I asked him to believe that there could be no question of any department of His Majesty's Govemment failing to sympathise with the sufferings of the Belgian

people/

people.

3. The Ambassador said he fully accepted this, but it was a pity that nothing of the kind had been said in the answers that Mr. Dingle Foot had given. When people suffer as the Belgians ~~are~~ were now suffering, they were perhaps unduly sensitive and the Belgian Ministers would have understood the position better if the answer had been prefaced by some phrase such as: "While His Majesty's Government have the greatest sympathy for the sufferings inflicted upon the Belgian people by the German occupation, etc." Quite frankly, the terms of the reply gave him the impression that we were saying to the Belgians: "You are not really quite so sick: you are not dead yet".

4. I said that I myself could not draw such a conclusion from the replies, and I hoped the Ambassador would accept my statement that their wording was in no way due to lack of understanding or of sympathy for what Belgium was suffering.

5. The Ambassador thanked me and said that he fully understood that the replies were not intended to have the effect which he had reported, but he considered it was his duty to tell me the feelings of the members of the Belgian Government. In confirmation of his view of the situation His Excellency left with me a number of memoranda on the situation in Belgium.

AK

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

48

General ..... Division

War General Jan 5/.

A copy has been sent to The King.

Despatch Branch.

Circulated to the Cabinet by direction of
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

49

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

ARCHIVES

[W 354/4/49] Copy No. 8

Mr. Eden to Sir L. Oliphant.

(No. 8.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 5, 1943.

DURING the course of our conversation this afternoon, the Belgian Ambassador said that, to his regret, he was compelled to make a criticism on behalf of his Government. The Belgian Ministers had taken strong exception to the language used by the Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Economic Warfare in reply to Mr. Edmund Harvey's questions about Belgium (copy attached). The Ambassador contended that the impression given by those replies was erroneous. The position had certainly deteriorated since the summer and was, according to information received by the Belgian Government, definitely worse than last winter. He feared that the Ministry of Economic Warfare formed their judgment too much upon information from newspapers published in Belgium, which, of course, merely contained German propaganda.

2. I said that I felt sure that the Ambassador was wrong in this conclusion and that, in fact, the Ministry of Economic Warfare very carefully weighed all the sources of information open to them before coming to a conclusion. I would, of course, report what his Excellency had said, but I asked him to believe that there could be no question of any department of His Majesty's Government failing to sympathise with the sufferings of the Belgian people.

3. The Ambassador said he fully accepted this, but it was a pity that nothing of the kind had been said in the answers that Mr. Dingle Foot had given. When people suffered as the Belgians were now suffering they were perhaps unduly sensitive and the Belgian Ministers would have understood the position better if the answer had been prefaced by some phrase such as: "While His Majesty's Government have the greatest sympathy for the sufferings inflicted upon the Belgian people by the German occupation," &c. Quite frankly, the terms of the reply gave him the impression that we were saying to the Belgians: "You are not really quite so sick; you are not dead yet."

4. I said that I myself could not draw such a conclusion from the replies, and I hoped the Ambassador would accept my statement that their wording was in no way due to lack of understanding or of sympathy for what Belgium was suffering.

5. The Ambassador thanked me and said that he fully understood that the replies were not intended to have the effect which he had reported, but he considered it was his duty to tell me the feelings of the members of the Belgian Government. In confirmation of his view of the situation his Excellency left with me a number of memoranda on the situation in Belgium.(1)

I am, &c.
ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure.

House of Commons—Parliamentary Debates.

Oral Answers to Questions.

Belgium (Food Supplies).

Tuesday, December 8, 1942.

Mr. Edmund Harvey asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare whether he will give the latest information available as to the conditions of malnutrition prevailing among the civil population of Belgium under German occupation; whether there has been any communication with any

(1) Not printed.

of the Allied Governments as to this position and as to the proposal that dried milk and vitamins should be permitted to be sent to Belgium for distribution to children, nursing mothers and invalids under the control of the International Red Cross?

Mr. Dingle Foot: I have no evidence to show that conditions of public health in Belgium have greatly changed since the answer which I gave to my hon. friend on the 21st July. In recent months, however, there has been an increase in the milk and potato rations, due mainly to improved distribution. As regards the second part of the question, His Majesty's Government are frequently in communication with Allied Governments regarding the condition of their respective countries under enemy occupation; but the House will not expect me to reveal the nature of such communications.

Mr. Harvey: Will my hon. friend say whether the Government are considering the appeal which has been made by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster with regard to the feeding of children in Belgium?

Mr. Dingle Foot: There has been no change in the blockade policy of His Majesty's Government.

Mr. Harvey: That is not an answer to my question. My question was about the appeal on this subject by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster.

Mr. Foot: All appeals received from those or other responsible quarters do receive the most careful consideration of His Majesty's Government, but I must repeat that there has been no change in our blockade policy towards occupied countries.

AMBASSADE DE BELGIQUE

51

W 354 / 4 / 49.

INDEXED

Le Secrétaire parlementaire du "Ministry of Economic Warfare" a déclaré le 8 décembre dernier à la Chambre des Communes qu'à sa connaissance l'état de la santé publique ne s'était pas beaucoup modifié en Belgique occupée au cours de ces derniers mois, et que les rations de lait et de pommes-de-terre avaient même été augmentées.

Sans vouloir en aucune façon s'immiscer dans la vie parlementaire britannique et dans les déclarations des Ministres de Sa Majesté, le Gouvernement belge doit néanmoins faire observer que les paroles de M. Dingle Foot - qui ont eu un retentissement considérable à l'étranger et notamment aux Etats-Unis et en Belgique occupée - ont eu certains effets malheureux. Elles ont donné lieu à certaines confusions, et elles ont produit l'impression - à tort sans doute - que la situation alimentaire en Belgique, et surtout l'état de santé de la population, étaient beaucoup moins graves qu'ils ne le sont en réalité. Certains commentaires en ont même conclu que la situation était meilleure qu'en 1941, et que les efforts des Allemands avaient contribué à améliorer le sort de la population belge.

S'il est rigoureusement exact que le rationnement de la population n'a pas été diminué au cours des derniers mois, et que les rations de pommes-de-terre ont été quelque peu augmentées, il faut remarquer que les modifications apportées à la ration de lait (et aussi de viande) ne font que compenser des diminutions antérieures. Il faut remarquer aussi que l'état de santé général de la population s'est beaucoup détérioré, ainsi qu'il ressort d'un rapport fait par le Comité suédois de secours aux enfants belges (Astrid Barnen), dont l'impartialité ne saurait

être mise en doute. Il ne faut, en effet, pas perdre de vue que la ration allouée à la population belge ne représente pas même la moitié de ce que celle-ci devrait normalement recevoir; et il est donc fatal qu'après douze mois de plus d'une sous-alimentation cruelle, cette population se trouve dans une situation infiniment plus mauvaise.

Un exemplaire du rapport Astrid Barnen, qui expose en détail la situation salutaire actuelle de la Belgique, est ci-jointe.

Edf/artiès

5 janvier 1943

LA SITUATION ALIMENTAIRE ET SANITAIRE EN BELGIQUE.

I. Situation alimentaire.

2. Situation sanitaire.

Futures-mères et accouchées.
Nouveau-nés.
Enfants de 0 à 6 ans.
Ecoliers.
Adolescents.
Adultes et vieillards.

Tuberculose.

Annexes:
Note sur la pénurie des combustibles.
Statistique relative à l'influence de la guerre et de l'occupation sur la moralité des enfants mineurs.

LA SITUATION ALIMENTAIRE ET SANITAIRE DE LA POPULATION BELGE.

"Le rationnement théorique de 1.300 calories par tête d'habitant et par jour, imposé actuellement à la population belge constitue le rationnement moyen le plus bas et le plus insuffisant qui ait jamais été imposé à une grande masse d'hommes pendant une période prolongée". - Rapport sur la situation alimentaire et sanitaire de la population belge, Département Médecine et Hygiène du Comité Central du Secours d'Hiver, JUIN 1941.

En JUILLET 1942, le rationnement officiel- et effectif d'ailleurs est de 886 calories, légèrement inférieur au rationnement graduellement décroissant des mois précédents et à celui d'AOUT 1942: 920 calories (1).

"La profonde sous-alimentation chronique de l'ensemble de la population, plus particulièrement la sous-alimentation chronique des enfants et des adolescents ont provoqué en Belgique, une recrudescence très inquiétante de la tuberculose. On peut affirmer que si le peuple belge continue à être sous-alimenté, la tuberculose prendra de plus en plus un caractère catastrophique et ne tardera pas à décimer non seulement la jeunesse et l'adolescence mais atteindra aussi tous les déficients, amenant ainsi, à brève échéance, un affaiblissement fatal de la race, contre lequel tous les efforts risquent de rester vains.". Cette conclusion du Rapport du Secours d'Hiver demeure valable. Les prévisions des médecins (2) qui ont collaboré à ce document d'autant plus impressionnant qu'il fut rédigé avec une rigoureuse objectivité se sont vérifiées au cours de l'hiver 1941-1942.

---

(1) Enfants jusqu'à 1 an: 1.405 cal. (Ces enfants reçoivent en outre
" de 1 à 3 ans: 1.338 cal. (200 gr. de semoule de riz
" de 3 à 6 ans: 1.187 cal. par mois).
" de 6 à 14 ans: 1.036 cal.
Adolescents de 14 à 18 ans : rationnement de l'adulte plus une ration plus ou moins effective de 1/2 L. lait écrémé par jour.

.....

Femmes enceintes et accouchées (voir plus loin).
Enfants et adultes prétuberculeux : double ration.
Travailleurs manuels: certaines catégories de travailleurs manuels bénéficient de rations supplémentaires distribuées d'une manière irrégulière.

(2) Prof. Dr. Heymans, président du Comité Médical Consultatif du Département Médecine et Hygiène du Comité exécutif central du Secours d'Hiver; Dr. Foorkin, professeur à l'Université de Liége; Dr. Malengreau, professeur à l'Université de Louvain; Dr. Van de Velde, Professeur à l'Université de Gand; Dr. Libbrecht, Directeur Général du Département de la Santé publique au Ministère de l'Intérieur; Dr. Martens,

.....

professeur à l'Université de Gand;Dr. Hoet,professeur à l'Université de Louvain; Dr.Hooft,professeur à l' Université de Gand; Dr.Herman , Professeur à l' Université de Bruxelles; Dr. Vermeulen,biochimiste; Dr. Grégoire , agrégé de l' Université de Bruxelles; Dr.Picard, président de l' Algemeen Vlaamsch Geneeskeeren Verbond ; Dr. Hendrix, Président de la Koninklijke Vlaamsche Academie voor Geneeskunde van Belgie; Dr. Gérard,Inspecteur principal des denrées alimentaires au Ministère de l' Agriculture; Dr. Willocx, de l' Université de Louvain; Dr. Watry, Directeur de l'Institut Dentaire Eastman; Dr. Lust, Directeur des Centres Belges de Puériculture ; Dr.Van der Straeten, Directeur de l' Institut d'Hygiènede la province de Hainaut; Dr. Brull, Professeur à l' Université de Liége; Dr. Schokaert,jr,professeur à l' Université de Louvain; Dr. Demoor ,Directeur de l'Institut d'Hygiène de la Province d' Anvers.

SITUATION ALIMENTAIRE.

Poursuivant l'analyse de la situation alimentaire de la population en juin 1941, le Rapport précise que le rationnement se montre plus insuffisant encore si l'on détermine ses déficiences chez les différentes catégories de sujets.

A titre documentaire, nous reproduisons cette partie du Rapport en annexe.

Voici d'une façon très schématique comment se présente la situation alimentaire de la population en juillet 1942.

La ration officielle de 886 calories peut être effectivement assurée. Les arrivages sur le marché des produits non rationnés sont rares ,irréguliers et ne couvrent qu'une minime partie des besoins de la population . Les fruits et les légumes sont peu abondants; l'écart entre les prix imposés et les prix réellement réclamés aux consommateurs est considérable(1). Une réglementation nouvelle de l'acheminement des légumes et des fruits du producteur au consommateur a eu pour effet de raréfier encore les arrivages et de provoquer une hausse exagérée des prix. Les possibilités offertes par le "marché noir" se sont réduites au cours de cette année,le pouvoir d'achat de la population a d'ailleurs considérablementdiminué. Une partie notable des milieux dits aisés continue à s'y pourvoir, y consacrant la majeure partie de ses ressources (2) . La fraude est intense, surtout dans les régions longeant la frontière française. Des familles entières des milieux ouvriers des régions industrielles du Borinage , du Centre ,des grandes agglomérations se consacrent à ce trafic.

Au point de vue textiles et chaussures,la pénurie est générale. Les familles éprouvent les plus grandes difficultés à vêtir et à chausser leurs enfants. Les difficultés sont particulièrement grandes en ce qui concerne la constitution des layettes à cause du manque à peu près total de flanelle, molleton, etc. On étudie actuellement la possibilité de remplacer les langes de tissu par des langes en cellulose, importés de l'étranger.

(1) Agglomération bruxelloise:
Pois, prix officiel: 4 frs le Kg. prix réel de 12 à 19 frs. le Kg. Haricots verts; prix officiel; de 5,20 frs le Kg. à 7 frs,prix réel: 21 à 25 frs. Cerises ,prix officiel : de 8,45 frs le kg. à 10,50 frs,prix réel; 20 frs,etc.

(2) Voici quelques prix: Beurre, 210 à 275 frs le Kg; Oeuf, de 6 à 10 Frs; Farine: de 70 à 85 frs,le kg, etc.

Une amélioration réelle a pu être apportée à la situation navrante des éléments les plus vulnérables de la population (enfants et adolescents débilités, futures-mères et accouchées,malades)par l'appoint que constituent ce que l'on a très vite appelé les " vivres du Portugal" c'est-à-dire les approvisionnements réunis par les Comités de Secours à

SITUATION SANITAIRE.

Il semblerait , d'après les premiers renseignements qui nous sont parvenus, que la situation après avoir connu son paroxysme de gravité en automne 1941 et au début de l'hiver 1942, se soit momentanément stabilisée. Les individus les plus faibles et les plus menacés ont disparus,la sous-alimentation persistante et la pénurie des combustibles qui se fera sentir plus encore dès l'automne préparent des nouvelles victimes .
Les femmes enceintes,les enfants prépubères et les adolescents demeurent les plus exposés ,les prétuberculeux de tous âges sont légion. La situation est particulièrement grave dans les communautés réduites au rationnement officiel: orphelinats,prisons, maisons de rééducation,etc.

Les études dont de larges extraits sont reproduits ci-après, sont dues à éminents médecins ,à des sociologues dont l'objectivité ne peut être mise en doute . Nous les avons complétées par des données les plus récentes qu'il nous a été possible de réunir. Cependant, les travaux d'ordre médical , sociologique et économique relatifs à l'année 1942 sont en cours et leurs conclusions ne pourront être communiquées qu'ultérieurement.

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la Belgique à l'étranger et acheminés jusqu'ici par l'intermendiaire de la Croix-Rouge Internationale.

Ces vivres ,distribués par le Comité Mixte de Répartition des Secours à la Belgique constituent, avec les quelques marchés que peuvent assez rarement conclure à l'étranger le Secours d'Hiver et le Ministère de l' Agriculture et du Ravitaillement l' Unique appoint au régime alimentaire de la population belge.

Leur suppression équivaudrait à rendre les effets de la disette en Belgique irrémédiables.

SITUATION ALIMENTAIRE.

Le nombre de calories nécessaires pour assurer journellement les besoins énergiques d'un adulte ne se livrant pas à un travail musculaire important est évalué à 2300 calories en moyenne.

Le rationnement de l'ensemble de la population belge, tel qu'il a été établi théoriquement au cours de ces derniers mois, atteint une valeur énergique d'environ 1300 calories par tête d'habitant et par jour.

Le régime moyen du Belge avant 1939 s'élevait à 2.725 calories nettes par jour et par tête d'habitant. Le rationnement belge effectif réalisé pendant la guerre 14-18 par la Commission for Relief in Belgium atteignit environ 2.280 calories par jour et par tête d'habitant.

Le rationnement théorique de 1.300 calories par tête d'habitant et par jour, imposé actuellement à la population belge, constitue le rationnement moyen le plus bas et le plus insuffisant qui ait jamais été imposé à une grande masse d'hommes, pendant une période prolongée.

Ce rationnement théorique se montre encore plus insuffisant au point de vue quantitatif et qualitatif lorsqu'on analyse les déficiences de ce rationnement chez les différentes catégories de sujets

a) femmes enceintes : le rationnement théorique met à la disposition de la femme enceinte 2.000 calories environ par jour (ration ordinaire + ration supplémentaire de lait et de pain), alors que ses besoins biologiques moyens atteignent 3.000 calories par jour environ. Si l'apport en hydrates de carbone est insuffisant, il y a par contre une insuffisance graves des protéines et des matières grasses. L'apport énergétique global montre une insuffisance d'environ 1.000 calories par jour. Remarquons que la ration mise théoriquement à la disposition de la femme enceinte se caractérise également par une insuffisance notable de l'apport en calcium, fer et vitamines lipopolubles. Souvent la future mère se voit obligée de céder une partie de sa ration aux autres membres du ménage sous-alimentés.

b) mères nourrices: la mère nourrice doit recevoir par jour, pour ses besoins et ceux de son enfant, 2.900 à 3.200 calories. Le rationnement théorique met à sa disposition par jour pendant les deux mois qui suivent son accouchement: son rationnement, le rationnement de son enfant et un rationnement supplémentaire, soit environ 4.000 calories; il lui est octroyé une ration totale d'environ 3.300 calories pendant les mois suivants. A condition que la mère puisse trouver tous les aliments auxquels les timbres de rationnement lui donnent droit, le

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nombre de calories exigé serait donc équilibré . Remarquons toutefois que bien souvent la mère ne peut obtenir certains aliments qui lui sont particulièrement indispensables: les graisses et la viande , et que très ouvent la mère se voit obligée de répartir ses aliments parmi les autres membres de la famille sous-alimentés.

c) <u>les nourrissons élevés artificiellement:</u> les nourrissons élevés au lait de vache reçoivent par leur rationnement actuel les quantités de lait et de farineux qui, si elles pouvaient être obtenues par les parents, seraient suffisantes.

d) <u>les enfants de 3 à 14 ans</u> : les enfants de 3 ans jusqu'à l'âge de 14 ans reçoivent théoriquement le même rationnement que les adultes plus 500 gr. de lait pour les enfants de 3 à 6 ans et 250 gr. de lait pour ceux de 6 à 14 ans. Cette ration, si les parents obtenaient tous les aliments auxquels les timbres donnent droit, serait suffisante pour les enfants de 3 à 12 ans, mais très insuffisante surtout en protéines(viandes) pour les enfants de 12 à 14 ans . Pendant la puberté les enfants doivent , en effet, avoir par jour un minimum de 2.000 calories ,dont un minimum de 80 à 90 gr. de protéines pour assurer leur besoin énergétique et leur croissance. Or la rationnement officiel leur donne théoriquement un maximum de 1.500 calories et 41 gr. de protéines par jour. Ajoutons-y la carence des acides aminés. La déficience du rationnement officiel est donc très marquée pour ces enfants de 12 à 14 ans, tant au point de vue quantitatif que qualitatif.

e) <u>les adolescents de 14 à 21 ans</u> : les adolescents de 14 à 21 ans ne reçoivent que le rationnement officiel de l'adulte, soit environ 1.300 calories par jour ,alors qu'ils ont besoin d'un minimum de 2.400 à 2.600 calories pour assurer leurs besoins énergétiques et leur croissance . Remarquons surtout la déficience très notable du rationnement en protéines(viande) et en graisses. L'adolescent a besoin par jour d'un minimum de 80 à 115 gr de protéines et de 80 à 100 gr de graisses par jour, alors que le rationnement officiel ne lui attribue que 33,5 gr de protéines et 18,5 gr de graisses par jour. Cette déficience en protéines et en graisses entraîne également une carence des vitamines A et D ,alors que le manque de pommes de terre et de légumes frais entraîne la carence des sels minéraux et de la vitamine C.

Il est à peine besoin de faire remarquer que cette sous-alimentation des enfants de 12 à 14 ans et des adolescents de 14 à 21 ans est particulièrement funeste et doit inévitablement avoir des conséquences que nous n'hésitons pas à qualifier de " tragiques " pour l'avenir de la jeunesse et, ainsi pour l'avenir de la nation.

f) les adultes : le rationnement théorique officiel de 1.300 calories environ par jour est totalement insuffisant, tant au point de vue quantitatif que qualitatif. L'adulte ne se livrant qu'à un travail physique très faible, a besoin d'au moins 2.300 calories par jour. Alors que pour les adultes la quantité journalière de protéines ne doit pas descendre en dessous de 1 gr de protéines par kilo de poids corporel, soit en moyenne 60 gr de protéines par jour, le rationnement théorique ne prévoit qu'un maximum de 33,5 gr. de protéines par jour. Remarquons que les protéines d'origine animal (viande) dont un minimum est indispensable pour la santé, sont surtout très déficientes. La quantité de substances graisseuses mise théoriquement à la disposition de l'adulte par le rationnement est également très insuffisante, au lieu de 50 à 80 gr de matières grasses nécessaires par jour, le rationnement théorique n'en fournit que 18,5 gr par jour. Ajoutons que la ration journalière de 225 gr de pain par personne est également très insuffisante, tenant compte surtout de la déficience de la ration officielle en protéines et en graisses.

En ce qui concerne les travailleurs manuels, dont les besoins énergétiques peuvent atteindre 4.000-5.000 calories par jour, des rations supplémentaires sont distribuées d'une manière irrégulière à certaines catégories. L'alimentation du travailleur manuel reste néanmoins en général encore très insuffisante.

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On aura pu remarquer que chaque fois que nous avons parlé de rationnement officiel imposé actuellement à la population belge, nous avons employé l'adjectif "théorique", ceci pour le motif que, dans la pratique et en fait, il est impossible d'obtenir les quantités de certains aliments fondamentaux auxquels la carte de rationnement donne droit.

Des enquêtes nombreuses faites dans différents milieux de la population belge, ainsi que les données transmises par les services officiels de distribution, mettent en évidence qu'en fait une partie très importante de la population belge est obligée de limiter son alimentation journalière moyenne à environ 1.000 calories.

Si le pain a été distribué, en général, d'une manière régulière à raison de 225 gr. par jour, il n'en est nullement de même des pommes de terre, de la viande, des matières grasses (beurre et margarine) et du lait.

(1941-1942. Depuis juin 1942, la ration de viande quotidienne est de 20 gr).

Alors que le rationnement théorique donne droit à 15 kgr de

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pommes de terre par personne et par mois, il fut distribué en fait dans les villes de 1 à 3 kgr de pommes de terre par personne et par mois. En ce qui concerne la viande,les distributions furent très irrégulières et n'atteignirent pas en moyenne,les 35 gr prévus par le rationnement théorique.
(1941-1942: les premiers mois du printemps et les derniers mois d'hiver ,la ration de pommes de terre a été pratiquement nulle .Une partie de la population avait cependant été en mesure de se constituer une provision représentant 15 kgrs par mois et par personne d'octobre à juin 1942.Malheureusement ,dans la plupart des cas, les pommes de terre étaient impropres à la consommation).

Remarquons que les produits alimentaires que la population pourrait encore se procurer sur le marché libre sont excessivement rares. Les produits alimentaires vendus sur le marché clandestin deviennent également rares et sont d'un prix si élevé que seuls quelques privilégiés peuvent s'en procurer. De ce fait, la population des grandes agglomérations est pratiquement obligée de se limiter aux produits alimentaires qui lui sont livrés , aliments dont le pouvoir énergétique ne dépasse pas en moyenne 1.000 calories par jour et par personne .

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Il est à noter que les milieux les plus touchés par la disette et par ses effets sont la petite et la moyenne bourgeoisie et non les milieux populaires. A ceux-ci vont tous les secours (ces secours ne sont que des palliatifs, mais la détresse de la population est si profonde que leur appoint est précieux). La plupart des familles ouvrières se livrent au trafic des denrées alimentaires, en retirent gros profits et suppléments au régime officiel). Enfin, les ouvriers de la grosse industrie,dont l'activité toute entière est consacrée aux occupants, bénéficient de salaires élevés, d'avantages matériels (rations supplémentaires) et de la priorité en matière de ravitaillement. De très nombreux ouvriers travaillent en Allemagne où ils jouissent d'un régime alimentaire suffisant et des salaires importants .Ces deux dernières catégories d'ouvriers forment une caste privilégiée à tous points de vue.

Les familles bourgeoises, à revenus fixes, ont vu diminuer de façon tragique leur pouvoir d achat. L'augmentation de traitement de 25% accordée aux employés (en compensation d'une semaine horaire plus élevée , exigée par les autorités occupantes) n'est pas proportionnée au coût réel de la vie dont l'écart avec les indices officiels est énorme. C'est dans cette partie de la population,tenue à un certain standing et ne s'adressant aux organisations officielles de secours que dans les cas les plus extrêmes,que se rencontre la misère la plus poignante.

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I. FUTURES-MERES.

ETAT SANITAIRE DES FEMMES ENCEINTES PENDANT LEUR GROSSESSE ET REPERCUSSION DE LA SITUATION ALIMENTAIRE ACTUELLE SUR L'ACCOUCHEMENT ET LES SUITES DE COUCHES IMMEDIATES. -

Extrait d'un rapport du Professeur Snock-clinique obstétricale de l' Université de Bruxelles.

1 - Il résulte de l'étude des dossiers de la clinique obstétricale que l'augmentation moyenne de poids des femmes enceintes, calculée au 4è mois de gestation jusqu'au terme de la grossesse et pour la période dite de paix, est de 6 kgs. 800.

Dans les mêmes conditions et pour la période dite de guerre, cette augmentation moyenne n'est plus que de 4 kgs. 600.

Une première remarque s'impose dès maintenant: en période de paix ,l'augmentation moyenne du poids des femmes enceintes, pour la classe sociale qui fréquentent le plus habituellement l'Hopital Universitaire St. Pierre , est inférieure au chiffre donné par les classiques et trouvé habituellement dans la classe aisée. On admet que le gain de poids pendant la grossesse est généralement égal à 1/5 du poids prégravidique. Il est courant en effet,de rencontrer une augmentation de poids de 10 à 12 kgs. pour une femme dont le poids prégravidique est de 60 à 65 kgs.

2. - Nous nous sommes demandés, en second lieu, s'il existait des différences de gain de poids, suivant qu'on s'adressait à des primipares, des secondipares; des tertipares ou des grandes multipares (4 enfants et plus).

Voici pour chacune de ces catégories les différences de poids, pour les deux périodes considérées :

TABLEAU I.

	1938-1939	1940-1941	Différence
Primipares	7 kgs. 700 (54)	4 kgs. 900 (94)	- 2 kgs. 800
Secondipares	6 kgs. 600 (33)	4 kgs. 200 (33)	- 2 kgs. 400
Tertipares	5 kgs. 700 (12)	4 kgs. 300 (21)	- 1 kg . 400
Quartipares et plus	5 kgs 900 (27)	4 kgs. 900 (30)	- 1 kg.

NB. Les chiffres entre parenthèses indiquent le nombre des cas qui ont servi à calculer les moyennes.

Il résulte des chiffres du tableau I :

a/ que si l'augmentation moyenne du poids des femmes enceintes fréquentant notre service hospitalier, en période de paix est en dessous des exigences physiologiques, le manque à gagner qui en apparait pour la période de guerre place les femmes enceintes en

point de vue pondéral, dans une situation nettement pathologique. Nous reviendrons encore sur ce point dans la troisième partie de notre rapport, quand nous envisagerons le poids des accouchées au moment où elles quittent la clinique .

b - dès maintenant toutefois et en tenant compte de ce que, pour la période de guerre, l'augmentation moyenne de poids, toutes catégories réunies, n'est que de 4 kgs 600, il convient de signaler que dans ces 4kgs 600, le poids du foetus intervient en moyenne, ainsi qu'il résulte des chiffres qui seront donnés plus loin, pour 3 kgs 300. Le poids moyen du placenta, suivant les données les plus classiques, doit être évalué dans ces conditions à 600 grs. environ et le poids du liquide amniotique à environ 700 grs soit un total pour l'oeuf et ses annexes de 4 kgs 630, c'est-à-dire l'augmentation moyenne de poids observée chez nos gestantes en 1940-1941.

Or, normalement la femme enceinte présente, pendante la grossesse, en outre, une rétention de liquide dans ses tissus d'environ 2 kgs., sans qu'il y ait apparition d'oedèmes. Enfin, dans des conditions alimentaires normales, l'accroissement du volume utérin, des glandes mammaires et du pannicule adipeux déterminent une nouvelle augmentation de poids de 2 kgs. à 2kgs. 500.

Il appara it des chiffres repris plus haut que le gain pondéral résultant de la rétention de liquide dans les tissus, ainsi que celui du à l'hypertrophie de volume utérin et des glandes mammaires, n'apparaît pas dans l'augmentation de poids observée actuellement chez les femmes enceintes. En effet, cette augmentation correspondant à peine au poids du foetus et de ses annexes, il faut donc admettre que l'hypertrophie mammaire, l'augmentation du poids de l'utérus gravide et la rétention de liquide qui se font en tout état de cause, cachent une perte de poids importante, la femme enceinte prélevant sur ses réserves en protides et en lipides des éléments indispensables, non seulement à l'élaboration du foetus et de ses annexes, mais aussi à l'hypertrophie des glandes mammaires et des organes génitaux internes.

3. - Voyons maintenant rapidement les répercussions que peut avoir la sous-alimentation sur la marche de l'accouchement et les suites de couches immédiates . Cette partie de notre enquête a porté sur 1054 cas en 1938-1939 et 1059 cas en 1940-1941. Les résultats en sont consignés ci-dessous:

TABLEAU II. voir page suivante.

TABLEAU II.

		1938-1939	1940-41	Observations.
Tension artérielle.	Mx	13	11	Mesures prises au Pachon lors de l'admission pour l'accouchement.
	Mn	7	6	
Fréquence des accouchements prématurés.		14%	15,4%	Nouveau-nés mesurant moins de 48 cm. à la naissance.
Fréquence de morts-nés après accouchements normaux		3,7%	1,4%	Mortinatalité des nouveau-nés à terme et nouveau-nés prématurés.
Fréquences d'interventions pour causes non mécaniques		3,3%	2,7%	C'est-à-dire longueur exagérée du travail due à l'épuisement ou la fatigue maternelle.
Fréquence des suites de couches fébriles.		10%	8,4%	----
Fréquence des Tuberculoses pulmonaires évolutives		0,2%	0,5%	Sont exclus les cas où la tuberculose pulmonaire évolutive diagnostiquée dans les trois premiers mois a justifié un avortement thérapeutique.
Fréquence des albumineries gravidiques simples.		6 %	2,6%	----
Fréquence d'éclampsies		0,3%	0,2%	----

La lecture de ce tableau montre une diminution moyenne nette de la tension artérielle, une augmentation considérable de la fréquence de la Tbc. pulmonaire évolutive entraînant dans la plupart des cas une mort rapide dans les suites de couches, et une augmentation très légère de la fréquence des naissances prématurées. Ce dernier point doit être attribué au fait que la sous-alimentation maternelle a également une action défavorable légère sur le développement de la taille du foetus , qui tend à diminuer. Ainsi la catégorie des enfants de moins de 48 cm. à la naissance a légèrement augmenté. Ceci a pour résultat d'augmenter le groupe des prématurés d'un certain nombre d enfants qui ont un poids relativement élevé à la naissance et dont les chances de survie sont donc meilleures. Une partie de l'amélioration observée pour la mortinatalité après les accouchements normaux et dystociques (3,7% en 1938-39 et 1,4% en 1940-41) est due certainement à ce fait.

Certains éléments de notre enquête ne paraissent pas modifiés de façon importante par les conditions alimentaires actuelles (fréquence des interventions obstétricales pour causes non mécaniques, fréquence des suites de couches fébriles).

Enfin, et ceci est également une notion classique, on sait qu'un régime pauvre en protides et en lipides diminue régulièrement la fréquence et la gravité des albuminuries et des éclampsies de la gestation. Ces faits se retrouvent dans les chiffres repris dans le tableau II.

En résumé :

Nous dirons que la sous-alimentation a surtout une action défavorable sur l'évolution rapide des lésions de tuberculose pulmonaire, dont la fréquence à plus que doublé depuis la guerre. Il importe de souligner qu'il s'agit pour la plus grande part de ces cas de malades qui ont toutes été radioscopiées, voire radiographiées au cours des examens prénataux sans qu'on ait pu déceler lors de ces examens des signes évolutifs de l'affection.

NOTES SUR L'ETAT GENERAL DES ACCOUCHEES AU MOMENT OU CELLES-CI QUITTENT LA CLINIQUE.

Pour les années 1938-1939, nous ne disposons pas de documents valables sur le poids des accouchées lors de leur départ de la Maternité . La pesée au départ n'était faite à cette époque que pour des cas spéciaux, tels que : éclampsies, oedèmes gravidiques, cardiaques, tuberculeuses, etc.

Néanmoins , depuis quelques semaines , nous avons fait peser toutes les sortantes afin de pouvoir juger si leur poids, dix jours après l'accouchement , était supérieur , égal ou inférieur au poids relevé lors d'une

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première pesée, soit celle du 4è mois de grossesse.

Ce dernier poids peut d'ailleurs être considéré, pour la plupart des cas, comme très comparable au poids prégravidique.

On sait, par ailleurs, que des recherches analogues faites sur un grand nombre d'individus soumis à une alimentation suffisante et dans des conditions de vie normale ont montré qu'après l'accouchement, la primipare possède un bénéfice pondéral de 1 kg. 500 à 2 kgs. environ. (Stander et Pastore: 2.502 cas de femmes enceintes). Ce bénéfice de poids va en diminuant progressivement avec la multiparité.

Voici quelques résultats moyens recueillis chez 30 de nos parturientes. Il s'agissait de cas surveillés dès le début de leur grossesse, qui ont accouché normalement et à terme et pour lesquels les suites de couches ont été apyrétiques.

TABLEAU IV.

Nombre de cas	Poids moyen au 4è mois de grossesse	Poids moyen lors de l'accouchement	Poids moyen du foetus et de ses annexes.	Poids moyen au 10è jour du post-partum
30	55 kgs. 700	61 kgs 350	4 kgs 800	54 kgs 850

A titre de comparaison, nous reproduisons ci-dessous les chiffres extraits du travail de Stander et Pastore : (Am. G. of Obst. and Gyn. T. 39- p. 928-937-1940 - Weight-change during pregnancy and puerperium.

TABLEAU V.

	Gain pondéral gravidique moyen	Perte moyenne de poids lors de l'accouchement (foetus et annexes)	Perte moyenne de poids pendant les 10 lers jours du post-partum	Perte moyenne de poids ultérieurement (de semaine du post-partum),
Stander et Pastore (2.502 cas)	13.960 grs	5.340 grs	2.300 grs.	630 grs. pas de renseignements pour le moment
Bruxelles (30 cas): Sept. oct. 41.	5.650 grs.	4.800 grs.	1.700 grs.	

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Ainsi donc, dès le 10è jour du post-partum, nos accouchées ont déjà un poids inférieur de 850 grs. au poids prévravidique. Et à ce moment, l'évacuation des liquides interstitiels n'est pas encore terminée, tandis que l'involution utérine se poursuit toujours. Une nouvelle perte de poids de 5 à 500 grs. au grand minimum est très vraisemblable dans les semaines suivantes. Mais nous ne disposons pas actuellement de renseignements précis sur ce point. Tandis que Bender et Pastore constatent que leurs anciennes accouchées conservent un bénéfice pondéral de près de 2 kgs (1 kg. 800) six semaines après l'accouchement et après une perte moyenne de 8 kgs. 320, les femmes qui fréquentent la Maternité de Bruxelles présentent dès le 10è jour du post-partum un déficit pondéral de 850 grs. et leur chute de poids n'est pas encore terminée à ce moment là.

RESUME ET CONCLUSIONS. -

Ces constatations nous paraissent souligner à suffisance le point que nous soulignions dans la première partie de ce rapport, à savoir que les femmes enceintes appartenant aux classes sociales les plus touchées par les restrictions alimentaires actuelles assurent le développement de leur foetus au détriment de leur réserve prégravidique et du bénéfice pondéral qu'elles devraient normalement présenter après la grossesse.

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Des rapports aux conclusions semblables ont été établis par les Docteurs SCHOKAERT(Louvain) BROUHA (Liége),VAN DAMME et VEREECKEN - GOOSSENS (Gand). Ils furent réunis par les soins du Professeur Docteur G.HEYMANS, Chef du Département "Médecine et Hygiène" du Comité Exécutif Central du Secours d'Hiver, qui formula les conclusions suivantes:

Le Département "Médecine et Hygiène" du Comité Exécutif Central du Secours d'Hiver,se basant sur les avis et les rapports des autorités médicales compétentes,estime qu'il est de son devoir d'insister une fois de plus sur la nécessité absolue d'octroyer aux futures mères des rations supplémentaires.

Le rationnement actuel met à la disposition de la femme enceinte 2000 calories environ par jour (ration ordinaire plus rations supplémentaires de lait et de pain), alors que les besoins biologiques moyens de la femme enceinte atteignent 2600 calories pendant les six premiers mois de la grossesse et se stabilisent entre 2600 et 3000 calories par jour pendant les trois derniers mois de la grossesse.-

Le rationnement officiel actuel établit donc un déficit alimentaire très important chez la future mère, déficit alimentaire qui atteint au point de vue énergétique global de 600 à 1000 calories par jour, soit un déficit alimentaire d'environ 35%.-

L'alimentation de la femme enceinte doit comprendre,au point de vue qualitatif ,80 à 100 grammes d'albumines, 60 à 100 grammes de graisses et 300 à 400 grammes d'hydrates de carbone par jour.

Le rationnement officiel actuel fournit à la future mère environ grammes d'albumines, 50 grammes de graisses et 340 grammes d'hydrates de carbone, soit donc un déficit surtout très marqué pour les albumines et pour les graisses. Ce déficit alimentaire qualitatif est d'autant plus grave qu'il atteint surtout les matériaux nutritifs les plus importants pour la future mère et son enfant.-

Le déficit alimentaire quantitatif et qualitatif établi par le rationnement officiel actuel pour la fururе mère, va à l'encontre des lois biologiques les plus fondamentales. Il est impossible, en effet, que la femme enceinte conserve la santé et donne le jour à un enfant normal, si les aliments qui lui sont absolument indispensables ne sont pas mis à sa disposition. -

Il est donc absolument nécessaire et urgent pour l'avenir de la race, que des suppléments quantitatifs et qualitatifs soient ajoutés à la ration alimentaire actuelle de la femme enceinte.-

Le rationnement actuel - juillet 1942 - de la femme enceinte est de 1528 calories aux 4e, 5e et 6e mois de la grossesse; de 1688 calories du 7e mois à l'accouchement. Le rationnement des accouchées est de 1678 calories jusqu'à 2 mois après l'accouchement; de 1488 calories, le 3e mois après l'accouchement; de 1112 calories les 4e, 5e et 6e mois suivant l'accouchement.-

Les futures mères et les accouchées ont droit depuis mars 1942 à des rations supplémentaires de pain, de viande, et de lait. De temps à autre, des oeufs leur sont vendus au prix officiel. Par l'intermédiaire de l'Oeuvre Nationale de l'Enfance, le Comité Mixte de Répartition des Secours à la Belgique leur distribue une blite de 500 gr. de Banacao chaque mois et le Secours d'Hiver, des vitamines A et D ainsi que des produits ferreux et:

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et calciques. Enfin,les femmes enceintes, bénéficiaires du Secours d'Hiver ont droit à des repas et des collations dans les cantines maternelles, repas et collations préparés surtout à l'aide des vivres mis à la disposition du Secours d'Hiver par le C.M.R.B. (Des timbres ne sont réclamés que pour les vivres qui ne proviennent pas du C.M.R.B.). Le Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Ravitaillement a pu mettre à la disposition des femmes enceintes, une certaine quantité de féculents, des timbres étaient toutefois requis pour ceux-ci.

2. NOUVEAU-NES.

ETUDE DU POIDS MOYEN DES NOUVEAU-NES A TERRE (nous n'avons retenu que les enfants mesurant au moins 48 cm. à la naissance) POUR LES PERIODES DE PAIX ET DE GUERRE.-

1°- En utilisant pour ce calcul statistique la méthode définie brièvement au début de ce rapport, nous constatons que pour 808 nouveau-nés, pour la période dite de paix, le poids moyen à la naissance est de 3 kgs. 390 (a - les mesures de poids sont faites à 10 grs. près - b - la grande majorité des mère sont des primipares) et que pour 946 nouveau-nés de la période de guerre,le poids moyen est de 3 kgs.330 (a - et b- voir plus haut) avec une erreur possible de plus ou moins 15 grs. pour la première catégorie et de plus ou moins 13 grs.pour la seconde catégorie . Ces 60 grs. de différence en défaveur des nouveau-nés de la période dite de guerre ne paraissent pas, à première vue, constituer un préjudice important à charge des nouveau-nés de cette période. Si toutefois on établit des courbes ingégrales représentant les observations faites dans ces deux catégories, on constate qu'il y a pour le groupe des nouveau-nés de guerre un décalage global vers des poids plus faibles.-

2°- Nous donnons ci-après le détail des poids des nouveau-nés suivant qu'il s'agit d'enfants issus de primipares, de secondipares, de tertipares, de quartipares et plus.-

TABLEAU VI

	1938-1939	1940-1941	Différence.
Primipares	3 kgs. 250 (100)	3 kgs. 250 (100)	.....
Secondipares	3 kgs. 440 (100)	3 kgs. 240 (100)	- 200 grs.
Tertipares	3 kgs. 440 (100)	3 kgs. 370 (100)	- 70 grs.
Quartipares et plus	3 kgs. 530 (194)	3 kgs. 440 (147)	- 90 grs.

N.B.- Les chiffres entre parenthèses indiquent le nombre de cas qui ont servi pour chaque catégorie à ces calculs.

Il résulte de la lecture du tableau VI qu'il ne semble pas y avoir de rapport bien évident entre la parité d'une part, et les différences de poids des nouveau-nés d'autre part.

De plus, si on compare les chiffres obtenus dans le tableau VI avec ceux relevés dans le tableau 1, on constate que chez les primipares, par exemple, pour un manque à gagner de poids maternel de 2kgs. 800, le poids du nouveau-né demeure inchangé,- que chez les secondipares, pour un manque à gagner de poids maternel de 2kgs.400, il existe une différence de 200 grs. en défaveur des nouveau-nés pendant la période de guerre,- que chez les tertipares, pour un manque à gagner de 1kg. 400 cette différence dans le poids du nouveau-né n'est plus que de

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70 grs. et que pour les quartipares et plus, pour un manque à gagner de 1 kg., la différence en défaveur du nouveau-né de la période de guerre est de 90 grs.

Il n'est donc pas possible de trouver dans ces chiffres la preuve d'une relation quelconque entre le déficit dans le gain pondéral gravidique chez la mère et la légère diminution de poids que présentent les enfants au moment de la naissance (il suffit, par exemple, de comparer les chiffres respectifs obtenus chez les primipares et les secondipares.-

Ce fait ne doit pas nous surprendre puisqu'il est actuellement admis que d'une façon générale l'apport d'élément nutritif au foetus se fait au travers du placenta, pour la plupart de ces éléments tout au moins et pour les plus importants d'entre eux, suivant un processus de simple diffusion; la solution la plus concentrée (maternelle) diffusant vers la solution la moins concentrée (foetale). Pour que cette diffusion ne se fasse plus ou se fasse en sens inverse, il faudrait imaginer des conditions d'alimentation de la mère telles que celle-ci se trouverait dans un état d'inanition des plus profonds incompatible, d'ailleurs avec l'existence de fonctions genitales normale. Néanmoins, il n'est pas douteux qu'actuellement -et ceci résulte de la première partie de notre rapport - si nos nouveau-nés ont encore un poids de départ à peine inférieur à celui rencontré pendant la période de paix, c'est au prix pour la mère d'une véritable spoliation organique qui porte, d'une manière les réserves qu'elle devrait normalement constituer en prévision à l'occasion de sa grossesse.-

RESUME ET CONCLUSIONS.-

Pour ce qui concerne les nouveau-nés, puisque nous avons constaté un fort manque à gagner pondéral chez les mères et un léger mais net affaisement du poids des nouveau-nés, nous pouvons dire que nous nous trouvons actuellement dans une zone de transition où la mère n'ayant plus les éléments nutritifs indispensables, l'enfant commence à pâtir de la carence en matériaux de construction.-

3. ENFANTS de 0 à 6 ANS.

"D'une manière générale, la petite enfance n'a pas autant souffert d'insuffisance alimentaire que la grande enfance et l'adolescence. Les nourrissons ont surtout pâti de la guerre quant à la qualité des soins qui leur sont nécessaires. La fréquence et la longueur des absences de la maman motivées par les courses du ravitaillement, ont été nettement préjudiciables à la santé des bébés, soit qu'ils étaient confiés à des personnes inexpertes, soit qu'ils accompagnaient leur mère.

Pendant l'hiver 1941-1942, le manque de charbon a créé des situations lamentables pour les tout-petits.-

Au point de vue alimentaire, jusqu'en automne 1941, les bébés n'ont pas eu à souffrir, sauf exception. Depuis lors, la rareté et la qualité variable du lait dans les agglomérations urbaines, l'absence quasi totale de légumes et de fruits frais, certaines difficultés d'approvisionnement en farineux ont provoqué des perturbations dans l'équilibre nutritif.-

Chez les nourrissons atteints de troubles digestifs, la disparition des laits modifiés (babeurre, lait en poudre demi-gras) et des maltodextrines préparées à base de céréales (la fécule de pomme de terre qui sert à la fabrication de Vigmaltose I est complètement déminéralisée) a singulièrement réduit nos moyens thérapeutique.

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Cependant, il ne semble pas que la fréquence des dyspepsies graves ait été tellement plus grande."

NOTE du Dr. GAROT - Conseiller Médical Provincial de l'Oeuvre Nationale de l'Enfance (Liége et Luxembourg) Juin 1942.

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" 1°- Aucun cas d'oedème de famine n'a été signalé. Les examens de l'Inspection Scolaire et des Consultations de nourrissons de 2 à 6 ans montrent que près de 75 % d'enfants sont en dessous du poids normal.-

2°- L'anémie est plus fréquente qu'avant surtout dans les villes et dans les centres industriels. La cause réside dans la pénurie de légumes et de fruits.-

3°- Le scorbut et le rachitisme ne sont pas plus développés qu'avant guerre.-

4°- Les infections cutanés sont plus fréquentes par suite du manque de soins de propretés dus à la disparition du savon. La gale surtout fait des ravages dans les écoles.-

5°- Tous les enfants de l'O.N.E. bénéficient de la distribution de vitamines D. et vitamines C, celle-ci en quantité moindre.-

6°- Il y a augmentation des affections pulmonaires chez les enfants. Celle-ci est due au manque de charbon (mai) et une insuffisance de vêtements et de chaussures.-

D'une façon générale, les enfants de 0 à 2 ans ne souffrent pas de l'état actuel sauf dans les crêches ou pouponnières mais à partir de 2 ans jusqu'à la puberté les restrictions alimentaires se font sentir fortement, comme les statistiques le prouvent."

NOTE.-du Dr. DELIRE, Conseiller Médical Provincial de l'Oeuvre Nationale de l'Enfance (Hainaut) juin 1942.-

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Voici quelques notes encore de médecins attachés aux consultations de nourrissons et aux consultations pour enfants âgés de 3 à 6 ans, de l'Oeuvre Nationale de l'Enfance.

"Notons en premier lieu le nombre énorme de décès... Remarquons qu'en règle générale les enfants décédés appartiennent presque tous à la catégorie des enfants nourris artificiellement, nous avons toutefois eu à déplorer également la perte de bébés nourris par la mère .... Le problème alimentaire se pose d'une manière angoissante.... Les pommes de terre ont été pratiquement absentes ces dernières semaines.... Beaucoup d'hommes travaillant au dehors emportent, dès le matin, leur ration entière et, évidemment, au retour se servent à souper sur les rations du restant de la famille....."

"L'examen d'un groupe d'enfants de 3 à 6 ans a montré que:

53 % ont un poids insuffisant et une taille insuffisante;
14 % " " " " " " exagérée;
11 % " " " normal " " insuffisante;
22 % sont normaux."

" Les statistiques portant sur les 107 enfants de 3 à 6 ans d'une consultation montrent que 56 % des enfants accusent une insuffisance de croissance et 42 % ont un poids ou une taille insuffisants".-

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-"Dans une autre consultation, sur 264 enfants examinés, 35 % des enfants ont un poids inférieur à la normale; cette situation due à la pénurie des denrées alimentaires ne peut durer sans risquer de compromettre l'avenir de la race".

L'examen des nourissons d'une consultation décela 45 % de rachitiques.-

MORTALITE INFANTILE.

La mortalité Infantile qui était de 7.25 % en 1938 s'est accrue de 7,35 % en 1939 à 8.53 % en 1940 et à 8.42 % en 1941 (morts-nés et enfants présentés sans vie, non compris.)-

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4. ENFANTS d'AGE SCOLAIRE.

Nous reproduisons ci-dessous les conclusions du rapport établi par M.le Prof.JACQUEMYNS pour le Service des enquêtes de l'Institut de Sociologie Solvay. (1941).-

"Dans un grand nombre de familles, même avec les aliments non rationnés, on n'obtient pas 1000 calories au lieu des 2725 calories nettes par jour et par tête d'habitant du régime moyen du Belge avant 1939".-

Il y a incontestablement sous-alimentation et dysalimentation.

La très grande majorité des enfants,même parmi ceux dont la couverture des besoins énergétiques,tout en étant insuffisante, est le mieux assurée, ont un régime dont les apports en principes protecteurs sont manifestement insuffisants.Il y a chez la quasi totalité des enfants déséquilibre du régime alimentaire ou dysalimentation.-

On sait que lorsque l'organisme est complètement privé des principes nutritifs protecteurs, il s'ensuit des maladies par carence grave. Or il y a un grand nombre de ces cas de carence grave.-

Chez presque tous les enfants,non frappés de carence grave, on observe des manifestations morbides, atténuées, latentespeu apparentes, dues à une carence partielle de ces principes. Il y a certainement beaucoup de ces états de précarence à cause précisément du manque des principes protecteurs qui "protégent l'organisme contre l'incidence de certaines manifestations pathologiques plus ou moins prononcées et qui favorisent notamment une croissance normale des organismes jeunes. La croissance est fortement ralentie chez certains enfants.-

Les chutes de poids sont particulièrement nombreuses dans certaines écoles.-

Chez beaucoup de sujet observés, l'indice de vitalité (indice de Pirquet) révèle une situation désastreuse.-

On m'a signalé de nombreux cas de syncopes, notamment chez les enfants de 13 à 18 ans. Chez les plus jeunes, il y a eu des vomissements. A remarquer que si dans certaines écoles payantes(N.de l'O.N.E.Le rapport a été établi en 1941) la situation est meilleure, il en est d'autres qui reçoivent les enfants de la petite

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bourgeoisie et notamment des employés où la situation n'est pas moins dramatique que dans les écoles des quartiers populaires.- Dans certaines de ces dernières, on est frappé de voir un état de nutrition assez satisfaisant d'enfants appartenant en apparence aux classes les plus pauvres.

Il est certain que les enfants de plus de 14 ans souffrent le plus de la sous-alimentation."

Etude des répercussions du régime alimentaire actuel sur la population scolaire de la ville de Bruxelles.

L'Association des Caisses d'Allocations familiales a fait procéder à une enquête sur 22.000 enfants de 10.000 familles habitant une grande ville, une agglomération industrielle ou des régions agricoles (1941). Les affections suivantes on été relevées parmi ces enfants:

Débilité		4.225	ou 20 %
Prétuberculose		282	5,5%
Tuberculose		164	3 %
	Ganglionnaire 38		
	Ostéo-articulaire 43		
	Pulmonaire 83		
Adénopathies d'origine indéterminée (tuberculeuses ou non)		167	
Maladies pulmonaires non tuberculeuses		68	
Maladies cardiaques		16	
Maladies digestives		40	
Maladies dermatologiques (souvent infectieuses:pyodermites,etc)		88	
Maladies nerveuses		36	
Maladies infectieuses (coqueluche, scarlatine,diphtérie,rhum.AA.etc.		28	
Maladies oculaires		13	
Maladies O.R.L.		16	
Maladies des glandes endocrines		5	
Rachitisme (avitaminose D.)		108	
Oedèmes de famine (déficience en protéines)		6	
Avitaminoses indéterminées		7	
		========	
		5.269	ou 24 %

Le Dr. Clerens auteur de cette étude précise que sont considérés comme prétuberculeux les enfants vivant en milieu contaminé. Les enfants classés comme débiles sont ceux chez lesquels on a relevé une ou plusieurs parmi les indications suivantes: insuffisance pondérale manifeste, amaigrissement important et récent; anémie; vertiges et tendances syncopales,asthénie et fatigabilité rapide soit au jeu,soit à l'école. "Les cas de tuberculose sont nettement en augmentation, c'est ainsi que dans une première statistique, nous avions rencontré 14 cas d'adénopathie tuberculeuse et la statistique portant sur les quatre derniers mois de l'année comporte 24 cas. De même les adénopathies non déterminées, c'est à dire tuberculeuses ou non, étaient au nombre de 43; elles sont au nombre de 124 pour la seconde partie de l'année.-

Nous avons pu relever dans les mêmes proportions, une augmentation importante des maladies infectieuses, en général,parmi lesquelles se rencontrent essentiellement les entérites,les pyodermites, le rhumatisme articulaire aigu et la coqueluche. Ces infections semblent devoir être attribuées au moins en partie à la déficience en vitamine C. Parmi les avitaminoses, il y a lieu de

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signaler tout particulièrement les nombreux cas de rachitisme rencontrés (108). D'autre part,les six cas d'oedèmes de famine sont naturellement en rapport avec une insuffisance alimentaire en protéines (viande). L'examen statistique de la morbidité suivant l'âge et le lieu d'habitation des enfants nous conduit à des résultats très importants. Cette morbidité passe de 13 à 20% suivant qu'il s'agit d'enfants en dessous ou au dessus de 6 ans, soit une augmentation de 50% des cas. Cette augmentation est en rapport direct avec l'insuffisance du rationnement.-

Lorsque nous examinons, d'autre part, la morbidité suivant le lieu d'habitation des familles, nous constatons tout d'abord qu'elle représente globalement 14% des enfants examinés en zone agricole et 37% des enfants examinés en zone industrielle.-

Cette triste réalité se vérifie par l'examen des fiches médicales des adolescents au travail - tutelle sanitaire - A cette période de la vie où la croissance et le poids devraient être en progression presque constante, nous relevons des cas très nombreux d'amaigrissement important.-

N.B. Les statistiques ci-dessus ont été dressées d'après des fiches provenant de la partie flamande du pays. La situation alimentaire des régions industrielles wallonnes (bassin de Liége, de Mons et de Charleroi) étant plus grave,les pourcentages cités par le Dr. Clerens sont en dessous de la réalité.-

"En résumé, conclut le Dr. Clerens, une situation sanitaire déplorable: 25% d'enfants malades, 37% de malades ou débiles dans les agglomérations industrielles, une augmentation rapide des cas de tuberculose, des perspectives d'avenir de plus en plus sombres, voilà le bilan tragique pour l'année 1941. De plus comme si la famine et la maladie ne suffisaient point à nos malheurs voilà le spectre tragique d'un hiver glacial sans charbon qui vient augmenter encore la détresse de notre enfance souffrante. En regard de tout cela, des améliorations fragmentaires, des suppléments de fortune, des solutions insuffisantes."

- Enquête sur l'état sanitaire de l'Enfance pendant l'année 1941 par le Dr. Clerens des Hôpitaux de Bruxelles - Association des Caisses d'Allocations Familiales.-

Les considérations ci-dessous sont extraites d'une étude faite par le Dr. Sillevaerts sur les écoliers de Forest.-

"Il convient de signaler l'inaptitude générale au travail intellectuel des enfants. Les élèves ont beaucoup de mal à fixer leur attention pendant toute la durée des cours. Les meilleurs éléments de la classe semblent en déficit de compréhension: quelques uns s'en rendent nettement compte. Les cotes obtenues aux compositions et aux examens sont en régression générale, surtout en mathématiques. Aux récréations, les élèves même les plus bruyants et les plus remuants, font preuve de calme; beaucoup d'enfants ne jouent même plus, restent assis et somnolents.-

La même constatation a été faite dans les écolestechniques et professionnelles. Ainsi qu'à l'usine où le rendement a également signalé une légère recrudescence des accidents du travail, dus presque tous au défaut d'attention ou à la négligence du personnel. L'apathie et le manque d'entrain au travail sont généraux, la durée du sommeil est plus prolongée que d'habitude, beaucoup d'ouvriers somnolent et même dorment profondément pendant le repos de midi.-

Les évanouissements,les tendances syncopales, les pâleurs subites sont fréquentes tant à l'école qu'à l'usine.-

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Un examen effectué sur un groupe d'enfants de 6 à 14 ans a montré que:

42 % ont un poids et une taille en dessous de la normale;
41 % ontun poids insuffisant et une taille supérieure à la normale;
1 % ont un poids normal et une taille insuffisante;
16 % sont normaux. (1941).

Colonies pour enfants débiles.

Les enfants actuellement accueillis dans les colonies pour enfants débiles de l'Oeuvre Nationale de l'Enfance présentant, à leur arrivée, un degré de débilité infiniment plus marqué qu'avant la guerre.-

A la rentrée du contingent de janvier 1942, ces enfants ont pu être classés comme suit:

profondément débiles	56,7 %
débiles	42,5 %
légèrement débiles	0,8 %

Avril 1942:

profondément débiles	50 %
débiles	50 %

En cet été 1942, les colonies de l'O.N.E. qui accueillaient autrefois surtout des enfants de condition modeste, remarquent à présent parmi leurs protégés un nombre croissant d'enfants appartenant à des familles d'un standing social plus élevé. A cet égard, citons le témoignage des dirigeants des meilleurs collèges du pays: 80 à 90 % de leurs élèves qui appartiennent le plus souvent à des familles très aisées sont débiles, sous-alimentés. Parmi ces familles, il en est qui connaissent à présent une réelle offrant un séjour de vacances reconstituant à leurs enfants. Plusieurs centaines de colonies nouvelles se sont créées cet été accueillant plus de 50.000 enfants.- Les enfants très débiles qui sont reçus dans ces colonies temporaires ou permanentes - après une sélection que les difficultés d'approvisionnement et le trop grand nombre de demande contraint à être rigoureuse - bénéficient presque tous d'un rationnement double et d'un supplément de vivres -relevés sur les approvisionnements répartis par le C.M.R.B. On ne saurait assez insister sur l'importance vitale que présentent ces vivres réservés à la partie la plus exposée de la population et que les dirigeants d'oeuvres, de cantines, de colonies, attendent avec une réelle anxiété.-

5.ADOLESCENTS.

"De l'avis unanime des médecins, les jeunes gens de 14 à 18 ans se trouvent actuellement, par suite de l'insuffisance alimentaire, dans une situation particulièrement grave. Quelques chiffres des poids de l'Ecole des Arts et Métiers marquent des pertes considérables. Généralement 50% des sujets sont déficitaires. Quelques uns ont perdu 5 à 6 kg. pendant l'automne 1940.

On signale de nombreux cas d'aménorrhée chez les jeunes filles comme suite à la sous alimentation.-

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Les adolescents sont particulièrement menacés par la tuberculose"

- rapport du Département Médecine et Hygiène du Secours d'Hiver - juin 1941.-

"Théoriquement, ces jeunes gens reçoivent la même ration que les adultes, pratiquement, ils participent à la ration moyenne du ménage. Et si parfois les parents consentent à de très réels sacrifices pour céder une part de leur ravitaillement à leurs enfants, le plus fréquemment et chaque fois qu'ils sont employés hors de l'habitation familiale, ils tombent sous un régime alimentaire tout-à fait spécial. Si en effet,les adolescents en âge d'école peuvent être facilement touchés par distribuer à la population scolaire de toutes les écoles primaires: soupe, lait, collation (C.M. R.B.), vitamines, il n'en est plus ainsi pour les adolescents qui étant en apprentissage ou déjà au travail ne fréquentent plus les écoles. Chez la plupart d'entre eux la ration de pain de 225 gr. déjà plus ou moins entamée et parfois très sérieusement par le repas du matin, constitue la presque totalité du repas de midi pris à l'usine; les plus favorisés bénéficient d'une soupe distribuée sur place et qui, malgré sa valeur calorigène de plus ou moins 200 calories, n'équivaut généralement pas au repas pris à domicile.-

La situation de ces jeunes gens est des plus critiques, la plupart ont beaucoup maigri et chez 40% des jeunes filles de 14 à 17 ans, les règles ont complètement disparu. Ces organismes en voie d'évolution et de développement sont tous en déficit alimentaire, surtout au point de vue des matières protéiques. Il y a là pour l'avenir de la race non plus une menace,mais un facteur grave de dégénérescence auquel il convient de faire l'impossible pour parer au plus tôt.- A remarquer l'inquiétude générale de toutes les classes de la population sur le sort lamentable des adolscents de 14 à 18 ans.-

- Rapport du Dr. Sillevaerts sur la situation des adolscents à Forest.

6. ADULTES

Une enquête faite par le Dr. SLOSSE sur 1.000 personnes (ville et campagne) montre que dès le mois d'octobre le déficit alimentaire était notable. La masse de la population belge est incapable de se procurer, par quelque procédé que ce soit,le supplément énergétique qui serait de nature à combler le déficit de la ration officielle. La morbidité du pays va en augmentant et ainsi que cela s'est passé lors de la guerre 1914-1918, on constate une recrudescence de la tuberculose.-

Le Dr. Brull, Professeur de médecine interne à l'Université de Liége, communique en février 1941 les constatations suivantes:

"Notre population de l'agglomération liégeoise n'a obtenu ces quatre derniers mois qu'un kilo de pommes de terre par tête et par mois, soit 30 gr. par jour (au lieu de 500 gr. prévus par le rationnement officiel).

Il n'y a plus de viande, plus de beurre, pas de lait,sauf pour les nourrissons, quelques malades et les vieillards de plus de 80 ans, et le plus souvent pas de féculents.-

Ceux qui ne sont pas assez riches,assez jeunes et débrouillards pour acheter sur le marché noir, ou qui n'avaient pas de réserves disposent d'environ 1.000 calories par jour (juin 1941).

.../

Nous constatons:

1) un amaigrissement presque général de 5 à 15 kilos, voire plus, parfois aussi pas de perte de poids mais un certain degré d'état précedémateux;

2) l'état misérable des vieillards ou des éclopés vivant isolés ainsi que les familles dans lesquelles il y a plusieurs chômeurs;

3) la ruée pour obtenir des certificats médicaux sous tous les prétextes, avec l'illusion de trouver des suppléments alimentaires.-

Le Rapport Général de la Ligue Nationale Belge contre la Tuberculose signale à cet égard:

> -Ce qui aujourd'hui constitue la masse, affluant dans nos consultations, c'est le nombre imposant des malheureux qui, privés d'aliments, tournent leurs regards vers nos institutions, espérant que nous apporterons un soulagement à leur faim. Hélas, nous sommes totalement impuissants à faire à ce propos oeuvre utile. C'est avec des paroles d'encouragement que le médecin est obligé d'opposer un pénible refus à leur demande pourtant si légitime.-

4) L'apparition sporadique, depuis janvier, de cas de maladies des oedèmes. Au début, on en voyait un ou deux par semaine, maintenant il arrive qu'on voit trois ou quatre fois le même cas par jour. Ce ne sont pas encore les jeunes, mais presque tous les hommes d'âge moyen ou avancé, chômeurs ou pensionnés.-

Nous redoutons surtout leur accroissement rapide dans les semaines à venir. Il s'agit chaque fois d'individus d'abord fortement amaigris; n'ayant plus mangé les dernières semaines que la ration de pain réglementaire, 5 gr. de margarine, et 2-3 kilos de rutabagas, navets ou carottes."

Le Dr. Paul GOVAERTS, Professeur de médecine interne à l'Université de Bruxelles, communique les observations suivantes:

" Les observations portant sur des sujets qui étaient bien portants avant la période des restrictions alimentaires, sont peut-être plus importantes que celles concernant les malades, puisqu'elles intéressent l'ensemble de la population.-

A ce point de vue, on peut déclarer qu'il existe en ce moment chez tous les adultes de Bruxelles (notre observation ne s'étend guère aux habitants des campagnes) un amaigrissement très net variant de 5 à 20 kgs. Cette situation n'est pas faite pour surprendre si l'on considère que dès octobre 1940 la ration officielle correspondait à 1.480 calories et que dans les derniers mois elle ne dépassait pas 1.300 calories. Encore faut-il noter que ces chiffres sont purement théoriques puisque cette ration de 1.300 calories suppose que chaque individu dispose de 500 gr. de pommes de terre et de 35 gr. de viande par jour. Or, au cours de ces derniers mois, la distribution réelle n'a été que de 130 gr. de pommes de terre par jour au maximum. En outre, la viande, la graisse et les féculents ont été totalement introuvables pour une grande partie de la population pendant ce laps de temps.

Ces circonstances ont déterminé des troubles nutritifs importants. Ceux-ci se marquent surtout chez deux catégories de sujets.-

.../

a) d'une part on observe chez les enfants à la période de la puberté une diminution de poids qui contraste avec l'augmentation physiologique existant à cette période de la vie et qui ne manquera pas d'exercer une influence funeste sur la résistance et le développement ultérieur de ces sujets;

b) D'autre part, depuis deux mois environ, nous avons pu observer des cas d'oedèmes de famine, qui, dans les tous derniers temps se sont multipliés d'une manière telle que journellement il s'en présente à la consultation externe ou dans les salles de l'Hôpital Universitaire St.Pierre. Ces cas d'oedèmes de famine ne sont nullement limités aux indigents; nous en avons vu survenir notamment dans le personnel subalterne de l'hôpital. Ils sont particulièrement fréquents chez les sujets ayant dépassé la cinquantaine, mais on en rencontre cependant chez les individus dont l'âge ne dépasse pas 35 ans.

Dans ces divers cas d'oedème de famine, on observe une diminution extrêmement marquée des protéines sanguines, réduction qui porte en ordre principal sur la sérumalbumine; c'est là le résultat direct de l'insuffisance très grande des protéines ingérées.-

Jusqu'ici nous avons pu observer deux sujets qui, du fait d'insuffisance alimentaire, sont arrivés à l'hôpital dans un état de dénutrition tel qu'ils sont morts au bout de quelques heures. Chez l'un d'entre eux, la glycémie était tombée au taux de 8 centigrammes par litre. (Note de l'O.N.E. Avant juin 1941. Depuis la situation s'est aggravée, et des statistiques nouvelles sont en vue d'élaboration.)-

Il est à noter enfin que même les grandes administrations hospitalières qui disposent de certaines facilités de ravitaillement, ne parviennent pas à fournir au personnel infirmier interne une ration alimentaire suffisante.-

L'un de mes collaborateurs, le Dr. MAHAUX, a calculé à diverses reprises la ration dont disposent les infirmières de l'hôpital. Celle-ci a varié entre 1.000 et 1.200 calories pour les infirmières faisant leur service de jour. Elle ne dépasse pas 1.450 calories pour les infirmières du service de nuit qui sont cependant privilégiées, dans toute la mesure du possible, en raison du caractère pénible de leurs fonctions.

La disproportion est manifeste entre la pauvreté de ce régime et les dépenses énergétiques qu'exige le métier d'infirmière."

RAPPORT du Département "Médecine et Hygiène" du Secours d'Hiver.

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A N N E X E S

La tuberculose en Belgique.

Le problème du Charbon.

Statistique relative à l'influence de la guerre et de l'occupation sur la moralité des enfants mineurs.- Chiffres communiqués par le Ministère de la Justice.-

Rapport du Département Médecine et Hygiène du Secours d'Hiver sur la situation alimentaire de la population belge
- juin 1941 -

I.

Annexe 1.

LA TUBERCULOSE EN BELGIQUE.

La sous-alimentation chronique et profonde de la population belge plus particulièrement des enfants et des adolescents vivant dans les agglomérations urbaines, pouvait faire craindre le développement de la maladie qui menace plus que tout autre les organismes sous-alimentés et débiles, à savoir la tuberculose.

Les rapports qui nous furent transmis de la part des différents milieux médicaux, particulièrement de la part des médecins et des organismes attachés à la lutte contre la tuberculose, ne justifient malheureusement ces craintes que d'une manière trop évidente. En voici les preuves:

Le Prof. Hoft, chef de la clinique infantile à l'Université de Gand, communique la statistique suivante :

Nouveaux malades examinés pendant les quatre premiers mois de 1940: 532. Parmi ceux-ci, il y a 20 cas de tuberculose, soit 3,74 %.

Nouveaux malades examinés pendant les quatre premiers mois de 1941: 495. Parmi ceux-ci, il y a 35 ans de tuberculose, soit 7%.

Cette statistique met également en évidence la recrudescence surtout très marquée des cas de tuberculose chez les enfants habitant la ville.

L'examen clinique des enfants des écoles primaires de la ville d'Ostende montre que 25% des enfants sont sous-alimentés, affaiblis et pré-tuberculeux.

Le Dr. Van Driessche, médecin-chef du Dispensaire antituberculeux à St-Nicolas, a soigné de mai 1939 à 1940 188 cas de tuberculose. Il signale que de nombreux cas présentent une évolution très rapide, particulièrement les cas nouveaux chez les adolescents. Il attire l'attention sur la recrudescence très marquée et très rapide de la tuberculose, et rattache cette situation alarmante à la sous-alimentation prononcée, surtout de la jeunesse.

Le Prof. Govaerts, chef de la clinique médicale de l'Université de Bruxelles, communique :

" Les effets de la sous-alimentation se sont fait sentir en tout premier lieu sur les tuberculeux, et ont eu incontestablement pour conséquence d'accélérer l'évolution des lésions et d'accroitre la mortalité. Dans les tous derniers mois, on note une diminution générale de la résistance aux infections, notamment aux infections pneumoniques qui se sont multipliées. On observe chez les enfants, à la période de la puberté, une diminution de poids qui contraste avec l'augmentation physiologique existant à cette période de la vie et qui ne manquera pas d'exercer une influence funeste sur la résistance et sur le développement ultérieur de ces sujets.

Le Prof. Brull, chef de la clinique de l'Université de Liége communique :

" La tuberculose augmente rapidement et les cas existants s'aggravent : pleurésies séro-fibrineuses trainantes, extension de lésions en voie de cicatrisation, généralisations tuberculeuses."

Le Dr. Slosse, agrégé de l'Université de Bruxelles, conclut de son enquête sur l'alimentation de la population belge :

" La morbidité générale du pays va en augmentant, et ainsi que cela s'est passé lors de la guerre 14-18; on constate une recrudescence de la tuberculose."

Le Dr. Derscheid, Président du Comité Exécutif et Mr. le Prof. Gengou, Président de la section de prophylaxie de la Ligue Nationale de Défense contre la tuberculose, nous ont transmis un rapport très documenté au sujet de la situation actuelle en ce qui concerne la tuberculose dans le pays. Ce rapport signale que :

a) Service d'hygiène de Bruxelles.

Un relevé établi par M. le Dr. Bech, Directeur du Service d'Hygiène de la ville de Bruxelles, de la mortalité par tuberculose pulmonaire, par tuberculose méningée, etc. pendant les premiers trimestres de 1939, 1940, 1941, montre une augmentation nette de la mortalité par tuberculose en 1940; une augmentation considérable de cette mortalité en 1941.

b) Dispensaires : des enquêtes faites dans les dispensaires mettent en évidence :
1) une augmentation considérable des malades en surveillance en 1940, et une augmentation du nombre de malades bacillaires.
2) Une augmentation très importante des malades admis en 1940 dans les dispensaires.
3) Une augmentation souvent énorme de la proportion de tuberculose avérée trouvée en 1940 par comparaison avec 1939 chez les personnes venues dans les dispensaires de Bruxelles, ainsi que parmi les personnes (venues) de l'entourage des tuberculeux.
4) Une perte de poids progressive depuis juin 1940 à avril 1941, chez les adultes fréquentant les dispensaires atteignant en moyenne 5 kgs.
5) Une perte de poids chez les enfants fréquentant les dispensaires de 1939 à 1941. Il est à noter que les enfants tuberculeux reçoivent des rations supplémentaires. Chez les adolescents non tuberculeux le déficit en poids atteint en moyenne de 5 à 6 kgs.

Le Dr. Renauld-Cappart, médecin chef d'un important sanatorium pour fillettes de 3 à 17 ans, signale :
" La tuberculose pulmonaire de l'enfant présente une caractéristique bien particulière suivant l'âge. En général, en temps ordinaire elle est ganglio-pulmonaire infiltrante, sans ulcération, dans l'âge scolaire pré-pubère, entre 5 et 13 ans. Rares sont à cette époque de la croissance en général, les cas ulcérés.

C'est après la puberté entre 14 et 16 ans chez les filles, que l'on trouve les grandes tuberculoses pulmonaires, avec larges ulcérations, rappelant les formes ulcéro-fibro-caséeuses de l'adulte.

En ce moment, on observe au Sanatorium Baronne Lucie Lambert, à Linsingen (sanatorium réservé au filles de 3 à 17 ans) de nombreux cas à pronostic fatal, de tuberculose ulcérative, chez des petites filles non pubères, et cela déjà depuis l'âge de 5 ans. On croit pouvoir attribuer ce fait déplorable au manque d'alimentation chez des enfants dont les parents sont souvent indemnes de tuberculose, où la contagion familiale ne peut être évoquée. "

D'autres médecins chefs de dispensaires anti-tuberculeux, ainsi que des médecins spécialistes des affections pulmonaires, nous ont également communiqué leur cri d'alarme et leur angoisse parce qu'ils constatent chaque jour l'extension rapide de la tuberculose particulièrement parmi les adolescents.

Le Prof. Gengou et le Dr. Derscheid concluent en ces termes, au nom de l'Oeuvre Nationale Belge de défense contre la tuberculose :

" L'Oeuvre Nationale Belge de défense contre la tuberculose jette un cri d'alarme en ce qui concerne la morbidité actuelle de cette affection et de ses répercussions présentes et futures sur la santé générale du pays, menacé d'une extension redoutable du mal.

Au cours de ces 40 dernières années, pendant lesquelles la lutte systématique a été entreprise contre la tuberculose en Belgique, l'on a pu enrégistrer une diminution progressive de la mortalité par cette affection, à telle enseigne que, d'après les statistiques officielles celle-ci avait jusqu'en 1939 diminué de 50%.

Toutefois au cours de la guerre 1914-1918, une recrudescence très vive de la maladie fut constatée. Cette recrudescence se maintenue en s'amplifiant jusqu'à la fin des hostilités.

Dès que les conditions de vie redevinrent normales, la courbe descendante de mortalité reprit son cours régressif.

Tous les physiologiques et les hygiénistes ont été d'accord pour attribuer la recrudescence de l'endémie tuberculeuse pendant cette guerre, en tout premier lieu à l'insuffisance alimentaire des populations, préparant ainsi un terrain éminemment réceptif aux atteintes du bacille.

Et cependant, au cours de ces évènements, la Belgique bénéficia du concours généreux et inlassable des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, par le truchement de la " Commission for Relief in Belgium".

C'est grace à cette admirable institution que notre pays dut de ne pas avoir trop souffert de la pénurie de vivres, et des conséquences néfastes qui en seraient résultées.

A plus forte raison la situation actuelle est-elle infiniment plus grave, même dramatique, aujourd'hui que les stocks alimentaires du pays sont épuisés et que le ravitaillement de celui-ci reste extrêmement aléatoire.

Les populations sont nettement sous-alimentées et prédisposées ce fait, à des infections diverses.

Parmi celles-ci, la plus redoutable est incontestablement la tuberculose.

Il n'est en effet plus à démontrer que si le bacille est l'agent causal de la maladie, le terrain en constitue l'élément essentiel et que le rôle de ce dernier est prédominant.

Il est donc fatal que, dans desconditions actuelles de sous-alimentation, la tuberculose se développe dans des proportions inquiétant tant sous le rapport du nombre des cas qui se multiplient que de la virulence exceptionnelle de l'infection entrainant une évolution particulièrement grave et rapide.

Si les conditions alimentaires ne s'améliorent pas rapidement, l'on peut affirmer que d'ici à un an, il manquera plusieurs milliers de sanatorium en Belgique.

Mais il est un autre aspect du problème qui à notre avis est tout aussi alarmant.

Il s'agit d'une forme de tuberculose pulmonaire apparemment nouvelle grave d'emblée, à évolution extrêmement rapide, bilatérale, du type pneumonique ou bronchopneumonique, exsudatif, qui prend en peu de temps une extension considérable.

Ces formes qui se rencontrent actuellement très fréquemment, tranchent nettement sur celles constituant antérieurement, et en ordre principal, la clientèle des sanatoriums.
Vu que le nombre de ces cas ne parviennent pas à être hospitalisés, la menace de contamination du milieu familial en est considérablement accrue, aggravant encore le problème social qu'elle pose.

Dans certains sanatoriums pour enfants, l'allure de la maladie s'est également modifiée, affectant même dans le jeune âge, la forme cavitaire antérieurement exceptionnelle.

L'adolescence, et particulièrement la jeunesse en période de formation, sont spécialement menacées et nous n'en tenons pour preuve que les rapports qui nous parviennent des dirigeants de groupements sociaux qui ont pris en charge, par exemple, les jeunes gens de la réserve de recrutement et des centres d'instructions de l'Armée Belge dénommés " CRAB " et " CRIB ", les familles de militaires et de prisonniers. A titre exemplatif : dans une seule consultation où s'étaient présentés 462 sujets appartenant à ces catégories, 62 d'entre eux tant CRAB que militaires ont du rester sous surveillance médicale; 46 ont été hospitalisés en sanatorium pour tuberculose, tandis que d'autres trop atteints ont du être soignés dans des hopitaux ou à domicile. Plusieurs décès ont déjà été constatés parmi ces derniers.

Il ne nous parait pas douteux que le manque de résistance des individus, joint à la sous-alimentation, constituent la cause primordiale de l'extension et de l'activité redoutable du mal.

En conclusion, nous pouvons affirmer que si le peuple belge continue à être sous-alimenté, la tuberculose prend de plus en plus un caractère catastrophique et ne tardera pas à décimer non seulement la jeunesse et l'adolescence, mais atteindra aussi tous les déficients amenant ainsi à brève échéance, un affaiblissement fatal de la race contre lequel tous les efforts risquent de rester vains".

Rapport du Département Médecine et Hygiène du Secours d'Hiver.

Le rapport publié par la Ligue Nationale belge contre la tuberculo (1940-1941) relate ce qui suit :

" A l'heure actuelle, la somme de travail exigé de nos infirmières dépasse sérieusement la moyenne. L'afflux des consultants a exigé la multiplication des séances de consultation. On peut craindre que le service des visites au domicile des malades soit rendu par là bien difficile. Nous attirons spécialement l'attention des sections sur l'importante nécessité de ne pas négliger cet aspect de la prophylaxie. Les conseils mis en pratique au lit du malade sont toujours plus efficaces que les recommandations faites au dispensaire. Cette activité domiciliaire devrait être autant plus développés que le nombre de grabataires augmente. Ce fait résulte notamment de ce qu'aujourd'hui nos sanatoriums sont débordés et que les malades doivent attendre pendant de nombreuses semaines leur admission dans les institutions de cure. La diminution de résistance organique, due à l'insuffisance de l'alimentation, crée d'autre part un terrain particulièrement réceptif au développement de la tuberculose.

Quelques graphiques annexés à ce rapport traduisent la réalité des considérations ci-dessus. La stabilisation des courbes en 1942 peut être attribuée, selon M. le Prof. Gengou, à la disparition des malades les plus atteints, en 1941, et non à une régression de la maladie.

LE PROBLEME DU CHARBON.

LE RAPPORT EST CONSTITUE AVEC LA COLLABORATION DE L'OEUVRE NATIONALE DE L'ENFANCE, AU COURS DE L'HIVER 1941, PAR L'ASSOCIATION DES CAISSES D'ALLOCATIONS FAMILIALES.

Comme si les spectres de la famine et de la maladie ne suffisaient point pour nos familles éprouvées, voici que brusquement en cet hiver si rude, un nouveau fléau se montre dans toute permis de présenter, dès à présent, des statistiques complètes concernant la disette en charbon et ses conséquences malheureuses. Néanmoins, le problème à résoudre est urgent et nous croyons de notre devoir de soulever dès aujourd'hui un coin du voile en vous présentant quelques cas glanés au hasard dans les rapports de nos infirmières-visiteuses :

1) Braine-l'Alleud : Parents et cinq enfants. Pas de charbon, Enfants glacés, enrhumés. Le père a démoli une partie des meubles (table, armoire, fauteuil) pour pouvoir chauffer la cuisine. A présent, il vole, lorsqu'il en a le temps, du bois dans un bosquet avoisinant.

2) Saint-Gilles : Parents et deux enfants. Ces derniers malades. Pas du tout de charbon.

3) Bruxelles: Un nouveau-né. Pas de charbon.

4) Bruxelles: Un nouveau-né. Deux autres enfants en bas âge. Pas un grain de charbon.

5) Anderlecht: Enfant atteint de coqueluche et de broncho-pneumonie. Pas de charbon.

6) Bruxelles : Femme de 40 ans. Bébé de 2 mois. La mère malade a été admise à l'hopital. Une de ses soeurs soigne l'enfant. Celle-ci est sans eau, sans gaz et sans charbon. Il fait plus froid dans l'appartement qu'à l'extérieur. Elle ne peut plus laver l'enfant depuis plusieurs jours. Elle ne peut lessiver le linge, ni préparer des biberons faute de charbon. L'enfant a été trouvé à moitié gelé

7) Bruxelles: Ménage de cinq personnes: trois enfants en bas âge. Père sans travail à cause du froid (laveur de vitres). Actuellement sans ressources et sans combustible. Un des enfants a une bronchite qui ne guérit pas, parce qu'on ne peut le maintenir dans une pièce chauffée.

8) Bruxelles : Ménage de cinq personnes : trois enfants en bas âge. Comme ressources, uniquement le secours civil. Logement : deux petites pièces. Fille ainée fréquente le dispensaire antituberculeux. Bébé atteint de coqueluche. Complications à craindre à cause du manque de combustible.

9) Bruxelles : Fille-mère sortant de la maternité. Sans ressources et sans charbon. Obligée de demander l'hospitalité pour elle et son bébé à une tante qui n'a qu'une seule chambre où elle vit avec son fils.

10) Molenbeek : Cinq enfants, dont bébé de 1 mois. Comme appartement, sous-sols inondés par les sales eaux des locataires des étages supérieurs (tuyaux gelés). Plafond en grande partie tombé sur les lits. Mère doit faire du café chez une voisine; prend les repas du midi au Secours d'Hiver. Les enfants essaient de se réchauffer au lit et y prennent leurs repas. Le nourrisson pleure

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du matin au soir, blit peu et parait tout bleu de froid. Tous les enfants toussent et paraissent fiévreux.

Nous pourrions allonger à volonté cette liste lamentable des centaines de cas analogues nous sont régulièrement signalés par l'Oeuvre Nationale de l'Enfance, par l'Entr'Aide des Travailleurs et par nos infirmières-visiteuses. Non seulement la ration de charbon est insuffisante, mais sa distribution n'est que partielle, tardive, voire même complètement absente. Les enfants passent la majeure partie de la journée dans leur lit; y prennent leurs repas; ne se lavent plus; les grippes, les bronchites se multiplient sans fin. La cuisine est transformés en dortoir, l'aération de la pièce n'est plus qu'un souvenir lointain. Le cortège des maladies infectieuses s'amplifie. Avec le froid, la promiscuité, la crassite et ses conséquences (maladies parasitaires, gale etc...) ont fait leur apparition. Ajoutons à cela, sans oublier les décès attribuables au froid, les nombreux cas journaliers d'admission dans nos centres hospitaliers pour syncopes, congestion par le froid, etc.....

Nous aurons ainsi un reflet assez exact de la situation que connaît en cet hiver tragique un pays producteur de charbon et cependant dans l'impossibilité de réchauffer les foyers de ses enfants affamés.

ANNEXE III.

EFFET DE LA GUERRE ET DE L'OCCUPATION
SUR LA MORALITE DES MINEURS.

	1939	1940	1941
Mineurs signalés aux parquets pendant l'année :	14.550	19.329	34.2[illegible]
Pourcentage d'augmentation par rapport au nombre de l'année 1939:		32, 8%	135,[illegible]%

FILLES: A peu près la totalité des cas de prostitution.
Rapports sexuels avec soldats allemands.
(signaler à ce propos le nombre énorme de filles mineures incarcérées, atteintes de maladies vénériennes.)

GARCONS : vols maraudes.

A N N E X E 1

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- juin 1941 -

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Le Dr. Van Driessche, médecin-chef du Dispensaire antituberculeux à St-Nicolas, a soigné de mai 1939 à 1940 188 cas de tuberculose. Il signale que de nombreux cas présentent une évolution très rapide, particulièrement les cas nouveaux chez les adolescents. Il attire l'attention sur la recrudescence très marquée et très rapide de la tuberculose, et rattache cette situation alarmante à la sous-alimentation prolongée, surtout de la jeunesse.

Le Prof. Govaerts, chef de la clinique médicale de l'Université de Bruxelles, communique :

" Les effets de la sous-alimentation se sont fait sentir en tout premier lieu sur les tuberculeux, et ont eu incontestablement pour conséquence d'accélérer l'évolution des lésions et d'accroitre la mortalité. Dans les tous derniers mois, on note une diminution générale de la résistance aux infections, notamment aux infections pneumoniques qui se sont multipliées. On observe chez les enfants, à la période de la puberté, une diminution de poids qui contraste avec l'augmentation physiologique existant à cette période de la vie et qui ne manquera pas d'exercer une influence funeste sur la résistance et sur le développement ultérieur de ces sujets.

Le Prof. Brull, chef de la clinique de l'Université de Liége communique :

" La tuberculose augmente rapidement et les cas existants s'aggravent : pleurésies séro-fibrineuses trainantes, extension de lésions en voie de cicatrisation, généralisations tuberculeuses."

Le Dr. Slosse, agrégé de l'Université de Bruxelles, conclut de son enquête sur l'alimentation de la population belge :

" La morbidité générale du pays va en augmentant, et ainsi que cela s'est passé lors de la guerre 14-18; on constate une recrudescence de la tuberculose."

Le Dr. Derscheid, Président du Comité Exécutif et Mr. le Prof. Gengou, Président de la section de prophylaxie de la Ligue Nationale de Défense contre la tuberculose, nous ont transmis un rapport très documenté au sujet de la situation actuelle en ce qui concerne la tuberculose dans le pays. Ce rapport signale que :

a) Service d'hygiène de Bruxelles.

Un relevé établi par M. le Dr. Bech, Directeur du Service d'Hygiène de la ville de Bruxelles, de la mortalité par tuberculose pulmonaire, par tuberculose méningée, etc. pendant les premiers trimestres de 1939, 1940, 1941, montre une augmentation nette de la mortalité par tuberculose en 1940; une augmentation considérable de cette mortalité en 1941.

b) Dispensaires : des enquêtes faites dans les dispensaires mettent en évidence :
1) une augmentation considérable des malades en surveillance en 1940; et une augmentation du nombre de malades bacillaires.
2) Une augmentation très importante des malades admis en 1940 dans les dispensaires.
3) Une augmentation souvent énorme de la proportion de tuberculose avérée trouvée en 1940 par comparaison avec 1939 chez les personnes venues dans les dispensaires de Bruxelles, ainsi que parmi les personnes (venues) de l'entourage des tuberculeux.
4) Une perte de poids progressive depuis juin 1940 à avril 1941, chez les adultes fréquentant les dispensaires atteignant en moyenne 5 kgs.
5) Une perte de poids chez les enfants fréquentant les dispensaires de 1939 à 1941. Il est à noter que les enfants tuberculeux reçoivent des rations supplémentaires. Chez les adolescents non tuberculeux, le déficit en poids atteint en moyenne de 5 à 6 kgs.

Le Dr. Renauld-Cappart, médecin chef d'un important sanatorium pour fillettes de 3 à 17 ans, signale :
" La tuberculose pulmonaire de l'enfant présente une caractéristique bien particulière suivant l'âge. En général, en temps ordinaire elle est glanglio-pulmonaire infiltrante, sans ulcération, dans l'âge scolaire pré-pubère, entre 5 et 13 ans. Rares sont à cette époque de la croissance, en général, les cas ulcérés.

C'est après la puberté entre 14 et 16 ans chez les filles, que l'on trouve les grandes tuberculoses pulmonaires, avec larges ulcérations, rappelant les formes ulcéro-fibro-caséeuses de l'adulte.

En ce moment, on observe au Sanatorium Baronne Lucie Lambert, à Puttingen (sanatorium réservé au filles de 3 à 17 ans) de nombreux cas à pronostic fatal, de tuberculose ulcérative, chez des petites filles non pubères, et cela déjà depuis l'âge de 5 ans. On croit pouvoir attribuer ce fait déplorable au manque d'alimentation chez des enfants dont les parents sont souvent indemnes de tuberculose, où la contagion familiale ne peut être évoquée. "

D'autres médecins chefs de dispensaires anti-tuberculeux, ainsi que des médecins spécialistes des affections pulmonaires, nous ont également communiqué leur cri d'alarme et leur angoisse parce qu'ils constatent chaque jour l'extension rapide de la tuberculose particulièrement parmi les adolescents.

Le Prof. Gengou et le Dr. Derscheid concluent en ces termes, au nom de l'Oeuvre Nationale Belge de défense contre la tuberculose :

" L'Oeuvre Nationale Belge de défense contre la tuberculose jette un cri d'alarme en ce qui concerne la morbidité actuelle de cette affection et de ses répercussions présentes et futures sur la santé générale du pays, menacé d'une extension redoutable du mal.

Au cours de ces 40 dernières années, pendant lesquelles la lutte systématique a été entreprise contre la tuberculose en Belgique, l'on a pu enrégistrer une diminution progressive de la mortalité par cette affection, à telle enseigne que, d'après les statistiques officielles celle-ci avait jusqu'en 1939 diminué de 50%.

Toutefois au cours de la guerre 1914-1918, une recrudescence très vive de la maladie fut constatée. Cette recrudescence s'est maintenue en s'amplifiant jusqu'à la fin des hostilités.

Dès que les conditions de vie redevinrent normales, la courbe descendante de mortalité reprit son cours régressif.

Tous les physiologiques et les hygiénistes ont été d'accord pour attribuer la recrudescence de l'endémie tuberculeuse pendant cette guerre, en tout premier lieu à l'insuffisance alimentaire des populations, préparant ainsi un terrain éminemment réceptif aux atteintes du bacille.

Et cependant, au cours de ces évènements, la Belgique bénéficia du concours généreux et inlassable des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, par le truchement de la " Commission for Relief in Belgium".

C'est grace à cette admirable institution que notre pays dut de ne pas avoir trop souffert de la pénurie de vivres, et des conséquences néfastes qui en seraient résultées.

A plus forte raison la situation actuelle est-elle infiniment plus grave, même dramatique, aujourd'hui que les stocks alimentaires du pays sont épuisés et que le ravitaillement de celui-ci reste extrêmement aléatoire.

Les populations sont nettement sous-alimentées et prédisposées de ce fait, à des infections diverses. :

Parmi celles-ci, la plus redoutable est incontestablement la tuberculose.

Il n'est en effet plus à démontrer que si le bacille est l'agent causal de la maladie, le terrain en constitue l'élément essentiel et que le rôle de ce dernier est prédominant.

Il est donc fatal que, dans desconditions actuelles de sous-alimentation, la tuberculose se développe dans des proportions inquiétantes, tant sous le rapport du nombre des cas qui se multiplient que de la virulence exceptionnelle de l'infection entrainant une évolution particulièrement grave et rapide.

Si les conditions alimentaires ne s'améliorent pas rapidement, l'on peut affirmer que d'ici à un an, il manquera plusieurs milliers de lits de sanatorium en Belgique.

Mais il est un autre aspect du problème qui à notre avis est tout aussi alarmant.

Il s'agit d'une forme de tuberculose pulmonaire apparemment nouvelle, grave d'emblée, à évolution extrêmement rapide, bilaterale, du type pneumonique ou bronchopneumonique, exsudatif, qui prend en peu de temps une extension considérable.

Ces formes qui se rencontrent actuellement très fréquemment, tranchent nettement sur celles constituant antérieurement, et en ordre principal, la clientèle des sanatoriums.

Vu que le nombre de ces cas ne parviennent pas à être hospitalisés, la menace de contamination du milieu familial en est considérablement accrue, aggravant encore le problème social qu'elle pose.

Dans certains sanatoriums pour enfants, l'allure de la maladie s'est également modifiée, affectant même dans le jeune âge, la forme cavitaire antérieurement exceptionnelle.

L'adolescence, et particulièrement la jeunesse en période de formation, sont spécialement menacées et nous n'en tenons pour preuve que les rapports qui nous parviennent des dirigeants de groupements sociaux qui ont pris en charge, par exemple, les jeunes gens de la réserve de recrutement et des centres d'instructions de l'Armée Belge dénommés " CRAB " et " CRIB ", les familles de militaires et de prisonniers. A titre exemplatif : dans une seule consultation où s'étaient présentés 462 sujets appartenant à ces catégories, 62 d'entre eux tant CRAB que militaires ont du rester sous surveillance médicale; 46 ont été hospitalisés en sanatorium pour tuberculose, tandis que d'autres trop atteints ont du être soignés dans des hopitaux ou à domicile. Plusieurs décès ont déjà été constatés parmi ces derniers.

Il ne nous parait pas douteux que le manque de résistance des individus, joint à la sous-alimentation, constituent la cause primordiale de l'extension et de l'activité redoutable du mal.

En conclusion, nous pouvons affirmer que si le peuple belge continue à être sous-alimenté, la tuberculose prend de plus en plus un caractère catastrophique et ne tardera pas à décimer non seulement la jeunesse et l'adolescence, mais atteindra aussi tous les déficients amenant ainsi à brève échéance, un affaiblissement fatal de la race contre lequel tous les efforts risquent de rester vains".

Rapport du Département Médecine et Hygiène du Secours d'Hiver.

Le rapport publié par la Ligue Nationale belge contre la tuberculose (1940-1941) relate ce qui suit :

" A l'heure actuelle, la somme de travail exigée de nos infirmières dépasse sérieusement la moyenne. L'afflux des consultants a exigé la multiplication des séances de consultation. On peut craindre que le service des visites au domicile des malades soit rendu par là bien difficile. Nous attirons spécialement l'attention des sections sur l'impérieuse nécessité de ne pas négliger cet aspect de la prophylaxie. Les conseils mis en pratique au lit du malade sont toujours plus efficaces que les recommandations faites au dispensaire. Cette activité domiciliaire devrait être autant plus développés que le nombre de grabataires augmente. Ce fait résulte notamment de ce qu'aujourd'hui nos sanatoriums sont débordés et que les malades doivent attendre pendant de nombreuses semaines leur admission dans les institutions de cure. La diminution de résistance organique, due à l'insuffisance de l'alimentation, crée d'autre part un terrain particulièrement réceptif au développement de la tuberculose.

Quelques graphiques annexés à ce rapport traduisent la réalité des considérations ci-dessus. La stabilisation des courbes en 1942 peut être attribuée, selon M. le Prof. Gengou, à la disparition des malades les plus atteints, en 1941, et non à une régression de la maladie.

LE PROBLEME DU CHARBON.

LE RAPPORT EST CONSTITUE AVEC LA COLLABORATION DE L'OEUVRE NATIONALE DE L'ENFANCE, AU COURS DE L'HIVER 1941, PAR L'ASSOCIATION DES CAISSES D'ALLOCATIONS FAMILIALES.

Comme si les spectres de la famine et de la maladie ne suffisaient point pour nos familles éprouvées, voici que brusquement en cet hiver si rude, un nouveau fléau se montre dans toute permis de présenter, dès à présent, des statistiques complètes concernant la disette en charbon et ses conséquences malheureuses. Néanmoins, le problème à résoudre est urgent et nous croyons de notre devoir de soulever dès aujourd'hui un coin du voile en vous présentant quelques cas glanés au hasard dans les rapports de nos infirmières-visiteuses :

1) Braine-l'Alleud : Parents et cinq enfants. Pas de charbon, Enfants glacés, enrhumés. Le père a démoli une partie des meubles (table, armoire, fauteuil) pour pouvoir chauffer la cuisine. A présent, il vole, lorsqu'il en a le temps, du bois dans un bosquet avoisinant.

2) Saint-Gilles : Parents et deux enfants. Ces derniers malades. Pas du tout de charbon.

3) Bruxelles: Un nouveau-né. Pas de charbon.

4) Bruxelles: Un nouveau-né. Deux autres enfants en bas âge. Pas un grain de charbon.

5) Anderlecht: Enfant atteint de coqueluche et de broncho-pneumonie. Pas de charbon.

6) Bruxelles : Femme de 40 ans. Bébé de 2 mois. La mère malade a été admise à l'hopital. Une de ses soeurs soigne l'enfant. Celle-ci est sans eau, sans gaz et sans charbon. Il fait plus froid dans l'appartement qu'à l'extérieur. Elle ne peut plus laver l'enfant depuis plusieurs jours. Elle ne peut lessiver le linge, ni préparer des biberons faute de charbon. L'enfant a été trouvé à moitié gelé.

7) Bruxelles: Ménage de cinq personnes: trois enfants en bas âge. Père sans travail à cause du froid (laveur de vitres). Actuellement sans ressources et sans combustible. Un des enfants a une bronchite qui ne guérit pas, parce qu'on ne peut le maintenir dans une pièce chauffée.

8) Bruxelles : Ménage de cinq personnes ; trois enfants en bas âge. Comme ressources, uniquement le secours civil. Logement : deux petites pièces. Fille ainée fréquente le dispensaire antituberculeux. Bébé atteint de coqueluche. Complications à craindre à cause du manque de combustible.

9) Bruxelles : Fille-mère sortant de la maternité. Sans ressources et sans charbon. Obligée de demander l'hospitalité pour elle et son bébé à une tante qui n'a qu'une seule chambre où elle vit avec son fils.

10) Molenbeek : Cinq enfants, dont bébé de 1 mois. Comme appartement, sous-sols inondés par les sales eaux des locataires des étages supérieurs (tuyaux gelés). Plafond en grande partie tombé sur les lits. Mère doit faire du café chez une voisine; prend les repas du midi au Secours d'Hiver. Les enfants essaient de se réchauffer au lit et y prennent leurs repas. Le nourrisson pleure

du matin au soir, blit peu et parait tout bleu de froid. Tous les enfants toussent et paraissent fiévreux.

Nous pourrions allonger à volonté cette liste lamentable des centaines de cas analogues nous sont régulièrement signalés par l'Oeuvre Nationale de l'Enfance, par l'Entr'Aide des Travailleurs et par nos infirmières-visiteuses. Non seulement la ration de charbon est insuffisante, mais sa distribution n'est que partielle, tardive, voire même complètement absente. Les enfants passent la majeure partie de la journée dans leur lit; y prennent leurs repas; ne se lavent plus; les grippes, les bronchites se multiplient sans fin. La cuisine est transformés en dortoir, l'aération de la pièce n'est plus qu'un souvenir lointain. Le cortège des maladies infectieuses s'amplifie. Avec le froid, la promiscuité, la crassite et ses conséquences (maladies parasitaires, gale etc...) ont fait leur apparition. Ajoutons à cela, sans oublier les décès attribuables au froid, les nombreux cas journaliers d'admission dans nos centres hospitaliers pour syncopes, congestion par le froid, etc.....

Nous aurons ainsi un reflet assez exact de la situation que connaît en cet hiver tragique un pays producteur de charbon et cependant dans l'impossibilité de réchauffer les foyers de ses enfants affamés.

ANNEXE III.

EFFET DE LA GUERRE ET DE L'OCCUPATION
SUR LA MORALITE DES MINEURS.

	1939	1940	1941
Mineurs signalés aux parquets pendant l'année :	14.550	19.329	34.269
Pourcentage d'augmentation par rapport au nombre de l'année 1939:		32, 8%	135,6%

FILLES: A peu près la totalité des cas de prostitution: Rapports sexuels avec soldats allemands.
(signaler à ce propos le nombre énorme de filles mineures incarcérées, atteintes de maladies vénériennes.)

GARCONS : vols maraudes.

4:

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 376

8 JAN 1943

93

Registry Number } W 376/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare

No. (communicated)

Dated

Received in Registry } 8th Jan., 1943

W: Co-ordination

Child Evacuation Scheme.

Record of a conversation between Mr. Dingle Foot and the Swiss Minister on 6th January regarding the child evacuation scheme. Mr. Foot and the Swiss Minister drew up five points for transmission to Swiss Government.

The Swiss Minister also raised the question of evacuation of German children to Switzerland.

Last Paper.

W 354 (W 16823/62/48)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Owing to obscurities in W'Ton telegrams we recently made quite clear to our Embassy there that such conversations are going on (see copy of F.O. tel to W'Ton No 173 attached).

I have no comments on what passed at this conversation; there is no object in considering further any hypothetical questions raised.

Central Dept. 21/1

N. A. Dept. 22/1

Mr. Lafone. 25/1

Dingle Foot. 12/1

See within copy of tel to Berne. No 137 Angas. Jan 8th.

13/1

14/1

(Action completed.)

pd 26/1/43

(Index.)

anF. 30/3/43

Next Paper.

(W 808)

W 430

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

COPY FOR D. MACLEAN, ESQ., FOREIGN OFFICE.

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With Mr.Foot's compliments

H 376
3 JAN 1943

The Swiss Minister came to see me today. He said that he had now received his Government's answer to the proposal for the evacuation to Switzerland of children from occupied countries. They wished to know more about the scheme before committing themselves. In particular, they wished to know by whom it was sponsored. Was it put forward by the American Red Cross, or some similar organisation, or was it put forward by His Majesty's Government? What were the numbers likely to be involved? Had we considered what the attitude of the Germans was likely to be?

I replied that we had not worked out this scheme in any detail, because we first wished to know whether the Swiss Government agreed in principle. In particular, it would be impossible to forecast the dimensions of the scheme without having some idea as to the accommodation that could be made available. After some discussion, M. Thurnheer and I drew up the following five points, for transmission to the Swiss Government:-

(1) The scheme is put forward by His Majesty's Government, with the knowledge and approval of the United States Government.

(2) It is impossible for H.M.G. to indicate the numbers that would be involved until they know what accommodation could be provided in Switzerland. They contemplate, however, a substantial number, possibly running as high as a hundred thousand.

(3) H.M.G. fully realise that the United Nations would need to bear the financial burden, and that the scheme would necessitate additional imports into Switzerland through the blockade.

(4) All arrangements made in Switzerland in connection with this scheme would, of course, be subject to the authorisation of the Swiss Government, and to such control as the Swiss Government might wish to impose (n.b., M. Thurnheer attached particular importance to this).

(5) At this stage, His Majesty's Government only wished to be informed whether the Swiss Government are prepared to consider favourably such a scheme.

It was agreed that I should send M. Thurnheer a fair copy of these points later in the day.

I said that we should be most grateful for an early reply. We had not yet broached this matter to the emigre Governments in London, though we might wish to do so at any moment.

The/

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The Minister then raised the question of shipping. I said that this, and other practical difficulties, would be considered if and when the Swiss Government intimated that they were favourably disposed to the scheme. We had not yet worked out any details, nor had I consulted the Ministry of War Transport. But perhaps it might be possible to arrange for supplies for the children to be carried in the same way as supplies for prisoners (i.e., a ship on charter to the International Red Cross might be given a safe-conduct to and from Marseilles or Genoa).

The Minister then returned to the question of the German attitude. He said that to counterbalance such a service to the children of our European allies, the Germans might demand some additional concession for themselves. They might, for example, wish to have a number of German children housed in Switzerland. What would then be the attitude of H.M.G.? Would they cut down Swiss food quotas if German mouths were being fed in this way? I replied that this was a hypothetical issue which might never arise. German children would not need to be accommodated in Switzerland for the same reasons as the children in occupied countries. Although German rations were inferior to our own, adequate provision of milk and other foodstuffs was still made for young children and nursing and expectant mothers. If, however, the question did arise, I did not suppose that we would allow food to pass the blockade in order to feed German children. The Germans would have to find the additional imports themselves. But, subject to further reflection, I doubted whether we should treat the admission of a modest number of German children as a ground for cutting of Swiss food quotas. This, however, was a matter which, if it ever arose, I should need to refer to higher authority.

M. Thurnheer said that in his opinion it would be extremely popular in Switzerland if the scheme included a proportion of Greek children. As another small nation, Switzerland had the highest admiration for the part which had been played in the war by Greece.

(S.P.DINGLE FOOT.

6th January, 1943.

E. Troutbeck.
Director-General
Minister

Copy to
Foreign Office,
Mr.Riefler,
and Mr.Quennell

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

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T.550/19/28.

(CYPHER)

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LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE.

No. 137. Arfar.
January 8th, 1943.

D: 7.25.a.m. January 9th, 1943.

------oOo------

My telegram No. 6128 [Arfar of November 14th: evacuation of children from occupied to neutral countries].

On January 6th the Swiss Minister asked the Parliamentary Secretary for further particulars of projected scheme. The following points were drawn up for transmission to the Swiss Government:

1) Scheme was put forward by His Majesty's Government with full knowledge and approval of United States Government.

2) His Majesty's Government cannot indicate numbers involved until they know accommodation available but contemplate a number possibly as high as 100,000.

3) His Majesty's Government understand that United Nations must bear financial burden and that scheme would necessitate additional imports into Switzerland through blockade.

4) All arrangements made in Switzerland would be subject to authorisation of Swiss Government and to such control as they might wish to impose.

5) At this stage His Majesty's Government only wish to know whether Swiss Government would consider such a scheme favourably.

The Swiss Minister added that in his opinion it would be extremely popular if scheme included a proportion of Greek children.

[OTP].

M.E.W. T.550/19/28
COPY D. Maclean Esq
DATE 10.1.43 F.O.

8

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 430

8 JAN 1943

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Registry Number W 430/4/49.

FROM Dr.Paton (World Council of Churches) to

No. Mr.Law.

Dated 5th Jan.,1943.

Received in Registry 8th Jan.,1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Relief for occupied Europe.

Refers to Mr.Law's letter of 2nd January (W 17584/62/49). Has showed M.Van Dusen's letter to Bishop of Chichester and gathers from him that conversations with Cammaerts and the Belgians and with the Norwegian pastor in London suggest that the version of things which has got to America is not quite accurate. M.Gautier of the League of Nations considers that Poland, occupied Russia, Greece and Yugoslavia as starving Norway and Belgium a little behind them and France as hungry and he hopes that vitamins and milk may be sent to children and mothers.

Last Paper.

W 376 (W 17584/62/49) 1942

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8/1. Dingle Foot (M.E.W.)
Yang

(Minutes.)

Dr Paton has evidently realised in the interim that there was a good deal of nonsense in his earlier letter.

Minutes on Santier's precedence list of starving countries is interesting in that someone has at last realised that parts of Poland & occupied Russia are probably much worse off than Belgium & Norway; it is certain however, according to new, that Belgium is worse off than Norway.

The President has not yet replied to the P.M.'s message of Jan 1st, so we cannot answer Dr Paton yet.

B.U. in 5 days.

Marlborough 10/1

Sir H 11/1

Mr Grey (& Bevan Latin minutes on W 17584)

11/1

B.U. in a week.

Eden 15/1

Fac H.

(Action completed.)

W&E 10/2/43

(Index.)

ORF 30/3/43

Next Paper.

W 499 (W 1726)

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

It is being suggested on another paper that the P.M. should ask the President to speed up his reply.

U.U. is another week

E.C. 24/1

See within letter from Brig Solomon (M.E.O.) to Mr. Grey Jan 23

E.C. 9/2

1) Mr Law
2) Foreign Dept (W.17584/62/49)

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TELEGRAMS:—"INMISCO, KNIGHTS, LONDON"

TELEPHONE:—SLOANE 1425

WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

(*In process of formation*)

PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE

(*Constituted by the World Conference on Faith and Order and the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work*)

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Secretary in America:
REV. H. S. LEIPER, D.D.

W 430
8 JAN 1943

EDINBURGH HOUSE
2 EATON GATE
LONDON, S.W.1

WP/SM

January 5th, 1943

Richard Law, Esq., M.P.,
The Foreign Office,
S.W. 1

1 C

My dear Mr Law,

Many thanks for your letter. I showed the Van Dusen letter to the Bishop of Chichester and I gather from him that conversations both with Cammaerts and the Belgians and with the Norwegian pastor in London suggest that the version of things which has got to America is, as one might expect, not in all respects quite accurate. The Norwegian pastor says that the Norwegian sailors had collected a large amount of chocolate for Norwegian children and demanded that this should be got to the children of Norway! (Incidentally it is very good food.) I gather that Cammaerts, who is in close touch with the Belgian authorities, while agreeing that they take the gravest possible view of the whole situation in Belgium, thought that the attitude as described in America was too extreme.

You will, I am sure, have fuller information on all this. I do not feel inclined to lay too much stress, as Van Dusen does, upon these pieces of evidence, but I do think that the evidence of an increasingly terrible situation in the occupied countries of the West grows daily. Gautier, of the health section of the League of Nations, said to me the other day that he regarded Poland, Occupied Russia, Greece and Yugoslavia as starving; Norway and Belgium and, a little behind them, France, as hungry, and very strongly supported our hopes that something in the way of vitamins and milk products might be available for children and nursing and expectant mothers in the countries which can be reached.

Yours very sincerely,

W. Paton.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

100

The proposed reply seems excellent and I think we can agree to its despatch

~~Off herewith~~

E. Le Rowe 25/1

M Grey 25/1

~~N American Dept~~

Then ring up Mr Foots p.s. (after consultation with Mr Grey) & say he concurs in his dft.

Thanks anyway. 25/1.

Draft sent to Mr Robert Palmer 25/1

H.E.O.

Telephone:
GROSVENOR 4060.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE,
W.1.

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YOUR REFERENCE.....

23rd January, 1943.

W 430 / 4 / 49

Dear Mr. Grey,

You will remember talking to Mr. Corbett-Palmer recently about correspondence with Dr. W. Paton (Foreign Office references W17584/62/49 and W.430/4/49) when it was decided that Mr. Foot should send his reply to Dr. Paton, to the Foreign Office for approval.

I understand that Mr. Law is to be out of town until Tuesday, and, as this matter has been held up owing to Mr. Foot's illness, would you be good enough to have the enclosed draft looked at by your experts, and if possible, return it to me by Monday night? Mr. Foot has been ordered by his doctor to go out of town for a few days, from Tuesday next, and he is rather anxious to send the letter before he goes.

Yours truly,

Personal Dept P.C. 25/1 Solomon
for Private Secretary

P. Grey, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

9

1943

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 477

9 JAN 1943

102

Registry Number W 477/4/49

FROM Dominions Office

No. W.T.515/1/38

Dated 5th Jan.,

Received in Registry 9th Jan., 1943

W: Co-ordination

Medical supplies for Jews in the Polish Ghettos.

Transmits copy of letter to Mr. Fourie (South Africa House) from Mr. Gray (Dominions Office) of 5th January giving details of schemes by which Allied Governments remit funds to neutral European countries to buy goods to be sent as relief to occupied territory.

The request for medical supplies to be sent to Jews in the Polish ghettos, should be refused.

Last Paper.

W430 (W168)

References.

(Minutes.)

13/1

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
13/1/43.	30/3/43

Next Paper.

W750.

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

To Mr Maclean.

103

With the Compliments of the
Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

1 - 473

9 JAN 1943

W.T.515/1/38 January, 1943.

Dear Fourie,

You wrote to Head on the 4th December, about an application by the South African Red Cross for permission to remit to the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva funds for the purchase of medical supplies for Jews in the Polish ghettos.

The position is that Allied Governments have been allowed from time to time to remit funds to neutral European countries to buy goods in those countries to be sent as relief to occupied territories, provided that the purchase of such goods was controlled by the British diplomatic or consular representatives in the neutral countries in question, and that the goods themselves did not include anything of a type which those countries were simultaneously being allowed to import through our controls, and that financial advantage to the enemy did not result from the transaction. The scheme which certain Allied Governments are operating under which parcels containing foodstuffs indigenous to Portugal are sent from Portugal to civilian addressees in occupied territories was set out, as you will recall, in my letter to you of the 14th September, and in my letter of the 4th December, I informed you of the introduction of a similar scheme by the Polish Government for the benefit of Jews in Polish ghettos. In addition there is an arrangement under

which

S.C. FOURIE, Esq.

which the Belgian Government is allowed to obtain the equivalent of £250,000 monthly in escudos across our Portuguese Special Account and spend these on buying certain types of foodstuffs to send to the Red Cross in Belgium.

Latterly, however, it has become increasingly difficult to allow further such remittances, partly because of shortage of neutral European currencies, and partly because of the effect of such transactions upon the policy of financial blockade, to which the United States Government especially attaches great importance. It has been agreed that additional remittances for such purposes from this country or from the United States should no longer be authorised except for the strongest reasons and after consultation between the United Kingdom and American Governments.

In view of the above, we share the opinion of the Union Government that the present request should be refused on the grounds that considerations of blockade policy and war finance have made it necessary to limit strictly the expenditure of neutral European currencies for such purposes. If permission for a remittance were to be considered, it should in our view be considered only at the instance of the Polish Government, and it would further be necessary to impose restrictive conditions on the expenditure of the money by the International Red Cross Committee in order to ensure that neither an indirect breach of the blockade nor financial advantage to enemy interests resulted.

Reffering

Referring to the last paragraph of your letter you may care to note that this reply is based on consultation with the Ministry of Economic Warfare, the Foreign Office and, in addition, the Treasury.

Yours sincerely,

Sgd. S.O. Gray.

40

106

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 750

13 JAN 1943

Registry Number } W 750/4/49

FROM Consul Parr (Brazzaville)

No. 166 (6375/3704/300)

Dated 23rd Dec., 1942

Received in Registry } 13th Jan., 1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for France.

Some confusion has been caused by the despatch to Loanda of a quantity of relief supplies intended for France.

The Bishop of Brazzaville has explained that, in view of the occupation of the whole of France, they proposed to contribute stocks of clothing and other articles against the time when it would be possible to send them to France. The French delegate at Loanda has now asked for authority to ship thirty four cases of such goods to Red Cross at Vichy. Proposes to discover who was responsible for this request and explain why it cannot be entertained.

Last Paper.

W 477.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8 - M.E.W.

(Minutes.)

This refers to Afem 28 to Brazzaville of Dec 22 (Reg A in 4/3295). Afem can be left to launch this 9 days. Text tel. Copy to them

Jan 22/1 Dept

French Dept Jan 23/1

19/1.

(Action completed.)

25/11/43

(Index.)

30/3/43

Next Paper.

W 808.

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

107

No. 166.

(6375/3704/300)

Brazzaville,

December 23rd., 1942.

W 750

13 JAN 1943

Sir,

I have the honour to report that a certain amount of confusion was caused a few weeks ago by the zeal of some voluntary workers who despatched to Loanda a quantity of relief supplies intended for France without ascertaining whether or not they could be sent on from that place.

2. On November 20th. I was visited by Monseigneur Biéchy, Bishop of Brazzaville, accompanied by his brother of Bangui, who explained that, in view of the occupation of the whole of France, they proposed to constitute stocks of clothing and other articles against the time when it would be possible to send them to that country. Perhaps it might be feasible eventually to ship them to some North African port so that they should be readily available when the moment came.

3. I said that I had no doubt that, when the situation was clearer, His Majesty's Government would give sympathetic consideration to any demand for cargo space for this purpose.

4. To-day I have learned from the Minister of Economic Warfare that the French delegate at Loanda has asked for authority to ship thirty-four cases of such goods to the Red Cross at Vichy. I shall discover who was responsible for this request and explain why it cannot be entertained.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

With the highest respect,

Your most obedient,

humble Servant,

Robert Jackson

To

The Right Honourable

Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,

Etc., Etc., Etc..

No.166.

(6375/3704/300)

Brazzaville,

December 23rd., 1942.

Sir,

I have the honour to report that a certain amount of confusion was caused a few weeks ago by the zeal of some voluntary workers who despatched to Loanda a quantity of relief supplies intended for France without ascertaining whether or not they could be sent on from that place.

2. On November 20th. I was visited by Monseigneur Biéchy, Bishop of Brazzaville, accompanied by his brother of Bangui, who explained that, in view of the occupation of the whole of France, they proposed to constitute stocks of clothing and other articles against the time when it would be possible to send them to that country. Perhaps it might be feasible eventually to ship them to some North African port so that they should be readily available when the moment came.

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4. To-day I have learned from the Minister of Economic Warfare that the French delegate at Loanda has asked for authority to ship thirty-four cases of such goods to the Red Cross at Vichy. I shall discover who was responsible for this request and explain why it cannot be entertained.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

With the highest respect,

Your most obedient,

humble Servant,

Signed ROBERT PARR

To

The Right Honourable

Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,

Etc., Etc., Etc..

11

1943

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION

W 808 109

14 JAN 1943

Registry Number W 808/4/49

FROM Lord Selborne (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Secretary of State.
No.

Dated 11th Jan: 1943.

Received in Registry 14th Jan: 1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Child Evacuation Scheme.

Encloses a record of an interview between Mr. Foot and Swiss Minister on January 6th regarding child evacuation scheme. If this scheme comes into force it will represent a new development in blockade policy, considers therefore that formal Cabinet approval should be obtained before any further steps are taken. The Treasury ought also be approached regarding payment for the scheme. Enquires whether the Belgians may be told of the scheme.

Last Paper.

W750 (W376)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Off/Q. Greenhill (M.E.W.) Jan. 23.
& to Sykes (Treas)
Q. Brownfield (H.W.T.) Jan 23

(Minutes.)

1. I am not sure whether the Secretary of State will think it necessary to go to the Cabinet before any further steps are taken. In paragraph 3 of his message to the President at Flag "A" in W17619/6597/G/1942, the Prime Minister mentioned these plans. He has therefore taken cognisance of them.

2. I think we should agree that discussions should now be held with the Treasury on the financial aspects of these schemes. Lord Drogheda has telephoned to suggest an interdepartmental meeting for this purpose on Tuesday, to which I provisionally agreed.

3. I feel sure that nothing should be said to the Belgians yet. Until the President answers the Prime Minister's telegram, as he was specifically requested to do, we do not know where we are. If, for example, the President insists on breaking the blockade for Norway this will entail doing the same thing for Belgium, and it is quite possible that we should not want to pursue the child-evacuation schemes at all. We are in any case at present/

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
WF 16/2/43	AWF 30/3/43

Next Paper.

W831 (W1093)

209 W

present under contract with the State Department not to say anything to the Belgians until the situation has been cleared up.

Since Lord Selborne wrote this letter Lord Drogheda has told me that the Swiss Minister has called again at M.E.W. to say that his government, while foreseeing difficulties with the Germans, are sympathetic to the scheme, but would like to discuss the matter in detail in Berne. For this purpose Mr. Norton will have to be instructed. This will mean really getting down to business, and I do not think that we should go so far until the President's reply is received for the reasons given in 3 above. We can, however, get on with the interdepartmental discussions referred to in 2 above.

Subject to the decision about going to the Cabinet,

Query: Proceed and reply accordingly.

D Maclean

15th January, 1943.

Refers Cyp. Rep.
Draft R.
5/11

J.M. le Rougetel
16/1

Reference 1) the Cabinet would seem to be unnecessary at the present stage, for they are in effect committed to the project as far as it has gone a/ by the P.M's telegram to

the

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes. to Dingle Foot's 111

the President and b/ by ~~the~~ request,
now accepted by M. Thurtheer, that
the Swiss Govt. should agree in principle
to the further exploration of the idea.
But something may come up in discussion
at tomorrow's interdepartmental
meeting which may throw a different
light on the need to say something now
at the Cabinet.

M
18/1

I attended the meeting at M.E.W. on January 19th. The view was accepted that we could not say anything to the Belgians, or anything further to the Swiss, until the President answered the Prime Minister's message. It was agreed however that practical proposals could meanwhile be telegraphed to Washington for the consideration of the U.S. Government, and M.E.W. will send us over a draft for concurrence embodying the general conclusions of the meeting.

Hugh Lord Drogheda suggested a reminder should be sent

It is worth noting from the full record in W 1096 of the Swiss Minister's conversation with Lord Drogheda on January 14th that the Swiss Government are very pessimistic about the scheme ever coming into operation.

The proposal to request the Prime Minister to ask the President to reply to

his/...

his message is being submitted on other papers.

Nothing emerged at the meeting requiring reference to the War Cabinet – see Mr Amold's speaking - minute above.

Hankey
21/1

We can await receipt of M. E. W.'s draft telegram.

L. S. Amery.
21/1

21/1

Now attached.
As it is proposed that the Allied forces should repay their shares of the costs and as their scheme is supposed to bring them credit, I do not think we ought to go ahead with the Swiss until at least the Belgian part has agreed. I don't think it would be worth holding up progress for the others as the plan is meant mainly for Belgian children. I have provisionally inserted an amendment accordingly
I have also inserted the
Sels. explanatory amendments

in

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

2 (d). + elsewhere.

? agree subject to the

amendments

MAS 26/1

Cabinet

DSL/28/1.

Sinclair

French DSL/28/1 Dept

Norton 28/1/22

L Oliver
24/1

Mr Greenall (M. E. W.) rang up to say that they wished para 2 (b), penultimate sentence to read:- "H.M.G. would probably later be re-imbursed pro rata by the allied Govts concerned". I have amended the draft accordingly. This revised wording somewhat weakens Mr Macleans argument in favour of consulting the Belgians before teaching the Swiss and, if we know the President's reaction to the scheme and assuming that his is favourable, I think the necessary approach

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

approach could be made to the two ports simultaneously

E. E. Cross

Draft to Sir Maxwell

E.C. 24/1

See within copy letter from Mr. Maxwell (M.E.W.) from Mr. Lymoro (Treas) Jan 27

See with: letter from Director of Sea Transport

M.W.T. Jan 26

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

115

Registry No. W 808/4/49.

Draft. Telegram

His Majesty's Ambassador, Washington.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

My telegram No. 241 to Berne /Arfar of 15th January : Evacuation of children from occupied countries to Switzerland/.

1. Scheme clearly cannot be discussed in detail at Berne or at all with Allied Governments until President has replied to Prime Minister's message of January 1st. We have nevertheless been considering practical arrangements and should like you to discuss them with United States authorities on the assumption that the scheme will be approved by the President in principle.

2. Instructions we should then suggest sending to Berne, <u>after</u> seeking concurrence in principle of Belgian Government, which is Allied Government chiefly concerned, are as follows:-

(a) Plans should be made to receive in Switzerland an eventual total of about 100,000 children to be drawn gradually as transport facilities permit from all occupied countries according to need and transport possibilities except Denmark and Norway, the latter country being covered by evacuation to Sweden. Greatest number should come from Belgium, as worst off accessible country except Greece, which is being relieved direct. (If we were pressed to do so we should be willing to include French children.)

(b) Swiss Government should be invited to undertake entire operation of housing, clothing and feeding children and to submit total cost

to/

to British Government. While Swiss Government might be willing to bear part of cost (e.g. for accommodation) themselves, balance would be paid by His Majesty's Government in currency to be determined in consultation with Swiss. His Majesty's Government would probably later be reimbursed pro rata by Allied Governments concerned. It would be aim of His Majesty's Government to ensure that Swiss obtained as little free foreign exchange as possible from the operation.

(c) We estimate that 100,000 children would require approximately 50,000 tons of foodstuffs and 1,000 tons of clothing and footwear a year. Any part of these goods that would need to be imported through the blockade would not be counted against Swiss quotas. Part of foodstuffs such as milk, cheese and vegetables should be obtained in Switzerland itself, and in such cases we could agree to certain compensatory imports outside the quotas, e.g. fodder against milk. As regards clothing, raw materials should be imported into Switzerland rather than finished goods, and should be made up locally. All purchases made from outside the blockade would be undertaken by the Swiss except purchases of such goods as are normally bought for the Swiss by British supply departments. If Swiss could not allot space on their own ships, arrangements could probably be made for space on ships at present allotted to prisoners of war parcels.

(d)/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

Draft.

(d) Scheme would be put to German and Italian Governments by the Swiss Government, who should also be invited to undertake the allocation and collection of the children in the occupied countries in such a way as to ensure impartial selection. For this purpose we suggest they should adopt health as sole criterion of priority i.e. the children most under-nourished or most prone to tuberculosis etc., should be chosen. Some such principle is essential if we are to avoid pro-German families getting priority. For the same reason it is desirable that Swiss Government as distinct from any Red Cross organisation should have responsibility for selection.

3. If scheme is approved in principle by the President and by Belgian Government we hope that United States Government will instruct their Minister in Berne to concert with His Majesty's Minister in approach to Swiss Government.

118

Tel. No.:
Mayfair 4060.

Dept. What do Jan 22nd?
PR Jan 12

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE,
LONDON, W.1.

W 808

14 JAN 1943

11th January, 1943.

My dear Anthony,

With reference to the proposal for evacuating to Switzerland children from Belgium and other occupied territories, I enclose a record of an interview which the Parliamentary Secretary had on Wednesday with the Swiss Minister. It appears that the Swiss Government wish for rather more precise information before committing themselves in principle to the scheme. It will, however, be surprising if they turn it down entirely. As you know, they have already received and maintained some thousands of Belgian and French children, and the number from Belgium would, I understand, have been larger if the Germans had not been obstructive.

If a scheme on these lines comes into operation it will, of course, represent a new development in our blockade policy. Although the benefit to the Germans will not be very substantial, they will nevertheless be absolved from the obligation of feeding the children concerned, while we on our side shall be letting additional foodstuffs pass through the blockade to a neutral country. In these circumstances, I have been wondering whether we ought not to obtain formal Cabinet approval before we go any further. Of course we do not yet know for certain whether the

/.

Swiss/

Swiss Government will play. But there is also a possibility of evacuating Norwegian children to Sweden, and it looks as though the project for evacuating Greek children may come to life again, although in a more modest form than we originally intended. Might it not therefore be worth while to ask for a Cabinet decision giving general approval to evacuation schemes for children in enemy-occupied territories ?

You will observe that the question of finance has also arisen. Clearly we could not ask the Swiss in addition to providing asylum for large numbers of children, to bear any considerable part of the financial burden, though they might be willing to provide free accommodation in vacant hotels, etc. I assume that the emigre Governments concerned might be asked to pay. But it would not be surprising if the Swiss asked at least for a guarantee from the British and United States Government that the expenses would be met. It therefore seems to me that we ought, at this stage, to approach

2. the Treasury. Do you agree, and if so, will you have a communication sent to them ?

There is one further point which I should be grateful if you would consider. You will recall that the United States Government agreed to our broaching this matter with both the Swiss and the

Belgians/

Belgians. So far we at this Ministry have said nothing to the Belgians, since it appeared to us that if we did so and the Swiss then turned down the scheme, the Belgians would be provided with a powerful additional argument for food relief through the blockade. I imagine, however, that the Belgian Government must be waiting impatiently for the Prime Minister's reply to M. Pierlot's letter, and of course the main purpose of this evacuation proposal is to make their position easier. Do you think, therefore, that we should now reveal to the Belgians what we have in mind ?

3.

Yours ever,

Selborne.

The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street, S.W.1.

Ministry of Economic Warfare.

COPY MINUTE.

The Swiss Minister came to see me today. He said that he had now received his Government's answer to the proposal for the evacuation to Switzerland of children from occupied countries. They wished to know rather more about the scheme before committing themselves. In particular, they wished to know by whom it was sponsored. Was it put forward by the American Red Cross, or some similar organisation, or was it put forward by His Majesty's Government? What were the numbers likely to be involved? Had we considered what the attitude of the Germans was likely to be?

I replied that we had not worked out this scheme in any detail, because we first wished to know whether the Swiss Government agreed in principle. In particular, it would be impossible to forecast the dimensions of the scheme without having some idea as to the accommodation that could be made available. After some discussion, M. Thurnheer and I drew up the following five points, for transmission to the Swiss Government:-

(1) The scheme is put forward by His Majesty's Government, with the knowledge and approval of the United States Government.

(2) It is impossible for H.M.G. to indicate the numbers that would be involved until they know what accommodation could be provided in Switzerland. They contemplate, however, a substantial number, possibly running as high as a hundred thousand.

(3) H.M.G. fully realise that the United Nations would need to bear the financial burden, and that the scheme would necessitate additional imports into Switzerland through the blockade.

(4) All arrangements made in Switzerland in connection with this scheme would, of course, be subject to the authorisation of the Swiss Government, and to such control as the Swiss Government might wish to impose. (N.B., M.Thurnheer attached particular importance to this).

(5)/

(5) At this stage, His Majesty's Government only wish to be informed whether the Swiss Government are prepared to consider favourably such a scheme.

It was agreed that I should send M. Thurnheer a fair copy of these points later in the day..

I said that we should be most grateful for an early reply. We had not yet broached this matter to the emigré Governments in London, though we might wish to do so at any moment.

The Minister then raised the question of shipping. I said that this, and other practical difficulties, would be considered if and when the Swiss Government intimated that they were favourably disposed to the scheme. We had not yet worked out any details, nor had I consulted the Ministry of War Transport. But perhaps it might be possible to arrange for supplies for the children to be carried in the same way as supplies for prisoners of war (i.e. a ship on charter to the International Red Cross might be given a safe-conduct to and from Marseilles or Genoa).

The Minister then returned to the question of the German attitude. He said that to counterbalance such a service to the children of our European allies, the Germans might demand some additional concession for themselves. They might, for example,wish to have a number of German children housed in Switzerland. What would then be the attitude of H.M.G? Would they cut down Swiss food quotas if German mouths were being fed in this way? I replied that this was a hypothetical issue which might never arise. German children would not need to be accommodated in Switzerland for the same reasons as children in occupied countries. Although German rations were inferior to our own, adequate provision of milk and other foodstuffs was still made for young children and nursing and expectant mothers. If, however, the question did arise, I did not suppose that we would allow food to pass the blockade in order to feed German children. The Germans would have to find the additional imports themselves. But, subject to further reflection, I doubted whether we should treat the admission of a modest number of German children as a ground for cutting off Swiss food quotas. This, however, was a matter which, if it ever arose, I should need to refer to higher authority.

M. Thurnheer said that in his opinion it would be extremely popular

in/

in Switzerland if the scheme included a proportion of Greek children. As another small nation, Switzerland had the highest admiration for the part which had been played in the War by Greece.

(signed) D.M. Foot,

6th January, 1943.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W 808/4/49

Draft.

Mr Greenhill
Mr Greenhill
Mr E.W.

from
Mr Crowe

Copy Mr Symons
Treas.

Mr Broomfield
M.of W.

93c
124

T 20. 28rd Jan. 1943

Dear Greenhill,

We have made a certain number of amendments in your draft telegram to Washington about the evacuation of children to Switzerland and I enclose a fair draft incorporating them.

In view of the fact that it is proposed to ask the Govts concerned to refund the sums expended by us on this scheme ~~scheme~~ we

we shall have to consult the
Belgian Govt at an early
stage as they will be most
closely concerned.
This explains our own
amendment in the first
sentence of para 2. & the
last para. The remainder
are, I think, self-explanatory.

E.C. 24/1

Yours sincerely

Ld.) E.L. Crowe

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

126

OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.
23rd January, 1943.

(W 808/4/49)

Dear Quennell,

We have made a certain number of amendments in your draft telegram to Washington about the evacuation of children to Switzerland and I enclose a fair draft incorporating them.

In view of the fact that it is proposed to ask the Governments concerned to refund the sums expended by us on this scheme we think that we shall have to consult the Belgian Government at an early stage as they will be chiefly concerned. This explains our amendment in the first sentence of paragraph 2 and in the last paragraph. The remainder are, I think, self-explanatory.

Yours sincerely

Sd/ E. E. Crowe.

P. Quennell, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

T550/19/28

to H.M.R. WASHINGTON

Mr. Seebohm
Mr. Troutbeck
Lord Drogheda
have concurred.

For concurrence by:

D. Maclean, Esq., Foreign Office.
R.A.B. Mynors, Esq. Treasury.
F.J. Broomfield, Esq., M.W.T.

REPEAT TO H.M.R. BERNE.

My telegram No: 241 to Berne [Arfar of 15th January : Evacuation of children from occupied countries to Switzerland] 127

1. Scheme clearly cannot be discussed in detail at Berne [~~preparatory to communication to~~] Allied Governments until President has replied to Prime Minister's message of January 1st. We have nevertheless been considering practical arrangements and should like you to discuss them with U.S. authorities on the assumption that the scheme will be approved by the President in principle.

2. Instructions we should then suggest sending to Berne, are as follows:-

(a) Plans should be made to receive in Switzerland an eventual total of about 100,000 children to be drawn gradually as transport facilities permit from all occupied countries except Denmark and Norway, the latter country being covered by evacuation to Sweden. (If we were pressed to do so we should be willing to include French children) [~~but greatest number should, we think, come from Belgium~~].

(b)/

(b) Swiss Government should be invited to undertake entire operation of housing, clothing and feeding children and to submit total cost to British Government. While Swiss Government might be willing to bear part of cost (e.g. for accommodation) themselves, balance would be paid by H.M.G. in currency to be determined in consultation with Swiss. H.M.G. would (probably) later be reimbursed (in part) by Allied Governments (concerned). It would be aim of H.M.G. to ensure that Swiss obtained as little free foreign exchange as possible from the operation.

(c) We estimate that 100,000 children would require approximately 50,000 tons of foodstuffs and 1,000 tons of clothing and footwear a year. Any part of these goods that would need to be imported through the blockade would not be counted against Swiss quotas. Part of foodstuffs such as milk, cheese and vegetables should be obtained in Switzerland itself, and in such cases we could agree to certain compensatory imports outside the quotas, e.g. fodder against milk. As regards clothing, raw materials should be imported into Switzerland rather than finished goods, and should be made up locally. All purchases made from outside

the/

the blockade would be undertaken by the Swiss except purchases of such goods as are normally bought for the Swiss by British supply departments. If Swiss could not allot space on their own ships, arrangements could probably be made for space on ships at present allotted to prisoners of war parcels.

(d) Scheme would be put to German and Italian Governments by the Swiss Govts., who should also be invited to undertake the allocation and collection of the children in the occupied countries in such a way as to ensure impartial selection.

3. If scheme is approved in principle by the President we hope that U.S. Government will instruct their Minister in Berne to concert with H.M. Minister approach to Swiss Government.

(and by Belgian Govt)

For this purpose we suggest they should adopt health as sole criterion of priority i.e. the children most undernourished or most prone to tuberculosis etc should be chosen. Some such principle is essential if we are to avoid pro-German families getting priority. For the same reason it is desirable that Swiss Govt as distinct from any Red Cross organisation should have responsibility for selection.

130
W

Telegrams: (Shipping) "SHIPMINDER, TELEX, LONDON"
(Inland Transport) "TRANSMINRY, TELEX, LONDON"
Telephon[redacted]BBEY 7711

Any reply should quote the following reference

.....

Your reference.....

MINISTRY OF WAR TRANSPORT,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE.
LONDON, W.1.

808 4 49.

Appdx

INDEXED

With the Compliments

of

The Director of Sea Transport

These additions will make the scheme even more difficult to get going; but I don't think we can well argue with the Treasury

E. Cross 1/2

26th January, 1943.

J 1/2

131

26th January, 19

Dear Quennell,

I have no amendments to suggest to your draft telegram to Washington regarding the proposed evacuation of children to Switzerland.

The Ministry of War Transport are only really concerned should shipping be required to transport foodstuff and clothing.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) F. J. BROOMFIELD.

P. Quennell, Esq.

With Mr. R.A.B. Mynors' compliments.

INDEXED

TREASURY CHAMBERS,
S.W.1.

27th January, 1943.

Dear Quennell,

We have been discussing here the financial difficulties inseparable from the scheme of removing a number of Allied children to Switzerland, and suggest an addition to the draft telegram of a paragraph on the following lines, which might perhaps be inserted as a fresh paragraph between 2(d) and 3.

> "It must however be made clear that in view of difficulty of obtaining Swiss francs His Majesty 's Government could not proceed with this scheme on any basis which did not provide for full cover by the Allied Governments concerned on any foreign exchange commitment. As far as we can see this could only be secured if the Allied Governments concerned made arrangements themselves with the Swiss Government for procuring necessary francs, not against sterling and not against any deposit of gold falling within the scope of the proposed Anglo-Swiss financial agreement. Similar ~~circumstances~~ considerations would apply if in the event ~~of~~ other difficulty foreign currencies are required to any material extent, e.g. for shipping or the purchase of supplies."

As you will see, this addition to the draft will necessitate an alteration at the end of your paragraph 2(b), but we are quite clear that we cannot shoulder the financial burden single-handed. For example, it would not make sense to use our own limited gold reserves for such a purpose while those of the United States remain entirely untapped, and it would be difficult if we did so to maintain our present position with the Americans that the amount of pre-emption which you could undertake in Switzerland is strictly limited. It is clear in any case that the chances that all the credit for this scheme, if it comes off, can be taken by the United Kingdom Government are negligible, since the Allied Governments will insist, and quite naturally insist, on a large share for themselves.

/I

P. Quennell, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.
Berkeley Square House, W.1.

I am sending a copy of this to Crowe.

Yours sincerely,

R.A.B. Mynors

12.

1043

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION

W 831

14 JAN 1943

134

Registry Number 831/4/49

FROM Lord Lytton, to Secretary of State.

No.

Dated 7th Jan., 1943.

Received in Registry 14th Jan., 1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Food situation in France.

Gives his brother's views on the food situation in France and requests that Mr. Kershener, the representative of the American Friends' Service Committee, may have an interview to discuss this question.

Last Paper.

W 808

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Sec of S / Lord Lytton from Sec of S. Jan 12.

(Minutes.)

See within

Mr. Eccles 16/1

French Dept 16/1. Mins 18/1. S Rowlands

15/1

For Dept. 23/2. 16/1

See within letter from Lord Lytton to Mr. Eden Jan 14.

(Action completed.)

24/2/43

(Index.)

30/3/43

Next Paper.

W891 (W1082)

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

TELEPHONE, SLOANE 8810.

W 831
18, CHESTER STREET,
16 JAN 1943
S.W.1.

135

7th January, 1943.

Dear Anthony,

My brother Neville has been to see me once or twice about the food situation in France. From the information he has received he is satisfied that real famine conditions prevail there and that many people are actually starving.

He argued (1) That our attitude is too optimistic and that conditions in France are worse than we have admitted (2) That though the shortage of food is due to German action, their propaganda has been successful in persuading the French people that it is due to the British blockade (3) That both on humanitarian grounds, and on grounds of policy, the sending of essential nourishment - not food in bulk but such things as vitaminous sweets,

dried milk and essential drugs for children - should be sent to France, as they have been to Greece (4) That these things have been collected by the American Society of Friends and that Swedish ships are available for their transport (5) That the Germans have given permission for these things to come overland from Sweden via Denmark and Holland.

I replied with the obvious arguments about not being able to ensure that what we sent got into the right mouths, and that even if it did it would only enable the Germans to take more out of France.

In answer to this he said that the Germans could not take any more - that they had already taken all that they could transport. He said that Mr. Kerschener, the representative of the American Friends' Service Committee, was now in London. He

TELEPHONE, SLOANE 8810.

18, CHESTER STREET,
S.W. 1.

had seen him and received his positive assurance (1) that the food we had allowed into France had not fallen into German hands (2) that the Germans had not increased their pillaging as a result (3) that even this small amount of food had done immense good and had greater propaganda value than anything else we had done or could do.

He concluded by begging me to ask you to see Mr. Kerschener and I promised to pass on his request. I think the line you have always taken on this feeding question would make you sympathetic to Neville's view, but unfortunately he did not find Winston so. You did succeed over Greece and you may find it helpful to hear what Mr. Kerschener has to say, so I hope you will consent to see him.

While I am writing may I add a word on an entirely different subject ? Madame Chiang Kai-Shek is now in the U.S .A . An invitation to her to come to this country would be immensely appreciated. She is a very intelligent and charming woman. Everyone here would like and admire her. Perhaps you have already thought of this ? If not, will you turn it over in your mind ?

Yours Ever
Lytton

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W 831/4/49

D.D.M.

Draft.

Right Honourable
the Earl of Lytton,
K.G., G.C.S.I.,
G.C.I.E.

from the Secretary of State

OUT FILE

139

12 January, 1943.

Thank you very much for your letter of January 7th about the food situation in France. I was very interested to learn your brother's views about the situation there, ~~But~~, as it happens, Mr. Kershner has already had a talk with the Head of the department concerned in the Foreign Office, when he expressed his ideas on this subject. ~~In the circumstances, and as I am pressed at present, I do not think I can set aside the time to see him myself.~~

On the general question, none of us can be indifferent to the ~~circumstances~~ considerations which your brother and Mr. ~~K~~ER shner advance, but ~~we are up against a big question, which~~ France is complicated by the equal claims, and in some cases stronger claims, of other occupied countries. We cannot afford to risk helping the

enemy/

enemy transfer to our shoulders the responsibility of feeding the ~~civilian~~ overrun territories, which at present lies on his. This is the crux of the problem. ~~I can assure you that the whole matter has our constant attention.~~ But I am always looking for ways & means of helping & have also written him a letter of limitation. They a

As regards the last paragraph of your letter, I need only say that Madame Chiang Kai-shek has been invited to come on to this country but we have not yet had her reply. This is of course strictly confidential at present. You may be sure that we shall do all we can to encourage her to come here.

Dr she is still ill.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

W 141

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

12th January, 1943.

Thank you very much for your letter of January 7th about the food situation in France. I was very interested to learn your brother's views about the situation there, for no one is better qualified than he to express an opinion. As it happens, Mr. Kershner has already had a talk with the Head of the department concerned in the Foreign Office, when he expressed his ideas on this subject. Bobbety Cranborne has also seen him and furnished us with a full report. I think therefore that we do know all Mr. Kershner's arguments.

On the general question, none of us can be indifferent to the considerations which your brother and Mr. Kershner advance, but the position of France is complicated by the equal claims, and in some cases stronger claims, of other occupied countries. We cannot afford to risk helping the

enemy/

The Right Honourable
The Earl of Lytton, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

enemy to transfer to our shoulders the responsibility of feeding the overrun territories, which at present lies on his. This is the crux of the problem, but our minds are not closed to other aspects of it.

As regards the last paragraph of your letter, I need only say that Madame Chiang Kai-shek has been invited to come to this country but we have not yet had her reply, for she is still ill. This is of course strictly confidential at present. You may be sure that we shall do all we can to induce her to come here.

(Sd.) ANTHONY EDEN.

TELEPHONE, SLOANE 8810.

W831/4/49.

18, CHESTER STREET,
S.W. 1.

14th January, 1943.

INDEXED

Dear Anthony,

Thank you very much for your letter of January 12th. I felt sure that your Department had already taken steps in both the matters about which I wrote to you, but I am very glad to have your assurance on this point.

Yr. Sincerely

Lyttelton

13.

GENERAL

W 891

15 JAN 1943

194

ORDINATI

144

Registry Number W 891/4/49

TELEGRAM FROM
Lord Halifax
(Washington)

No. 257

Dated 14th Jan: 1943

Received in Registry 15th Jan: 1943

W. Co-ordination.

Relief for Norway.

Refers to Foreign Office telegram to Washington 7759 (W 16713/62/49) December 11th.

The Swedish Cargo Commissioner has instructions from Stockholm to ship 100 tons of fat a week for Norway.

Asks for advice as to what arrangements His Majesty's Government have made with Stockholm for handling the company's documents needed for these secret shipments.

Last Paper.

W831 (W16738/62/49)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

& Le. Cannon-Brookes (M.E.W.) Jan 15.

(Minutes.)

MEW are handling this & I have arranged for Mr. Cannon-Brookes there, & there a copy of Lord Halifax's telegram & answer will form series.

Norway 19/1. Keep them moving
M.P. Depts 24/1.

15/1

15/1.

See within copy of tel to Washington No 192 Ajax Jan 16

(Action completed.)

29/1/43

(Index.)

W.F. 30/3/43

Next Paper.

W924.

22910 9/41 F.O.P.

W

W 891

15 JAN 1943

145

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher] DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET)

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Viscount Halifax
No. 257
14th January, 1943.

D. 12.32 a.m. 15th January, 1943.
R. 8.15 a.m. 15th January, 1943.

:-:-:-:-:-:

IMMEDIATE

MOST SECRET

Your telegram No. 7759.

The Swedish cargo commissioner has just telephoned from New York saying that they have instructions from Stockholm to ship 100 tons of fat a week for Norway. If Swedes had not consulted us first but had put in an ordinary application to the Board of Economic Warfare, the story of your secret arrangements with the Norwegian Government might well have become public within a very few days.

2. Please advise me immediately what arrangements you have made with Stockholm for handling the company's documents needed for these most secret shipments.

O.T.P.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

146

W

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

INDEXED

W891/4/49

Z.130.

[CYPHER]

22 JAN 1943 ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON

No. 192. Arfar. D. 9.20 p.m. January 16th, 1943.
January 16th, 1943.

bbbb

IMMEDIATE.

MOST SECRET.

W

Your telegram No. 257 to the Foreign Office [of the 15th January].

I am surprised and alarmed at this indiscretion as it was agreed with Norwegians that only the persons immediately concerned in Stockholm should know of these secret arrangements, that shipments and licences should be dealt with in all respects as though goods were destined for Swedish consumption and that Norwegians would inform me when they required export licences. (See paragraph 2 of Foreign Office telegram No. 7759 [of the 9th December]).

2. Since Cargo Commissioner already apparently knows so much you may think it advisable to explain whole position to him and impress upon him necessity to preserve absolute secrecy about real destination of the goods. I have asked Stockholm to do all possible to limit ill effects of indiscretion.

3. Norwegians have asked for licence to be issued for 50 tons lard and 50 tons fat backs for shipment by Armour to Kooperativa Forbundet on SS Bilbao due to sail shortly. Please arrange issue of this licence.

4. I am examining possibility of making arrangements for issue of export licences ostensibly for Sweden through ordinary existing machinery without having on each occasion to ask you to intervene. Until I can devise satisfactory scheme I will inform you by telegram which licences are required.

5. Norwegians are experiencing considerable difficulty in obtaining space on Gothenburg ships and none was available on December ships. Moreover, in order to have goods ready for shipment when occasion arisesNorwegians will have to forecast future requirements and hold small stocks to meet them. We have, therefore, agreed that arrangements for initial trial shall be extended to cover all ships sailing during January/March quarter instead of merely during one month as indicated in paragraph 4 of Foreign Office telegram No. 7749.

O.T.P.

Northern Dept
28 Jan
27/1

14

147

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 924

16 JAN 1943

Registry Number W 924/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare.

No. T 550/12/Z

Dated 15th Jan., 1943.

Received in Registry 16th Jan., 1943

General:Co-ordination

Relief for Norway.

Transmits copy of letter from Mr. Mitcheson (Stockholm) and Mr. Collins (Ministry of Economic Warfare) of December 7th and copy of Mr. Collins' reply of January 9th regarding despatch of humanitarian consignments to Norway.

Last Paper.

W 891.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

MEW's reply correctly describes HM position at present, though the Americans may be about to launch a plan for sending Swedish relief foods for Norway.

20/1.

Norwegian Legation 20/1.

(Action completed.)

23/1/43

(Index.)

AWF 30/3/43

Next Paper.

W 96 Y

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

AP. copy

T550/12/Z

LB/MW 148

139/2A/42

BRITISH LEGATION,
STOCKHOLM

7th December 94

W. 924
16 JAN 1943

Dear Collins,

We feel that the question of humanitarian consignments to Norway needs simplification, and I should like to have your approval with regard to the following proposals:- that, (subject always to the requirements set out in your telegram no.625 and elsewhere that official British approval should neither be put in writing nor given any publicity),

a) small consignments of garments for children or babies may be approved by me without reference to London;

b) all consignments from South America need no approval from me, so long as the Norwegian destination of the goods has been put on record when the navicert was applied for;

c) as regards goods sent by aeroplane from London either to us or to the Norwegian Legation for Norwegian relief, our authorisation for their re-export is self-understood;

d) unless I observe any other objectionable feature I may agree to small consignments, i.e. not exceeding 5,000 kronor in value, but I would not inform the Norwegians here of such a ruling, as it would probably result in the splitting up of larger consignments.

Owing to political and other considerations, I should like to be reasonably liberal with regard to goods of Swedish origin collected or purchased as the result of philanthropic activity in Sweden, but subject to general guidance from H.M. Minister.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd.) J. MITCHISON

L.H. Collins, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare,
London, W.1.

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/12/Z
COPY FOR M.O.
DATE 15/1/43

149

SECRET

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkley Square,
London, W.1.

Copy to:
D. Maclean Esq.,
Foreign Office,
S. W. 1.

T550/12/2.

9th January 1943.

Dear Mitcheson,

We are rather puzzled by your letter of the 7th December - reference 139/2A/42 - about humanitarian consignments for Norway. At the moment of writing Camps is over in Stockholm and has probably discussed these questions with you. In any event, you will however want our official views on the question of policy raised in your four proposals.

(a) I am afraid we cannot agree that small consignments of garments for children or babies can be approved by you without reference to us. These goods if not actually imported through the controls, have been made out of material so imported and it is quite contrary to principle to allow them to be re-exported either in a new or used state to Norway. It is true on one occasion, and perhaps more than one occasion, we have allowed such a consignment to be sent to Norway, but this very exception ought to show what our general rule is and ought not to be allowed to lapse into the rule itself. We are afraid your proposal might be the first step to making it a general rule that this kind of goods can be sent to Norway. It is true too we agreed to a consignment of babies clothing being sent to Finland, but for your own information this decision was taken by us here without proper consultation with other persons interested, and we have got into trouble with the Foreign Office for having agreed to the consignment.

(b) There are no consignments from South America. Unless you are referring to some secret plan of Sporborg's we do not quite follow what you have in mind. I do not know anything about Sporborg's

/arrangements

J. Mitcheson Esq.,
H.M.Legation,
STOCKHOLM.

arrangements which are very properly being kept most secret, but I cannot believe that there will be any placing of the Norwegian destination of the goods on record when the navicert is applied for. Without having seen Sporborg about his plan, I think the procedure will have to be for Sporborg to prepare a list of those "Swedish" imports which are to be sent on to Norway, and then to send that list to you so that you may know what will in fact be exported to Norway, though of course you will not officially take any part in it or have any hand in such exports.

(c) We are not aware of any goods authorised to be sent by aeroplane for Norwegian relief, though there were consignments of butter for the benefit of the Norwegian Colony in Finland. You should not authorise any re-export of goods imported by aeroplane without our specific instructions in each case.

(d) I am afraid we cannot agree to the proposal in your paragraph (d).

I fear all this must seem very unhelpful to you, but the official attitude of His Majesty's Government, is to refuse to allow any goods to be sent through the Gothenburg traffic through Sweden for Norwegian relief. Likewise His Majesty's Government refuse to allow any goods to be exported to Norway which are prohibited from export under the Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement. The result is that you should not approve of any export to Norway from Sweden or have anything to do with any such exports unless you receive specific instructions from London.

Yours sincerely,

15.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 967

17 JAN 1943

Registry Number } W 967/4/49

FROM War Office communicated.

No.

Dated

Received in Registry } 17th Jan. 1943

W : Co-ordination

Food parcels from North Africa to France.

Transmits copy of telegram from Algiers to Usfor No. 4559 7th January stating that the French have raised the question of despatching food parcels to Metropolitan France from North Africa. Requests comments.

Last Paper.

W 924.

References.

(Minutes.)

See with this copy of letter from. Mr. Gregory (T.W.E.D.) to Mr. Key (W.O.) 16/ Abroad/ 1642 (F.S.) Jan 12.

See also W 968/4/49.

18/1

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
Pub. 21/1/43.	Chief 30/3/43

Next Paper.

(W 968)

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

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W

U.S.30

SECRET

W 967
17 JAN 1943

No. 4559
NAF 93
Dated: JAN 07th/1701Z
Rec'd: JAN 08th/0335Z

INCOMING MESSAGE
ETOUSA.

IMPORTANT.

From:- Algiers.

To:- Usfor Ldn.

~~7~~ 516
~~21~~ JAN 1943

No. 4559 Dated 7th Jan. 1701Z
NAF 93

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

Interior Addresses: To: AGWAR
For: FISCAL DIVISION STATE and TREASURY for Action and COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF For Information.
To: USFOR for ENEMY TRANSACTIONS DEPT For Action ~~and~~ BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF and AMBASSADOR WINANT For Information.
Signed: EISENHOWER
From: MURPHY
From: BERNSTEIN

The French have raised the question as to the desirability of making an administrative exception to their trading with the Enemy Ordinance which would permit under certain conditions the sending of food parcels to Frenchmen in Metropolitan France. Information as to present attitude towards this matter and similar matters adopted by Governments in Washington and London in administering their respective trading with enemy controls would be appreciated. On question raised by French would appreciate comments.

(Relayed to AGWAR by Signals)

(Circulation)

Brig. Jacob.
Foreign Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
C.I.G.S.
Mr. Strang.
Mr. Benson.
Lord Strathallan.
Crumb Distribution.

COPY.

TRADING WITH THE ENEMY DEPARTMENT,
(Treasury and Board of Trade),
24, Kingsway, W.C.2.

To:- Lord Strathallan,
Cabinet Office.

16/Abroad/1642.(F.5.)

12th January, 1943.

MOST SECRET.

W967/4/49

Dear Key,

Your letter of the 6th January enclosing a copy of a telegram from Rabino on the question of the despatch of parcels of foodstuffs from North Africa to France. While I was looking up the Rabino wire, a further wire NAF 93 dated 7th January came to hand from which I see the French have raised the question officially and a circulation has been made by the Cabinet Office to members of the African Committee.

This is a matter which is primarily for M.E.W. but you may like to have the following note on the position. For the past 12 months or so, there has been in existence a scheme under which the Fighting French can send token parcels to French relatives and friends in France on behalf of its members. These parcels can only contain foodstuffs produced in Portugal and the amount is regulated to four tons a month in all. The scheme is operated from Lisbon by the representatives of the Fighting French subject to supervision by the British Embassy. Names and addresses are sent from here to Lisbon. Orders are placed with local Portuguese firms who pack and despatch. No indication is given in the parcels as to the sender or to the Fighting French organisation. The reasons for this are self-evident.

The wires to which I referred in my first paragraph do not indicate the sort of organisation which is being set up but prima facie the scheme is likely to invite criticism from M.E.W. unless some very strict controls are laid down. If these parcels are despatched from French North Africa, there will be very little control possible either as to the contents or the maximum amounts sent. In fact I should expect to find that the dispatch of the parcels became an easy method of

/communication

C.R. Key Esq.,
War Office.

between North Africa and Metropolitan France. At the French end, it is difficult to know whether the parcels would get through to their recipients and there may be objections to allowing for example the International Red Cross to distribute supplies of foodstuffs. Certainly any extension of their existing privileges would result in even greater pressure from various other refugee organisations in the United Kingdom to send parcels to overrun territories than we experience at present.

I have not commented on the curious condition of affairs under which the Americans are proposing to treat North Africa as a famished country while at the same time the inhabitants are in a position to export foodstuffs.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Troutbeck at M.E.W. and to Strathallan. My own opinion for what it is worth is that this proposal should be frowned upon by our representatives.

Yours sincerely,

H.S. GREGORY.

16.

155

1943

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 968

17 JAN 1943

Registry Number } W 968/4/49

FROM Mr.Troutbeck (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to

No. Mr. Maclean.

Dated T 550/7/907

Received in Registry } 15th Jan.1943 / 17th Jan.1943.

W : Co-ordination

Food parcels from North Africa to France.

Encloses a copy of letter to Mr. Key (War Office) from Mr. Troutbeck of 15th January giving Ministry of Economic Warfare views on the question of despatch of food parcels from North Africa to France.

Considers that United States Government should be consulted.

Last Paper.

(W967)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Off) to Mr. Troutbeck (M/E.W.). from Mr. Maclean. Jan 19.

& to Mr. Key (W.O.) Mr. Gregory (T.W.E.D.) Lord Stanhope. (P.W.C.O.) Jan 19.

(Minutes.)

It is at present his policy of H.M.G. (and his U.S. Govt.) to maintain a strict food blockade of all enemy-controlled territory except Greece.

Apart from various transactions involving the ~~French~~ despatch to Belgium etc. of food brought inside the blockade there has been no departure from this and we have resisted very serious Belgian, Norwegian etc. protests accordingly. It is true that this question is to some extent open in that the President has not yet expressed his agreement to the reaffirmation of this policy expressed in a telegram to -

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
WF 21/1/43	AWF 30/3/43

Next Paper.

W 1023

(W 1509.

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

to him [illegible] from the Prime
Minister of January 1st, last
it must be assumed ~~that~~
presumable that no major
change of policy is to take
place in the immediate future

This being so I am sure we
should not contemplate allowing
the despatch of parcels to
Metropolitan France from French
North Africa. The Germans take
away large quantities of
food from France and the
case for an exception in her
favor is therefore much weaker
than that for Belgium. Needless
to say, the despatch of
parcels from the Belgian Congo
to Belgium is not permitted
under our policy.

I suggest therefore that after
we have notified the
Washington authorities indicating
assumption that the proposal
will be turned down I suggest
the U.S. authorities in North N.
Africa be instructed accordingly;
the W.O. could answer their
cable by saying that this has
been done.

The Americans have in fact
notified us sending [illegible] the
[illegible] occupied

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Unoccupied France despite our
misgivings and it remains
to be seen whether what
has now likely will take in
hand circumstances; but there
seems to be no point
in anticipating this
difficulty & beyond putting
the case against as clearly
& as possible in
telegraphing the new telegram to
Washington.

? reply accordingly.

French Dept. I agree. 18/1
N.A. Dept I agree.

NB.
19/1

See two also W'ton despatch
No 203, which I have
discussed with French Dept. JSS.

French Dept agrees. 19/1
FAP 19/1

See within copy of tel to
1st Army 4 9 5386 cipher Jan 19

Cuba 158

W967

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square W.1

T550/7/907

15th January, 1943.

W 968
17 JAN 1943

SECRET

Dear Maclean

Gregory of the Trading with the Enemy Department sent us a copy of a letter he addressed to Key at the War Office about the despatch of food parcels from North Africa to France. Key has since written to us asking what line Robins should be instructed to take. I enclose a copy of a letter we have sent Key giving the Ministry of Economic Warfare view. But obviously there are political considerations involved which you will no doubt wish to discuss with the French Department.

It strikes me that it will not be enough merely to send Robins instructions and that we ought to express our views to the United States Government, namely either through Washington or through Riefler - and that we ought to do as quickly as possible. If you agree would you like us to take action or do it yourselves? If action is taken via Riefler we ought to inform Washington of what has been done.

Yours ever

D. Trevelyan.

D. Maclean Esq.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1

159

Copy to:
D. Maclean Esq.,
Foreign Office.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W. 1.

T550/7/907.

15th January 1943.

SECRET

Thank you for your letter of January 13th enclosing copies of your letter to Mr. Gregory and of the telegrams from North Africa on the question of parcels for Metropolitan France.

From the M.E.W. point of view it is most undesirable that the French should be allowed to send food parcels through the blockade or that there should be any departure from the present arrangement, which does no more than allow allied governments to buy food parcels within the blockade area amounting to £3,000 monthly in value or 4 tons in weight, whichever proves to be the less.

In this context, you will note that the telegram from Rabino seems to be founded on the mistaken belief that the Free French in this country are allowed to remit parcels through the blockade via Lisbon: whereas, of course, they are allowed merely to buy parcels there.

I note from the copy of Gregory's letter of January 12th, which you were kind enough to send me, that the Trading with the Enemy Department shares M.E.W.'s objection to the French proposal, and I have since gathered that Mr. Maclean of the Foreign Office has the same standpoint.

Obviously political, as well as economic considerations are involved: but it seems a matter of some urgency that we should express our views as soon as possible to the United States Government. I am accordingly sending a copy of this letter/

C.E.Key Esq.,
War Office,
S. W. 1.

160

Copy to:
D. Maclean Esq.,
Foreign Office.

letter to Maclean at the Foreign Office, as well as Gregory at the Trading With the Enemy Department.

(Sgd.) W.M. Ironside

16a

161

Registry
No.

W968/4/49

D.D.M.

Draft. 16/1.

Mr. Troutbeck

M.E.W.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

from Mr. Maclean

Copy Mr.C.H.Key
(War Office)

Mr. Gregory
(F.W.E.D)

Lord Strathallan
(Cabinet
Offices)

French Sym. AR 19/1

OUT FILE

+ 3C

19th January, 1943.

Immediate

Dear Troutbeck,

Please refer to your letter no.T550/1/907 of the 15th January about food parcels from North Africa for France.

Apart from the various transactions involving the despatch to Belgium etc of food bought inside the blockade, there has been no departure from the agreed policy of H.M.G. and the U.S. Government to maintain a strict food blockade of all enemy-occupied territory except Greece. It is true that the question is to some extent open in that the President has not yet expressed his agreement to the reaffirmation of this policy set forth in the Prime Minister's telegram to him of January 1st, but we think it must be assumed meanwhile that no major change of policy is to take place in the immediate future.

This being so, we agree with you that the proposal should not be approved. We believe it to be ~~the case~~ a fact, though you will know better than we, that the Germans take away large quantities of food from France, and the case for making an exception in her favour is therefore much weaker than the case for ~~the~~ an exception for, say, Belgium. Yet the despatch of parcels from the Belgian Congo to Belgium is of course not permitted under the policy described ~~at the beginning~~/... abm

~~beginning of this letter.~~ close.

We agree with you that the matter should be referred to the U.S. Government via Washington in the first place, indicating our assumption that the proposal should be turned down, and suggesting that the U.S. authorities in French North Africa be instructed accordingly. The War Office could, if they cared, answer the telegrams they have received by saying that this has been done.

The Americans have, as you know, in the past insisted on sending relief to Unoccupied France (while it was still unoccupied), despite our misgivings, and it remains to be seen what line they will take in the new circumstances; but there seems to be no point in anticipating this difficulty beyond putting the case against the proposal as clearly as possible in your telegram to Washington.

Since considering your letter we have ~~telegram no.~~ seen Arfar telegram no. 203 of the 16th January from W'Gon proposing that we offer to agree to a parcel scheme from Portugal being instituted on behalf of Frenchmen in French North Africa. We think this is a good idea as it will avoid a blank negative, and hope that you can consider it favourably. It has its complications in that you already allow the Free French here to run a parcels scheme from Portugal, and the new one would have to be a separate and additional/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

additional to it; the relations between the Fighting French here and the French Administration in North Africa are such that we could not propose to the latter that they should concert arrangements with the former, nor would it be reasonable to ~~maintain~~ include ~~the~~ allowance of four-tons ~~total~~ for ~~Frenchmen in French~~ parcels dispatched on behalf of ~~North Africa as well as Frenchmen in the~~ Frenchmen in the United Kingdom. It is conceivable that the Free French on learning of the existence of a separate scheme for French North Africa would claim to have an additional scheme for, say, French Equatorial Africa, but we think this could be resisted. Equally we do not think that the Belgians would have much ground for claiming a separate scheme for the Congo on the North African precedent; France would indeed be getting eight tons instead of four, but France is a very much bigger country than Belgium.

parcels from N. Africa in the allowance maximum

I have sent copies of this letter to Key, War Office, Gregory, T.W.E.D. and Strath~~e~~allan, Cabinet Offices.

Besides, I believe you would show that the Belgian Congo already obtains, with your consent, by financing its purchase of parcels in Portugal, much larger & not-dissimilar absolute more than 4 times assessment of parcels being sent.

Yours sincerely
Ed) D Macleod

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

19th January, 1943.

OUT FILE

(W 968/4/49)
Immediate.

Dear Troutbeck,

Please refer to your letter No. T 550/1/907 of the 15th January about food parcels from North Africa for France.

Apart from the various transactions involving the despatch to Belgium etc. of food bought inside the blockade, there has been no departure from the agreed policy of His Majesty's Government and the United States Government to maintain a strict food blockade of all enemy-occupied territory except Greece. It is true that the question is to some extent open in that the President has not yet expressed his agreement to the reaffirmation of this policy set forth in the Prime Minister's telegram to him of the 1st January, but we think it must be assumed meanwhile that no major change of policy is to take place in the immediate future.

This being so, we agree with you that the proposal should not be approved. We believe it to be a fact, though you will know better than we, that the Germans take away large quantities of food from France, and the case for making an exception in her favour is therefore much weaker than the case for an exception for, say, Belgium. Yet the despatch of parcels from the Belgian Congo to Belgium is of course not permitted under the policy described above.

We agree with you that the matter should be referred to the United States Government in Washington in the first place, indicating our assumption that the proposal

should/

J.M. Troutbeck, Esq., C.M.G.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

should be turned down, and suggesting that the United States authorities in French North Africa be instructed accordingly. The War Office could, if they cared, answer the telegrams they have received by saying that this has been done.

The Americans have, as you know, in the past insisted on sending relief to Unoccupied France (while it was still unoccupied, despite our misgivings, and it remains to be seen what line they will take in the new circumstances; but there seems to be no point in anticipating this difficulty beyond putting the case against the proposal as clearly as possible in your telegram to Washington.

Since considering your letter we have seen Arlar telegram No. 205 of the 16th January from Washington proposing that we offer to agree to a parcel scheme from Portugal being instituted on behalf of Frenchmen in French North Africa. We think this is a good idea as it will avoid a blank negative, and hope that you can consider it favourably. It has its complications in that you already allow the Free French here to run a parcels scheme from Portugal, and the new one would have to be separate and additional to it; the relations between the Fighting French here and the French Administration in North Africa are such that we could not propose to the latter that they should concert arrangements with the former, nor would it be reasonable to include parcels from North Africa in the maximum of four-tons allowed for parcels despatched on behalf of Frenchmen in the United Kingdom. It is conceivable

that/

that the Free French on learning of the existence of a separate scheme for French North Africa would claim to have an additional scheme for, say, French Equatorial Africa, but we think this could be resisted. Equally we do not think that the Belgians would have much ground for claiming a separate scheme for the Congo on the North African precedent; France would indeed be getting eight tons instead of four, but France is a very much bigger country than Belgium. Besides, I believe your records show that the Belgian Congo already cheats, with your tacit consent, by financing the purchase of parcels in Portugal, though I am not sure whether this involves more than four tons aggregate of parcels being sent.

I have sent copies of this letter to Ke , War Office, Gregory, Trading with the Enemy Department and Strathallan, Cabinet Offices.

Yours sincerely

(Sd) D Shaclean.

W968/4/49

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[Cypher] INDEXED LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Viscount Halifax
No.203 ARFAR.
16th January, 1943.

D. 3.50 a.m. 17th January, 1943.
R. 1.00 p.m. 17th January, 1943.

[ ] [ ] [ ]

IMPORTANT.

Reference Agwar-Usfor telegram No.4559 of 7th January from Algiers.

State Department inform us that they are still considering this proposal. Have you any views which you wish us to express to them. Would it be desirable to say that food parcels cannot be sent from F.N.A. but that we would be prepared to consider a scheme for the despatch of 4 tons per month of parcels purchased in Portugal on the lines of the existing schemes with the Allied Governments.

SECRET CIPHER TELEGRAM

put with M/168 W

From:- War Office. Desp. 1700 20 Jan 43.

INDEXED

To :- First Army.

968/4/49

95386 cipher (F.5.) 19 Jan. For Rabino.

Your CP/R/45 cipher 5 Jan.

One. Scheme exists whereby Allied Governments can buy Lisbon foodstuffs produced in Portugal £3,000 monthly or 4 tons whichever less for sending token parcels.

Two. Most undesirable this scheme be augmented other sources at present but some political considerations involved which under discussion.

T.O.O. 18.00 A/19.

C.6. Telegrams.

Copies to:-

F.5. (4)
Trading with the Enemy Dept. (Mr.H.S.Gregory)
Min. of Economic Warfare (Mr.J.Troutbeck)
Foreign Office (Mr. Maclean)
War Cabinet Offices (Lord Strathallan).

French Dept 4/2.

4/2

W1023 /G 169
18 JAN 1943

2 1943 H

W 1023 ~~1220~~ 220/a. 49

Mr. Trouthbeck (HCW)

to Mr. Le Rougetel. Jan 15. -18.

Rel. ref for Norway.

Refs. to F.O. letter of 7/1. (W 220/220/a). Original idea of secret plan was to allow Norwegians to ship as much on December Gothenburg ships as Swedes would allow. Comments on difficulties which have been met on further consideration.

Last Paper.

W220.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel. Witon 721. Jan 30.

to Mr. Trouthbeck (HCW) Feb. 3.

(Action completed.)

Mr. 4/2/43.

(Index.)

Nothing.

Next Paper.

W 5205.

(Minutes.)

It is difficult to know to what exactly what this last para: of W'Hn No 6298 does refer. As Mr Trouthbeck's news about the secret plan is very vague, I am uncertain whether it is worth telegraphing it to Lord Halifax.

? So say to Mr Trouthbeck & ask him either to enable us to tell Ld Halifax when this first consignment is shipped or instruct the appropriate person in W'Hn to do so.

19/1

We have just heard that the Gothenburg traffic has been suspended. Subject to this we might reply as suggested. (by telephone)

Northern Dept first. J.H. de Rougemont

All that we know of the suspension of the Gothenburg traffic

24724 12/42 F.O.P.

traffic is continued in Stockholm tel. N°: 64 - copy attached. It is certainly suspended now, but it is impossible to say how long this state of affairs will continue.

E.O. Coote.
22/1.

I think we might reply to

the Post the Gothenburg service,

by which it was intended to send

these supplies, has been closed

by the Germans for the present

but that we hope supplies will

be sent as soon as it is opened.

Northern Dept

J.R. Crow.

But he must also explain very briefly

the abortive plans indicated in N°: 7:

Chin.

27/1.

Dft to

E.C. 28/1

W 171

T550/12/Z

W1023

MOST SECRET

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

15th January, 1943.

My dear Ian.

Under cover of your letter No:W220/220/G of the 7th January you sent me a copy of Washington telegram No: 6298 on the subject of relief for Norway.

I am not sure that the third part of the telegram referred solely to the secret plan as it was sent before the Prime Minister's reply to the President. But so far as the secret plan is concerned, the original idea was to allow the Norwegians to ship as much on the December Gothenburg ships as the Swedes would allow them. On enquiry the Norwegians found that the Swedes could not allocate them any space at all on the December ships and so we agreed that the plan should be carried out on any ships sailing to Gothenburg during the January - March quarter on which space was available. Detailed arrangements are presenting some difficulty, and of course the possibility can still not be excluded of the Gothenburg traffic being closed altogether. But if this does not happen we hope that the technical details may be satisfactorily resolved. We are in communication with Raeder on the subject.

Yours ever

Jack Thornbeck

J. Le Rougetel, Esq., C.M.G.

Foreign Office.

Registry No. W1023/220/G.

30. 1. 43

Draft. Telegram

Washington

No 721.

Cypher

K/OTP

Copy to Treasury

M.E.W.

Feb. 3rd.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Northern Dept first

N. American Dept a.a!

Should be safer to make the amendment shown.

CFAS.

By all means

10 — 15 Jan

1/2 172

W

MOST SECRET

W220/220/G.

Your telegram 6148. (last para.)

I presume you refer to Secret scheme.

Agreement with Norwegians supplies had been reached to send on January - March sailings of Swedish Gothenburg service. (December sailings were full).

~~German has not known~~ ~~closed~~ Gothenburg service but it still

It is hoped that supplies will go forward ~~as soon as~~ if when traffic is resumed.

Gothenburg ~~sailings~~ ~~re-opened~~

General Dept a Dom

Typed out: Aug 2 07

Typed out from telegram

Typed out: Aug 2 07

Typed out: Aug 2 07

Typed out: Aug 2 07

185 173

[Cypher]. FILES

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 721 D. 5.15 p.m. 1st February, 1943.
30th January, 1943.

//////

MOST SECRET

Your telegram No. 6298 (last paragraph). I presume you refer to secret scheme.

Agreement with Norwegians had been reached to send supplies on January-March sailings of Swedish Gothenberg service. (December sailings were full).

It is still hoped that supplies will go forward. ~~It would be safer to make the amendment shown~~ if and when Gothenberg traffic is resumed.

O.T.P.

18

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 1082

19 JAN 1943

Registry Number W 1082/4/49

FROM The Hon. Neville Lytton to Secretary of State.

No.

Dated 14th Jan. 1943

Received in Registry 19th Jan. 1943

W : Co-ordination.

Relief for French children.
Gives reasons why relief should be sent to children in France. The organisation for distributing food is already in existence in France and one ship load of dried milk and dried vegetables would help to feed 100,000 children for six months. Suggests that food might also be sent for Belgian children.

Last Paper.

W1023 (w831)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Sgt/Hon. Neville Lytton from Sec. Bullard Jan 18.

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
12/3/43	QMF 30/3/43

Next Paper.

W1093 (w1768)

(Minutes.)

The difficulty in which the Foreign Office (and the M.E.W. for that matter) find themselves in this matter is that they have themselves for nearly a year now wished to do very nearly what Mr. Lytton, Mr. Kerschner and others propose. The Secretary of State's War Cabinet paper of April, 1942 (flag B in W 6165/62/49) proposed a despatch of milk to children in the worst areas in occupied Europe. This was turned down by the War Cabinet twice, in April and June. Since then the Prime Minister laid down in the autumn that milk might be sent to Greece only and in his message to the Prime Minister (at flag A in W 17619/6397/G) he amended the F.O. draft so as to take a purely negative line.

The Secretary of State's milk plan ~~is~~ seems the minimum concession we could make which would ~~be of~~ make any material difference to the lot of Allied and French children. There is practically nothing which can be done for France by purchases inside the blockade. Dropping food from airplanes is nothing but a propaganda gesture which the R.A.F. in any case dislike; some few thousands of French children may eventually be evacuated to Switzerland under our scheme, but this may not come to anything at all and even if it does, priority must be given to Belgian children who are worse off.

Unless by any chance the President's answer to the Prime Minister suggests abandoning a hundred per cent negative policy I do not see that we can do anything to relieve French or other Allied children this winter or satisfy Mr. Lytton. It follows that this letter should be answered on the usual lines, i.e. small concessions lead to big ones, it is not in the common interest to risk this, France, which supplies Germany with large quantities of food, could not be treated as an exception, etc., etc.

I am not sure, however, whether we should send off such a letter until the President's reply has been

received/

received. As regards this it is becoming impossible to move in any direction whatever in its absence. I venture to submit, therefore, a draft minute to the Prime Minister from the Secretary of State enquiring whether a reminder could be sent.

A Maclean

January 21st, 1943.

~~Fuels Dept~~

E.C. Crowe 22/1

I strongly endorse R. Maclean's suggestion. If the child evacuation scheme proves unworkable, as we rather fear it will, we may soon find ourselves driven to consider some alternative even if it is only a lesser one. But until the President's reply is received we cannot even send adequate answers to such letters as this — & their number is increasing.

J.H. Le Rougetel. 22/1.

M.E. Dixon 22/1.

Now see also W 1437 giving a general impression of American developments

E.L.C. 25/1.

(and W'ton Tels Arfan 445, 446 & 447.) — also these

On further consideration I am inclined to think that our best

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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course may be to ask Ld Halifax to make discreet enquiries at Washington if he can do so without approaching the State Dept.

N. American Dept. (for obs^n)

French Dept. WMH 3.

J.H. de Rougemont 5/2.

? am not clear why the State Dept. should be kept out of it. ? we. have thought it desirable to do what we can to ensure that they and the President kept in step, and that we were not involved in cross-purposes with each.

But it seems desirable in any case that our own Embassy shd. be 'au courant' with both lines, and if importance is attached to keeping the

State Dept. out. Ld. Halifax cd. no doubt tell Mr Hopkins or the President that a reply to the P.M.'s cable is greatly desired. We should presumably get No. 10 to concur in this procedure.

N Butler
6/2.

If N: Butler feels that it will create unnecessary complication & distinct H.M.A. on the lines suggested I have no wish to press this point and should prefer the course originally suggested by N: Maclean.

Draft minute resubmitted. H. Lee Pemberton
8/2

I agree. We shd. get No. 10 to let us respect to Ld. Halifax whatever the P.M. may send to Pres. Roosevelt direct.

N Butler
10/2.
16/2

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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Secretary of State.

You will recall that at the meeting in your room last Friday (Feb. 6) it was decided that, until the President replied to the Prime Minister's telegram of January 1st (flag A), no progress could be made on the various projects for relief of our Allies through the blockade.

I submit the draft of a minute which I hope you will

(over

agree to send to the Prime Minister,
asking him to send a reminder
to Mr Roosevelt, if nothing was said
on the subject at Casablanca.

N McLean
10/11

2610

180

Draft

Feb. 10, 1943
PM/43/17

PRIME MINISTER

You may remember that in replying to President Roosevelt's telegram No. 243 of December 23rd you expressed the view that his plan for the despatch of relief parcels to Norway through the Swedish Red Cross would involve a complete reversal of our blockade policy, which you felt we should not contemplate. You also invited an expression of his views. No reply has yet been received from him.

Seen by Mr. Butler 10/2 JM Martin 10/2

In the meantime the secret relief plan for Norway is in suspense owing to the interruption of the Gothenburg traffic and, until the President's views on the broader issue are known it is not possible to proceed with the child evacuation scheme although there have been discussions with the Treasury as regards the ways and means of putting it into force when the time comes. Thus all our plans for extending the scope of relief are at a standstill. As a result the Belgian Ambassador's letter to you of October 30th is still unanswered and, although I am being constantly pressed to agree to the shipment of foodstuffs to occupied Europe in one form or another, it is not possible to return a complete or convincing reply to any such enquiries.

Unless/

Unless you had an opportunity of covering the ground during your recent meeting with the President at Casablanca, you may therefore wish to remind him that you hope shortly to receive the expression of his views for which you have asked.

HL

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

182

I think M. E. W. should be informed of P.M.'s decision.

Cecil Stoppford Sheppard / depts to see

N. A.

E. L. Cross.
1572

(H. Brown)

No 10 have now agreed to a copy of the P.M.'s minute being sent to L^d Selborne & we sh^d also suggest sending him a copy of the S. of S. minute on which it is based.

June 16/72

I understand that L^d Drogheda will be raising his question of relief with Sir A. Cadogan tomorrow in the light of Wilson Fels Afars 445, 446 and 541 and will point out that we cannot hope to maintain a purely negative

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attitude even if he wish to
do so. Governor Lehmann has
a high fructose business organization
which is bound to make trouble
for all of us unless we are
willing and able to convince
him that relief through the
blockade is not practical
politics at present.

See minute on W.2554. JMB 16/2.
N. American Dept 16/2.
Central " "
Southern Dept 17/2.

J.H. [illegible] Rogers
16/2.

[See also W 2554/4/49 & minutes
thereon].

17/ii

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MINUTE

10, Downing Street, Whitehall.

SECRET.

(31)

SERIAL No M. 46/3

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

I did not discuss this with the President at Casablanca and, since he has not replied to my original telegram, we may assume he has cooled down. I hope this is so. The less we have to do, the better.

W.S.C.

12.2.43

P. M. 143/17. Relief parcels to Norway. — General

General Dept to see

AB 2 Feb 43

38 Oakley St. S.W.3

14. I. 43.

Dear Mr. Anthony Eden

My Mother has shown me your letter and as you are kind enough to say that you have great respect for my opinion on matters concerning France I will make one last attempt to convert you to my point of view with reference to making a token allowance of food which would save some 100,000 children from starvation. I have had a conversation with the Prime Minister on the subject and he takes the same line as you do, namely, that the responsibility is upon the Germans to feed the countries which they occupy and that we are under no obligation to do anything in the matter.

I am, for the moment, only going to deal with the question of France. Of course we cannot undertake to feed France – that would be sheer folly & no one suggests it. France collapsed, broke her treaty obligations and set up a Quisling government which proceeded to collaborate with our enemy – then the people of France made it clear to the whole world that they did not support the band of traitors who held the reins of power. A campaign of resistance was started which has called for a degree of courage and self sacrifice which can only be understood by those who have been witnesses of this bitter struggle.

Few people in England know what heroic comradeship has been shown by French civilians towards our prisoners escaping from German prison camps through France and to our prisoners interned in France & brutally ill-treated by the Vichy authorities. They have risked their lives and are continuing to do so every day in helping our prisoners to get back to England - they hide them and clothe them and feed them with their own scanty rations and hundreds have been shot for doing so. Before I left France, some of our airmen were brought down in our district - they were toasted and made much of and then mysteriously disappeared and got back to England. These Frenchmen are under no obligation to behave like this and they know that if they are found out they will be tortured by the Vichy officials. They might say (as this Majesty's government says about the food question): - "We cannot assume the responsibility of helping British prisoners to get back to the fighting line". And yet they continue to do so, first, because it is the right thing to do and second, because it is helping the military effort of the allies.

Now, I maintain that the right thing for us to do is to recognise this noble conduct by saving the lives of a few of their starving children. Furthermore such a gesture would help to diminish the effect of the German campaign of starvation blackmail which is being used to secure French mechanics for the German factories.

In France, the organisation for distributing the food is

already in existence. One ship-load of dried milk and dried vegetables would help to feed 100,000 children for six months. 187

I am well aware that the condition of Belgium is almost worse and therefore I respectfully suggest that the same token help would be opportune in this instance.

The case of Holland is less bad, and also Norway. Poland & occupied Russia are beyond the possibility of help.

I respectfully suggest also that the state of famine should be carefully studied from the military point of view. I am quite certain that the seriousness of the situation is underrated by His Majesty's government. If we put off the liberation of occupied countries much longer we shall arrive too late and our triumphant armies will be welcomed by skeletons.

We hear a lot on the B.B.C of the bright future that awaits the United Nations when there will be freedom from want, freedom of thought and freedom of belief. All this sounds hollow to those who are starving. For them there is no future.

Yours Sincerely

Neville Lytton.

W. 1082
19 JAN 1943

188

D

2C

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

18th January, 1943.

Dear Sir,

Mr. Eden has asked me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter to him of January 14th, and to let you know that he will be replying himself very shortly.

Yours truly,

(Sd.) G. E. MILLARD.

Private Secretary.

The Honourable
Neville Lytton, O.B.E.

19

189

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 1093

19 JAN 1943

Registry Number W 1093/4/49

FROM Mr. Morrison (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Lawford.

No.

Dated T 550/14/28

Received in Registry 15th Jan., 1943. 19th Jan., 1943.

General:Co-ordination

Child evacuation scheme.

Refers to Lord Selborne's letter of January 11th (W 808/4/49). Encloses a record of a conversation between Swiss Minister and the Director General on January 14th. The Swiss Minister said that his Government were willing to study any scheme of evacuation of children from occupied territory, but saw great difficulties in the scheme, ever coming into operation. The Swiss Minister asked that instructions might be sent to His Majesty's Minister at Berne so that the matter could be discussed by him with the Federal authorities. M. Thurnheer also referred to evacuation of German children to Switzerland.

Last Paper.

W1082 (W808/

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See within copy of tel to Berne No 241 Dated Jan 15th

See on W808/4/49

21/1

(Action completed.)

Feb 16 2 42

(Index.)

Aug 30/3/43

Next Paper.

(W1150)

W 1135.

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

Enclosure W 190

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

15th January 1943.

W 1093.

19 JAN 1943

Dear Lawford,

With reference to my Minister's letter of January 11th to the Secretary of State regarding the proposal to evacuate children from occupied to neutral countries, I enclose a record of an interview between the Swiss Minister and the Director General. I understand that a copy of this has already been sent to Maclean.

Yours sincerely,

Ronald Mavisen

V.G. Lawford, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street,
S.W.1.

Enclosure Dept. first [illegible]

T.550/19/28.

The Swiss Minister came to see me to-day in Mr.Foot's absence. He said that he had now received a further communication from his Government on the subject of the proposed evacuation to Switzerland of children from occupied countries. He thought that this matter had probably been fully discussed at the meeting of the Federal Countil on Tuesday last the 12th January.

The answer that he was instructed to give was that the Swiss Government were always willing to support any movement which would ease the situation for innocent sufferers of war, and would therefore regard the scheme sympathetically. His Government, however, saw great difficulties in the way of the scheme ever coming into operation. These difficulties were not connected with the support of the children when they arrived in Switzerland for the Swiss Government knew that they could rely on the promise of our help. They asked us however not to forget that they had to collaborate not only with us but with the Axis belligerents as well.

In spite of the difficulties that they contemplate the Swiss Government will be willing to study immediately the plans which we have in mind for the evacuation to Switzerland of the children, and asked that H.M.Minister at Berne might receive full instructions in the matter so that the details might be discussed by him with the Federal Authorities. (At this point M. Thurnheer said, off the record, that he thought that the Swiss Minister for Foreign Affairs took some pride in working on humanitarian schemes himself, and that this was probably the reason why he had asked that the matter might be negotiated at Berne. He, M. Thurnheer, was of course at our disposal if we wanted to discuss any broad questions of principle with him.)

The Minister then referred again to the possibility that it might help if his Government offered to have a number

of /

of German children housed in Switzerland, and asked if we had anything more to say on this point. I said that I thought that we would not wish to express any opinion on this point unless it were put forward by the Swiss Government during the negotiations, and that I very much doubted whether the Germans would be influenced in the least degree by such an offer. I did not think that there could be any question of our allowing food to pass the blockade for German children, and in my personal opinion, [redacted] it would be much better if the question were not raised with us at the moment.

Finally, M. Thurnheer said that he thought that it would be a good thing if our instructions to Berne could be sent off fairly soon. I replied that we would try and get them drafted as soon as possible, but that we should probably have to discuss the matter with the U.S.Government, and that it might be a fortnight or so before we were able to telegraph to Mr. Norton on the subject.

(Intd) D.

14th January,1943.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

INDEXED

T550/19/28

W1093/4/49

[CYPHER]

~~LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.~~

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE.

No. 241. Arfar.

15th January, 1943. D. 8. 00 a.m. 16th January, 1943.

Repeated to Washington No. 165 Arfar.

W W W W W

My telegram No. 137 [Arfar of 9th January: evacuation of children from occupied countries to Switzerland]

Swiss Minister informed us on 14th January that his Government would consider the scheme sympathetically though they foresaw great difficulty in securing its acceptance by all the belligerents. Swiss Government were willing to study our plans at once and asked that you might be sent full instructions enabling you to enter upon detailed discussions in Berne.

2. Necessary instructions will be sent to you as soon as possible, but several points of principle have still to be cleared up in consultation with the United States Government. In the meantime if Swiss Government mention matter to you, you should confine yourself to expressing our pleasure at their reply and asking that the matter may be regarded as secret for the present.

O.T.P.

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/19/28
COPY FOR J. Maclean Esq. F.O. only.
DATE 7.1.43

20

194

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 1135

20 JAN 1943

Registry Number W 1135/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated) T 550/19

Dated –

Received in Registry 20th Jan. 1943

W : Co-ordination

Relief for Belgium.

Transmits copy of letter to Co-ordination Centre, Washington, of 16th January, stating that in December 34 tons of soap were despatched from Spain to Belgium for the l'Oeuvre de l'Enfance and that in Jauary a small quantity of children's clothes, addressed to members of Belgian Royal Family, was allowed through blockade for distribution by certain approved societies.

Last Paper.

W1093.

References.

(Minutes.)

Central Dept MAPS. 26/1

EC 23/1

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

wlo. 27/1/43

(Index.)

anF. 30/3/43

Next Paper.

W 1150.

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

195

T.550/19.

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

16th January, 1943.

W 1135
20 JAN 1943

Dear Coordination Centre,

For your information, we have recently allowed two minor departures from our normal blockade practice in favour of the Belgians.

(a) On December 11th we sanctioned the despatch from Spain to Belgium of some 34 tons of soap, value 600,000 pesetas, for the L'Oeuvre National de L'Enfance.

(b) On January 15th we agreed to a single case containing a small quantity of childrens clothes, addressed to members of the Belgian Royal Family, being forwarded for distribution by certain approved societies. This case (origin unspecified) appears to have been in Portugal for some time.

We have made it quite clear that both these concessions are exceptional and must not be regarded as a precedent.

Co-ordination Centre,
British Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

21

GENERAL

1043

CO-ORDINATION.

W 1150

23 JAN 1943

196

Registry Number } W 1150/4/49

TELEGRAM FROM

Mr. Norton, Berne

No. 272

Dated 18th Jan:1943

Received in Registry 20th Jan:1943

W: Co-ordination

Child Evacuation Scheme.

Requests that, since discussions with Swiss Government are contemplated, it would be more convenient that all future telegrams on this subject be sent in the Foreign Office series.

Last Paper.

W 1135 (W1093).

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/Mr. Troutbeck (M.E.W.) from Mr. le Rougetel Jan. 23.

Tel Berne to 472. Feb 3

& Mr. Troutbeck (M.E.W.) Feb 6

(Minutes.)

It may from organisational & other awkwardness do this as most of the questions will be for M.E.W., and their opposite numbers in America. I write as in attached dft & arch.

L Maclean 21/1

J 21/1

R H Caccia 21/1

See within letter from Mr. Troutbeck (M.E.W.) to Mr. le Rougetel Jan 26.

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
Mle. 6/2/43	Auf. 30/3/43

Next Paper.

W 1198. (W1972).

22910 9/41 F.O.P.

197

W

W 1150

JAN 1943

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL No. 1.

FROM BERNE TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Norton
No. 272.
18th January, 1943.

D. 8.20 p.m. 18th January, 1943.
R. 11.55 p.m. 18th January, 1943.

JJJJ

Proposed evacuation of children from occupied territory to Switzerland

? 241 w N1093

Your telegram No. 243 ARFAR.

Since discussions with the Swiss Government are contemplated and these can only be conducted with F.P.D. it would be more convenient if all future telegrams on this subject were sent in Foreign Office series.

Can this be arranged?

JAN 1943 20 F.O. REGISTRY

O.T.P.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

W1150/4/49

D.D.M.

Draft.

Mr. Troutbeck

M.E.W.

From Mr. Le
Rougetel

22
198

OUT FILE

23rd January, 1943.

Dear Troutbeck,

I enclose a copy of Berne telegram no. 272 suggesting that future telegrams about the child evacuation scheme should be in Foreign Office rather than Arfar series.

We/Consulate have see no objection to this proposal but foresee the difficulty that the negotiations will turn largely on economic warfare questions such as extra Swiss imports and the remission of funds to Switzerland. ~~These~~ Then questions will, moreover, have to be discussed step by step with the Americans which would normally be done in Arfar series. We should ~~however~~ like to meet Norton's wishes but lots if you ~~do not~~ think this will ~~lead to too many organisational~~ create difficulties and delays at this end.

Yours ever

(Sgd) J. G. WARD

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1. 197

OUT FILE

(W 1150/4/49)

23rd January,
1943.

Dear Troutbeck.

I enclose a copy of Berne telegram No.272 suggesting that future telegrams about the child evacuation scheme should be in Foreign Office rather than Arfar series.

We ourselves have no objection to this proposal but foresee the difficulty that the negotiations will turn largely on economic warfare questions such as extra Swiss imports and the remission of funds to Switzerland. These questions will, moreover, have to be discussed step by step with the Americans which would normally be done in Arfar series. We should like to meet Norton's wishes but not if you think this will create difficulties and delays at this end.

Yours ever

(Ian Kirkpatrick)

J.M. Troutbeck, Esq., C.M.G.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

Telephone:
GROSVENOR 4060.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE,
W.1.

T559/19/28

YOUR REFERENCE W 1150/4/49

200

26th January, 1943.

INDEXED

My dear Sam

Your letter W 1150/4/49 of the 23rd January on the point whether future telegrams about the child evacuation scheme should be in the Foreign Office or Arfar series.

I think from the London angle it would be far more convenient to keep these telegrams in the Arfar series. As you say a great part of the discussions will turn on economic warfare questions and the correspondence with Washington will presumably take place in the Arfar series. I think it would be bound to lead to confusion if the correspondence with Berne was in one series and that with Washington in another.

Yours ever

Jack Troutbeck

Submitted with file

J. le Rougetel, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

P/W Lt to Berne

E. E. Cross
26

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No.

OUT FILE

201

Draft.

Bern

Despatched

5 Feb M. 4

Telegram. No 472 Feb 3rd

Cypher

K35/OTP

a R35.

Copy to Frankfurt

Dept No 1

Central Dept No 2 files

Your telegram No 272

[of Jan 18th: child evacuation scheme]

Negotiations ~~with~~ have largely an economic character which questions ~~such as exchange securities and securities of funds to Switzerland. These~~ will have to be discussed with Americans and this would ~~be~~ is normally to be done in Anglo American series. To Berne - London exchanges in F.O. series and London Washington exchanges M.E.W. are reluctant to ~~do~~

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in Cuba series would
inevitably lead to confusion
and H. E. W. are therefore
reluctant to agree to your
suggestion.

agree to change you suggest
which would lead to correspondence
with Berne being in one series
& that with W'ton in another.
In the circumstances [we] do not
feel inclined to free them.

JB

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

203

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[Cypher] DEPARTMENTAL No. 1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO BERNE

No. 472.
3rd February, 1943. D. 5.45 p.m. 4th February, 1943.

:-:-:-:-:

Your telegram No. 272 [of 18th January: child evacuation scheme].

Negotiations turn largely on economic warfare questions which have to be discussed with Americans and this is normally done in Arfar series. Ministry of Economic Warfare are reluctant to agree to change you suggest which would lead to correspondence with Berne being in one series and that with Washington in another. In the circumstances we do not feel inclined to press them.

O.T.P.

22

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 1198

21 JAN 1943

Registry Number } W 1198/4/49

FROM Lord Cranborne (Lord Privy Seal) to
No. Mr. Law.

Dated 15th Jan.,
Received in Registry } 21st Jan., 1943

W: Co-ordination

Visit of Mr Kerschner to Ireland.

Encloses a copy of letter to Mr. Peake (Home Office) of 15th January stating that Mr. Kerschner an American Quaker wishes to go to Ireland to discuss with Irish Quakers post war relief and other questions. The British authorities have refused him facilities to go to Ireland. Requests that his application may be looked into again.

Last Paper.
(W1735-6/62/49 1942)
W 1150

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See also W 1199 & W 1232.

The matter is primarily one for the H.O. and subject to the views of the ~~F.O.~~ North American Dept ? Perhaps we can leave them to state their case upon.

Now see H.O. reply attached. Pp. 25/.

M ~~Foster~~ Ogilvie
N. American Dept 23/1

E.L.C. 24/1

See within H.O. letter to M. Grey Jan 23rd

D

(Action completed.) 1/2/43.

(Index.) AWF 30/3/43

Next Paper.

(W1199)

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

205

PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL

Gwydyr House,
~~10, Downing Street,~~
Whitehall. S.W.1.

15th January 1943.

My dear Dick,

The enclosed letter, which I have written to Osbert Peake, explains itself. This is not, of course, a case with which I am officially concerned, and I do not wish in any way to butt in. I was only brought into the matter owing to the fact that I have known Mr. Kershner for a good number of years in my capacity as President of the International Commission for Refugees. I do feel, however, that this is a matter on which the Government ought to proceed with some caution, for Mr. Kershner might be a very tiresome enemy if he were antagonised. Moreover, I doubt whether he could do very much harm in Ireland if he did go there. At any rate, this is a matter which your Department and the Home Office will no doubt consider together.

W 1198
21 JAN 1943

Richard Law, Esq., M.P.,
Foreign Office.

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15th January 1943.

My dear Osbert,

I had a slightly embarrassing interview this afternoon, about which I think you in the Home Office ought to know, with Mr. Howard Kershner. Mr. Kershner, as you may possibly know, is an American Quaker who has long been connected with the International Commission for Refugees, of which I was at one time President. He has spent a large part of his life on relief work of one kind or another, and he is now on a visit to this country with a view to persuading people here that it would be to the benefit of the Allied cause if the United States' and British Governments would agree to send food into occupied Europe, and especially into France, for the relief of children.

His visit is now coming to an end, and he had intended before returning to America to go to Ireland in order to talk to Irish Quakers about post-war relief and other questions. He had his passport visaed at the American Embassy, and was preparing to start when he was told that the British Authorities had refused him facilities. He came to ask me whether this meant that he was regarded as

Osbert Peake, Esq., M.P. /Over

persona non grata by the British Government. He wanted me to make enquiries about this, but I told him that I could not properly do so. It seemed to me that his wisest course would be to approach the American Embassy who were in charge of American interests in this country and who would no doubt do what they thought right in the matter. I added, however, that I would be quite ready to passon what he had said to the proper quarter, though I was afraid that in the circumstances I could do no more.

I do not, of course, know what the rights or wrongs of the case are. Mr. Kershner is a most pertinacious man, and I have no doubt that the line of talk which he has been handing out since he has been here has been inconvenient and embarrassing. On the other hand, I should think that he represents a pretty large body of opinion in the United States and it would be a pity to send him back there with a flea in his ear. It would, I think, be worth the while of the Home Office to look into his application again and weigh the advantages and disadvantages of refusing his application.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Dick Law in order that he may be aware of the position from the Foreign Office end.

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INDEXED

23rd January, 1943.

W 1198/4/49

Dear Grey,

Mr. Law may be interested to see the enclosed copy of Mr. Peake's reply to Lord Cranborne's letter about Mr. Howard Kershner.

Yours sincerely,

R. Schuck

So much the better

E.L.G. 24/1

P. F. Grey, Esq.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Gen. 571/2/369 22nd January, 1943

We had not heard about Mr. Howard Kershner's application for a permit to visit Eire before receiving your letter of the 15th January.

I find that a permit was refused on security grounds but that these are not so serious as to outweigh the considerations of public policy which you put forward; exit permits will therefore be granted to Mr. Kershner and his companion, Mr. William Eves.

The Rt. Hon. Viscount Cranborne.

23.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 1199

21 JAN 1943

Registry Number } W 1199/4/49

FROM Mr. Hendricks (Lord Privy Seal's Office) to Mr. Lawford
No.

Dated 18th Jan.,
Received in Registry } 21st Jan., 1943

W: Co-ordination

Mr Kerschner's visit to Ireland.

Refers to Lord Cranborne's letter of 15th January (W 1198/4/49). Transmits a copy of letter from Mr Kerschner of 16th January. Enclosing a card announcing an address which he was supposed to deliver in Dublin. Requests that it may be explained to Foreign Office that Mr Kerschner neither arranged nor authorised this meeting.

Last Paper.

(W 1198).

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See minute on W 1198

M. of Gren 25/1.

N. Economic Dept 30/1

25/1

D

(Action completed.)

2/43

(Index.)

AWF 30/3/43

Next Paper.

(W 1231)

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Gwydyr House,
Whitehall, S.W.1.
18th January 1943.

Dear Nicholas

With reference to Lord Cranborne's letter of Friday last about Mr. Kershner's application to visit Eire, I enclose a copy of a letter which reached him this morning from Mr. Kershner. He has informed Mr. Kershner that he has sent a copy of his letter and enclosure to the departments concerned.

Yours ever

V. G. Lawford, Esq.
Foreign Office.

W 1199
21 JAN 1943

COPY

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FRIENDS SERVICE COUNCIL

Friends House
Euston Road,
London, N.W.1.

16th January, 1943.

My Dear Lord Cranborne:

Returning from the very cordial visit with you yesterday I found the enclosed card announcing an address that I was supposed to deliver in Dublin last night. I knew nothing about the arrangement of this meeting and had not authorised it. As I told you yesterday I had no intention of discussing the famine relief problem while In Ireland. Of course Friends there know of my work in France, and on their own initiative they had arranged this meeting and assigned the subject to me.

In your communication to the Foreign Office I should be glad if you would make this explanation, as the censor may have picked up this card coming to me from Ireland and the Foreign Office might therefore think that the information it contained did not agree with what I told you yesterday. I would like to say in addition that had I arrived in Ireland and found myself advertised to speak in accordance with the enclosed card I should have described the situation in France but certainly would not have raised in Ireland the controversial question regarding sending food to that country. I do hope that the Foreign Office will understand my position in this matter.

Most sincerely yours,

(Sgd) Howard E. Kershner

The Rt. Hon. Viscount Cranborne,
Gwydyr House,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

COPY

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IRISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

A Private Meeting of the Institute

will be held on

FRIDAY, 15TH JANUARY, 1943

at 7.45 p.m.

in the

CLARENCE HOTEL
(Wellington Quay,
Dublin)

when

Mr. Howard E. Kershner
(Formerly Director of Relief of the International Commission for the Care of Child Refugees.)

will speak on

"CONDITIONS IN UNOCCUPIED FRANCE DURING THE YEARS 1940-1942"

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1943

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 1231

21 JAN 1943

Registry Number } W 1231/4/49

FROM Mr. Holmes (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Grey *No.*

Dated 15th Jan.,
Received in Registry } 21st Jan., 1943

W: Co-ordination

Food situation in occupied Europe.

Encloses various documents about food consumption in Germany and German occupied territory, which may be useful for Mr. Law's interview with Mr. Kerschner.

Last Paper.

(W1199).

(Minutes.)

Ecc 241

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
22/1/43	AWF. 26/5/43

Next Paper.

(W1232)

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

Telephone:
GROSVENOR 4060.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE,
W.1.

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YOUR REFERENCE

W 1231
21 JAN 1943

15th January, 1943.

Dear Grey,

Further to Lord Drogheda's and Miss Solomon's conversations with you this afternoon, about Mr. Kershner's visit to Mr. Law, I enclose two papers which I hope will be of assistance.

Much the same information is contained in them - in fact the one marked "A" might be called an up-todate version of "B". I am sending the latter, however, as it contains one or two items of information - notably about the Channel Islands - which were not included in "A".

If there is anything further we can do to help, please let me know. Our expert on these matters is Miss Dennehy, extension 2891, and I am sure she will be pleased to give you any information you want.

Yours sincerely,

Hugh Cobbold

P. Grey, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

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A

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,

ENEMY BRANCH.

L.250/84/Z
Dated 4.1.43

FOOD CONSUMPTION IN GERMAN EUROPE

INDEX

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APPENDICES

I Table of estimated consumption of main foodstuffs in Europe.

II Table of estimated daily calorie and protein intake.

III Table of estimated daily calorie and protein intake from current rations and unrationed foods.

IV Table of estimated daily calorie intake for the various consumer classes in Greater Germany.

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FOOD CONSUMPTION IN GERMAN EUROPE.

Summary and Conclusions

1. This paper attempts to show the changes in food consumption which have occurred in the various countries of German Europe since the outbreak of war. In every country there has been some fall in total food supplies, but for the Balkan countries and Italy this fall has so far been comparatively small.

2. In Germany there was a deterioration in the first half of 1942, but since the harvest food supplies have once more improved. In the Protectorate, and to a lesser degree in Denmark, there has been some fall in food consumption, but the most serious fall has occurred in the countries which formerly relied on imports for a large proportion of their food supplies - Greece, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway and Finland; in France and Poland too, the drop has been substantial owing to the fall in agricultural production.

3. With certain exceptions, the major part of the decline in the level of food consumption occurred in 1941; in 1942 there has been little change.

4. In every country of western and northern Europe there has been a marked fall in consumption of cereals, but the most striking fall has been in vegetable fats, though consumption of meat and dairy produce have also considerably declined. Sugar consumption has been well maintained, and even increased, while there has been a tendency to increased consumption of potatoes in compensation for shortages of other foodstuffs.

5. Within individual countries, food shortage has fallen with varying weight on the various sections of the community. Broadly speaking, the rural population has maintained food consumption at but little below pre-war level, while the urban working classes who cannot afford black market purchases have been heaviest hit. Owing to milk allowances, young children are relatively well provided for, while adolescents, owing to their high energy demands, are worst off. Workers helping the German war effort are generally adequately fed.

6. While there have been no major epidemics, food shortage in certain countries has taken its toll of health and vitality; there are reports of various deficiency diseases, and the incidence of tuberculosis has everywhere risen.

7. As to the future, unless the winter should prove unusually severe, or military operations dislocate food distribution, it is unlikely that there will be any significant change in the level of food consumption, save perhaps in France and the Balkans. The loss of French colonial imports may materially reduce the level of urban food consumption, while the poor grain harvest in South-Eastern Europe may lead to shortages later in the year, of which the brunt will be borne by town dwellers.

8. The estimates made in this summary are necessarily subject to a margin of error and are based on intelligence available to M.E.W. up to the end of December 1942. They should not be used by other Departments at any later date without prior reference to the Enemy Branch, Ministry of Economic Warfare (Extension 3137) for confirmation of validity.

PART I - GENERAL

This note attempts to show the changes in food consumption which have occurred in the various countries of German Europe since the outbreak of war. The most convenient means of presenting such changes is provided by figures of national average consumption for individual foodstuffs. While pre-war figures are fairly reliable, at least for western Europe, in most instances war-time figures are necessarily estimates, based on the available information. For som foodstuffs, such as cereals and sugar, these war-time figures are reasonably reliable, but for others, notably milk and eggs, the margin of error may be wide.

Table I shows the estimated consumption in kilogrammes per head of population per year for the main foodstuffs, before the war, and in 1941 and 1942. Table II shows the daily calorie* and protein intake from these foodstuffs, together with foods such as fruit and vegetables, which are not included in Table I. It is clear that in every country there has been some fall in total food supplies since the war. For the Balkan countries - Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and Italy, this fall has so far been comparatively small. Germany was able to maintain a high level of consumption throughout 1941, and though there was a marked worsening in 1942, there was no question of critical food shortage, while owing to her high pre-war calorie intake, Denmark, in spite of some fall since the war, still has a higher level of consumption than many European countries before the war.

A marked fall in the level of food consumption has, however, occurred in countries which formerly relied on imports for a large proportion of their food supplies - Greece, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway and Finland. In France, too, the drop has been substantial, but here loss of imports was not the only nor even the main factor; largely owing to shortage of agricultural labour (nearly a million French agriculturalists are prisoners of war in Germany), French agricultural production is still well below the pre-war level. In addition, France has had to supply to Germany considerable quantities of grain and meat.

For most of the countries - Greece is a notable exception - the major part of the fall in food consumption occurred in 1941; in 1942 the fall was much smaller and, in fact, there has even been a rise in individual foodstuffs in certain countries, for instance, in potato consumption in the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway.

Turning to individual foodstuffs, in every country of western and northern Europe there has been a marked fall in consumption of cereals. In some countries, e.g. Norway and Belgium, this has been mainly due to loss of imports; in few countries, however, has the war-time production of cereals been up to peace-time levels. In Germany, in both 1940 and 1941 the wheat and rye harvest was only some 12 million tons, compared with the pre-war average of 14 million, while the 1942 crop is unlikely to have exceed 10 million tons. The poor outcome has been mainly due to bad weather, but war-time agricultural difficulties, such as shortage of fertilisers, may also have played a part. In France, owing to labour shortage, the acreage sown to wheat in 1941 and 1942, was only a little above 80% of normal. In Greece the appalling war disturbance which has meant a shortage of labour, draught power and seed, has led to disastrously poor grain harvests.

/Owing

---

* Calorie values used in this note for the various foodstuffs are not the new Ministry of Food scale, according to which the daily total calorie intake would be about 10% lower (for both pre-war and war-time).

Owing to the high rates of grain extraction - 90% and over - now customary in German Europe bread consumption has not been reduced in the same proportion as grain consumption. On the other hand, had it not been for the large-scale use of fodder grains such as barley, oats and maize in bread, bread rations in some countries would have been low indeed. For instance, Germany now uses 20% barley in bread and Denmark 30%, while in South-East Europe at times even larger percentages of maize have been necessary.

Since the war sugar beet cultivation has been well maintained and even expanded in some countries, such as Belgium and the Netherlands. Sugar supplies have therefore been ample, save in a few countries. In Norway, Finland and Greece, which depend on imports, consumption has fallen. In France, too, supplies have been short, partly because sugar beet crops have been below normal, and partly because France has had to send sugar to her African colonies. On the other hand, in Italy and South-East Europe, there has even been some increase, though consumption still remains low by Western European standards.

In view of the shortage of other foods, it is to be expected that consumption of potatoes and vegetables would increase. As regards potatoes this is not universally true. In some countries, for instance, France, production has remained well below pre-war levels, so that potato consumption has fallen. In other countries it has been possible to increase the acreage sown to potatoes, for instance, in the Netherlands and Norway where consumption has risen considerably. In Germany, too, the demand for potatoes, which until recently were still unrationed, has greatly increased; in 1941 the average consumption was 300 kilogrammes, as compared with less than 200 before the war. The large supplies for human consumption were not provided by expanded production, but by the diversion of supplies from livestock to human beings. It was not, however, possible to maintain this high level throughout 1942, because owing to the exceptionally severe winter which caused heavy losses both on the fields and in the clamps, supplies were very short in the early months of the year.

Though information about vegetable consumption is always difficult to obtain, reports suggest that vegetable production is everywhere being expanded. In Germany the acreage under vegetables increased by 40% in 1941 and a further increase of 25% was planned for 1942. France and Roumania have both announced considerable increases in vegetable production, while everywhere vegetable growing in allotments and private gardens is now the rule. An interesting development is the increasing practice of large-scale employers, such as railway companies and big factories, of growing sufficient vegetables for the needs of their employees.

The most striking fall has been in consumption of vegetable fats. Before the war the western and northern European countries consumed these in large quantities in the form of margarine, made from imported vegetable and marine oils. After the war, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium and Norway were almost entirely cut off from imports* and by the end of 1941 stocks were nearly exhausted. Consequently, consumption in 1942 fell to very low levels, particularly in the first three countries; Norway has some domestic herring oil which can be used for margarine. France secured some supplies from French West Africa (which will now cease), while in Germany, owing to large pre-war stocks, supplemented by substantial imports from the Far East before the Trans-Siberian railway was closed, a fair ration of margarine has been possible. Her stocks are now, however, nearing exhaustion, so that unless further imports can be secured from Occupied Russia or from the Far East by blockade running, future

/prospects

* Germany has supplied small quantitites to Norway, Belgium and Denmark.

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prospects for margarine supplies are unhopeful.

Attempts have been made to expand European oil seed production but so far with little success. Germany invested considerable sums of money in trying to develop sunflower seeds and soya beans in South-East Europe, but her efforts have met with a poor response from the peasants of these countries. She had counted on obtaining imports of more than 100,000 tons of oil content in 1942 but is unlikely to obtain more than 20,000. In Western Europe rape is the most profitable oil bearing crop, but it does not winter well. Last winter the Dutch crop was entirely destroyed and the greater part of the German too.

Nutritionally and psychologically the fall in supplies of meat and dairy produce has had most far reaching effects. European livestock have suffered heavily from lack of fodder. In addition to loss of normal imports and poor domestic crops, the universal increase in the rate of flour extraction has deprived livestock of considerable amounts of bran, while the diversion of fodder grain and potatoes to human needs has also aggravated the fodder shortage. As a result, pig numbers have fallen to 50% and less of their pre-war level while even in cattle numbers, except in Germany and South-East Europe, there has been a fall of 10 to 20%. Moreover, owing to lack of oil cake and bran, milk yields per cow have also fallen substantially. In Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands, for instance, the total milk output is now little more than half pre-war. This has meant a substantial fall in liquid milk consumption in every country. Butter consumption has, however, not shown any marked fall, in fact in several countries it is considerably higher than before the war. This is because butter output has been maintained by diverting milk from liquid consumption to butter making. In most countries consumption of whole milk is now confined to children and certain other priority groups, while ordinary adults are entitled only to skimmed milk.

The falling off in supplies of meat and dairy produce has involved a large reduction in the intake of animal protein. Whereas before the war this was insufficient by accepted nutritional standards only in Italy and the Balkans, since the war it is nowhere adequate except perhaps in Denmark - even in Germany it is inadequate.

In the preceding paragraphs discussion has been confined to national average consumption. This is a useful index but it does not give any idea of how the different groups in any country fare under war conditions. Broadly speaking, the farming population has not suffered any real shortage of food; there are of course notable exceptions, such as in the deficient regions of Greece and Yugoslavi , the poverty-striken east of Poland and the barren areas in the north of Norway. Elsewhere, however, peasants have lived as well as in many instances better than before the war. Where the farming community makes up a large proportion of the population, as in Italy and the Balkans, this inevitably means that even a comparatively small shortage of any individual food falls very heavily on town dwellers. Consequently, though in these countries the national average consumption has not fallen markedly since the war, urban consumption has. Moreover, in such countries the administration finds it difficult to get deliveries of foodstuffs from the producers, who prefer to dispose of their surplus for higher prices on the black market. This means that the official rations are necessarily low and the diet for the ordinary person who cannot afford black market purchases is inevitably meagre.

The evils of peasant "hoarding" and the black market are also found in France and Belgium; in Norway and the Netherlands they are much less serious, while in Germany, so far, the administration has retained full control of food supplies. Nevertheless, even there farmers are much better fed than the bulk of the population.

Turning to town dwellers, even in the worst-fed countries every effort is made to provide children and pregnant and nursing women with a better diet. Supplies of whole milk are reserved for these classes, which are also given special distributions of cereal foods, vitamin preparations etc. Moreover, in countries such as Belgium and Italy where rations of the main foodstuffs are very small, children usually receive the same amount of bread, meat and fats as ordinary adults.

It is now increasingly the practice to feed adults according to the work they perform. At the outbreak of war Germany introduced an elaborately differentiated system of rations in which liberal provision was made for the needs of heavy and very heavy workers; in fact even during last spring when food was definitely short for the orindary person, very heavy workers were still adequately fed. In the other countries, however, this differentiation was introduced much later and probably at German instigation. Now, however, it is broadly true to say that in any country a man doing work of use to the German war effort receives the food he needs, if not from the official rations then through factory distributions. For instance, miners in Belgium obtain from official rations 2,900 calories per day as compared with 1,300 for the normal consumer. In France, the miner's bread ration is now higher even than the agricultural worker's allowance, while in Italy their canteens have special food facilities. It is the ordinary adult - the "normal consumer" - who bears the brunt of food shortage (See Table III.) Even in Germany his present level of food consumption can hardly be regarded as nutritionally adequate, while in Belgium, where his calorie intake cannot substantially exceed 1,300 daily, malnutrition is chronic. In Greece he fares yet worse. Only in Denmark is the diet still reasonably adequate for the ordinary town-dweller.

After more than two years of ill-nourishment throughout most of urban occupied Europe certain ill effects are to be expected. On the whole, the increase in epidemic diseases has not been serious. There have been sporadic outbreaks of infantile paralysis in Norway and Denmark, while an increased incidence of scarlet fever has been reported from several countries. The most alarming sign has been the increase in tuberculosis which has now been reported from every country. In Germany this is probably associated rather with war strain than malmutrition, but in the occupied countries dietary deficiencies are undoubtedly the underlying cause. In Belgium and France the increase in infant mortality and decreased rate of growth in town children is alarming. In Greece, where famine conditions existed throughout last winter, the ill effects have inevitably been much more serious. In Athens, Piraeus and the islands there was a large rise in the death-rate, but even here there were no serious epidemics.

It is difficult to determine the degree of vitamin deficiency in Europe to-day. Owing to the generally high rate of flour extraction there should be no marked shortage of B vitamins; as for vitamin C, the higher consumption of potatoes and vegetables should go far to compensate for shortage of fruits, but during winter months particularly some degree of C deficiency is probably general except in the southern countries. Young children are likely to be more affected because they cannot consume the large amounts of potatoes and vegetables needed to secure sufficient of this vitamin. Isolated cases of scurvy have been reported from various countries, the majority from Norway where in Northern districts even before the war it occurred from time to time.

The most serious deficiency is undoubtedly of vitamin A; even in Germany the intake is insufficient.

/As

As to future prospects, it seems likely that with certain exceptions, there will be little change in food conditions throughout 1942/3, unless an exceptionally severe winter should dislocate food distribution in the towns. Bread rations should be maintained throughout 1942/3 while potatoes should be more plentiful this winter than last because in almost every country the crop is larger than in 1941. Some further, though small, falling off in the supplies of meat and dairy produce is not unlikely. In France, however, the loss of colonial imports has already caused a cut in the fats ration, while a cut in the wine ration is probable. Later bread rations may also have to be reduced, because France counts on imports from North Africa for tiding her over until the new harvest. Poor cereal harvests in South-Eastern Europe will mean shorter supplies both for human beings and livestock. In spite of official efforts to ration the peasants, this will mainly be reflected in food shortage in the towns, and in these countries some shortage of staple foodstuffs for town dwellers is not unlikely before the 1943 harvest.

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PART II - INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES.

1. GERMANY

Throughout 1940 and 1941 the German population was sufficiently well fed to meet the increased strain of war. Consumption of meat and fats had, of course, to be substantially reduced but liberal bread rations could be maintained and plentiful supplies of potatoes enabled everyone to obtain his full need of calories. Potato consumption in fact increased from 180 kg. per head per year before the war to 300 kg. in 1941. The elaborate system of differential rationing ensured the largest share of available food to those whose needs were greatest, workers and pregnant and nursing women (see Table IV). Young children also received relatively generous allowances but the ordinary adult's consumption of certain foods was cut considerably. Because milk normally consumed liquid had to be diverted to butter making, supplies of liquid whole milk were confined to priority classes (children and pregnant and nursing women) but the nutritional loss is not so great as might appear because skimmed milk was plentiful. In fact, in 1941 the consumption of whole and skimmed milk together was somewhat larger than before the war.

At the beginning of 1942, however, there was a marked lowering in the level of food consumption. Potatoes were very scarce because the severe winter prevented distribution to the towns. Moreover, even when the coming of spring should have improved the potato supplies, it was found that frost damage in the clamps had been so extensive that it was necessary to ration the remaining quantities, at less than the pre-war rate of consumption. Then, in April 1942. there were substantial cuts in the bread, meat and fat rations. Finally, owing to the late spring, green vegetables were very scarce in the towns at a time when normally they should have been plentiful. At this time, when German food consumption reached its lowest level, the normal consumer obtained barely 1,800 calories per day from rationed and unrationed foods. Had no improvement been possible, there is no doubt that this diet would ultimately have taken its toll of health and efficiency.

But the summer was favourable; the potato harvest was abundant and the grain harvest turned out much better than had been expected earlier in the year. In October it was possible to restore the bread rations to their former level, and partly to restore the meat rations, while the potato allowance could now be fixed at 4½ kilos (nearly 9 lb.) per head weekly. The present diet may be regarded as adequate in calories for all classes of the population. For normal consumers living alone it is barely sufficient but such people are usually in a position to supplement their rations by restaurant meals, etc. In families, where the liberal children's allowances of potatoes and certain other foods are normally pooled, food supplies should be adequate. (The potato ration of 9 lb. weekly is given to even the youngest children for whom obviously it is far too much.)

The chief weaknesses of the present German diet are, for adults, the lack of first-class protein, and for all classes of the population shortage of Vitamin A. The use of "wholemeal" bread should prevent deficiency of the B Vitamins, while plentiful supplies of potatoes should be an adequate source of Vitamin C, except perhaps for a month or so in spring, when their vitamin content is low.

So far, the wartime standard of health would appear to be reasonably high in Germany. Increased incidence of tuberculosis is causing some alarm and teeth troubles are also said to be prevalent. Reports of industrial fatigue are becoming more frequent. It is difficult, however, to decide to what extent the decrease in vitality, which is reflected in industrial fatigue and increased tuberculosis, is due to the strain of over three years of war and to what extent to dietary inadequacies.

/Before

Before considering whether Germany can maintain the present level of food consumption throughout the coming year, it is necessary to consider briefly how the German food economy has been managed throughout the war. In spite of Nazi striving for self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, at the outbreak of war Germany still imported, in terms of calories, about 15% of her total food supplies, together with substantial amounts of animal feedingstuffs. Though, given normal harvests, she was roughly self-sufficient in bread grains, her dependence on imported fats was very heavy. Against the contingency of war she had, however, accumulated substantial stocks of both bread grains and fats. She also hoped to secure certain supplies from imports during the war. At first these hopes were largely realised. Russia supplied grain; substantial quantities of vegetable and marine oils were imported from the Far East before the Trans Siberian route was closed, and useful quantities of meat and fats were obtained from the occupied western countries. In recent months, however, imports have dwindled until now they are negligible, except in so far as occupied Russia can be exploited.

Domestic grain harvests have been disappointing, wheat and rye were only some 12 million tons in 1940 and 1941 and 10 million in 1942, as compared with the normal 14 millions. Good fodder grain crops, however, to some extent compensated for the poor outcome of bread grains in 1942; 20% barley is to be used in bread in 1942/43.

As a result of deficient domestic production and dwindling imports Germany has had to draw steadily on her once substantial stocks; it is now thought that stocks both of bread grains and vegetable oils are practically exhausted.

As to her livestock industry, cattle numbers, at least until recently, and milk output, have been maintained but there has certainly been a heavy fall in pig stocks, which are now probably little more than half their pre-war figure. This is reflected in the 33% fall in meat consumption.

From now on, then, except in so far as she can exploit occupied Russia or obtain supplies of vegetable and marine oils from the Far East by running the blockade, Germany is virtually dependent on domestic production for maintaining food supplies. As to 1942/3, there should be no difficulty in maintaining present bread rations; if necessary more barley or potato flour could be added to the bread to eke out supplies. For meat the forecast is peculiarly difficult. It is most likely that the recent increase in the meat ration was only made possible by some additional slaughtering of cattle, and reports suggest that further extra slaughtering is contemplated this winter. If so, meat should be relatively plentiful so long as this lasts, but without additional slaughtering it would appear unlikely that present rations can be maintained for the whole of 1943, unless larger supplies can be obtained from the occupied countries (including Russia).

For fats the position is undoubtedly very tight. Butter production cannot be increased, it is in fact likely to fall somewhat in the coming year. The fall in pig numbers has meant a corresponding drop in lard supplies, while the failure of the 1942 German rape crop has further reduced vegetable oil supplies. Moreover, Germany can hope for little from South-East Europe (see page 18). It is difficult to see how present rations can be maintained throughout the next twelve months unless supplies are supplemented by considerable imports from Occupied Russia or by running the blockade from the Far East. Potato supplies should be ample for human requirements and every precaution has been taken, by accumulating large stocks in the towns, to prevent a recurrence of last year's shortage, if this winter should prove equally severe.

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2. PROTECTORATE.

Though since the war there has been a substantial fall in the level of food consumption in the Protectorate - from over 3,000 calories to 2,500 per head of population - the general level is stil well above most of occupied Europe. It is clear that Germany has decided that it is to her interest to maintain the Protectorate rations at a reasonable level. Administratively, the Protectorate is now virtually part of the Reich and the system of food distribution and rationing closely parallels that of the Reich. There is a similar differentiation between the rations for children of various ages and for the various categories of workers. As in Germany local rationing controls the distribution of most foods not universally rationed. Rations for bread, meat and potatoes are the same as in Germany, while sugar is higher and fats considerably lower. Unlike Germany, there is still a small ration of whole milk for the ordinary person, children and pregnant and nursing women getting more liberal allowances. The calorie intake from rationed and unrationed foods is not greatly below the present German level; the normal consumer can obtain over 2,000 calories daily, heavy workers about 3,000 calories and very heavy workers well over 3,000. At this level a population can exist for a long time without grave disablement and reports of serious ill-health are rare. The rural population gets relatively generous allowances of grain, meat, fats and milk and, moreover, appears to keep back certain further quantities in spite of threats and penalties. The urban black market is not, however, extensive.

In order to maintain this level it would appear that Germany has had to supply the Protectorate with certain quantities of food-stuffs, notably grain and margarine, but possibly also certain quantities of meat and lard. Of sugar, the Protectorate has a very substantial surplus, a part of which, at least, has been used for meeting the needs of the sugar - deficient countries Norway and Finland.

For the future, the Protectorate town dwellers will probably continue to be fed at their present level so long as this remains to Germany's advantage.

3. POLAND

Though it would be misleading to talk of recovery in Poland, nevertheless, some measure of stability has been reached, though at a very low level for large masses of the population.

Information suggests that crops are still below normal and that livestock losses have been fairly heavy, particularly in eastern Poland where the Russians on leaving, carried out their usual scorched-earth policy. For peasants in eastern Poland, for whom existence was always hand to mouth, there must be severe privation over wide areas.

In western Poland the rural population is better off, but there is still widespread suffering among the urban poor. Though good distribution in large towns such as Warsaw and Cracow is immeasurably better than it was in the months immediately after occupation, the rations for Poles, and particularly Jews, are poor indeed. (German residents in Poland receive the same rations as they would in the Reich.)

As in Greece, the black market further depresses the level of working-class consumption.

4. FINLAND

In the last two years the Finnish administration has been faced with many problems in trying to obtain sufficient food for the towns. Finland has always had to import some bread grain, vegetabl oils for margarine and almost all her sugar, and though formerly there was an export of butter Finnish cattle consumed substantial quantities of imported oilcake. In the last few years Finland has had to face the disorganisation of two wars, loss of territory and livestock followed by the regaining of a ravaged land and, in eastern Karelia, a poverty-striken region. Labour was short owing to mobilisation, sowings below normal and harvests poor. Yet food supplies available per head of population do not show the heavy fall which might have been anticipated, because in both 1941 and 1942 Finland had quite substantial imports of grain, sugar and fats. Even with these, however, urban rations have been low. Two-thirds of the population are rural and, like most of the European peasantry, have maintained more or less normal consumption. Only a small fraction of the domestically produced food has reached the towns, which have therefore had to depend largely on imports. Last winter, for instance, when the freezing of the Baltic prevented supplies of German rye from reaching Finland bread supplies for the towns were for some time precarious. But it has also been a difficult problem to get unrationed foodstuffs for the towns, largely because for so many months of the year, transport is a serious problem and also because of a thriving black market. In some instances, an unwise price policy has also contributed to food shortage. For instance, when the price of fish was fixed too low inland towns did not get supplies.

From rationed and unrationed foods the normal consumer now gets some 1,450 calories daily; the heavy worker 2,050 and the very heavy worker 2,500. In view of the long and cold Finnish winter these are particularly inadequate allowances. No extra allowance is made for the adolescent. As yet there are few reports of serious malnutrition but anxiety is expressed for the health of the children and there is some increase in deficiency diseases and tuberculosis.

The Finnish Government speaks of the coming year with more optimism. Germany has promised sufficient grain to maintain the present bread rations (which were recently somewhat increased), Denmark is to send additional butter and, though sugar supplies have been a problem, in spite of her poor harvest Denmark should be able to provide a part at least of the Finnish needs, while some imports may also be obtained from the Protectorate.

Nevertheless, it is likely that adequate provisioning of the Finnish towns through the severe northern winter, will remain difficult.

5. ITALY.

Italy entered the war with a far higher degree of self-sufficiency in foodstuffs than Germany. Out of total wheat supplies of some 8 million tons only about half a million tons were imported. In addition, considerable quantities of vegetable oilseeds and a little meat were imported. But in recent years her dependence on imports probably did not exceed 5% of her total food supplies (in terms of calories). Her livestock, too, were mainly fed on domestic feeding stuffs, though some imported maize and oil cake were used.

But the level of food consumption was low; the total calorie intake was only some 2,500 daily and the intake of animal protein only 20 grammes per day. In fact the Italian dietary resembled that of the Balkans in consisting mainly of cereals, which provided two-thirds of total calories; consumption of meat and dairy produce was very low.

/Admittedly

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Admittedly in the warm climate of Southern Italy calorie needs are lower than in, say, Norway or Finland. Italy, too, is fortunate in having abundant supplies of fruit and vegetables, but even allowing for these factors, there is no doubt that a large section of the Italian population was badly nourished. Regional differences in consumption were marked. In the more prosperous industrial north consumption of meat and dairy produce was far higher than in Southern Italy. The following table, derived from working-class dietary surveys, brings out the dietary poverty of Southern Italy. The Campobasso diet, poor though it be, is likely to be fairly representative of the working classes of Southern Italy.

Food	Consumption Kg. per man value per year		
	Milan	Bolzano	Campobasso
Cereals	209	198	235
Meat	43	30	16
Fats	21	23	14.5
Milk	103	215	29
Cheese	7.3	3.2	4.7
Eggs	13	7.5	10
Fresh Vegetables	72	63	40
Fruit	24	2	4
Sugar	14	11	4
Wine	86	58	72
Calories per day +	3,300	3,300	2,800
Expenditure lire per annum.	2,000	1,600	1,200

\+ Includes foods not listed in table.

Since the war the fall in total food supplies has been much less marked in Italy than in most countries of German Europe. The three wartime wheat harvests have been only slightly below average, 7.1 million tons compared with 7.5, while potato and sugar crops have somewhat increased. The last two olive oil crops were about average; 1940 was poor. Wine harvests have been below average but not disastrously so. The heaviest fall has probably been in the output of meat and dairy produce.

Yet to consider only the food available per head of population would give an entirely false picture of how the Italian population has fared under war conditions. Italy is preponderantly a peasant country; nearly half the population is dependent on agriculture. For the peasants the war has made little difference. Even had they kept to their official allowances of foodstuffs they would have been reasonably well fed but in fact owing to the administrations lack of control, they have kept back substantial additional quantities which subsequently pass to the black market. For instance, it is estimated that in 1941-42 out of a net wheat crop of 6 million tons the peasants retained over 5 million tons, of which they were officially entitled to only some 4 million tons. The result, of course, has been short commons for the Italian towns. The well-to-do are all

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right because they can afford to supplement the low official rations by black market purchases. But for the average working-class family the situation is difficult. From rationed and unrationed foods the ordinary persons obtains rather less than 1,500 calories, even the heaviest workers do not exceed 2,500 calories.

As to future prospects, unless the Italian authorities can succeed in obtaining larger deliveries of foodstuffs from the producers the Italian town-dwellers are likely to remain at a low level. It is understood that Italy has had to enlist German aid for supplies of grain from South-Eastern Europe and occupied Russia in order to maintain urban rations. Apparently the situation is little changed from last spring when Italy had urgently to borrow grain from Germany to eke out supplies until the harvest was ready.

6. BELGIUM.

Before the war Belgium imported one-half her food, in terms of calories relying more heavily on imports than any other country in Europe except Norway and the United Kingdom. She imported the bulk of her bread grain and vegetable oils for margarine, while even with large imports of fodder for livestock she still did not cover needs of milk, butter and cheese.

In consequence of this low degree of self-sufficiency, the Belgian level of food consumption has inevitably been greatly depressed since the war. As Belgium cannot hope to produce sufficient wheat and rye for even minimum human needs, Germany has had to make up the deficit. Owing to lack of fodder milk output has fallen by nearly half, and pig numbers, and hence pork output, have declined considerably. On the other hand, sugar output has increased.

It is estimated that from domestic production and imports Belgium now has available about 2,000 calories per head of populati per day. This compared poorly with the pre-war level of nearly 3,000 calories daily, but if evenly distributed would allow the average adult male 2,500 calories daily. This is barely sufficien for health, and certainly does not allow for any additional strain; heavy manual work would be impossible. Actually, however, it has not been possible to distribute the available food evenly throughout the population. Because they could not get deliveries of foodstuffs from the peasants, the authorities found great difficulty in meeting even the small rations for the towns-people. But the rural population, about one-fifth of the total, has lived at nearly its pre-war level, and in addition has supplied the urban black market.

In 1941 the meat, fats and potato rations frequently could not be obtained in full, and milk for children was not always available. But in recent months there has been a marked improvement in food distribution and it would appear now to be the exception for rations not to be fully obtainable. Nevertheless, the diet provided is meagre. The normal consumer obtains only some 1,500 calories per day, children slightly more, while workers get from 2,000 to over 3,000 according to the class of work performed. Miners are the most favoured category, no doubt owing to their usefulness to Germany.

At this level malnutrition has been unavoidable, but even in the towns a certain number of people do obtain a somewhat better diet. For those who can afford it there is the black market, and for the poor some help is provided by communal meals and relief feeding. Efforts are made to provide children and pregnant and

/nursing

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nursing women with supplementary rations and milk. Moreover, if the Germans want to maintain any industry at an efficient level they provide extra food for the workers through factory distribution and canteens.

Inevitably the present diet must affect the health and fitness of a considerable number of the urban population. Certain symptoms of malnutrition are manifest, the ill effects being most marked in children. The infant mortality rate is said to have increased and there are reports of stunted growth, scurvy, anaemia, rickets and skin troubles in young children. The incidence of tuberculosis in towns has increased and a virulent type has appeared in adolescents. There have not, however, been any serious outbreaks of infectious diseases.

There is no reason for anticipating any considerable worsening of the urban food situation in 1942/3, provided that Germany allows sufficient grain for bread rations. From her own crop Belgium should have enough for 8 to 9 months. Unless Germany allows some butter or margarine, fats will be very short in the winter, and the ration (only 2½ oz. weekly for the normal consumer) may have to be further cut. On the other hand, reports suggest that the Belgian authorities are making every effort to improve food distribution in the towns, particularly of potatoes and vegetables; it is too early yet to judge of their success.

7. FRANCE

As in Belgium a large section of the working classes in the large towns has been underfed now for more than 2 years.

Reports of serious ill-health or of a marked decline in working efficiency in adults are, however, rare, but minor infectious diseases are said to have increased. Children, too, are said to be retarded in growth.

Rationed and unrationed foods, including wine, which is locally rationed, provide the normal consumer with less than 1,600 calories per day. Workers, adolescents, and pregnant and nursing women get somewhat more, but even the very heavy workers' allowance does not exceed 2,500 calories daily, which is quite insufficient for heavy work. For adolescents, whose calorie needs are high, the rations are particularly meagre.

Yet France is normally nearly self-sufficient in food. Wheat imports did not exceed 5% of consumption; sugar imports, too, were inconsiderable. The only important deficiency was vegetable oil, of which there was an annual import of about half a million tons (in oil content), four-fifths of which was supplied by her colonial empire. Fodder imports were negligible, less than 5% of total needs.

Moreover, since occupation until recently there has been a steady stream of imports into metropoliton France from the African Colonies; cereals, wine, meat, fruit and vegetables from North Africa, and vegetable oils from West Africa. (These, however, have been less than half normal.)

Why then are the rations so low? There are three reasons. Firstly, domestic output, though it has recovered from the disastrous level of 1940/41, is still below normal; owing largely to shortage of labour and draught power sowings have not returned to their pre-war level. The consequent shortage of fodder reacts adversely on the output of meat, milk and eggs.

/Secondly,

Secondly, German demands are a steady drain on French food supplies. In 1941 Germany asked for some half million tons each of wheat, oats and hay, over 150,000 tons of meat, 4 million hectolitres of wine and certain quantities of cheese, canned foods, fruit and vegetables. The 1942 demands are on an even larger scale, but may include certain arrears from the previous year. In addition Germany claimed by agreement one-quarter of the vegetable oil, 30% of the cocoa and 12½% of oilcake imported from French Africa. Most of these foodstuffs are actually sent into Germany. (They are, of cource, far in excess of the needs of the Army of occupation.)

It is estimated that these German demands deplete French food resources to the extent of some 250 calories per head of population per day.

Most important, however, is the third reason, the maldistribution of available food supplies because the peasants cannot be either cajoled or coerced into delivering up their produce through official channels. It is admitted that out of the 1941 wheat harvest over 1 million tons were illegally held back and either fed to livestock or disposed of through the black market. Yet had this amount been available to the authorities the rations could have been increased by at least 25%. A large proportion of the farm butter, which amounts to half the total French butter production, also disappears unofficially.

Clearly it is not hard to understand why, when some 2,300 calories are available per head of population per day, the individual confined to the official rations can obtain barely 1,600.

Nevertheless, as in Belgium, the authorities are making more strenuous efforts to improve food distribution and in some instances, notably in milk collection, would appear to have some measure of success. So far, however, there is little sign of any real change of heart in the French producer who continues to mistrust the franc as a return for his crops.

As to 1942/43, there is likely to be some fall in the level of consumption of town dwellers through the loss of imports from North and West Africa. Already there has been a 30% cut in the fats rations, which is now at the Belgian level, the lowest in German Europe. The loss of wine imports, which were to provide 25% of rationed consumption, is also serious, while for lack of wheat supplies from French North Africa next summer, France may find it difficult to tide over until her own harvest is available later in the year.

8. NETHERLANDS.

In the Netherlands the food situation is considerably better than in either France or Belgium. Before the war she did not depend on imports for her basic foods to the extent of Belgium and Norway. The substantial imports of fodder produced a considerable export surplus of butter, cheese, eggs and pork. Of foods, she imported some wheat and rye for bread, large amounts of oilseeds for margarine and a small amount of sugar.

Since the war the Netherlands has maintained her population, although at a considerably reduced level of consumption, entirely from her own food resources. These are not likely to decline any further in 1942/43.

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This has meant, however, the use of all domestic wheat and rye, together with some barley, for bread making which has had repercussions on the livestock industry, already depleted of its normal imports of fodder. Pigs and poultry numbers have fallen by more than half and milk cows, through compulsory slaughter, by more than 20%.

The milk output is now less than 60% of the pre-war level, but through restricting liquid consumption of milk, and partly skimming it before sale, butter production has been maintained practically at its former level.

Although, since fodder imports were cut off, the Netherlands can no longer maintain her livestock industry on a true export basis, nevertheless, by imposing strict rationing of domestic consumption, considerable quantities of butter, cheese, eggs and meat have been sent to Germany. Exports have, however, been steadily diminishing and are likely to be negligible in 1942/43.

There is also a large export to Germany of vegetables. For the most part this is a genuine export surplus, but reports suggest that German demands do at times restrict home consumption.

Calorie intake per head of population is about 2,300 daily. Due in large measure to its pre-war experience in market control, the Dutch administration distributes food supplies on the whole efficiently and fairly. Hitherto, the black market has been unimportant but the Dutch authorities view with some anxiety the recent increase in black market dealings in dairy produce.

However, the normal consumer's rations of some 2,000 calories per day still approaches more nearly to the national average than in any other country in Europe. While it does not represent an adequate diet, it is well above the danger-line of serious under-nutrition. Children get liberal milk allowances, but their cost probably puts them beyond the reach of the lowest income group.

Health conditions appear to have deteriorated in 1942. There has been an increase in the death-rate of children under 14 years of age, in which malnutrition must surely be a factor. Since the war there has also been a marked increase in mortality from respiratory diseases, such as influenza, pneumonia, and, in particular, tuberculosis.

9. NORWAY.

Due to the barren nature of most of the country Norway's degree of self-sufficiency is even lower than that of Belgium. Normally, she imports the bulk of her bread grains, all her sugar and some vegetable oil for margarine.

The Norwegian fishing industry provided important exports, mainly from the catch in Norwegian waters. Out of a total catch of about 1 million tons annually, only about 10% were domestically consumed and about 25% were exported, both as fish; from the remainder edible and technical oils were extracted, some of which were exported.

Since the war imports of rye from Germany and of sugar from Denmark and the Protectorate have enabled Norway to maintain a much reduced, but not seriously inadequate level of consumption. Meat supplies for the towns are small and irregular, but fish has been reasonably plentiful. Potato supplies depend on the time of the year; there are always shortages in the towns in the winter and spring owing to transport difficulties.

/Norway's

Norway's main problem is to maintain the fats ration, of great importance in so cold a country. Last winter Germany had to come to the rescue with some vegetable oil for margarine. (Present fat consumption though only half of pre-war, still provides the normal consumer with 7½ oz. weekly, more than twice what the Belgian normal consumer can obtain, and roughly the same as in the United Kingdom.) Butter output has fallen, and margarine is dependent on domestic herring oil production, this in turn depends on how much of the catch Germany allows Norway to retain.

Germany obtains certain supplies of meat, butter, cheese, milk and potatoes for the occupying troops. While the quantities are not large they are, however, an appreciable loss to the Norwegian people and may amount to 10% or more of the total output of these foodstuffs. More important, however, are the German claims on the fish catch, of which they took about one-half in 1942.

Over the past year, there has been a marked fall in food supplies. The average normal consumer, from rations and unrationed food, now obtaines only 1,800 calories per day, heavy workers get less than 2,500 and very heavy workers less than 3,000. This represents a fall of nearly one-third of the pre-war level. In view of the long and hard Norwegian winter, the diet is certainly not liberal, but on the whole should be sufficient to stave off serious malnutrition. Generous milk rations are a safeguard for the children. So far there has been no evidence of any marked deterioration in health, but from time to time cases of scurvy are reported.

As to the future, in a recent frank statement the Minister of Supplies, while admitting that there had latterly been a deterioration in food supplies, said that essential foodstuffs were ensured for the main part of 1943. Germany had provided sufficient grain and sugar, and some fats.

As to other foodstuffs, though the 1942 potato crop was disappointing, it was considerably above pre-war, and there should be sufficient fish, even after German demands are met.

10. DENMARK

Of all Occupied Europe Denmark is the only country which has been able to maintain a reasonable standard of food consumption for the population as a whole, and at the same time export considerable quantities of meat and butter to Germany.

The pre-war national average calorie intake of some 3,300 per day was one of the highest in Europe, and now, at the beginning of the fourth year of war, this level has dropped by less than 10%. Nevertheless, owing to the rise in food prices (the Cost of Food index now stands at over 160) the lowest income group in Copenhagen and other towns has certainly fared worse than the average of the population; in particular its consumption of meat and protective foods, such as dairy produce, has been seriously curtailed.

Owing to lack of fodder imports, in particular of grain and oilcake, the Danish livestock industry has necessarily suffered heavily. While the cattle population has fallen by less than 15% milk yield per cow has dropped by 30%; pig numbers after falling to 40% of pre-war are now rising again. Exports of meat and butter have steadily declined, and in 1942 are unlikely to exceed a third of the 1940 figures.

/of

Of the occupied countries Denmark has undoubtedly received favoured treatment from Germany, who would appear to have made no attempt to restrict Danish consumption of meat, or even of butter, in order to obtain larger supplies of these foods. In fact, meat is still unrationed (though the rise in price limits consumpti and the butter ration of 10½ oz. a week is the highest in German Europe.

11. GREECE

The level of food consumption has always been low in Greece. Before the war the average calorie intake, including calories from wine, was little more than 2,400 per day - well below the Western European standard of 3,000 or more daily. The diet was based on bread, supplemented by olives, fruit, and vegetables, (grapes, raisins and dried beans were important) and goat's milk cheese. Olive oil was the main fat. The consumption of meat and dairy produce was very low. There were few dairy cows; ewes and goats were both more important than cows as suppliers of milk.

Greece's primary food deficiency is wheat; normally she imported 30 to 40% of her needs. Total sugar supplies were also imported, but of olive oil, raisins, fresh fruits and wine there were considerable exports.

Since the German occupation the food situation has been continuously critical, and for long periods in certain parts, acute. In Athens and Piraeus, and the Aegean Islands, during last winter and spring famine conditions existed. The arrival of Allied wheat shipments together with seasonally more plentiful supplies of fruit and vegetables, brought some improvement, but in the towns the diet is quite insufficient. The present bread ration in Athens and Salonika of 7 oz. a day, while double that of last winter, is still lower than that of Belgium. For other foods there is no regular ration. From time to time there are distributions of sugar, dried fruit, pulses, olive oil, etc., and the arrival of a relief shipmen from Turkey usually means a distribution of pulses, fish and eggs.

The difficulties of the working classes are increased by the inflationary rise in food prices to ten times and more than pre-war levels; increases in wages lagging far behind. Moreover, there also exists an extensive black market, on which astronomical prices are reached, which drains a part of the available food away from the bulk of the town dwellers.

In the country districts, save for the barren maountainous parts which are not normally self-sufficient, the situation is much easier but the diet is probably slightly below the meagre pre-war level.

The critical shortage of food last winter and spring inevitably took its toll of health and vitality. Fortunately no major epidemics broke out, but the death-rate in Athens, and Salonika rose steeply, women and children being the main victims of the starvation diet.

A variety of causes have contributed to Greece's food difficulties. Firstly, she lost to Bulgaria some of her best wheat country, which produced one-quarter of the total crop. Secondly, owing to the disturbed stated of the country, and shortage of man and draught power, harvests have been far below normal. Moreover, the peasants, who make up more than half the population, have been understandably reluctant to give up their produce, particularly as there are few consumer goods which they can buy. Against direct barter, a proportion finds its way to the black market.

/Transport

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Transport difficulties also increased the problem of provisioning the towns. Even after transport facilities had improved, the ban on free movement of domestic foodstuffs imposed by the occupying authorities continued to impede distribution. In even more direct ways the presence of the Germans reacted unfavourably on the Greek food situation. While there is little evidence that they take grain from the country, there is no doubt that they have drawn on olive oil stocks and that they buy up fruit and vegetables.

The 1942 harvest was even lower than that of 1941, but deliveries from the peasants may be somewhat larger than last year. In any event, to maintain present bread rations Greece will need relief shipments.

It is possible that some improvement may occur in food supplies, as a result of the Axis undertaking that no foodstuffs shall be exported from Greece unless there are compensatory imports of equal calorie value. Moreover, the occupying powers have promised that any local food taken for their armies shall be replaced. Certain supplies of pulses, sugar, and potatoes have already been promised.

12. SOUTH-EAST EUROPE

Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Roumania form a group of countries which cannot properly be compared with the other countries in this survey. Normally, they were surplus countries exporting principally grain but also livestock products (meat, cheese, etc.) fruit, vegetables and wine. The grain exports varied considerably from year to year because, largely for climatic reasons, yields per acre were very variable. Nevertheless, however bad the wheat harvest, none of these countries imported wheat; consumption was restricted or made up by increased consumption of maize.

In all these countries the general standard of living was low. Roumania and Yugoslavia were essentially peasant countries, the rural population comprising over 80% of the total and consisting mainly of peasant families living on less than 5 acres. With such a degree of rural overcrowding a reasonable standard of living is impossible and the peasants were obliged to stint themselves of food in order to obtain enough money to pay taxes and buy the minimum of clothes and household necessities. Hungary is much more industrialised than the other three countries of South-East Europe, but for the bulk of the rural population, at least 50% of the total, conditions differed little from those in Roumania and Yugoslavia. In Bulgaria, owing to the development in recent years of the co-operative movement, which fostered the growing of fruit and vegetables for the export market, conditions for the peasant had somewhat improved.

At the beginning of the war it was clearly the German intention to develop South-Eastern Europe as a source of grain and vegetable oils. Germany invested considerable sums of money in companies for promoting oilseed cultivation and promised a substantial return in money and agricultural machinery, but her attempts to obtain substantial dividends from South-East Europe have been unsuccessful. Wartime grain harvests have brought poor results; in many areas the peasants have sown to grain much less land than formerly, partly through lack of labour owing to army mobilisation, partly through officially fixed prices offering insufficient inducement to grain cultivation. Weather has also been an unfavourable factor. As to oil seeds, planned expansion of acreage has not occurred, again largely owing to the non-co-operative attitude of the peasants, who have probably been influenced by Germany's inability to provide promised agricultural equipment. As a result, grain exports in 1941 were only one-fifth of normal and are likely to be even less in 1942, while instead of the hoped-for 100,000 tons vegetable oil, exports to

/Germany

Germany will not exceed 20,000 tons in 1942.

But until recently, at least, any falling off in agricultural productivity has not been reflected in rural consumption; total food supplies have shrunk but little since the war. Naturally, however, economic disorganisation, marked in Yugoslavia and Roumania, less so in Hungary and Bulgaria, has led to food difficulties in the towns. Where rations can be fixed they are low and supplies of unrationed foods are frequently irregular and always expensive. In fact in Roumania, inflation has already gone a long way. The official cost of living index is now more than three times its pre-war level.

Special reference must be made to Yugoslavia. After invasion. part of the fertile Danube province, which produced a large grain surplus, was annexed by Hungary. Moreover, the splitting of Yugoslavia into two separate states - Serbia and Croatia - led to an uneven distribution of grain, Croatia being very deficient while Serbia, obtaining the rest of the Danube province, would normally have a small surplus over her own needs. Early in 1942 reports suggested that food conditions were much worse in Croatia than in any other part of the Balkans, excepting, of course, Greece.

For the year 1942/3, however, food prospects have markedly worsened for all these countries. The wheat harvest is everywhere below normal owing to deficient sowings, and the long summer drought spoilt otherwise fair maize prospects. In Roumania, for instance, there is a shortage over normal needs of about half a million tons each of wheat and maize; exports, except of small quantities, are out of the question. In Hungary, both wheat and maize crops are 20% below normal, while in the normally deficient Croatia, supplies are very tight. Only in Serbia would there seem to be sufficient cereals for normal needs. Though the Governments in each of these countries have attempted to retion producers it is doubtful if their efforts will be successful. This means that the brunt of the shortage must be borne by town dwellers whose rations are already, in most cases, small.

Owing to the fixed prices offering insufficient inducement, sugar beet production has also fallen in all these countries. The shortage of sugar will also mainly effect the town population because little is normally consumed in country districts. At present meat is relatively plentiful because some cattle are being slaughtered owing to shortage of fodder, but when this temporary glut is over supplies must fall below normal. Though it is too early to speak with any certainty about food prospects in South-East Europe, about which information is always incomplete, it looks as though supplies will be shorter in both town and country in the coming year, but unless Government control improves any shortage will fall heavily on the towns where the evil of the black market is likely to become increasingly serious.

ENEMY BRANCH
4.1.43.

TABLE I. ESTIMATED CONSUMPTION OF MAIN FO
(Kg. per Head of Population per Yea

WESTERN AND NORTHERN EUROPE

	Germany			Protectorate			Poland		Finland			Italy			
	Pre-war	1941	1942	Pre-war	1941	1942	Pre-war	1942	Pre-war	1941	1942	Pre-war	1941	1942	Pre wa
Total grain	146	146	130	171	140	130	137	116	166	128	146	196	201	194	17
Potatoes	180	300	200	176	166	170	300	300	182	150	125	41	45	45	16
Sugar	23	25	25	26	26	26	11	10	29	18	16	7.6	12	9	2
Meat	46.	35	29	33	32	25	19	16	40	25	20	16	12	10	4
Milk (liquid)	114	74	67	147	118	85	110	70	261	146	136	65	56	47	7
Butter	8.5	9.4	8.7	6.3	6.3	4.2	3	2	9.7	8.2	8.4	1	1	1	8.
Margarine	8.6	4.4	3.6	7.5	4.9	4.4	≠ 1	≠ 1	2.9	2.8	Nil	≠ 6.5	≠ 6.0	≠ 4.5	8.
Pig-fat	8.1	4.8	3.8	6.3	4.6	4.2	2	2	1.0	0.4	0.2	3.5	2.2	1.7	2.
Eggs (number)	120	70	50	140	100	80			47	30	20	130	110	100	1
Fish	11.5	5	5	1.5	1	1			12	10	8	6	4	4	
Cheese	5.3	3	3	2.7	2	2			1.0	1.0	1.0	4.7	3.2	2.8	4
Wine	-	-	-						-	-	-	85	70	70	

≠ Oil

e Margarine contained 20% butter

SOUTH-EAST EUROPE

	Greece			Hungary	Roumania	Bulgaria	Yugo-slavia
	Pre-war	1941	1942	Pre-war	Pre-war	Pre-war	Pre-war
Total grain	175	167	98	300	293	286	290
Potatoes	15	16	6	100	50	14	58
Sugar	≠ 10	3	2	11	5	3	4.5
Meat	16	14	10	26	17	21	16
Milk (liquid)	40	30	25	80	70	48	74
Butter	1	0.7	0.6	1	1	1	2
Oil	≠ 15	12	10	1	1.5	4.5	0.4
Pig-fat	-	-	-	11	4	2.5	5.5
Cheese	9	7	5				
Fish	5	4	3				
Wine	39	35	30				

TED CONSUMPTION OF MAIN FOODSTUFFS
(ead of Population per Year)

RN AND NORTHERN EUROPE

Italy		Belgium			France			Netherlands			Norway			Denmark		
1941	1942	Pre-war	1941	1942	Pre-war	1941	1942	Pre-war	1941	1942	Pre-war	1941	1942	Pre-war	1941	1942
201	194	172	98	98	168	115	115	124	113	109	131	102	102	118	116	116
45	45	168	116	125	167	133	150	117	144	170	105	150	160	112	145	160
12	9	29	26	25	22	10	12.4	31	30	30	31	20	22	53	43	43
12	10	40	21	20	42	27	25	39	20	21	36	19	15	56	50	50
56	47	78	47	47	103	79	79	140	85	63	155	135	100	173	143	143
1	1	8.2	5.1	5.0	4.8	4.4	4.4	5.5	8.0	8.3	4.8[e]	6.8	6.8	8.5	18.6	18.6
≠ 6.0	≠ 4.5	8.9	2.4	1.7	≠ 6.3	≠ 2.5	≠ 2.5	12.4	2.8	1.0	19.0[e]	10.5	6.4	21.5	3.0	Nil
2.2	1.7	2.6	0.8	0.7	1.9	1.0	1.0	2.1	0.5	0.4	1.7	0.3	0.2	0.8	2.0	1.6
110	100	163	60	50	154	100	100	90	50	40	121	60	50	115	110	110
4	4	9	2	2	11.3	5	5	17.5	11	11	30	30	30	16	13	13
3.2	2.8	4.8	1.0	1.0	5.4	3	3	7.6	6.8	5.7	6.1	5	4	5.9	5.6	5.6
70	70	-	-	-	180	100	95	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

	Yugo-slavia
	Pre-war
	290
	58
	4.5
	16
	74
	2
	0.4
	5.5

TABLE II.

ESTIMATED CALORIE AND PROTEIN INTAKE FROM RATIONED AND UNRATIONED FOODSTUFFS

Calories or grammes protein per head of population per day

	Pre-war			1941			1942		
	Calories	Protein		Calories	Protein		Calories	Protein	
		Total	Animal		Total	Animal		Total	Animal
Germany	3050	82	35	3050	83	29	2700	70	25
Protectorate	3050	82	30	2750	69	25	2500	60	20
Finland	3100	93	42	2450	66	25	2500	66	23
Italy	2500	70	20	2500	63	14	2350	60	12
Belgium	2950	82	30	1950	50	21	1950	50	21
France	3100	85	34	2250	62	24	2350	62	23
Netherlands	2750	79	40	2350	62	25	2300	60	23
Norway	2850	81	42	2400	68	34	2250	63	29
Denmark	3300	84	47	3050	77	40	3050	78	40
Greece	2450	71	24	2200	64	20	1600	43	14

	Pre-war	1942
	Calories	Calories
Poland	2500	2300
Hungary	3200	3200
Roumania	2750	2650
Bulgaria	2700	2500
Croatia	2650	2450
Serbia	2900	2850

TABLE III

ESTIMATED DAILY CALORIE AND PROTEIN INTAKE FROM CURRENT RATIONS AND UNRATIONED FOODS

calories or grammes protein per day

	Normal Consumers		Light Workers		Heavy Workers		Very Heavy Workers		Adolescents		Pregnant and Nursing Women	
	Calories	Protein	Calories	Protein	Calories	Protein	Calories	Protein	Calories	Protein	Calories	Protein
Germany	2150	52	2150	52	2950	77	3750	93	2400	58	2800	72
Protectorate	2150	53	2450	64	2950	77	3700	93	2250	58	2350	65
Finland	1450	45	1650	53	2050	65	2500	78	1450	45	1950	57
Italy	1450	37	1800	50	2150	60	2450	70	1800	40	2100	60
France	1550	55	1550	55	2000	64	2150	66	1750	64	1850	68
Belgium	1500	40	1750	47	2000	54	2300	60	1550	44	2000	60
Netherlands	2000	57	2000	57	2700	78	3600	100	2400	68	2250	65
Norway	1800	50	2050	58	2350	64	2850	80	2000	57	2200	66

TABLE IV

ESTIMATED DAILY CALORIE INTAKE FOR THE VARIOUS CONSUMER CLASSES IN GREATER GERMANY

Class of Consumer	Daily Calorie Intake			Daily Calorie Requirements
	Before April cut	Lowest Level ø	Current Rations x	
Normal Consumers	2,500	1,800	2,150	2,500
Heavy Workers	3,600	2,550	2,950	3,200-3,600
Very Heavy Workers	4,400	3,300	3,750	4,000
Farm Population Adults	4,200	4,000	4,000	4,000
Children under 3	1,700	1,750	2,100	900
Children 3-6	1,700	1,750	2,050	1,000-1,400
Children 6-10	2,050	1,900	2,150	1,400-2,000
Children 10-14	2,550	2,250	2,500	2,000-2,800
Adolescents 14-20	2,650	2,100	2,400	2,800
Pregnant and nursing women	2,950	2,450	2,800	3,000

ø After April cut in rations and when potato allowance was only 2.5 kg. per head weekly.

x Potato ration 4.5 kg. per head weekly.

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B/-

FOOD CONDITIONS IN OCCUPIED EUROPE.

SUMMARY.

1. Certain features are common to all the countries of Occupied Europe. In the rural districts, save in parts of Greece, certain normally deficient areas of Yugoslavia, parts of Poland, and in occupied Russia, there has been no marked shortage of food. Roughly, out of a total population of 200 millions in Occupied Europe, nearly half is rural, for the most part living at almost the pre-war level.

Of the urban population, the well-to-do can generally obtain a substantially better diet than the official rations through purchases on the black market.

The urban working classes are the worst off, since they are for the most part restricted to the official rations, which vary in amount from country to country but are nowhere liberal.

2. In Greece, though relief shipments have brought some improvement to the worst areas, the situation remains grave; in Athens and some of the islands famine conditions existed last winter. and there was serious suffering and ill-health. The shortage of food was aggravated by transport and distribution difficulties.

3. In Poland privation in towns is likely to continue, and in the part of Poland formerly occupied by Russia, where the earth is believed to have been thoroughly scorched, there must be widespread suffering. This is true, too, of Occupied Russia.

In Yugoslavia, many people in the towns go short of food, and in the deficiency regions of Croatia there is likely to be a scarcity even for the rural population.

In both Poland and Yugoslavia the urban population amounts to less than one quarter of the total.

4. In Belgium, and to a lesser degree, in France, a considerable proportion of the urban population has now lived on meagre rations for more than 2 years. Certain symptoms of malnutrition are manifest, including an increase in tuberculosis and stunted growth in children.

The shortage of food in Belgium has been considerably aggravated by the uneven distribution of agricultural produce between town and country.

In France, which normally is largely self-sufficient in food, this factor is paramount. If all food could be fairly distributed there need be no acute scarcity. German demands, which greatly exceed the needs of the army of occupation, are also a drain on France's food supplies.

5. In the Channel Islands ample supplies of potatoes and vegetables prevent serious food shortage.

6. In the Netherlands, Norway, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States the diet, though considerably below the pre-war, is sufficient to prevent real under-nourishment, and so far there has been no marked deterioration in health. Food distribution is fairly efficient. German claims on Norwegian food, particularly on fish, represent an appreciable loss to the Norwegian people; in the Netherlands, exports to Germany are perhaps less significant.

7. In Denmark, while there has been some fall in the high pre-war level of consumption, the diet is still adequate, even by pre-war standards.

8. At some time or other, German demands have been a drain on food resources in every country of Occupied Europe; from most of these countries Germany

continues/

continues to exact a toll. Depletion of food stocks on entering the country, army requisitioning, private purchases by individual soldiers of the occupying army, all these have played their part in aggravating food shortages in the deficiency countries, while the better placed countries, such as the Netherlands and France, have had to contribute regularly to the food supplies of the German Reich.

9. As to the future, there is no prospect of any considerable change in food conditions in 1942/43. The new harvest, while below normal, should yet assure current bread rations except in Belgium, Norway and Greece. A further but small decline in consumption of meat and dairy produce is likely. Throughout Allied Europe as a whole, a measure of stability has now been reached, though for the most part, at a low level of food consumption. This stability is likely to continue throughout the harvest year 1942-3 unless fresh circumstances arise (such as an extremely severe winter) which cannot now be foreseen.

NOTE.

In this memorandum the calorie intake has been used as an index of the level of food consumption. There are two different indices. Firstly, there is the number of calories available per head of population per day. This value is a useful index to the general level of consumption throughout the country but its disadvantage is that it may mask large differences in the consumption between different classes of consumers within the country, e.g. between town and country dwellers, between workers and the well-to-do.

Secondly, in countries where the main foods are rationed, it is possible to make an estimate of the calories available to the various classes of consumers (i.e., normal consumers, children, workers, etc.) from rations plus a reasonable share of unrationed foods. Such estimates do attempt to define the actual level of consumption of average individuals but they are necessarily open to many sources of error particularly where a large number of foods remain unrationed. Moreover, as childrens' rations are usually relatively liberal, and as rations are normally pooled in households, the calorie intake of adults tends to be under-estimated.

GREECE.

Pre-War Consumption.

The level of food consumption has always been low in Greece. Before the war the average colorie intake, including calories from wine, was only 2,400 per day, which is even lower than that of Italy - about 2,600 - and well below the Western European standard of 3,000 or more daily. The diet was based on bread, supplemented by olives, fruit, and vegetables, (grapes, raisins and dried beans were important) and goats' milk cheese. Olive oil was the main fat. The consumption of meat and dairy produce was very low. There were few dairy cows; ewes and goats were both more important than cows as suppliers of milk.

Greece's primary food deficiency is wheat; normally she imported 30 to 40% of her needs. Total sugar supplies were also imported, but of olive oil, raisins, fresh fruits and wine there were considerable exports.

Food Conditions since the German Occupation.

Since the German occupation the food situation has been continuously critical, and for long periods in certain parts, acute. In Athens and Piraeus, and the Aegean Islands, during last winter and spring famine conditions existed. The arrival of Allied wheat shipments, together with seasonally more plentiful supplies of fruit and vegetables, brought some improvement, but in the towns the diet is,at best,meagre indeed. The present bread ration in Athens and Salonika of 7 oz. a day, while double that of last winter, is still lower than that of Belgium. For other foods there is no regular ration. From time to time there are distributions of sugar, dried fruit, pulses, olive oil, etc., and the arrival of a relief shipment from Turkey usually means a distribution of pulses, fish and eggs.

The difficulties of the working classes are increased by the inflationary rise in food prices to ten times and more than pre-war levels, increases in wages lagging far behind. Moreover, there also exists an extensive black market on which astronomical prices are reached, which drains a part of the available food away from the bulk of the town dwellers.

In the country districts, save for the barren mountainous parts which are not normally self-sufficient, the situation is much easier, but the diet is probably slightly under the low pre-war level.

Effects on Health.

The critical shortage of food last winter and spring inevitably took its toll of health and vitality. Fortunately no major epidemics broke out, but the death-rate in Athens and Salonika rose steeply, women and children ebing the main victims of the starvation diet.

Causes of food shortage.

A variety of causes contributed to Greece's food difficulties. Firstly, she lost to Bulgaria some of her best wheat country, which produced one-quarter of the total crop. Secondly, owing to the disturbed state of the country, and shortage of man and draught power, harvests have been far below normal. Moreover, the peasants, who make up more than half the population, have been understandably reluctant to give up their produce, particularly as there are few consumer goods which they can buy. Against direct barter, a proportion finds its way to the black market.

Transport difficulties also increase the problem of provisioning the towns. Though transport facilities are now improved, the ban on free movement of domestic foodstuffs imposed by the occupying authorities still impedes distribution. In even more direct ways the presence of the Germans reacts unfavourably on the Greek food situation. While there is little evidence that they take grain from the country, there is no doubt that they have drawn on olive oil stocks and that they buy up fruit and vegetables. In the early days of the occupation shortages were considerably accentuated both by direct wholesale requisitioning for the armies and by the purchases of individual soldiers with the freely-printed drachma notes. The second factor has become less important but requisitioning has continued and has

substantially/

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substantially reduced the benefit which the Greeks will obtain from this year's harvest.

Prospects for 1942/3.

There is little prospect of any material improvement in 1942/3 over the present level for the Greek urban population. Indeed, the 1942 harvest is said to be even lower than that of 1941, but this may be offset by improved collection from the peasants. In any event, to maintain present bread rations, Greece will need relief wheat shipments. In view of the increasing tightness of the Axis grain supplies and because Greece is economically unimportant to the enemy, it seems unlikely that Germany or Italy will contribute in 1942/3 even the small quantities of grain they supplied in the past year.

YUGOSLAVIA.

The New Partition.

Unlike Greece, Yugoslavia was a surplus country, exporting wheat, maize, pulses, meat, eggs, fruit (plums and apples) and small amounts of wine, olive oil and cheese. At the same time, however, the peasants were poorly fed, the rural dietary in Yugoslavia being one of the worst in the Balkans, notable for its low nutritional levels.

After invasion, part of the fertile Danube province, which produced a large grain surplus, was annexed by Hungary. Moreover, the splitting up of Yugoslavia into two separate states, Serbia and Croatia, led to an uneven distribution of grain supplies, Croatia being very deficient while Servia, obtaining the rest of the Danube province, would normally have a small surplus over her own needs.

Present Food Conditions.

In Croatia food may be short in later months even in the country districts; in the towns the rations are meagre now. Owing to disturbed conditions, sowings for the 1942 harvest were below normal, and unless a greater measure of control over the producers can be achieved, the problem of providing sufficient bread for the towns and the deficient areas may well become acute in 1942/3.

For Serbia the prospects are considerably better, and unless German demands on grain are excessive, there should be sufficient for town and country. Difficulties of distribution, however, are likely to keep the Belgrade rations at a low level.

POLAND.

Though it would be misleading to talk of recovery in Poland, nevertheless, some measure of stability has been reached, though at a very low level for large masses of the population.

Information suggests that crops are still below normal, and that livestock losses have been fairly heavy, particularly in Eastern Poland where the Russians on leaving, carried out their usual scorched earth policy. For peasants in Eastern Poland, for whom existence was always hand to mouth, there must be severe privation over wide areas.

In Western Poland the rurual population is better off, but there is still widespread suffering among the urban poor. Though food distribution in large towns such as Warsaw and Cracow is immeasurably better than it was in the months immediately after occupation, the rations for Poles, and particularly Jews, are extremely poor. (German residents in Poland receive the same rations as they would in the Reich. As in Greece, the black market further depresses the level of working class consumption.

OCCUPIED RUSSIA.

It would be erroneous to suppose that the territory occupied by Germany in the summer of 1941 produced a large surplus of grain. It is true that

formerly/

formerly the Ukraine did have a substantial export, but since the last war this has shrunk to very modest proportions, owing to rapid industrialisation and the consequent growth of a large urban population. Apart from the Ukraine, the remaining territory occupied in 1941 was a grain deficiency area.

The 1941 harvest was "scorched". Sowings for the 1942 harvest were far below normal owing to shortage of the tractors now essential for cultivating this land, and reports suggest that the crop is unlikely to exceed half the normal. Though the population has been somewhat reduced through mobilisation for the Red Army and evacuation to Unoccupied Russia, inevitably there must have been grave suffering over wide areas, and the outlook for the coming winter is far from hopeful. Though Germany has so far been largely disappointed in her hopes of sending food from this area to the Reich, yet the quantities of grain and other foodstuffs taken for the German army in Russia must have seriously aggravated local shortages.

On the other hand, the territory recently occupied by Germany contains some of the richest grain lands of Russia - the famous "black earth" - and normally produces a surplus over local needs of several million tons. This year, however, through effective Russian "scorching", together with general war disturbance, it is unlikely that any considerable surplus has fallen into German hands. But this loss is also likely to mean severe privation for many of the inhabitants in the coming winter.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

Of the former territory of Czechoslovakia with a population of nearly 15 millions, only the territories comprising the Reich Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the independent state of Slovakia now exist as separate entities. The rest of Czechoslovakia, containing nearly 5 million people, has been incorporated into the German Reich, Poland and Hungary.

Before the war Czechoslovakia had a high degree of self-sufficiency in food, the only substantial imports being vegetable oils for margarine manufacture. Trade in cereals, for food and fodder was negligible but there was a net export of over 200,000 tons of sugar, almost entirely derived from the Protectorate. Broadly speaking, the various territories provided for their own needs in cereals and potatoes but in livestock products there was a certain inter-regional trade, their consumption in the Sudetenland and the Protectorate being much higher than that in Slovakia. In the Sudetenland and the Protectorate, with 3,000 calories per head of the population per day, food standards were roughly the same as in Germany, but in Slovakia, and particularly in Sub-Carpathian Russia, the level of food consumption was low. For Slovakia the calorie intake was only 2,500 per head per day.

In Slovakia there has been no striking change since the war in the level of food consumption. Potatoes and fats are not rationed, while meat rationing applies only to towns of over 5,000 inhabitants. Reports of shortage of one food or another occur from time to time in towns; for the rural population, more than half the total, there has been little change, but by Western European standards their dietary is poor.

Administratively, the Protectorate is now virtually a part of the German Reich, and the system of food distribution and rationing closely parallels that of the Reich. There is a similar differentiation between rations for children of various ages and for the various categories of workers. As in Germany, local rationing controls the distribution of most foods not universally rationed but, unlike Germany, there is still a small ration of whole milk for the ordinary adult; children and pregnant and nursing women getting more liberal allowances.

Rationing provides the normal consumer with about 2,000 calories daily, while heavy workers obtain nearly 3,000 and very heavy workers well over 3,000 calories daily. At this level a population can exist for a long time without grave disablement, and reports of serious ill health are rare.

The rural population gets relatively generous allowances of grain, meat, fats and milk and, moreover, appears to keep back certain further quantities

in spite of threats and penalties. The urban black market is not, however, extensive.

No marked change in food resources is anticipated in 1942/3 in either the Protectorate or Slovakia.

BALTIC STATES.
(Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia).

Before the Russian occupation in 1940, Latvia and Lithuania were self-sufficient in all the main foodstuffs, and in fact had small exports of cereals. Estonia had to import all her sugar and small quantities of cereals. All three countries exported butter and certain quantities of pork and bacon. Formerly the nutritional level was fairly high; there was a large consumption of fresh milk, and the calorie intake per head of population per day was well in excess of 3,000.

The vicissitudes of war and occupation have reduced agricultural output and livestock numbers. Normal crops have not been obtained, and all true export surpluses of cereals and livestock products have vanished. Nevertheless, the level of food consumption within the Baltic States is still tolerable, particularly for the rural population, which delivers up its produce with extreme reluctance. In consequence, the urban rations are not liberal, being somewhat below those of the Protectorate. Reports of food shortages in the towns have been received from time to time, but there would not seem to have been any serious ill effects on health.

Germany has done her utmost to obtain certain supplies of foodstuffs from the farmers, but, it would seem, with only limited success. That the army of occupation has been fed off the country there is no doubt, but even the inducements of bonuses in kind, of commodities which are scarce, such as salt, cigarettes, sewing needles, and agricultural equipment, have so far failed to produce any significant amounts for export to the Reich. The latest German ruse is to capitalise the Baltic States' sympathy for Finland by suggesting that any food supplied by these countries will be sent to relieve the Finnish food shortage this coming winter.

BELGIUM.

Before the war Belgium imported one-half of her food, in terms of calories, relying more heavily on imports than any other country in Europe except Norway and the United Kingdom. She imported the bulk of her bread grain and vegetable oils for margarine, while even with large imports of fodder for livestock she still did not cover her needs of milk, butter and cheese.

In consequence of the low degree of self-sufficiency, the Belgian level of food consumption has inevitably been greatly depressed since the war. As Belgium cannot hope to produce sufficient wheat and rye for even minimum human needs, Germany has had to supply up to one-half her requirements. Owing to lack of fodder, milk output has fallen by nearly half, and pig numbers, and hence pork output, have declined considerably. On the other hand, sugar output has increased.

War-Time Diet.

It is estimated that from domestic production and imports Belgium has available about 2,000 calories per head of population per day. This compares unfavourably with the pre-war level of nearly 3,000 calories daily, but if evenly distributed would allow the average adult male 2,500 calories daily. This is barely sufficient for health, and certainly does not allow for any additional strain. Heavy manual work would be impossible. Actually, however, it has not been possible to distribute the available food evenly throughout the population. Because they could not get deliveries of foodstuffs from the peasants, the authorities have found great difficulty in meeting even the small rations for the townspeople. But the rural population, about one-fifth of the total, has lived at nearly its pre-war level, and in addition has supplied the urban black market.

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In 1941 the meat, fats and potato rations frequently could not be obtained in full, and childrens' milk was not always available. But in recent months there has been a marked improvement in food distribution and it would appear now to be the exception for rations not to be fully obtainable. Nevertheless, the diet provided is far from adequate. The normal consumer obtains only some 1,500 calories per day, children slightly more, while workers get from 2,000 to over 3,000 according to the class of work performed. Miners are the most favoured category, no doubt owing to their usefulness to Germany.

At this level malnutrition has been unavoidable, but even in the towns a certain number of people do obtain a somewhat better diet. For those who can afford it there is the black market, and for the poor some help is provided by communal meals and relief feeding. Efforts are made to provide children and pregnant and nursing women with supplementary rations and milk. Moreover, if the Germans want to maintain any industry at an efficient level they provide extra food for the workers through factory distributions and canteens.

Effects on Health.

Inevitably the present diet must affect the health and fitness of a considerable number of the urban population. Certain symptoms of malnutrition are manifest, the ill effects being most marked in children. The infantile mortality rate is said to have increased and there are reports of stunted growth, scurvy, anaemia, rickets and skin troubles in young children. The incidence of tuberculosis in towns has increased and a virulent type has appeared in adolescents. There have not, however, been any serious outbreaks of infectious diseases.

Prospects for 1942/3.

There is no rason for anticipating any considerable worsening of the urban food situation in 1942/3, provided that Germany allows sufficient grain for bread rations. From her own crop Belgium should have enough for 8 to 9 months. Unless Germany allows some butter or margarine, fats will be very short in the winter, and the ration (only 2½ oz. weekly for the normal consumer) may have to be further cut. On the other hand, reports suggest that the Belgian authorities are making every effort to improve distribution in the towns, particularly of potatoes and vegetables; it is too early yet to judge of their success.

FRANCE.

As in Belgium, a large section of the working classes in the large towns has been underfed now for more than 2 years.

Reports of serious ill-health or of a marked decline in working efficiency in adults are, however, rare, but minor infectious diseases are said to have increased. Children, too, are said to be retarded in growth.

Rationed and unrationed foods, including wine, which is locally rationed, provide the normal consumer with only 1,600 calories per day. Workers, adolescents, and pregnant and nursing women get somewhat more, but even the very heavy workers' allowance does not exceed 2,500 calories daily, which is quite insufficient for heavy work. For adolescents, whose caloric needs are high, the rations are particularly meagre.

Yet France is normally nearly self-sufficient in food. Wheat imports did not exceed 5% of consumption, sugar imports, too, were inconsiderable. The only important deficiency was vegetable oil, of which there was an annual import of about half a million tons (in oil content), four-fifths of which was supplied by her colonial empire. Fodder imports were negligible, less than 5% of total needs.

Moreover, since occupation there has been a steady stream of imports into metropolitan France from the African colonies; cereals, wine, meat, fruit and vegetables from North Africa, and vegetable oils from West Africa. (These, however, have been less than half normal).

Why/

Why then are the rations so low? There are three reasons. Firstly, domestic output, though it has recovered from the disastrous level of 1940/41 is still below normal. Owing largely to shortage of labour and draught power sowings have not returned to their pre-war level. The consequent shortage of fodder reacts adversely on the output of meat, milk and eggs.

Secondly, German demands are a steady drain on French food supplies. In 1941 Germany asked for some half million tons each of wheat, oats and hay, over 150,000 tons of meat, 4 million hectolitres of wine and certain quantities of cheese, canned foods, fruit and vegetables. The 1942 demands are on an even larger scale, but may include certain arrears from the previous year. In addition, Germany claims by agreement one-quarter of the vegetable oil, 30% of the cocoa and 12½% of oilcake imported from French Africa. Most of these foodstuffs are actually sent into Germany. (They are, of course, far in excess of the needs of the Army of Occupation).

It is estimated that these German demands deplete French food resources to the extent of some 250 calories per head of population per day.

Most important, however, is the third reason, the mal-distribution of available food supplies because the peasants cannot be either cajoled or coerced into delivering up their produce through official channels. It is admitted that out of the 1941 wheat harvest over 1 million tons were illegally held back and either fed to livestock or disposed of through the black market. Yet had this amount been available to the authorities the rations could have been increased by at least 25%. A large proportion of the farm butter, which amounts to half the total French butter production, also disappears unofficially.

Clearly it is not hard to understand why, when some 2,300 calories are available per head of population per day, the individual confined to the official rations can obtain only 1,600.

Nevertheless, as in Belgium, the authorities are making more strenuous efforts to improve food distribution, and in some instances, notably in milk collection, would appear to have some measure of success. So far, however, there is little sign of any real change of heart in the French producer who continues to mistrust the franc as a return for his crops.

There is little change in prospect for 1942/3. The worst problem facing Vichy is the maintenance of the fats ration, already, at 3½ oz. weekly, one of the lowest in German Europe. Owing to the West African natives' reluctance to harvest the ground nut crop, because there are no goods for him to buy, vegetable oil imports are dwindling, and unless the Government can obtain larger butter deliveries from farmers the problem will be well-nigh insoluble.

CHANNEL ISLANDS.

Before the war the Channel Islands depended mainly on imports for their food. All the sugar, and the bulk of the wheat, meat and butter were imported. There were, however, considerable exports of potatoes and vegetables.

Since occupation the Islands have had to depend mainly on their own production. The food situation is undoubtedly made less difficult thanit would otherwise be by the considerable reduction in population, and also by the loss of tourist traffic, which over the year as a whole probably swelled the population by as much as 10%. Certain quantities of wheat and other foods are obtained from France, probably in return for local produce, but the mainstay of the diet are now potatoes and vegetables, of which there are ample supplies. The diet is monotonous but not unhealthy, and in fact there are few reports of serious ill-health. The average person probably obtains about 2,000 calories a day. The chief disadvantage of so vegetarian a diet is its bulkiness, which makes it difficult for the heavy manual worker to obtain sufficient calories for his needs.

The extent to which Germany has drained the Islands' resources is not known. Vegetables such as tomatoes are certainly regularly exported to Germany, but probably these exports do not encroach on local needs. Reports of the removal of considerable numbers of cattle are more serious, and such requisitioning is no doubt largely responsible for the shortage of dairy products.

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NETHERLANDS.

In the Netherlands the food situation is considerably better than in either France or Belgium. Before the war she did not depend on imports for her basic foods to the extent of Belgium and Norway. The substantial imports of fodder produced a considerable export surplus of butter, cheese, eggs and pork. Of foods, she imported some wheat and rye for bread, large amounts of oilseeds for margarine, and a small amount of sugar.

Since the war the Netherlands has maintained her population, although at a considerably reduced level of consumption, entirely from her own food resources. These are not likely to decline any further in 1942/43.

This has meant, however, the use of all domestic wheat and rye, together with some barley, for bread making, which has had repercussions on the livestock industry, already depleted of its normal imports of fodder. Pigs and poultry numbers have fallen by more than half and milk cows, through compulsory slaughter, by 15%.

The milk output is now only 60% of the pre-war level, but through restricting liquid consumption of milk, and partly skimming it before sale, butter production has been maintained practically at its former level.

Although, since fodder imports were cut off, the Netherlands can no longer maintain her livestock industry on a true export basis, nevertheless by imposing strict rationing of domestic consumption, considerable quantities of butter, cheese, eggs and meat have been sent to Germany. Exports have, however, been steadily diminishing and are likely to be negligible in 1942/3.

There is also a large export to Germany of vegetables. For the most part this is a genuine export surplus, but reports suggest that German demands do at times restrict home consumption.

Calorie intake per head of population is about 2,250 daily. Due in large measure to its pre-war experience in market control, the Dutch administration distributes food supplies on the whole efficiently and fairly. Hitherto, the black market has been unimportant but the Dutch authorities view with some anxiety the recent increase in black market dealings in dairy produce.

However, the normal consumer's ration of some 2,000 calories per day still approaches more nearly to the national average than in any other country in Europe. While it does not represent an adequate diet, it is well above the dangerline of serious under-nutrition. Children get liberal milk allowances, but their cost probably puts them beyond the reach of the lowest income group.

So far there has been no marked deterioration in health. Tuberculosis has, however, increased.

NORWAY.

Due to the barren nature of most of the country, Norway's degree of self-sufficiency is even lower than that of Belgium. Normally, she imports the bulk of her bread grains, all sugar and some vegetable oil for margarine.

The Norwegian fishing industry provided important exports, mainly from the catch in Norwegian waters. Out of a total catch of about 1 million tons annually, only about 10% were domestically consumed and about 25% were exported, both as fish; from the remainder, edible and technical oils were extracted, some of which were exported.

Food conditions since the War.

Imports of rye from Germany, and of sugar from Denmark and the Protectorate,

have/

Please take care to cover the old address (or address panel) and the date stamp when sealing an Envelope with this Label.

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ON HER MAJESTY'S SERVICE

have enabled Norway to maintain a much reduced, but not seriously inadequate, level of consumption. Meat supplies for the towns are small and irregular because the farmers prefer to take the risk of selling direct to the consumer. (In a country like Norway where communications are difficult, it is comparatively easy thus to evade the law). On the other hand, fish appears still to be reasonably plentiful, and in fact its consumption has increased considerably since the war. Potato supplies depend on the time of year; there are always shortages in the towns in the winter and spring, owing to transport difficulties.

Norway's main problem is to maintain the fats ration, of great importance in so cold a country. Last winter Germany had to come to the rescue with some vegetable oil for margarine. (Present fat consumption though only half of pre-war, still provides the normal consumer with 7½ oz. weekly, more than twice what the Belgian normal consumer can obtain, and roughly the same as in the United Kingdom.) Butter output has fallen, and margarine is dependent on domestic herring oil production; this in turn depends on how much of the catch Germany allows Norway to retain.

Present Food Consumption.

The average normal consumer, from rations and unrationed food, can now obtain some 2,000 calories per day, heavy workers get about 2,500 and very heavy workers 3,000. This represents a fall of nearly one third of the pre-war level. In view of the long and hard Norwegian winter, the diet is certainly not liberal, but on the whole should be sufficient to stave off serious malnutrition. Generous milk rations are a safeguard for children. So far there has been no evidence of any marked deterioration in health, but from time to time cases of scurvy are reported.

German Demands.

Germany obtains certain supplies of meat, butter, cheese and milk. While the quantities are not large they are, however, an appreciable loss to the Norwegian people and may amount to as much as 10% of the total ouput of these foodstuffs. More important, however, are the German claims on the fish catch, of which they are to take about one-half in 1942.

Future Prospects.

As to the future, so long as Norway has ample fish and potatoes she need not fear famine, even should Germany reduce supplies of grain and sugar. A good potato crop has been announced for 1942, but its distribution through the winter is always a problem. Fish prospects are not so favourable. Owing to shortage of boats, fuel and fishermen, catches are falling much below normal, but German demands are unlikely to decrease.

DENMARK.

Of all Occupied Europe Denmark is the only country which has been able to maintain a reasonable standard of food consumption for the population as a whole, and at the same time export considerable quantities of meat and butter to Germany.

The pre-war national average calorie intake of some 3,400 per day was one of the highest in Europe, and now, at the beginning of the fourth year of the war, this level has dropped by only some 10%. Nevertheless, owing to the rise in food prices (the Cost of Food Index now stands at over 160) the lowest income group in Copenhagen and other towns has certainly fared worse than the average of the population; in particular its consumption of meat and protective foods, such as dairy produce, has been seriously curtailed.

Owing to lack of fodder imports, in particular of grain and oilcake, the Danish livestock industry has necessarily suffered heavily. While the cattle population has only fallen by 15%, milk yield per cow has dropped by 40%, and pig numbers are now less than 40% of pre-war. As a result exports of meat and butter have steadily declined, and in 1942 are unlikely to exceed a third of the 1940 figures.

Of the occupied countries Denmark has undoubtedly received favoured treatment from Germany, who would appear to have made no attempt to restrict Danish consumption of meat, or even of butter, in order to obtain lar[illegible]ies of these foods. In fact, meat is still unrationed (though the rise i[illegible]its consumption) and the butter ration of 10½ oz. a week is the highest in [illegible]pe.

[illegible] OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
[illegible]h September, 1942.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 1232

21 JAN 1943

Registry Number } W 1232/4/49

FROM Foreign Office minute (Mr. Law)

No.

Dated 18th Jan.,
Received in Registry } 21st Jan., 1943

W: Co-ordination

Mr. Kerschner's visit to Ireland.

Records a conversation with Mr. Kerschner and Mr. Eaves regarding the meeting of Members of Parliament which Mr. Astor has asked them to address in the House of Commons on 26th January.

Mr. Kerschner also raised the question of their visit to Ireland for which facilities had been refused by Home Office.

Last Paper.

(W1231.)

References.

(Minutes.)

Mr Grey 25/. See minutes.

Re Mr K's visit to Ireland

see W1198 and W1199

EL 21/1

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
W.O. 1/2/43	A.U.F. 26/5/43

Next Paper.

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

Mr Law:

I learned with Mr Howard Kirschner after he saw you; and he said that, having escaped from Mr Easter, he owed title one that his principal motive in all this was the desire to win the war. He was no pacifist, — though he was a Quaker and a humanitarian, — and as he saw it, the real importance of getting food to occupied territory was to stiffen (indeed to make possible) resistance — sabotage, and ultimately when the invading armies landed they were met by a few walking skeletons. He was absolutely convinced that the feeding of occupied Europe was of strategic, military importance, and

and was likewise calculated to harden, rather than postpone, the hour of the war.

I promised to report this to you, and also the same time to ask whether you did not think there might be a chance of the Secretary of State receiving him.

Yrs
19 Jan

I wd like the S/S to see Mr. K. but I wd not press him to do so. Mr. K is not long winded and could be induced to confine himself to 10 minutes I wd think. I have always thought that there was a good deal in his argument but I doubt whether the Cabinet wd be influenced by it.

PL 19/1

The S/S saw Mr Kirchner this afternoon.

Yrs
27 Jan

Pc. 29/1

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Mr Fisher

Mr Kershner's call on Mr Law on 16/1

For general background see brief previously prepared for Mr Law ci W16705. For what passed after Mr Law was called away see W16989.

Mr Kershner has been chocolate (& sugar) that he chopped from his ration. The answer to his is that this plan has already been considered & indeed tried several times.

As for his meeting of M.P.'s which Mr Kershner is to address Lord Brayhead suggests that Mr K [illegible] will probably not wish to say

Say i. anything ~~they~~ particularly objectionable from our point of view., but, if he does ~~not~~ reveal what he proposes to, Lord Stoyhedon Lopes a' Law will seek to restrain him & convince him that the question of which kingdom the blockade is one best left to H.M.'s & the U.S. Govt who have the whole matter constantly under review.

Lord Stoyhedon does not know ~~that~~ what Govt mt be to address & thinks it may be an open meeting for any M.P. or Lord.

S Maclean
15/1

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

W 1903
2 FEB 1943

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Mr. Kirschner and Mr. Eaves spoke to me today about the meeting of M.P.'s which Mr. Astor had asked them to address in the House of Commons on the 26th January. Mr. Kirschner said that he proposed to follow the line that he had taken in his article in the Sunday Times yesterday. I said that I thought it would be better if he would confine himself in his statement to an objective review of the facts, without making recommendations on policy. No doubt he would be asked questions after his statement as to what course he thought should be adopted, and he would be obliged to answer them. Nevertheless, it would not, I thought, be a good thing if he seemed to be putting pressure upon the Government to take action which for one reason or another they were not ready to take. Mr. Kirschner asked me whether we had considered all the arguments on his side, the political and psychological arguments as well as the purely blockade arguments. I said that we had, and pointed out that conditions had changed since the occupation of unoccupied France. It was now impossible to treat what was formerly unoccupied France as a special case. Any treatment which we gave to them we would have to give to other occupied territories in Europe and that would be likely to lead to a very big breach of the blockade.

Mr. Kirschner then raised the question of their visit to Ireland. I said that this was a Home Office matter. I had only heard of it indirectly and I did not think the Foreign Office ~~could be~~ had been consulted at all. I had no doubt that the reason was that the rules were extremely strict and the Home Office wished to adhere to them. Mr. Eaves said that they had been given to understand that Americans were allowed to go to Ireland with a good deal of freedom. He wondered whether a ban had been put upon them because it was thought that they would make difficulties about our blockade policy. He assured me that they had no intention at all of going to Ireland in order to ventilate conditions in Europe. They had been billed for a meeting in Dublin, it is true, but that was unknown to them and if they were to go now they would certainly have no kind of meeting. They were anxious to go for two reasons. The first that two members of the World Council of Quakers lived just outside Dublin. Secondly, they had sent a lot of money to Northern Ireland for relief, and they wanted to examine the situation there. I said that I would look into the matter again, but that if it was not possible for the visit to be arranged they could be assured that it was nothing personal against them.

RH

18th January, 1943.

S/S: Please see also the attached minutes.

HL
25 Jan

W 1232

21 JAN 1943

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end

Mr. Kirschner and Mr. Eaves spoke to me today about the meeting of M.P.'s which Mr. Astor had asked them to address in the House of Commons on the 26th January. Mr. Kirschner said that he proposed to follow the line that he had taken in his article in the Sunday Times yesterday. I said that I thought it would be better if he would confine himself in his statement to an objective review of the facts, without making recommendations on policy. No doubt he would be asked questions after his statement as to what course he thought should be adopted, and he would be obliged to answer them. Nevertheless, it would not, I thought, be a good thing if he seemed to be putting pressure upon the Government to take action which for one reason or another they were not ready to take. Mr. Kirschner asked me whether we had considered all the arguments on his side, the political and psychological arguments as well as the purely blockade arguments. I said that we had, and pointed out that conditions had changed since the occupation of unoccupied France. It was now impossible to treat what was formerly unoccupied France as a special case. Any treatment which we gave to them we would have to give to other occupied territories, in Europe and that would be likely to lead to a very big breach of the blockade.

Mr. Kirschner then raised the question of their visit to Ireland. I said that this was a Home Office matter. I had only heard of it indirectly and I did not think the Foreign Office ~~could be~~ had been consulted at all. I had no doubt that the reason was that the rules were extremely strict and the Home Office wished to adhere to them. Mr. Eaves said that they had been given to understand that Americans were allowed to go to Ireland with a good deal of freedom. He wondered whether a ban had been put upon them because it was thought that they would make difficulties about our blockade policy. He assured me that they had no intention at all of going to Ireland in order to ventilate conditions in Europe. They had been billed for a meeting in Dublin it is true, but that was unknown to them and if they were to go now they would certainly have no kind of meeting. They were anxious to go for two reasons. The first that two members of the World Council of Quakers lived just outside Dublin. Secondly, they had sent a lot of money to Northern Ireland for relief, and they wanted to examine the situation there. I said that I would look into the matter again, but that if it was not possible for the visit to be arranged they could be assured that it was nothing personal against them.

M Foreign Dept

Mrs 9/1

18th January, 1943.

GENERAL

1943

F.O.
371

CO-ORDINATION

FILE No. 4

Pps. 1338-3071

[redacted]

CLOSED
UNTIL
1972

36509

26.

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 1338 2

23 JAN 1943

Registry Number } W 1338/4/49

FROM Mr. Mallet, (Stockholm)

No. 27 E (64/1/43)

Dated 15th Jan., 1943.

Received in Registry } 23rd Jan., 1943.

W : Co-ordination

Relief for Norway.

Refers to his despatch No. 560 2nd December (W 16640/4/49). Large sums of money have been collected in Sweden for purchase of relief supplies for Norway. Considers that great disappointment will be felt in Sweden when it is discovered that the large funds collected for Norwegian relief can only be used in a small way. Suggests that British and United States propaganda should begin to enlighten the Swedish people about Norwegian relief.

Last Paper.

W1232 (W16640/62/49 1943)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

It is clearly desirable that the Swedes (both Govt. + people) should know our attitude about Norwegian relief; but this once again depends on the President's reply to the P.M.

6.v. in 10 days

13/2

Northern Dept.

E. Crowe

How can we enlighten anyone about our relief policy until we have a clearer idea of what it is going to be ourselves. We might however send M. Mallet a short letter recapitulating very briefly recent developments - or lack of developments - & promising to keep him informed

Pol. Dept. transmit yes 15/2 30/1

See

36509

(Action completed.) 15/3/43

(Index.) AWF 26/5/43

Next Paper.

W 1437

3

See within letter from Mr. Campos (M.F.O.)
to Mr. Rowe T550/12 Feb 13

W 1.JAN 1943

36203

W 1338
23 JAN 1943

4

British Legation,
Stockholm.
15th January 1943.

No. 27 E
(64/1/43)

Sir,

As I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 560 of the 2nd December last, very substantial sums of money are being collected in Sweden, largely through trade union and employers' organisations, for Norwegian relief. According to the Swedish press subscriptions for the same purpose are also being accepted in the United States of America mainly from persons of Scandinavian origin. It is stated that the organization known as "Swedish Aid to Norway" mentioned in paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 560 of the 2nd December has at its disposal more than 700,000 dollars in New York and some 2 1/2 million kronor collected or promised in Sweden. Further sums have been raised by other bodies.

2. The Swedish public appear to be under the impression that it will be possible to purchase foodstuffs for the Norwegian population, not only in Sweden, but also in Hungary and the Balkans, and even on the American continent. According to private information received from the Swedish Cooperative organisation, some anxiety is felt as to the methods by which foodstuffs sent to Norway shall be distributed for the benefit of the non-quisling population, without any of it being used by the Germans. It is generally appreciated that the Swedish-Norwegian relief organisation working in conjunction with Monsieur Ditleff, the head of the Norwegian Legation's Relief Department, have made certain arrangements for distribution in a satisfactory manner, but some doubt is felt in certain quarters (including the Cooperative organisation) as to whether the existing arrangements can be safely extended to handle relief distribution on a large scale. With regard, however, to the question of purchases of foodstuffs on the American continent which involve shipment to Sweden with the permission of His Majesty's Government and the United

States/

The Right Honourable
Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.
etc., etc., etc.,

States Government, the Swedish public do not appear to realise the difficulties and objections likely to be encountered. Thus, it is not improbable that great disappointment will be felt in Sweden when it is discovered that the large funds collected for Norwegian relief not only here, but also in the United States of America, cannot be used except in a small way until the enemy is driven out of Norway. No doubt a substantial part of the money will be able to be used for other kinds of relief than actual food purchases, for instance for the administration of soup kitchens and children's hospitals. Nevertheless it seems inevitable that a great part of the money, and especially the American dollars, will not be usable in the manner originally intended by the subscribers.

3. The Swedish Government have not, so far as is known, taken any steps to explain the situation to the Swedish public, nor to warn them of the difficulties lying ahead. It seems probable that for political reasons the Swedish Government is anxious to avoid doing or saying anything which might obstruct the activities of humanitarian workers for Norway.

4. In these circumstances I venture to suggest that the time has come for us to consider seriously whether the propaganda and information services of the British and American Governments should not begin to enlighten the Swedish people as to our intentions regarding Norwegian relief and as to our reasons for severely restricting deliveries of foodstuffs to Norway in present circumstances.

5. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Ministry of Economic Warfare and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,
Sir,
Your most obedient,
humble Servant,

Dalrymple

L.F. T550/12

W1338/4/49

6

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
LONDON, W.1.

13th February, 1943.

Dear Crowe,

Please see Stockholm despatch No. 27E of January 15th, of which you were kind enough to forward us a copy.

We feel that any action of the kind suggested in the last paragraph, for the purpose of enlightening the Swedish public as the restrictions imposed by, and the motives underlying, our blockade policy, would be premature.

We cannot, in the first place, take a very strong or definite line, so long as problems affecting our policy in the matter of Norwegian relief have still to be settled with the U.S. Government.

Collections in the United States are a matter for the U.S. Government rather than for us. As regards collections in Sweden, we hope that, as soon as our rule regarding exports for Sweden, is established, it will be explained clearly at the outset to the Swedish authorities. We should deprecate, however, trying to explain it to the Swedish public, since this would involve explaining to them the nature of our War Trade Agreement.

Yours sincerely,

W. A. Crowe

E.E. Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office, Whitehall,
S.W.1.

27.

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 1437
25 JAN 1943

7

Registry Number W 1437/4/49

TELEGRAM FROM
Lord Halifax
(Washington)
No. 397

Dated 22nd Jan: 1943.

Received in Registry 25th Jan: 1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Allied Relief purchases.

Transmits message for Mr. Troutbeck from Mr. Hall stating that everything possible is being done to get coherent statements out of the State Department about prisoner of war shipments and relief purchases by the Allies inside the blockade area. Governor Lehman is to have charge of all these matters and a change in policy may be expected.

Last Paper.

W1338

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Para 4 seems to indicate that the Americans are now likely to urge us to consent to a considerable expansion of relief schemes in Europe.

F. E. Crowe.

M. Buthlay
Sir D. Scott 2/3/43

Perhaps but not necessarily: even if Gov. Lehman is actually convinced by Mr Hoover, which is not certain, there will be obstruction from Shipping, Food & perhaps other Depts.

M.B. 1/3.

E.L. 1/3

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
MB 2/3/43	All 26/1

Next Paper.

W1482 (W2100)

22910 9/41 F.O.P.

W

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

W 1437

25 JAN 1943

8

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Viscount Halifax
No. 397
22nd January, 1943

D. 6.34 a.m. 23rd January, 1943
R. 1.55 p.m. 23rd January, 1943

ddddddd

Confidential

Following for Troutbeck from Hall.

All of us here greatly appreciate your forbearance during the last six weeks on all matters connected with prisoner of war shipments and relief purchases by the Allies inside the blockade area. We have been doing everything possible to try to get coherent statements out of the State Department and the Ambassador has stirred up both Hull and Welles. Long, the Assistant Secretary in charge, has frequently been away ill and no-one else would touch the questions. There has also been a long desire to decide whether Governor Lehman should take over all these questions.

2. Yesterday I spoke most earnestly to the English desk at the State Department explaining our difficulties and pleading that some steps should be taken to get all these matters handled with greater despatch and clarity. Whether as a result of this interview or not, I cannot tell, but I have just been summoned urgently to a conference with Governor Lehman to-morrow on prisoner of war questions.

3. If, as it now appears, Lehman is to have charge of all these matters, they should be more coherently and expeditiously handled as the Governor has an able and an adequate staff.

4. I understand that Lehman has been somewhat influenced by Hoover's views and that we ought to expect a change in policy on all these matters. I am aware that it is dangerous to report opinions of this kind. My source is Acheson.

5. This is for your background information to explain a situation which seemed to me to be in danger of becoming well nigh intolerable as the result of ineffective handling.

O.T.P.

JAN 1943 FO

28

1943

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 1482

26 JAN 1943

9

Registry Number W 1482/4/49

FROM Mr. Quennell (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Crowe

No. -

Dated

Received in Registry 22nd Jan:1943 / 26th Jan:1943

W: Co-ordination

Belgian Exhibition at Harrods.

Encloses a minute by the Food and Agriculture section of the Ministry of Economic Warfare regarding the Belgian Exhibition at Harrods. The part of the exhibition concerned with food grossly misrepresents the facts. Enquires what action should be taken.

Last Paper.

W1487

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

I do not know whether the M.E.W. figures are correct or not. If they are, they merely go to show that the food shortage in Belgium is due not to German requisitioning but to our blockade. It seems to me that it would be entirely foolish for us to point this out to the Belgians even if it does mean that the British public are misled. I have spoken to Mrs. Cranley, Ministry of Information, who agrees with me, and I have so informed Mr. Quennell of the M.E.W. Mr. Quennell said that he felt he had done his duty in bringing the facts to our attention and it was for the Foreign Office to decide whether or not to take any action on the matter.

I suggest that no action be taken except to mark this paper for Mr. Aveling to see.

I entirely agree. ASA

Mr. Aveling 29/1/43

W Harrison

27th January, 1943

E.L.C. 27/1

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
mle. 2/2/43	amf. 26/5/43

Next Paper.

W1509.

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

Relief Section
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE, W.1.

TELEPHONE:
GROSVENOR 4060.

10

22:1:43

W. 1482
26 JAN 1943

Dear Croz,

I enclose a Minute I have received from the Food & Agriculture section here on the Belgian Exhibition at Harrods about which I spoke to you yesterday.

Perhaps you will let us know what steps you propose to take. Mrs Coakley of B.O.I has some information on how the Exhibition was organized etc.

Yrs, Pat Quennell

1 copy

Reference.....11

THE BELGIAN EXHIBITION AT HARRODS.

F O O D.

The part of the exhibition concerned with food is in two sections; both in the form of illustrated placards:

(a) Food consumption;
(b) Requisitioning.

Both sections grossly misrepresent the facts and are not entirely consistent with each other. One or two of the most striking errors are pointed out below.

FOOD CONSUMPTION.

In this illustration it is shown that the current Belgian consumption is a great deal less than it need be because of German demands. Bread grain consumption is shown to be about one-third less; potatoes about half; meat much less than half and sugar about one-third less than need be because of German requisitioning.

This picture is not only inaccurate but entirely wrong. In 1942 the Germans actually supplied the Belgians with some 300,000 tons of bread grain. The Belgians covered their own consumption of sugar and potatoes but were not forced to send any to the Germans.

REQUISITIONING.

A nicely illustrated placard states that the Germans are taking:

70% of the potato crop;
500 tons of butter monthly;
8000 cows monthly;
3000 pigs monthly;
Nearly all the horses.

As we have already seen, the Belgians are allowed to keep their entire potato crop.

The livestock figures are quite excessive and altogether improbable in view of the fact that the Belgian cattle herd has been maintained at the pre-war level (Official Census of October 1st, 1942). The pig population has fallen considerably, but this has been due largely to

lack/-

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1,000,000 3/42 JC&S
Gp736/208
(REGIMEAN)
Code 5-33-0

12

lack of breeding caused by the fodder situation and not to German requisitionings.

The statement about horses can only be a gross exaggeration. At the end of 1941 the Belgians had more horses than before the war.

The figures given above are quoted from memory but what I would also like to stress is the falsity of the impression given.

FOOD SECTION.
22nd JANUARY, 1943.
A.S.T. Corder.

Miss Dennehy, HP 22/1/43.
Mr. Quinell. Q

29

1943

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 1509

26 JAN 1943

13

Registry Number W 1509/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare.

No. T 550/7/907

Dated 23rd Jan.,1943.

Received in Registry 26th Jan.,1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Food parcels from French North Africa to France.

Transmits a copy of telegram to Washington No.264 Arfar of 21st January stating that the proposal to send food parcels from French North Africa to France cannot be allowed, but there is no objection to a parcel scheme from Portugal being instituted on behalf of Frenchmen in North Africa. Such a scheme would be separate and additional to that already being operated by the Fighting French. Requests United States Government's views.

Last Paper.

W1482 (W968)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

This is in accordance with our suggestion in W968

French Sect 28/1.

N. Af 30/1

E.E.C. 28/1

(Action completed.)

W4 1/2/43

(Index.)

OWF 30/3/43

Next Paper.

W 1530

(W2501)

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

14

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

M.E.W. FILE No. T.550/7/907
COPY FOR E Crowe Esq F.O.
DATE 23/1/43

W 1509
26 JAN 1943

T.550/7/907.

[CYPHER]

LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 264 ARFAR.
21st January, 1943.

D. 9.40 p.m. 21st January, 1943.

JJJJ

IMPORTANT.

Your telegram No. 203 [Arfar of 16th January: Food parcels from French North Africa to France].

The proposal to send food parcels from French North Africa to France is open to the obvious objection that it would be completely at variance with the general blockade policy agreed between the British and United States Governments and would necessarily lead to demands from other Allies, in particular the Belgians, to organise the despatch of food parcels from outside the blockade. We presume that the United States Government will disapprove the proposal for the same reason and we hope they will instruct their authorities in French North Africa accordingly.

2. We should not see so strong objection to a parcel scheme from Portugal being instituted on behalf of Frenchmen in North Africa as this would at least avoid giving the French a blank negative. Such a scheme would of course be separate and additional to that already being operated by the Fighting French here but in view of relations existing between them and the French administration in North Africa, we doubt if latter would at present agree to concert arrangements with the Fighting French or participate in their scheme.

3. We should hope to avoid repercussions from the Fighting French since their scheme allows for the despatch of parcels on behalf of the French in Equatorial Africa. We can be less certain of reactions of Belgians who may demand a separate scheme on behalf of the Congo, but in point of fact funds and orders are already with our tacit consent being remitted direct from the Congo to Lisbon outside the official limits of the Belgium scheme.

4. We presume that any scheme run on behalf of French North Africa would be organised and financed from there. In this case we think it important that the scheme should be operated under the closest supervision of the American authorities in Algiers and Lisbon in the same way as the Allied schemes are controlled by us.

5. Please report reactions of United States Government to our proposals.

Copies also sent to
A S Gregory Esq. T.E.D.
H E Kay Esq., War Office
Lord Swinton War Cabinet

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GENERAL

W 1530

26 JAN 1943

15

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

Registry Number W 1530/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare.

No. T 550/12.

Dated 23rd Jan. 1943

Received in Registry 26th Jan. 1943

W : Co-ordination.

Medical supplies for Norway.

Transmits copy of telegram to Stockholm No.34 Affar of 13th January stating that United States Treasury confirm that a licence was recently given to the Norwegian Government to transfer 2 million dollars but it specifically precluded use of these funds for relief purposes without their written consent. In November Norwegians informed the Treasury that these dollars were to be used for purchases in Sweden to be stored there for the time being. Requests that this matter may be elucidated.

Last Paper.

W 1509

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See within copy of tel from Stockholm No 485 Affair Dec 5

See within copy of despatch from Commercial Counsellor, Stockholm No 1610 Dec 14

Northern Dept

Stores 12 Feb. E.C. 1072

See within copy of tel from Washington No 1147 Affair. March 27

Northern Dept 12 Apr.

E.C. 1074

See within copy of tel to Washington No 522 Affair Saving April 7 2

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
mk 13/2/43	Acts 24/7

Next Paper.

W 1926.

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

WES. and also to W & Hacken Treasury 16

T 550/12 "T 550/12 Crowe Esq. F.O. 23/1/43.

[CYPHER] ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO STOCKHOLM.

No. 34 ARFAR
13th January, 1943. D. 7.55 p.m. 13th January, 1943.

Repeated to Washington No. 136 ARFAR.

W 1530
26 JAN 1943

sssss

IMPORTANT

Your telegram No. 485 [Arfar of December 5th: Medical supplies for Norway].

Following for Camps from Troutbeck.

Washington have now replied to our enquiry regarding Norwegian allegation to have received permission from United States authorities to transfer one million dollars for relief purchases in Sweden. They state that United States Treasury confirm that a license was recently given to the Norwegian Government to transfer two million dollars but it specifically precluded use of these funds for relief purposes without their written permission.

2. Last November Norwegians here informed the Treasury that these dollars were to be used for purchases in Sweden to be stored there for the time being and only to be released with the consent of the United States Legation in Stockholm in consultation with Swedish Government.

3. Position is therefore obscure to us but it may be that despite apparent contradiction with normal American policy United States Legation has been instructed to agree to release of medical supplies mentioned in your despatch C.C.No. 1610 [of December 14th] and to payment being made out of the above mentioned funds. Can you elucidate?

17

M.E.W. FILE NO. 1550/12
COPY only for Miss Caffyn Gen. Dis. 7.0.
DATE 10/2/43.

1530 4 / 49

[Cypher] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM STOCKHOLM TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Mr. Mallet. D. 7.20 p.m. 5th December, 1942.
No.485 ARFAR. R.12.10 a.m. 6th December, 1942.
5th December, 1942.

c c c

Your telegram No.638.

Our early consent appears to be desirable regarding medical goods in view of Red Cross interest in [group undec. ?goods of] Swedish origin. United States Commercial Attaché concurs and Norwegian Legation are pressing us strongly. Please telegraph reply.

OTP

BW

T550/12

Copy for Miss Caffyn

LB/MW F.O.

139/2A/42.

Memorandum

for M.E.L. 18

From the Commercial Counsellor, H.M. Legation, Stockholm,
To the Ministry of Economic Warfare, London.

C.C. No.1610

Stockholm, 14th December 1942.

W 10897

Referring to your telegram Arfar 690, dated the 9th instant, I append a list of the 900,000 kronor's worth of medical supplies which it was desired to export to Norway.

I passed on to the Swedish authorities your instructions as to the supplies which may not be exported to Norway, with the result that they have refrained from giving an export permit for the seven items on the list marked with an X.

(Signed) J. Mitcheson.

1530 4 49.

Translation of a letter from the Materials Committee of the Swedish Royal Board of Medicine, Stockholm, to the Directorate General of the Swedish Red Cross, Stockholm, dated the 26th September 1942.

In compliance with your letters, dated the 13th August and 7th September, asking for information regarding the quantities of medical and hospital supplies which can be made available for civilian use in Norway, we beg to inform you as follows:-

From the Military Apothecary the following medical supplies from the stores of the defence force can be counted upon. In case the whole quantity of each item is purchased it may be necessary to ask for a period in which to deliver.

	Adrenaline solution, 30 ml. each	3,000	bottles	Kr.1.50 each	Kr.4,500
	Atropine ampoules, 0.5 mg.atropine sulphate each, 10 x 1.2 ml.each box	1,400	boxes	1.90	2,660
X	Boracic acid ointment, 50 gr.each tube (if licence is granted for aluminium tubes)	14,000	tubes	0.50	7,000
	Bromide tablets	250,000	tablets	14.50 per 1,000	3,625
	Diemon tablets	1,500,000	tablets	25.- per 1,000	37,500
	Digitalis ampoules, boxes of 10 x 1.2 ml.	10,000	boxes	2.25	22,500
	Digitalis tablets, 5 cg. each	140,000	tablets	9.- per 1,000	1,260
	Ephedrine ampoules, 5 percent boxes of 10 x 1.2 ml.	3,500	boxes	1.50	5,250
	Emetine ampoules, boxes of 10 x 1.2 ml.	1,700	boxes	6.60	11,220
	Etokain solution, 1 percent, for injections, cylinders,100 ml.each	600	cylinders	2.50	1,500
	Fenemal tablets, 0.1 gr. each	240,000	tablets	11.50 per 1,000	2,760
	Adhesive shellac solution, 100 gr. each bottle	5,000	bottles	0.50	2,500
	do. do. do. 150 gr. each bottle	2,500	bottles	0.75	1,875
	Potash-glyconate ampoules, 10 percent boxes of 5 x 10 ml.	2,500	boxes	2.20	5,500
X	Calomel ointment, 35 percent	75	kilogs.	10.- per kilog.	750
X	Camphor oil ampoules, 20 percent, boxes of 10 x 1.2 ml.	20,000	boxes	1.50	30,000
	Chloramine solution tablets, 1 gr. each	500,000	tablets	15.- per 1,000	7,500
X	Caffeine ampoules, 20 percent boxes of 10 x 1.2 ml.	5,500	boxes	1.50	8,250
	Cocaine solution tablets, 0.4 gr. each	25,000	tablets	60.- per 100	15,000
	Lobeline ampoules, 0.3 percent boxes of 10 x 1.2 ml.	3,900	boxes	6.75	26,325
	Morphine ampoules, 2 percent, boxes of 10 x 1.2 ml.	25,000	boxes	2.-	50,000
	Narkotal ampoules, boxes of 50	150	boxes	48.- per box	7,200
	do. do. do. 5	2,000	boxes	7.- do.	14,000
	Fern Root extract capsules, 0.5 gr.	35,000	capsules	5.- per 100	1,750
	Santonin cakes or tablets, 0.025 gf. each	13,500	tablets	35.- per 1,000	472.50
	Scopolamine ampoules 0.3 mg. each, boxes of 10 x 1.2 ml.	1,500	boxes	2.25	3,375
	Sulphanilamide tablets, 1 gr.	900,000	tablets	28.- per 1,000	25,200
	Sulphanilamide ampoules, 5 percent 5.5 ml.	60,000	ampoules	0.65 each	39,000

Cod /

X	Cod Liver ointment, 50 gr. each tube	6,000 tubes	0.50 per tube	3,000
X	Xebinol ointment, 30 gr. per tube	3,900 tubes	0.030 per tube	1,170

In addition A/B Astra, A/B Pharmacia and A/B Leo can deliver the following medical supplies, for which the Materials Committee is prepared to support the export licence, namely:-

From A/B Astra.		
Sulfatiazol, 2000 x 1000 tablets 0.5 gr. each	Kr. 62.33 per 1,000 tablets	124,660
Sulfatiazol, 100 x 100 ampoules, 5.5 ml. each	42.21 per 100 ampoules	4,221
Tonocard (pyridine carbon oxide diethylamide, 25 percent) 25 x 250 ml.	17.60 per 250 ml.	440
Hypadrine (contains the rear-hypophysis's two hormones, vasopressine and oxytocine, each of a strength of 10 I.E. per ml.)		
100 x 100 ampoules, 1.2 ml. each	62.33 per 100 ampoules	6,233
500 x 24 do. 0.6 ml. do.	11.37 per 24 ampoules	5,685
Laxative cakes (phenolphthalein cakes 0.12 gr. each), 1000 tubes of 22 cakes	1.02 per tube	1,020
Thyreototal (medium, containing 0.18 mg. and strong, 0.54 mg. organic iodine per tablet)		
200 x 1000 medium	17.95 per 1,000	3,590
200 x 1000 strong	25.67 per 1,000	5,134
X E-vimin (standardized wheat germ oil containing 40 Pacini-Linn units per ml). 100 x 100 ml.	9.55 per 100 ml.	955
K-vimin (containing 0.015 gr. 2-methyl-1.4-nafto-hydrokinondiacet. per ml.) 100 x 24 ampoules of 1.1 ml. each	6.63 per 24 ampoules	663
From A/B Pharmacia		
Sulfapyradin, substance, 500 kilogs.	176 per kilog	88,000
do. 1,000 x 1,000 tablets 0.5 gr. each	90 per 1,000 tablets	90,000
Sulfapyradin, 100 x 100 ampoules, 5.5 ml. each 20 percent	85 per 100	8,500
Sulphanilamide, 200 x 1,000 tablets, 1 gr. each	31 per 1000	6,200
do. 100 x 100 ampoules, 5.5 ml. each, 5 percent	70 per 100	7,000
2-Sulphanilamidothiazole, substance 800 kilogs	116 per kilog	92,800
do. 1600 x 1000 tablets, 0.5 gr. each	60 per 1000	96,000
100 x 100 ampoules, 5.5 ml. each 20 percent	42 per 100	4,200
From A/B Leo.		
Morphine ampoules, 2 percent, 8,500 boxes of 10 x 1.2 ml.	1.84 per box	15,640
	Total	903,583.50

X = held back

With regard to payment and conditions of delivery, etc. we propose that you communicate with the suppliers.

21

INCOMING

F.O. REGD. FILE No. T 550/12.
FOR E E Cave Esq.,
5/4/43.

Copies sent to J Fraser & J. Lieth-Roo.

[Cypher]. LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Viscount Halifax. D. 2.15 a.m. 28th March, 1943.
No.1117 Arfar
27th March, 1943.
Repeated to Stockholm No. 8.

1530 4 49

/////

We are now informed that licence for two million dollars granted to Norwegians specified that credit should be used for following purposes:

(a) Expenses of Norwegian Government for administrative and relief (i.e. refugee) activities in Sweden,

(b) support of "patriot" activities in Norway,

(c) purchase of medical and surgical supplies in Sweden for despatch to Norway,

(d) purchase of foodstuffs for storage in Sweden for later shipment,

(e) purchase of telephone and telegraph equipment in Sweden for post-war.

2. Only expenditures under (d) and (e) require specific approval of United States Treasury. So far no expenditure has been authorised under (d).

M.E.W. FILE No. T 580/12.
COPY FOR E Browne Esq.
DATE 13/4/43.

Copies sent
U-d. Foreign.
D Ward. B.o.T.

22

T590/12

O.H.

By Bag.

W 1530/4/49

INDEXED

TELEGRAM

From Ministry of Economic Warfare, London.
To H.B.M. Embassy Washington AREAR SAVING 522.
Rpt: H.B.M. Legation Stockholm AREAR SAVING 2.

7th April 1943.

Your telegram No. 1117 Arfar of March 27th, headings (a) and (d). Licence granted to Norwegians for 2 million dollars.

We rather regret (c), because funds locally unburdened in Sweden are promoting demands for permission to export goods to Norway which we are frequently obliged to refuse in accordance with the rules governing Relief Exports from Neutral Countries. In fact, there are very few goods eligible for export from Sweden in accordance with these rules. Consequently the less extra money available in Sweden for relief purchases, the better from our point of view at present. Moreover "surgical supplies" probably will be understood by the Norwegians to include bedding, clothing, bandages etc, none of which as do we normally allow to be sent from Sweden to Norway, despite frequent and embarrassing requests.

2. We are of course opposed to purchases of foodstuffs for storage in Sweden, because of the demand that would follow to transfer them to Norway during the war in defiance of blockade policy. We are therefore glad that such expenditure is to be controlled by U.S. Government.

K Kle 13/4

31.

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 1726

29 JAN 1943

23

Registry Number W 1726/4/49

FROM Mr.Corbett-Palmer(Ministry of Economic Warfare)to

No. Mr. Grey.

Dated 26th Jan:1943

Received in Registry 29th Jan:1943

W.,Co-ordination.

Relief for occupied Europe.

Transmits copy of letter from Mr. Foot (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Dr. Paton of January 26th regarding Dr. Van Dusen's letter about United States attitude towards relief for occupied Europe.

Last Paper.

W1530 (W430)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

E.R.C. 4/2

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
W.O. 8/2/43	Aut. 30/3/43

Next Paper.

W1768

(W1900)

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

Copy for P. Grey, Esq., Foreign Office.

With Mr. Corbett-Palmer's compliments.

General Dept. We concurred in this. R. 27/1 24

W 1726

29 JAN 1943

26th January, 1943.

Dear Dr. Paton,

I must apologise for the long delay in answering your letter of 28th December. I have been ill for the last fortnight, and have only just reached the stage when I can deal with correspondence. I do not think that much purpose would be served by my recapitulating the arguments in favour of a general food blockade. You are thoroughly familiar with them already. I did, however, read with some concern the rumours that are circulating in the United States regarding the Norwegians and the Greeks. I hope you will inform Dr. Van Dusen that these have really no foundation in fact.

As you know, it is my particular province to deal with food relief questions. Until I received your letter I had never heard of the threatened strike by Norwegian merchant sailors. If they had in fact threatened that they would no longer carry supplies to belligerent areas unless supplies were also sent to their civilian population at home, this threat would clearly have been communicated to the Ministry of Economic Warfare. We have never received it, and it sounds to me precisely the kind of rumour which would be fabricated by Nazi propaganda.

As regards the second rumour, namely that the Greek relief scheme was due to pressure brought to bear upon the British and American Governments by Turkey, this has no foundation in fact whatsoever. The Turkish Government had nothing to do, either with the emergency shipments which we allowed to pass through the blockade between March and August last year, or with the Swedish relief scheme which has been in operation since the end of August.

As regards the extract from Dr. Van Dusen's letter, I am a trifle puzzled by the fourth paragraph. He states that "We do not advocate a scheme of general relief. What is proposed is merely the extension to other areas in desperate need of the plan already functioning with the full approval of the Allied Governments for the relief of Greece, provided the occupying powers will agree to the same conditions and safeguards in its administration". This distinction is not clear to me. The Greek relief scheme is a scheme of general relief, and extends to all classes of persons in the famine-stricken areas. Its

Rev. W. Paton, D.D.,
Edinburgh House,
2, Eaton Gate, S.W.1.

extension/

25

extension to the other occupied countries would involve a complete abandonment of the blockade, with consequent inestimable benefit to the enemy.

With regard to the last paragraph, I cannot accept the assumption that "millions of lives of our Greek Allies are now being saved, without aid to the Axis and to the satisfaction of Allied Governments". I do not believe it is possible to devise any relief scheme in occupied territory which will not bring some degree of benefit to the Axis. For reasons which have been frequently stated, such benefit is likely to be substantially less in the case of Greece than it would be elsewhere. But I do not think we can assume that it is non-existent. It would certainly be very much greater in an industrial country like Belgium, whose large scale industries are harnessed to the German war machine, and whose workers, however reluctantly, are making a considerable contribution to the enemy's war effort.

As regards the last paragraph of your own letter, I am sorry that the Famine Relief Committee do not feel that their arguments have really been met. But I am afraid that this is inevitable. I hope you will not mind my saying that most members of the Committee appear to have concentrated their attention purely on the relief aspect of this question, without any regard to the long-term consequences of what they are trying to do. We, on our side, must be governed by the paramount necessity of maintaining an effective blockade. I quite see your distinction between a special concession for women and children and a general feeding scheme. The difference, however, is one of degree, rather than of kind.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd) D.M.Foot

32.

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 1768

30 JAN 1943

26

Registry Number W 1768/4/49

FROM Bishop of Chichester.

to Secretary of State. *No.*

Dated 22nd Jan: 1943

Received in Registry 30th Jan: 1943

W. Co-ordination.

Relief for children in France.

Outlines a scheme for relief of children in France put forward by Mr. Howard Kerschner to the Famine Relief Committee. Requests that this scheme may be considered.

Last Paper.

W 1726 (W1082)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See within

EHC 1/2

(Action completed.)

6/2/43

(Index.)

AWF 30/3/43

Next Paper.

(W1807)

Minutes.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

The despatch of even one token shipment to France under present conditions would involve a modification of our blockade policy which as explained in Mr. Maclean's minute on W 60 82 cannot even be considered until a reply has been received to the Prime Minister's last telegram to the President.

The only course open to us at present, I submit, is to ask the Prime Minister to press for an early reply.

J. H. Roupell.

27th January, 1943.

W. Strang
27/1.

I want to discuss this subject at an early date.

Mr Butler
Sir O. Scott.

I don't think I could add anything to what Mr Butler covered in the 10th May.

27 Jan 27

Please see ✠ W 1437 (behind). Would either

28

Either of you wish to be present when the S of S. is ready to discuss this?
Meanwhile the Private Secy at no. 10. has confirmed again today that no reply has come for the President. J.M. Monteith 28/1

The American aspect is I think as follows. The U.S. Government adopted in 1940 the principle that responsibility for feeding occupied territories rested entirely upon the occupying Power. They adopted this principle in the teeth of a campaign sponsored by Mr. Hoover for feeding either the civilian population or children in certain of the occupied territories, and H.M.G. were much relieved when they took this firm line.

If the U.S. Government changed their attitude, this would be in a sense a victory for Mr. Hoover and his Republican friends.

Both the above points ~~suggest that it would be a pity for us to take~~ are 'pro tanto' considerations against our taking the initiative in breaking a unity of policy that we have established with the U.S. Government.

I do not think that American opinion will bring the pressure on President Roosevelt to change his policy that is liable to be brought upon us, because (1) Europe is further from the Americans than it is from us; (2) when once Americans have got into a show they favour being tough, and last but not least (3) Americans are expecting their forces and ours to invade the ~~enslaved~~ continent in the course of this year, bringing food relief for the enslaved territories with them. They know too that shortage of shipping is one of our great obstacles. I am inclined to think that in American eyes 'it would not make sense' if we began to use shipping for feeding these territories a few months or perhaps only weeks in advance of the liberating armies. I do not think therefore that internal political con-/

probably even a stupid toughness;

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

considerations are likely to make President Roosevelt or the U.S. Government change their policy. A new factor however is the appointment of Governor Lehmann, who is a sound Democrat and close personal friend of the President. If it is true, as Washington telegram No.397 suggests, that he is being influenced by Mr. Hoover on the need for a change of policy, this might move the President. In this case I think that in view of the Prime Minister's message to him and Prof. Noel Hall's close contacts with Mr. Acheson we shall be informed of this before the U.S. Government make any sudden and embarrassing change.

On top of the Norwegian aspect there, I think, his personal feelings are engaged,

Apart from the above, if we, as the most responsible trustee for Europe, felt that a change of policy was essential, I think that we could press this strongly on the U.S. Government without damage to Anglo-American relations, provided that our case was well presented and took full account of the military situation.

I would be glad to be present at any discussion with the Secretary of State though I doubt if I cd. add much to the above.

RAB
25/7

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

I would wish say "was based primarily on the military situation"

RAB

CHICHESTER 2161

THE PALACE,
CHICHESTER.

ACKNOWLEDGED
25.1.43

22nd January, 1943

W 1768

30 JAN 1943

Dear Mr Eden,

I hope you will allow me to write to you about a simple and definite scheme for continuing the help to children in certain areas in France, which was put before the Famine Relief Committee at its meeting under my chairmanship a few days ago, by Mr Howard Kershner, and has since been stated with some fulness in the columns of The Times (January 20th) and the Sunday Times (January 17th).

As I think you know, he was in France up till last August, directing a scheme for the American Friends Service Council, which brought help to some 85,000 children. The supplies were obtained chiefly within the blockade area, and the U.S. Treasury allowed the necessary transfer of funds. These sources of supply are now closed, and unless new stocks of food are allowed in from America this beneficent help to the children of France will come to an end, with all the sorrow and disillusionment that this will cause among the people there.

Mr Kershner informed us that there are 9 American members of his organisation still there, and that about 140 dependable neutrals trained by him are prepared to carry on with the feeding scheme for 100,000 children, if supplies can be allowed to enter France from America. Mr Kershner proposes

W 1768

to take a shipment of 3,000 tons of dried vegetables and 100 tons of rat to Marseilles and personally deliver it to his staff of workers who would meet him on board the ship. He proposes to obtain a Swedish ship to carry the consignment from America.

I should like to point out that if this proposal were accepted by the British Government, one of three things would result :-

(1) Germany might refuse safe conduct, in which event we should be in a very strong position to tell the peoples of the occupied countries by radio that we were prepared to send food to them but that Germany would not allow it. This would give us great psychological advantage.

(2) Although the Germans have never seized any of the food which this organisation has distributed, it is theoretically possible that they might do so in this case. If so, we should be in an even stronger psychological position to tell the peoples of all the occupied countries that we were prepared to feed them, and had in fact sent the first ship load, but that the authorities had seized it. You will agree, I think, that this very important advantage would far outweigh the loss of 3,000 tons of food.

(3) It is most probable that the food could be taken to Marseilles by Mr Kershner and delivered to his staff there. The knowledge of the arrival of this food would immediately go all over France through the channels that have been established during the past years, and the gratitude and thankfulness of the French people for this gesture of continuing friendship would be very great.

You will appreciate, I feel sure, the very great shock it will be to the French people if this work, which has been continued for so long, is now abandoned, and the French people led to believe that the democracies no longer care for their children. It is important to avoid the mental and physical depression that would result from such a blow.

We believe that an effective means of shortening the war is to restore the courage and strength of the people in the occupied countries. The presence of food in these countries, in substantial amounts for their children, would reanimate these people to the point where they might very well become a very important, if not the most important, factor in throwing out their conquerors. It would certainly be worth many divisions and from a military point of view General de Gaulle has stated that he is in favour of the scheme as

outlined.

The Famine Relief Committee earnestly hopes that you will give this practical scheme your attention.

Yours sincerely,

George Cicetti.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Lord Selborne for his information.

33

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 1807

1 FEB 1943

34

Registry Number W 1807/4/49.

FROM Mr. Kerschner, (communicated)

No.

Dated 27th Jan., 1943.

Received in Registry 1st Jan., 1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Relief for France.

Transmits copy of memorandum giving reasons why food should be sent to France.

Last Paper.

(W1768)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See Mr Lamford's minute written.

Nothing more can be done until after the suggested meeting.

French / Dept
N. A. / W.S.
12/2

9/2.

3/2

E. E. Cross.
2/2.

W. M. Dingdale. 8/2.

(Action completed.)

22/2/43

(Index.)

30/3/43

Next Paper.

W1900
(W1807)

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

35

Mr Bridges
& Eady.

Mr Compton.

The W 1807

Board to... FEB 1943

a meeting next
week about
the Steel question
of relief to Dumping
Countries. Mean-
while you may
like to see this
note dictd by
Mr Kirschner
yesterday.

28/Jan

W 1807
FEB 1943

Copy of Mr Kirkpatrick's letter of 28 Jan 36

STRATEGY.

1. There are still 140 well-trained, dependable, non-American workers in Southern France. Most of them have been in the employ of the International Commission for Refugee Children and since June 1940, of the American Friends' Service Committee for as much as five years. Since the Armistice a part of their activities have been to help escaped British soldiers. You could ask Captain Whitney Straight or Mr. Joe Enoch, two brave British lads whom we assisted, whether or not these relief workers are performing useful service. Unless we get food to them their ability to continue working will be seriously undermined and the force will gradually disintegrate. What better thing could be done than to keep them where they are and put into their hands means of giving moral courage, friendship and material assistance to at least some of the friendly people in Southern France? The colonies of children are under their care, the equipment of the school canteens is under their supervision. If we could send them some food, they are in a position to see that every mouthful goes to the children for whom it is intended and would be able to continue their useful work as a moral encouragement to the whole population. In view of impending events next spring or summer, it would seem most useful to have these people stay where they are and to put into their hands facilities with which to carry on their work.

2. It would be impossible to measure the value of the goodwill accumulated in Southern France as a result of the work done there since 1940. Many thousands of letters prove it, columns of newspaper publicity have testified to it. Every person in France knows it and is grateful. If the 100,000 children that have been fed are now abandoned, it will not only be cruel but will be a violent shock to a friendly people who trust our goodwill towards them and are eager for the day when they can show how grateful they are. Make no mistake about it, they will prove that some day if they have any strength left and if the shock of abandoning their children to starvation is not too great for human nature to stand.

3. Only yesterday 250 persons were shot in Marseille for resisting the enemy. If they could do this in their weakened physical condition, what would they not do if you restored their strength and courage by sending them some

food. Germany is now short of man-power, the occupying forces in many countries are much smaller than formerly. The time is probably approaching when, if you re-animate the courage and strength of the people of the occupied countries by giving them food, they would be able to make an enormous contribution towards driving the Germans out. Personally I would consider putting food into the stomachs of the people of France more useful than ten divisions. I know the temper of these people; I know the diligence with which they have hidden such arms as they could find; I know what they intend to do when the time comes and I think we are wasting a most precious asset in not helping to keep them in condition to do it.

4. The man whose children are starving will work for the Germans, but if his children are not hungry, he will not only refuse to work for them but will be an active saboteur and revolutionist. I am told that Germany must feed the people of these countries because she wants their industrial contribution. I reply that she is now giving the heavy workers 2300 calories a day, while large categories of women and children and old people are starving on 700 to 900 daily.

5. If it is Germany's deliberate purpose to destroy a large part of the population of the occupied countries, are we not defeating Hitler's purpose if we prevent him from so doing?

6. If Hitler feeds his own people well, as he is doing, and if he decimates the other peoples of Europe by starvation and disease, no matter what the peace, a strong German people will start after the war in a far stronger position than other European countries.

7. What hope will there be for satisfactory re-construction if the democratic, freedom-loving people are allowed to perish while the totalitarians are being fed?

8. The Famine Relief Committee is urging token shipments of milk and vitamins to children in Belgium, Holland, Norway and France. It has also been proposed to send 3000 tons of food to Marseille, enough for 100,000 children another year. Money and food are available in America. It could be transported in neutral ships not available for the war effort. The International

Red Cross will guarantee supervision and in the case of France, the 140 workers mentioned above are still there, able to carry on their devoted service. What better preparation for the great day!

With reference to this shipment to France, it could be said that it is permitted in order to continue long-existing work, but that a careful study of results must be made before any decision could be taken with reference to any further feeding. With reference to this shipment to Marseille, one of three things could happen -

a) The Germans might refuse safe conduct. In this case, by radio the people could be informed that the Allied Governments are ready to feed them but that the Germans would not permit it. This would give us an immense psychological advantage.

b) The Germans might take the food after it arrived. They never have and they probably would not, but theoretically they might. In that case, by radio we could tell the people of all occupied countries that we are ready to feed them and had in fact sent the first shipment, but that their masters took it. Consider the enormous psychological advantage of being in this position.

c) What would most likely happen would be that the food would arrive and would be given to the children for whom sent. We would thus be saving 100,000 children from the general wreck, would be showing the people of our friendly interest in them and helping to keep up their courage.

These psychological matters are of great importance, for one can scarcely realise the awful barrage against us that the people on the Continent have to live through. I have lived there most of the time since the Armistice. I know the people are on our side and will help, but there is a limit to how much propaganda they can live through and still love us, if we are doing nothing to show them that we appreciate their friendship. What I have proposed is in my judgment a shrewd move to help the Allied cause.

9. I do not agree with the argument which the authorities put forth that if we begin to send food, we will be drawn deeper and deeper under the burden of feeding the people of occupied countries. We could stop at any time and by radio tell the people why the enemy had made it necessary for us to stop. But if we went on and sent more and more food, the gratitude of the people and their

returning strength would supply the most formidable opposition to the Germans. Indeed, they might find the strength and courage to drive them out. Certainly the help they would render to Allied re-occupation would be of the utmost importance. It would, in my opinion, be impossible to over-estimate the importance to the Allied cause of the wave of optimism and courage that would galvanise the people of the occupied countries if we were to send them important quantities of food. Hungry men are listless and inactive, but fill their stomachs and they will rise in fury against their conquerors. What better preparation for the campaign of next spring and summer?

36.

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 1926 40

3 FEB 1943

Registry Number } W 1926/4/49

FROM Times (extract)

No.

Dated 29th Jan.,

Received in Registry } 3rd Feb., 1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for occupied Europe.

Letter from the Famine Relief Committee giving details of its scheme for relief for children, expectant and nursing mothers and invalids in Belgium and Greece, also letter from Mr. Nolson, M.P. regarding relief for occupied Europe.

Last Paper.

W1906 (W1900)

References.

(Minutes.)

Central Dept
MAPS
11/2

7/2

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
12/2/43	Act 26/7

Next Paper.

W1972.

24794 12/42 F.O.P.

CUTTING FROM "THE TIMES" OF JANUARY 29th 1943.

W 1926
3 FEB 1943

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RELIEF IN EUROPE

OUTLINE OF THE PLAN

THE CHILDREN'S NEED

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—In view of the misconception evident in the minds of some of your readers we consider it opportune to outline the scheme which the Famine Relief Committee, on the recommendation of its medical and other technical advisers, has submitted to the Government for the relief of children up to 16 years in Belgium, together with nursing and expectant mothers and sufferers from deficiency diseases. This scheme is also intended to apply to children, and similar categories, in Greece.

The scheme is deliberately limited to the special categories, with a particular concern for children. It proposes the provision of 2,000 tons a month of vitamin capsules and dried milk, to be brought from America in neutral shipping, at the cost of the Belgian Government. The amount has been calculated on the known average of children under 16 and expectant and nursing mothers a 1,000,000 inhabitants in each country, together with an estimated number of people suffering from diseases due to famine conditions. The amount of extra calories daily a person is 264, which seems negligible, but is of real benefit when, as in Belgium, the daily intake is stated to be round about 800 to 900 calories instead of the normal 2,700 for many classes of the population. While we are assured that for these small quantities neutral shipping is available, we are fully aware that difficulties of shipping and control would preclude large-scale feeding of the civilian populations of occupied countries; but the example of controlled food relief in Greece, where the representatives of the International Red Cross and the Swedish Red Cross are able to maintain it, strengthens our conviction that the schemes we propose are capable of being put into effect without benefit to the enemy or hindrance of the war effort. The Famine Relief Committee therefore asks for navicerts to enable these 2,000 tons to be sent month by month. The plea made by Mr. Howard Kershner in *The Times* for a trial shipment of 3,000 tons of food to Marseilles, in order to continue, for another year, the help already given for two years to 100,000 children in the South of France, has the full support of the Famine Relief Committee. Here, again, all that is wanted is permission to send it.

To what extent the amount of assistance proposed for the children of these countries will save them from disease we do not know. What we do know is the value of such evidence to the people in these oppressed countries that their friends and allies realize what is being endured and are anxious to do what they can to help.

Yours faithfully,

GEORGE CICESTR: Chairman; WILLIAM PATON, Vice-Chairman; NEVILLE LYTTON, Hon. Treasurer, Famine Relief Committee.

67, Brook Street, W.1, Jan. 27.

Sir,—Surely no one need be "bewildered" as Professor Young suggests by the problem of relief to children in occupied Europe. It is a controversy between those of us who reluctantly feel that total war implies total blockade and humanitarians each of whom wishes to relax it in favour of the objects of his special solicitude.

The whole of Europe is within the German economic system. Belgian industry is now in double harness with the Ruhr to drag the German war chariot. It is estimated that 400,000 tons of cereals have been sent by Germany into Belgium since our Government rejected Mr. Hoover's offer in June, 1941, to undertake relief in that country. The total food allowance a Belgian receives now is approximately the same as he had in the last war when Mr. Hoover was sending relief. Therefore now the Germans are supplying as much as they plus Mr. Hoover supplied in 1917. Mr. Hoover was, therefore, then relieving the German food supplies to the exact extent that he was relieving the Belgians, and we do not intend that that shall happen again.

Germany can benefit from relief in four ways:—(1) By taking for herself the food intended for the children; (2) by taking a correspondingly larger share of the country's domestic production; (3) by reducing the amount of food she sends to the occupied country; (4) by feeding her army of occupation on the food produced by that country. All that Mr. Kershner can say is that the Germans have not so far acted as in (1). He has indeed admitted that Germany was taking food from unoccupied France, but not up to the maximum of her armistice "entitlement" because she could not get it. Whatever France received in relief would clearly increase the amount available for export which Germany would take.

If we accept responsibility for relieving any starving people in occupied countries, does that not encourage the Germans to starve them as a deliberate policy? Lord Noel-Buxton refers to hunger in Norway; this is the result of the exchange of much Norwegian fish oil for a lesser quantity of German cereals. How can we relieve Norway without relieving Germany as long as this trade continues? We are blockading the fortress of Europe, and we cannot distinguish between the captors and the captives, the oppressors and the oppressed. Any food admitted to the beleaguered fortress assists the garrison. It is sad that children should be starved by our blockade or killed by our bombs, but total war which is being waged against us is not a pretty thing.

Your obedient servant,

HUGH MOLSON.

House of Commons, Jan. 28.

35

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 1906

2 FEB 1943

42

Registry Number W 1906/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare

No. (Communicated) T 572 T 550/29

Dated

Received in Registry 2nd Feb: 1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Dettol for Belgian prisoners of war.

Transmits copy of letter from Mr. Quennell (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Lady Enid Browne (British Red Cross) of January 29th stating that there is no objection to 700 small bottles of Dettol being sent to Belgian prisoners of war.

It has been decided that there is no objection in blockade grounds to the despatch of fittings for temporary hospitals to be erected in Greece but enquires whether some of these articles could not be obtained in Switzerland.

Last Paper.

W1905

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

NOTES 7/-

Central / D.S.L. 9/2.

Sanitary Depts

E.W. 4/2

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
10/2/43	Act 24/7

Next Paper.

W1926.

24794 12/42 F.O.P.

43

Copy to: E. Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W. 1.

Ref: T.572
T.550/29

29th January, 1943.

W 1906
2 FEB 1943

Thank you for your letter of January 27th, enclosing a copy of your letter to the Ministry of Supply on the subject of 700 small bottles of Dettol for Belgian prisoners of war. So far as this Ministry is concerned, there is no objection to the goods being forwarded.

I am also glad to be able to reassure you on a second point, originally raised some time ago. You may remember receiving a letter from Mr. Camps, dated December 12th, about a request for fittings for temporary hospitals to be erected in Greece. It has now been decided that there is no objection on blockade grounds to the despatch of these fittings: but we should like to know whether some of the articles mentioned could not be obtained in Switzerland. No doubt you will be taking the matter up with the Greek Red Cross.

Yours sincerely,

Lady Enid Browne,
Foreign Relations Department,
British Red Cross Society,
Clarence House,
St. James's,
LONDON. S.W.1.

34

1943

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 1900

2 FEB 1943

44

Registry Number } W 1900/4/49

FROM Mr. Corbett-Palmer (Ministry of Economic Warfare.

No.

Dated

Received in Registry } 2nd Feb:1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Relief for occupied Europe.

Transmits a copy of letter from Dr. Paton (World Council of Churches) to Mr. Foot (Ministry of Economic Warfare) of January 28th commenting on Mr. Foot's reply on the points raised by Dr. Van Dusen about relief for occupied Europe.

Last Paper.

W1807. (W1726)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See minute within

K.E.C. 5/2

(Action completed.)

ME 8/2/43

(Index.)

AWF 30/3/43

Next Paper.

W1906.

TELEPHONE:
GROSVENOR 4060.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE, W.1.

45

Ref: W 1900/30/4/69

W 1900

2 FEB 1943

With Mr. C.H. Corbett-Palmer's

compliments.

General Dept

I send you before receipt of the letter to which this is the reply. Mr. W. proposes to draft an answer to this one, let us see it next week

P.G. 29/.

COPY

World Council of Churches,
Edinburgh House,
2, Eaton Gate,
London, S.W.1.

46

WP/SM.

January 28th, 1943.

D.M.Foot, Esq., M.P.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House, W.1.

Dear Mr. Foot,

Thank you very much for your letter. I was very sorry to hear from your secretary that you had been ill and very much hope that you are now better. It is a very awkward time at which to be away from one's work.

I sent you a copy of Dr. Van Dusen's letter to me because I knew that you were aware, as I am, of his extreme cordiality towards this country and I thought it important for you to know that these statements are being made and believed in America. On the Norwegian sailors question I have heard a possible explanation, though on rather indefinite authority. The story was that Norwegian sailors had got hold of chocolate on their voyages and insisted on its being made available to children in Norway. That the Belgian authorities here are desperately anxious about the situation in Belgium is, of course, not open to doubt. It would be difficult to exaggerate the concern which they feel.

I am very glad to have your definite denial that the Greek relief scheme was due to pressure brought to bear by Turkey. I have heard from others besides Van Dusen that this is being stated in America and I will communicate to him your explicit denial.

You are undoubtedly right in pointing to certain confusion in the latter part of Dr. Van Dusen's letter. I can only accept responsibility for the project put forward by the Famine Relief Committee here, of which I am vice-chairman. This specifies, as you know, a scheme confined to the provision of vitamins and milk products for nursing and expectant mothers, invalids and children. It applies to Greece in so far as the provision of one hundred tons of powdered milk a month is wholly inadequate to the gravity of the need. It applies to Belgium as we have gone on the plan of drawing attention to those areas in which we believe the need to be greatest. I would only add that the information that comes in steadily about Belgium goes to show a really desperate and tragic position.

I therefore cannot quite see what is the weight of your arguments about Belgium. You speak of large-scale industries being harnessed to the German war machine. We do not suggest the feeding of industrial workers.

We/

We suggest the provision of vitamins and powdered milk for children under sixteen, nursing and expectant mothers. If I may say so, your argument does reinforce in my mind the view which our interview with Lord Selborne, yourself and your colleagues very much left with me, that the arguments advanced in reply to our contentions are really arguments in defence of a general blockade policy which we do not question. We offer some evidence to show that the extremely modest restricted scheme prepared by our committee would not help the German war effort, and that it would greatly help the morale in these countries. It would not help the German war effort for two reasons; if they were seized, the supply could immediately be stopped with good results on propaganda; and all the evidence available, e.g., in relation to Greece and the Portuguese supplies to Belgium, suggest that in fact supplies of this kind are not taken by the Germans. (b) The further reason why it would not help Germany's war economy is that the substances proposed to be sent are not those which Germany is now sending. There would, therefore, be no relief to the German stocks and no relief to German transport.

I hesitate, in discussing this matter in public, to stress too much the question of morale, lest one should get the impression - which I think would be wholly false - that the morale of these countries is tottering. I have never ceased to say, and I believe it, that the people of these countries know perfectly well to whom they owe their sufferings. At the same time one cannot I think brush aside the evidence of all the Belgians one knows than an action, even on so modest a scale, would be of real benefit to the preservation of the life of children, and in doing so would be of much greater value in sustaining morale than almost anything else we can do.

I must therefore venture to say that I do not think that anything that has been yet said by either the Ministry of Economic Warfare or the Foreign Office seems to us (and we are really not unreasonable people) a genuine answer. There are no doubt members of our committee whose minds are given over completely to the question of relief. There are others of us who are quite clear that the blockade instrument is necessary in total war, and who have no sympathy with any movement which by implication makes food relief a kind of alternative to beating the Germans. Because we have striven for this position we feel that the distinctive case that we have sought to make ought to be met rather more definitely than it has so far been.

Let me say again that I do hope you will completely recover from your illness.

Yours very sincerely,

(sd) W. Paton

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1943

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

48

W 1972

3 FEB 1943

Registry Number W 1972/4/49

FROM Treasury (communicated)

No.

Dated 1st Feb.

Received in Registry 3rd Feb., 1943

W: Co-ordination

Child evacuation scheme.

Transmits a copy of letter from Mr. Fraser (Treasury) to Mr. Quennell (Ministry of Economic Warfare) of 1st February regarding financial responsibility for the proposed children evacuation scheme.

Last Paper.

W1926 (W115-0)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See within copy of letter from Mr. Quennell (M.E.W.) to Mr. Fraser (Treasury) Feb 3rd.

See within copy of tel to Washington. No 405 Confd Feb 1st

E.E.C. 1/2

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
11/2/43	30/3/43

Next Paper.

(W5996)

W2013.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF MR. W. L. FRASER.

49

W 1972
3 FEB 1943

1st February, 1943.

Dear Quennell,

I wanted to write a word to you regarding the scheme for the removal of a number of Allied children, mostly Belgians, to Switzerland, for it seems to me that there may be a danger of getting off on the wrong foot in this matter.

As you probably know, my main pre-occupation here is to deal with the Allies from the financial angle, and all I learn in this connection makes me quite sure that if any evacuation of children is to take place from e.g. Belgium, the Government concerned at present domiciled in London will not only wish to pay the costs but should do so in view of its financial position. It, therefore, follows that any kudos which there may be as a result of the scheme will go to the Governments concerned.

I have had no direct connection with any Allied Government on this matter but I feel pretty certain that the above view will prevail with them. The fact that it may be difficult for them to obtain Swiss francs is, I suggest, beside the point.

The real point is, is it really for H.M.G. to appear as the protagonist in this affair, and assume a lot of responsibility, when payment will be made, and kudos claimed, by the Allied Governments?

I am sending a copy of this letter to Crowe at the Foreign Office.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd) W. L. Fraser.

P. Quennell, Esq.
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

T.550/29/E.

Copy to E.Crowe,Esq., Foreign Office.

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square W.1.

3rd February 1943.

INDEXED W 1972/4/49.

Thank you for your letter of February 1st, regarding the scheme for the evacuation of Allied children.

You may be relieved to hear that, after a meeting attended by Mynors some days ago, a telegram was sent to Washington, in which it wasmade quite clear that financial responsibility would fall upon the Allied governments. In the first draft this point was dealt with less explicitly; but that particular paragraph at Mynor's suggestion was subsequently much strengthened. A copy of the telegram has already reached him or will reach him very shortly.

In your penultimate paragraph you raise a question as to whether H.M.G. should appear as protagonist in this affair. I imagine that it is necessary for them or the United States Government to do so, insofar as someone must take a lead if the scheme is to be put into operation.

R Vansittart

W.L.Frazer,Esq.,
Treasury Chambers,
Gt.George Street,
S.W.1.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

51

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

(T 550/18/28)

1972 / 4 / 49

[CYPHER]

LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON

No. 405 Arfar
1st February, 1943

D. 4.40 a.m. 2nd February, 1943

Repeated to Berne No. 522 Arfar

ddddddd

My telegram No. 241 to Berne [Arfar of 15th January: evacuation of children from occupied countries to Switzerland].

1. Scheme clearly cannot be discussed in detail at Berne or at all with Allied Governments until President has replied to Prime Minister's message of 1st January. We have nevertheless been considering practical arrangements and should like you to discuss them with United States authorities on the assumption that the scheme will be approved by the President in principle.

2. Instructions we should then suggest sending to Berne, after seeking concurrence in principle of Belgian Government, which is Allied Government chiefly concerned, are as follows:-

(a) Plans should be made to receive in Switzerland an eventual total of about 100,000 children to be drawn gradually according to need and transport possibilities from all occupied countries except Denmark and Norway, the latter country being covered by evacuation to Sweden. Greatest number should come from Belgium, as worst off accessible country except Greece, which is being relieved direct. (If we were pressed to do so we should be willing to include French children).

(b) Swiss Government should be invited to undertake entire operation of housing clothing and feeding children and to submit total cost to British Government. While Swiss Government might be willing to bear part of cost (e.g. for accommodation) themselves, incidence of the remainder would have to be discussed between His Majesty's Government and Allied Governments. It must however be made clear that in view of difficulty of obtaining Swiss francs, His Majesty's Government could not proceed with this scheme on any basis which did not provide for full cover by the Allied Governments concerned on any foreign exchange commitment. As far as we can see this could only be secured if the Allied

M. FILE No. T 550/19/28
COPY FOR Sec. Foreign Office
DATE 4/2/43

Copy also sent to
Treasury
M/W/T
Min of Food
Min of Supply

Governments/

Governments concerned made arrangements themselves with the Swiss Government for procuring necessary francs, not against sterling and not against any deposit of gold falling within the scope of the proposed Anglo-Swiss financial agreement. Similar considerations would apply if in the event other difficult foreign currencies are required to any material extent, e.g. for shipping or the purchase of supplies.

(c) We estimate that 100,000 children would require approximately 50,000 tons of foodstuffs and 1,000 tons of clothing and footwear a year. Any part of these goods that would need to be imported through the blockade would not be counted against Swiss quotas. Part of foodstuffs such as milk, cheese and vegetables should be obtained in Switzerland itself, and in such cases we could agree to certain compensatory imports outside the quotas, e.g. fodder against milk. As regards clothing, raw materials should be imported into Switzerland rather than finished goods, and should be made up locally. All purchases made from outside the blockade would be undertaken by the Swiss except purchases of such goods as are normally bought for the Swiss by British supply departments.

(d) Scheme would be put to German and Italian Governments by the Swiss Government, who should also be invited to undertake the allocation and collection of the children in the occupied countries in such a way as to ensure impartial selection. For this purpose we suggest they should adopt health as sole criterion of priority i.e. the children most under-nourished or most prone to tuberculosis etc., should be chosen. Some such principle is essential if we are to avoid pro-German families getting priority. For the same reason it is desirable that Swiss Government as distinct from any Red Cross organisation should have responsibility for selection.

3. If scheme is approved in principle by the President and by Belgian Government we hope that United States Government will instruct their Minister in Berne to concertwith His Majesty's Minister the approach to Swiss Government.

O.T.P.

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1943

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 2013

4 FEB 1943

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Registry Number W 2013/4/49

FROM Mr.Donnan, (U.K.C.C.) to Mr.Maclean

No. HHD/OMC.

Dated 1st Feb.,1943.

Received in Registry 4th Feb.,1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Last Paper.

W1972 (W1230/62/49)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/Mr. Donnan (U.K.C.C.) from Mr. Crowe 7.2.43

& Mr. Campbell (M.E.W.) Mr. Davidson (Treasury) 9.2.43.

Next Paper.

(W 3005)

W2099.

Relief for Yugoslavia.

Encloses a copy of telegram from Angora No.18 Econ of the 28th January regarding purchases in Turkey of goods destined for Yugoslav relief. If Foreign Office and other departments agree that the foodstuffs may be supplied from Turkey to Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation would be prepared to handle the business in the same way as they did for Greek relief.

(Minutes.)

See M.E.W.'s Tel No 78 Angora to Ankara.

I understand that M.E.W. are consulting W'hall about this.

Reply to Mr Donnan herewith

Southern Dept WR 10/2 E.C. 7/2

Copy to Mr Campbell (M.E.W.)
Mr Davidson (Treasury)

See within copy of tel to W'hall No 479 Angora Feb 5
" " " " to Angora No 78 Angora Feb 5

E.C. 15/2

See within copy of tel to W'hall No 995 Angora March 12.

E.C. 14/3

(Action completed.) Wb 11/2 Wb 22/2/43 4^3

(Index.) AEH 26/2.

24794 12/42 F.O.P.

Sulta 1 and Mosul pp S4

Telephone:
AVENUE 5011.

Telegrams:
ENCOMIUM, FEN, LONDON.

UNITED KINGDOM COMMERCIAL CORPORATION LTD.,

PLANTATION HOUSE,
FENCHURCH STREET.
LONDON, E.C.3.

W 2013
4 FEB 1943

1st February, 1943.

Ref. HAD/OMC.

Dear Maclean,

.... I am enclosing herewith a copy of Encom 18 from Ankara which we have just received and which is self-explanatory.

I do not know what the policy of H.M.G. is with regard to relief for Yugoslavia, and we ourselves are not particularly anxious to assume new responsibilities of the nature proposed. However, if you and the other Departments agree that the foodstuffs may be supplied from Turkey to Yugoslavia, we would be prepared to handle the business in the same way as we did the relief to Greece.

I am sending copies of this letter, together with a copy of the cable for easy reference, to Davidson at the Treasury and Camps at the M.E.W. and shall be grateful to have your decision.

Yours sincerely,

H.A. Donman

Donman.

D. Maclean, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall,
LONDON, S.W.1.

55

[CYPHER] ENCOM.

FROM ANGORA TO UNITED KINGDOM COMMERCIAL CORPORATION (LONDON).

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen.
No. 18 Encom. D. 2. 20 a.m. 31st January, 1943.
29th January, 1943. R. 4. 50 p.m. 31st January, 1943.

W W W W W

General.

Yugoslav Relief.

Yugoslav Ambassador has asked me to commence purchases of goods destined for Yugoslav relief and approved by Turkish authorities.

2. First purchase would consist of approximately 1,000 tons of assorted foodstuffs and would be held in our depots until final arrangements and authority for despatch are given.

3. We are examining the possibilities and cost, of which I will inform you. Purchases would be made as in the case of Greek relief through Ticaret Ajasi.[sic]

4. Payments to be made by me in Turkish lira, counter value to be settled by Yugoslav Government in London.

5. Failing satisfactory transit and distributive arrangements goods would be re-sold and any loss that might arise would be for account of Yugoslav Government.

6. Have I your permission to proceed with the purchases?

O.T.P.

Copy,

(W 2013/4/49).

56

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

February 5th, 1943.

Dear Donnan,

I have taken over from Maclean the question of relief supplies and am, therefore, writing in answer to your letter HAD/OMC of February 1st.

As far as the Foreign Office is concerned there is no objection to the U.K.C.C. acting as buying agents for the Yugoslav Government to purchase supplies for relief in Yugoslavia. Camps and Davidson, to whom I am sending a copy of this letter, will doubtless reply to you on the points which concern their Departments.

(Signed) E.E. CROWE.

H.A. Donnan, Esq.,
United Kingdom Commercial Corporation. Ltd.,
Plantation House,
Fenchurch Street,
E.C.3.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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M.E.W. FILE No. T550/12
COPY FOR E.E. Crouse Esq
Date 8/2/43

57

Copies also sent to
T.550/25. D Davidson Esq F.O.
[CYPHER]. H A Donnan Esq U.K.C.C.

LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 479. ARFAR.

D. 7.30 p.m. February 6th, 1943.

February 5th, 1943.

[ND

yyyyyy

My telegram No. 84 [ARFAR of January 9th: Yugoslav relief purchases in Turkey] and our letter T550/25 of October 30th.

This is to warn you that Yugoslavs are now trying to buy 1,000 tons of foodstuffs in Turkey through United Kingdom Commercial Corporation.

2. We await a list of the goods proposed and meanwhile have not of course assumed a specific commitment. But we are as you know commited in principle if the goods prove to be in order and must therefore count on United States concurrence over transfer of funds.

3. While we cannot escape from the individual commitment, we appreciate that Turkish currency may be less plentiful in the future, and should have to explain to the Yugoslavs that further transactions of the kind may not be possible.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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W 2013/4/49

T550/25

[Cypher]

INDEXED

LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO ANGORA.

No.78 ARFAR. D. 11.35 p.m. 6th February, 1943.
5th February, 1943.

C C C

W 2013

Your telegram No.18 [Encom of January 31st: Yugoslav relief from Turkey].

Before approving purchases for Yugoslav relief please let us have detailed list of goods it is proposed to buy with consent of Turkish Government: as we must be sure that none of these goods is of a type which we cannot allow.

2. For your own information the question of payment here by Yugoslavs is likely to be somewhat complicated, and will be examined meanwhile.

3. Clearly you should not begin purchasing until these two points are settled.

OTP

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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T. 550/25

[CYPHER] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 995 ARFAR. D. 4.55 a.m. 13th March, 1943.
12th March, 1943.

£ £ £

Your telegram No. 875 [Arfar of March 8th: Yugoslav purchases in Turkey].

Please explain financial transaction as follows to the State Department. Goods would be purchased in Turkey by United Kingdom Commercial Corporation. Yugoslavs would re-imburse United Kingdom Commercial Corporation here in sterling acquired from the Treasury against dollars. No special release of dollars, therefore, of the kind the State Department seems to contemplate, would be involved. Yugoslavs normally buy from us with dollars all the sterling they need for all their various purposes, not only for relief, dollars being the only form of currency that they possess. We only felt obliged to mention this particular transaction to United States because it could be interpreted as indirectly a dollar expenditure on relief.

2. Yugoslavs wish to purchase goods such as salt port, salt and dried fish, olives, oil soap, figs to the value of £100,000 sterling. We have no objection on principle to any of these commodities, since all are indigenous to Turkey: but in practice it is extremely doubtful what quantities of foodstuffs Turkish authorities will allow to leave the country, and most unlikely that the full amount can be spent. We cannot now give further details of the goods it is proposed to buy, as it will be necessary for United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, when or if they receive our approval in principle, to go round making purchases whenever an opportunity occurs. Final list would of course have to be approved here. The intention is apparently that if goods are bought and then cannot be transported, or licensed for export from Turkey, United Kingdom Commercial Corporation should re-sell locally and Yugoslavs bear any loss incurred.

M.E.W. FILE No. T 550/25
COPY FOR E E Grove Esq
DATE 17/3/43.
Copy sent Fraser.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 2099

5 FEB 1943

60

Registry Number W 2099/4/49

FROM Parliamentary Question (Mr. Lipson).

No.

Dated 3rd Feb.1943

Received in Registry 5th Feb.1943

W : Co-ordination.

Food supplies for occupied countries

Mr. Lipson asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare whether His Majesty's Government would follow the precedent set in the case of Greece and allow a limited amount of food to be sent to occupied countries for distribution among the child population. Mr. Foot replied that the Greek relief scheme was a wholly exceptional measure, taken in viewof the unprecedented conditions in that country.

Last Paper.

W 2013.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

D.D.I. 11/2.
Southern
A.U. 11/2
Central
depts
Northern
Spare.
16 Feb.

L.C. 9/2

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
17/2/43	Ath 26/2

Next Paper.

W 2101/

24794 12/42 F.O.P.

GENERAL.

61

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION.

W 2099

5 FEB 1943

* 68. Mr. Lipson,—To ask the Prime Minister, if His Majesty's Government will follow the precedent set in the case of Greece and allow a limited amount of food to be sent to the conquered countries of Europe under Nazi domination for distribution, under proper safeguards, among the child population. 2nd. Sitting Day after 31st Jan.

IN).

Being transferred by No. 10 to R.E.W.

F.O. ARE NOT ASKED TO ADVISE

VP906

ANSWERED 3 FEB 1943

REPLY ATTACHED.

Library Pl. attach reply

E.L.E. 5/2

6.2

3 FEB 1943

ENEMY-OCCUPIED COUNTRIES (FOOD SUPPLIES)

Mr. Lipson asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare whether His Majesty's Government will follow the precedent set in the case of Greece and allow a limited amount of food to be sent to the conquered countries of Europe under Nazi domination for distribution, under proper safeguards, among the child population?

Mr. Foot: No, Sir. It was made clear at the outset, and has been restated on several later occasions, that the Greek relief scheme is a wholly exceptional measure, taken in view of the unprecedented conditions in that country.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

63

Draft.

Proposed reply by M.E.W. to Mr. Lipson's question.

~~No, Sir.~~ It was made clear at the outset and has been restated on several later occasions that the Greek relief scheme is a wholly exceptional measure ~~which it is not proposed to extend to other occupied territories.~~ taken in view of the unprecedented conditions in that country.

agreed by Ld Droghda: [illegible] 1/2

unique conditions in that country & does not create precedent.

Do you agree?

I suggest that the last two lines should be ~~deleted~~ omitted as the whole question of relief for other countries is under consideration. It might also be better to omit the 'No, Sir.' at the

the beginning and add after "exceptional measures" something like "taken in view of the unprecedented conditions in that country and these exceptional conditions do not exist in other principal countries and the Greek enactments does not therefore form a precedent."

E. E. Crowe.
1/2

I think it will be sufficient to omit the first two words & to add a further sentence as suggested by Mr Crowe omitting the words in brackets.

H. Lister Powell.
1/2

Shall put this to Mr Tilley.
R. -1/2

P.S.
Now see my marginal note overleaf.
1/2

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 2100

5 FEB 1943

65

Registry Number } W 2100/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare

No. (communicated)

Dated -

Received in Registry } 5th Feb:1943

W: Co-ordination.

Supplies for Polish prisoners of war.

Transmits copies of telegrams from Washington No.324 Arfar and No.325 Arfar of 25th January regarding the provision of American Red Cross prisoners of War packages for Polish prisoners under lease lend.

Last Paper.

W 2101 (W143)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

a-J. 11/2 Central 12/2 Reduct/depts IRD 13/2. N.J. 20/2.

E.W.S 9/2

See within copy of tel to Washington No 441 Arfar Feb 3rd

E.W.S 18/2

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
26/3/43.	All 26/2

Next Paper.

W 2101.

(W 2256).

D

Mr. E. Crowe, Foreign Office.

L.F. Copy.
[Cypher]

LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Viscount Halifax.
No. 324 ARFAR.
25th January, 1943.

D. 2. 1 a.m. 26th January, 1943.
R. 9.50 a.m. 26th January, 1943.

888888

W 2100

IMPORTANT.

My telegram No. 397 to Foreign Office (which should have been addressed to you).

Lehman told us on Saturday that United States Government had decided to provide individual American Red Cross prisoner of war packages for Polish prisoners under Lease-Lend at rate of 60,000 a month, their estimate of number of Poles mainly officers in prisoner of war camps. Clothing (see my telegram 5343) was still under consideration, from supply angle but intention is to try to provide it. Polish Ambassador has taken part in discussions between United States Departments concerned. He therefore already knows of American provisional acceptance of parcels commitment which is subject to assent of Blockade Committee.

2. While there seemed to be grounds for objecting to this American commitment to Pol s without prior discussion with us, and although proposal runs counter to undertaking that use of Lend-Lease f nds for Yugoslav prisoners would not constitute a precedent, it seemed to us wiser on first occasion that Governor Lehman has taken a leading part in these matters not (repeat not) to tax him directly with these aspects of matter.

3. We therefore begged him to examine this and related matters rather more fully before embarking on a programme which might grow to extensive proportions. We emphasised importance that both governments attach to maintaining reputation of International Red Cross and dangerous consequences of taxing its inspecting staff beyond its very limited capacity to discharge its important functions. We then referred to really critical situation with regard to shipping space passing on to him information that had recently reached us that some of staff of State Department are contemplating a further approach to you to secure further use of your Swiss shipping space in order to help American Red Cross out of its difficulties.

4./.....

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4. Governor who was attended by Sayre and another member of his staff was visibly shaken. It was clear that this was first occasion that these aspects of matter had been pressed upon him. He was appreciative particularly when information in your telegram 257 was given to him. He allowed us to take him over past history of problem, dealing throughout with practical difficulties that have to be overcome to establish a programme for prisoners of war that was acceptable on both political and blockade grounds.

5. In conclusion we stated on your behalf that you were most anxious to have closest possible collaboration with him if he is to handle all these matters that there seemed to be no difference between us in policy so far as allied prisoners of war were concerned but that you would feel obliged to satisfy yourself about adequacy of International Red Cross supervision if Lend-Lease goods were to be sent regularly to allied prisoners without a protecting power and in particular you would regret further difficulties with regard to shipping space upsetting all our plans for both British and American as well as allied prisoners.

6. See my immediately following telegram.

Mr. E. Crowe, Foreign Office.

T572

CC 68

L.F. Copy.

[Cypher]

LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Viscount Halifax,
No. 325 ARFAR.
25th January, 1943.

D. 12.43 a.m. 26th January, 1943.
R. 9.10 a.m. 26th January, 1943.

8888888

IMPORTANT.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Reference paragraph 4 please telegraph fully regarding ships now put at disposal of British Red Cross indicating cubic capacity, speed, date on which they will enter prisoner of war trade routes on which you recommend employing them etc.

2. Reference paragraph 5 please telegraph present state of negotiations with Dr. Burckhardt for strengthening of International Red Cross control and indicate whether the employment of additional inspectors is contemplated. Could we enlist help of Swiss or Swedish Government in this connexion.

3. In the course of the conversation referred to Lehman made it clear that he is thinking of sending some parcels to French prisoners of war, possibly up to 100,000 a month. He showed us a telegram sent to International Red Cross by American Red Cross asking a number of searching and relevant questions about present number and condition of French prisoners.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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INDEXED

T.572.

[Cypher].

LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON

No. 441 Arfar D. 3.40 a.m. 4th February, 1943.
3rd February, 1943.

/////

Your telegrams Nos. 324 and 325 [Arfar of January 26th: Lehman's proposal and additional shipping for British Red Cross].

We do not object to Lease-Lend for Poles and shall welcome United States action to provide for Allied prisoners on a reasonable scale, subject to proper control and provided some solution of the shipping problem can be found that does not involve withdrawal of British Red Cross tonnage.

2. Shipping problem, however, is fundamental. Negotiations for the acquisition of three Portuguese vessels mentioned in paragraph 1 of your telegram No. 325 (Congo, Malange, Lobito, with a joint cubic capacity of 630,000 cubic feet) are liable to break down over German insistence on repatriation of Axis seamen to which Admiralty strongly objects. Moreover, even if negotiations succeed, it is not certain how much of the resulting tonnage will be available for trans-Atlantic work after the needs of the Lisbon-Marseilles shuttle-service have been met, as certain vessels now in service on it may have to be withdrawn. You should therefore not encourage hopes at this stage.

3. Reference paragraph 3 we have no objection to Lehman's scheme with regard to French prisoners, provided it incorporates conditions with which you are familiar and does not still further complicate shipping position. Obviously claims of French are still secondary to those of Belgian, Polish and Yugoslav prisoners.

4. Reference paragraph 2, no negotiations with Burckhardt have been initiated on this subject. We still await State Department's agreement to a joint approach on lines explained in enclosure to Camp's letter T.572 of October 3rd. With regard to camp visits, see our telegram No. 350 Arfar of January 29th.

T.572.
5.2.43. F.O

Copies to:
M.I.9
W.O.

4 ϕ

GENERAL

W 2101

5 FEB 1943

70

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

Registry Number W 2101/4/49

FROM Miss Wheeldon (Board of Education) to Miss Scurfield.

No.

Dated 27th Jan.1943

Received in Registry 5th Feb.1943

Co-ordination.

Relief for occupied Europe.

Encloses the papers which a deputation from the Saffron Walden Famine Relief Committee left with the President of the Board of Education. Enquires what reply should be given.

Last Paper.

W 2099

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Miss Wheeldon (B/Education) from Miss Scurfield Feb-10.

(Minutes.)

(Action completed.)

No. 4 | 3 | 43

(Index.)

All 26

Next Paper.

W 2953 W 2196

24794 12/42 F.O.P.

W 2101
5 FEB 1943

I Food conditions in Greece have always been far worse than those of other occupied countries (except probably Poland, which however is of course inaccessible) and recognition of this fact is given by the Greek Relief Scheme which has been working in one form or another (i.e. originally from Turkey, then wheat shipments from Syria and now wheat, pulse & milk shipments from Canada) since the second half of 1941. At present the allocation for Greece is 18,000 tons a month which is distributed in accordance with the needs of the population and practical possibilities by a Swedish - Swiss Commission. This commission also sees that the conditions on which we agreed to send relief to Greece are fulfilled e.g. that food stuffs produced in Greece are reserved for the civil population. The original scheme was for 15,000 tons of wheat only per month. In response however to recommendations from the commission we have agreed to add to the monthly allotment 3,000 tons of pulse and 100 tons of dried milk. Any

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Any further recommendations by the committee for either altering the items within the total allotment or increasing it would of course be sympathetically considered.

[redacted]

II Belgium is a totally different question. Conditions are not comparable with those in France but are comparable rather with those in other Central, Western & Northern European occupied countries. A united scheme for Belgium could not be justified on the facts and any scheme would have to include at least Norway and probably Yugoslavia and France.

H.M.G. have always maintained and still maintain that the responsibility for feeding the civil population of the occupied countries rests solely with the occupying power. Except in cases (where the population were reduced to actual starvation level) the Germans have

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

have tacitly accepted their responsibility and have sent quite considerable quantities of food to Belgium for the civil population. The despatch of appreciable quantities of food (corn of milk also) would almost certainly enable the Germans either to reduce the amount of their supplies or to increase the quantities which they requisition.

[insert 3 marked paras on p 2 of Mr Markham's minute of 4/11/42 in W 14951]

74

D

Board of Education,
14, Belgrave Square, ~~Curzon House,~~
London, S.W.1. ~~Kingsway, London, W.C.2.~~

~~27th January~~, 1943.

M. Crowe

W. 2101

5 FEB 1943

Dear Miss Scurfield,

In the course of a two-day visit to his Constituency last week, the President received a deputation from the Saffron Walden Famine Relief Committee on the subject of food for the occupied countries. I enclose the papers which the deputation left behind.

As we have been receiving several letters urging that the Government should do all in their power to get food to these starving people, would you be kind enough to advise what is the official reply to such exhortations? Incidentally, are you able to say whether the figure of 22,030 tons of Dried Milk, which the President has underlined, is a good estimate of the amount required for each country?

Yours sincerely,

Rita Wheeldon

Miss T. Scurfield,
Foreign Office.

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75

A RESOLUTION passed unanimously at a public meeting on January 21st, 1943, held in Saffron Walden, and arranged by the Saffron Walden Famine Relief Committee :-

That this Meeting urges the Government to put into operation forthwith the scheme of the Famine Relief Committee (London) for controlled relief to the distressed areas of Europe, commencing with Belgium and Greece.

Presented on January 23rd, 1943
to the Rt. Hon. R.A.Butler, M.P.

76

Scheme for Belgium and Greece, presented to the British Government.

The total population of Belgium and of Greece amounts in each case to about 8 millions, but it is probable that, for various reasons, about 2 millions in each country would be outside the scope of the present scheme of relief. The following calculations are therefore made on the basis of a population of 6 millions only. The classes to whom it is desired to bring additional milk products and vitamins are the children and adolescents who are suffering most severely from shortage of adequate food, the expectant and nursing mothers and the invalids and aged.

It is estimated that of 6 million inhabitants in each country:

Group 1.	Children up to 16 years of age would amount to	1,500,000
Group 2.	Expectant and nursing mothers would amount to	100,000
Group 3.	Invalids would amount to	600,000

Estimated Yearly Needs of Supplementary Milk and Vitamins for the above three Groups in each country (calculated on the numbers corresponding to a six million population.)

		Kg. yearly millions.	**Tons yearly.*
A. Full Cream Dried Milk.			
Group 1.	1,500,000 children up to the age of 16.. .. 25 gr. dried milk daily, providing: **Protein 6.6 gr., Fat 7.4 gr., Carbohydrate 9.2 gr.=134 calories.	13.69	13,690
Group 2.	100,000 expectant and nursing mothers .. 50 gr. dried milk daily, providing Protein 13.2 gr., Fat 14.8 gr., Carbohydrate 18.4 gr.=268 calories.	1.82	1,820
Group 3.	600,000 invalids .... 25 gr. dried milk daily, providing: Protein 6.6 gr., Fat 7.4 gr., Carbohydrate 9.2 gr.=134 calories.	5.47	5,470
	Total:		20,980
	Add 5% for packing		1,050
			22,030

(If 30 gr. dried milk daily were provided for Groups 1 and 3, the required yearly amounts would be.....*Group* 1. 16,430 tons. *Group* 3. 6,560 tons. The total weight of dried milk would be 24,810 tons plus packing= 26,050 tons yearly.)

B. Vitamins. A "gunshot" capsule of vitamins A, B^1, C, D and G is advised for ease of packing and administration, containing a minimum of:—

4,000 International Units Vit. A
400 ,, ,, ,, D
200 ,, ,, ,, B_1
100 micrograms Riboflavine Vit. G
500 International Units Vit. C
} 10,000 capsules weigh 3 kg.

2,200,000 capsules daily weigh 660 kg.

	kg.	*Tons.*
Total yearly amount	241,000	241

TOTAL TONNAGE REQUIRED FOR EACH COUNTRY:

Dried milk.....	22,030 tons.
Vitamins	241 ,,
Total per year	22,271 ,,

or with increased amount of dried milk for Groups 1 and 3:
Total per year .... 26,301 tons.

---

* 1 ton—approx. 1,000 kg.

** Figures taken from Chemical Composition of Foods, McCance and Widdowson. Medical Research Council Special Report, Series No. 235, 1940. (H.M. Stationery Office).

October, 1942.

FAMINE RELIEF COMMITTEE

77

HUNGER IN EUROPE

A Statement of the case for Controlled Food Relief in German Occupied Countries

ISSUED BY

FAMINE RELIEF COMMITTEE

67 BROOK STREET LONDON, W.1

November, 1942 Price 3d.

Greece.

Although most of the population is agricultural, about 40 per cent of necessary foodstuffs had to be imported before the war. The cession of Macedonia to Bulgaria and the devastation of Thessalia in last year's warfare has involved less products from the fertile northern fields, and as most of the goods traffic is seaborne, it has naturally come almost to a standstill. Bread in normal times is the staple diet and the average daily consumption for an adult was 27 ozs. but in December the official ration was 2½ ozs., and it is reported from Corinth and other places that no bread or flour has in fact been given to holders of ration cards for many months.

(*The Economist, February*, 1942).

Since July there has been nothing to eat, particularly in the urban districts, the islands and the Peloponnesus, except green vegetables and some fruits. Bread is the principal food of the Greeks, but at the present time the ration is understood to be only 2 oz. per day. Moreover, there have been periods of as long as 14 days when no bread has been obtainable at all in Athens. In the Peloponnesus such conditions have prevailed for many months.

During September, in the Athens-Piraeus area, 25 persons died daily from starvation. In November, in the same area, the average daily number of deaths from starvation appeared, according to reliable reports, to have risen to 450. More than half the population of all urban and industrial areas are existing on about 250 calories per day compared with the League of Nations irreducible minimum of 2,400.

(*Inter Allied Information Committee Report, No.* 2).

In Athens and the Piraeus thousands of them (children) survive only as living skeletons, literally creatures of skin and bone. The terrible mortality among adults has been partly checked by shiploads of various foodstuffs from Turkey—with which not fewer than 500,000 persons, mainly adults, were fed at communal feeding centres—and, more recently, by the arrival of three Swedish food ships. In April and May there were 110,000 deaths from starvation in Athens and Piraeus alone.

The plight of young children is even worse than that of adults. A trustworthy confidential report, received through a neutral channel, states that last March children were losing weight at an average rate of 2 lbs. per month through lack of milk, of which the supply was rapidly decreasing. No condensed or powdered milk had then been imported for eleven months, and milk-yielding livestock, without fodder, was being slaughtered for meat.

The outlook was appalling, and was expected to grow worse with the approaching heat of summer. The International Red Cross can no longer get milk from Switzerland. Food shortage in Turkey impedes the sending of further shiploads of foodstuffs.

(*Extract from letter to The Manchester Guardian, 23rd Sept.*, 1942, *from Professor Gilbert Murray, O.M., and Mr. Wickham Steed*).

Abandoned children of under six years are placed into families where they are very badly fed . . . . . it is not the money that is needed, but the food. . . . . There are great difficulties in placing the children in the provinces because food is short everywhere. The Greek peasants, and this to their honour, accept these poor children with cordiality and kindness and share with them their food, with an altruism worthy of all praise.

(*Report from Greece, received in London September*, 1942).

The Dilemma.

The case against making the attempt to relieve the growing starvation in enemy-occupied Europe is very powerful. The paramount consideration of the Government is, and must continue to be, to win the war. Blockade is an essential weapon of modern war. It is aimed not primarily at starvation (though this may become its ghastly consequence) but at the imposition of a strain on the enemy's administrative and transport systems sufficient to handicap his productive war capacity. The introduction of food supplies into countries under his control may result in one of two things:

(a) If inadequately controlled it may directly feed his army or munition workers.

(b) Even if properly controlled it may relieve the strain on administration and transport, and thus indirectly assist his war effort.

Food itself is now contraband. The distinction between absolute and conditional contraband vanished with total war.

The ruthlessness of the present German Government, their reduction of exploitation to an exact science, their use of starvation as a means of obtaining submission—all these must be admitted.

On the other hand, it is intolerable that Christian people should be forced to acquiesce in the slow starvation of their fellows, and particularly of children and nursing or expectant mothers. Such acquiescence may well trouble the Christian conscience. Neither can we justify, from a purely humanitarian point of view, the mental and physical mutilation (or in extreme cases such as Greece, the cruel elimination) of a whole generation of European peoples. True peace will be harder to win if this is allowed, and many Christians will feel impelled to do their utmost to prevent it.

Our own civilisation is founded upon certain standards of Christianity which embrace compassion and mercy. If these standards are abandoned now, we shall sustain a moral and spiritual loss that cannot be measured.

"It is right that Christian communions should watch for every real opportunity of giving relief as long as there is reasonable ground for hope that it will reach those for whom it is intended. We cannot wait until we have certainty."

(*The Archbishop of Canterbury to the Upper House of the Convocation of Canterbury*, 15.10.42.)

Belgium

The first conclusion which emerges from all they write and say is that the food question has become an obsession among rich and poor. Everything is rationed except fresh vegetables. Belgians were allowed officially, in July last, 8 oz. of bread per day, ¾ oz. of meat (including 20 per cent. of bone), 7 oz. of potatoes, 1¾ oz. of sugar, and ⅜oz. of butter and margarine. These rations are much lower, in food value, than German rations, and below the average rations of other occupied countries. They should not, however, be taken at their face value. In fact, only bread and sugar can be purchased regularly at the fixed price. Potatoes have been unobtainable after the exhaustion of last year's crop in April. The black market only supplies the wealthy, about 5 per cent. of the population, and this last resource is waning fast through lack of stocks and funds. The vast majority are reduced to a diet providing 900 calories, that is to say less than half the minimum required by a man not engaged on physical work. Extra rations had to be provided for manual workers not, as in this country, in order to stimulate production, but in order to induce strikers to resume work. As for milk, it is being strictly reserved all through the year for children, expectant mothers, people over 70, and the sick.

The future is black. Margarine has been struck from the list, and a slight increase in the butter ration will not make up for the deficiency in fats. The sick will only be able to obtain milk by giving up their ration of butter, and old people will have to do altogether without it next winter. New potatoes have not yet come on the market, and the bread ration will soon be unobtainable for twenty days, or subjected to reduction. Lack of fuel will greatly aggravate the position, even more than it did last winter, when famine and cold made as many victims as the war in the spring of 1940, when German planes bombed civilians on the roads. In spite of the efforts made by the Belgian administration and organized charity to preserve the young, the mortality among children under six has trebled in the large hospitals. There is a fall of 80 per cent. in the growth-rate of the young. Attendance at school, in the towns, has considerably decreased. The boys and girls who are still able to attend are in such a weak condition that games have to be cancelled, and no serious work can be done in the afternoons. In hospitals and sanatoria, the number of cases of tuberculosis has trebled, and in Brussels the number of deaths caused by a specially malignant form of the disease known as "Tuberculosis 1941" is 80 per cent. larger than in pre-war days. The only efficient remedy is a healthy diet, and doctors stand helpless, since they cannot obtain the means of curing their patients. They certainly would not agree with the statement that no food can be considered as medicine.

Professor Emile Cammaerts. Quoted from "The Tablet," August 1st, 1942.

It is no longer possible to obtain official figures relative to the state of health among the Belgian children. Unofficial reports of such persons who have recently been in Sweden state that the mortality among children is appalling and that conditions are infinitely worse now than a year ago.

The conditions in Belgium are appalling. As the war goes on the state of health gets worse day by day. It is quite incredible how it is possible for people to exist on the diminishing rations. The mortality among children is alarming.

Letters which have passed the German censor state how the people get ration cards, but that there is nothing to buy.

(Extracts from report of the Swedish Committee for the Relief of Belgian Children, September, 1942.)

The Case for Trying.

Experience gained so far shows that it is possible to devise small, well-controlled schemes, even though large-scale shipments of foodstuffs are (with the notable exception of Greece) too difficult to contemplate at the moment. The most urgent need is a scheme, the aim of which is the prevention of disease, the assistance of normal physical development in growing boys and girls, and the sustenance of expectant and nursing mothers. Consignments of medicine and medicinal foods, dried lactic products and concentrated vitamins, occupying little shipping space, are a reasonable possibility.

An advantage of the small-scale scheme is that only comparatively small stocks are in the occupied country at any given moment. Should the enemy fail to honour his undertaking he would therefore receive no substantial benefit and supplies could be cut off immediately without serious dislocation.

Reports from occupied countries, extracts from which are quoted on the opposite pages, reveal certain features common to all. Scurvy, rickets, anaemia and eye infections are rampant among young children. Infant mortality is tragically high. Tuberculosis is on the increase. Older children who should be growing rapidly are losing weight. Schoolchildren are unable to work and lessons are a pitiful farce. Children are kept at home in bed to prevent them from getting hungry. Food available covers less than half of the nutritive value necessary for children and expectant and nursing mothers.

Schemes of relief designed to meet these special needs would not necessarily assist the enemy's war effort.

Control by neutral observers is still possible. The International Red Cross and the Swedish Red Cross can supply sufficient personnel to supervise small-scale schemes, and the American Red Cross and American Friends' Service Committee can still operate in unoccupied France (early November).

Neutral shipping is available for small tonnage requirements.

The physical difficulties are thus not insuperable, and the moral case for making the attempt is unanswerable. The return in goodwill in the post-war period would be the soundest possible investment for future generations.

Poland.

The Poles and the Jews are dying of starvation. News has reached London that in parts of the country the people have been reduced to boiling down the bark of trees and the skins of dead animals.

Life for the Jews in Poland is even more difficult than for the Poles: the Jews receive as a rule little more than half of the rations of the Poles. For instance, in Lwow the Germans receive 4½ lb. of bread per week, the Poles 2¼ lb., and the Jews little more than 1 lb. per week.

Unable to live on what they are legally permitted, the population is forced to turn to black markets for food. But the extreme poverty to which they have been reduced by the Germans makes it impossible for all but a very few of them to pay the exorbitant prices demanded by black marketeers.

Inter-Allied Information Report, No. 2.

Comparison of Death Rates. Dr. Schwartsbart, a member of the National Council of Poland, reported in June, 1942, that the annual death rate of Jews in Warsaw in 1938 was 9.9 per thousand and in September, 1941, was 158 per thousand. From another source the following figures illustrate the increase in mortality among the Christian and Jewish population of Poland since 1938:

Christians:	1938	11.3	per 1,000.
	1941	21.5	,,
Jews:	1938	9.9	,,
	1941	158.0	,,

Comparison of Food Consumption. A statement received recently from trustworthy sources gives a comparison between pre-war and present-day actual consumption in certain foods that are now officially rationed for Poles (Christian) and Poles (Jews):

	Monthly quantities in kilograms.		
	For Christians.	*For Jews.*	*Pre-war consumption.*
Bread	5.35	4.30	9.07
Rolls	0.18	—	1.38
Rye Flour	0.20	0.10	1.33
Wheat Flour and Maccaroni ..	0.08	0.02	2.12
Rice and Groats	0.02	0.02	1.13
Potatoes	0.20	0.20	13.33
Sugar	0.61	0.38	1.50

It is stated also that calorie value per head in working-class families pre-war was between 2,300 and 2,600; that of to-day is 600/800 for Christians and 220/290 for the Jewish population. Milk and butter are practically non-existent in Warsaw. There is a theoretical maximum of rationed foods but in practice they are seldom available or cannot be afforded owing to the fantastic rise in prices due to shortage and illegal trading. Wages earned by the Polish population have either stayed at their pre-war level or dropped considerably below it.

"The Swedish scheme, of which I informed the House on April 21st, has now come into operation, and three Swedish ships carrying 15,000 tons of Canadian wheat arrived at Piraeus on August 29th. Two other Swedish ships carrying approximately a further 15,000 tons sailed from Montreal on the same date. This is in addition to the cargo of the ss. Hallaren, which reached Piraeus on August 21st with 1,245 tons of wheat, all of which had been made available from allied resources in the Middle East. She had already off-loaded at Smyrna 1,000 tons of wheat for trans-shipment to the Greek Ægean islands. The Turkish ss. Dulumpinar also arrived at Piraeus during the last week of August with a cargo of dried fruit and vegetables. . . . . The shipments will continue at the rate intended—namely, 15,000 tons a month—provided that the conditions of the scheme are observed by the enemy."

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Partial Solutions.

The suggestion that more could be done is strengthened by the fact that much *has already* been done. The Governments have not been indifferent or idle.

Five shiploads of foodstuffs (two of wheat and flour and three of dried milk, vitamins and clothing for young children) have been allowed to reach Vichy France, where their distribution has been supervised by the American Red Cross. The distribution was conditional upon the fact that it was *an addition* to the rations of Vichy France and did not form part of them. The administration of this scheme was naturally eased by the fact that the United States Government was in a strong position in relation to the Government of Vichy France.

Secondly, the British Government have permitted, and in some cases encouraged, the export of surplus food produce of neutral countries inside the blockade area to German occupied countries. Under these arrangements foodstuffs have gone from Switzerland to France and other parts of Europe, from Portugal to Belgium, from Sweden to Norway and from Turkey to Greece.

Thirdly, the Government of the United States gave authorisation for the transfer of funds by the American Friends' Service Committee for the purchase of food within the blockade area, for distribution under their control to children in France. and this continues without interference (early November).

Lastly, and most important, there is the case of Greece, where there is actual famine, and where people are dying of starvation at this present time. Here the blockade has deliberately been relaxed. On the initiative of the Swedish Red Cross, and through arrangements made between the British Government and the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, considerable shipments of wheat and flour have been allowed to reach the country. The most recent statement on this subject in the House of Commons was made by Mr. Dingle Foot, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, on September 8th, and is quoted on the foot of the opposite page.

France.

Here is a table showing the quantity of calories contained in the official rations at various periods since the autumn of 1940:

Number of calories per day.

November, 1940	1,307
January, 1941	1,276
March, 1941	1,181
May, 1941	1,156
June, 1941..	1,134

The absolute minimum agreed upon by expert medical opinion is 2,400 calories per day, as stated in the Report on the Physiological Bases of Nutrition (*The Problem of Nutrition*, Vol. II, League of Nations, Geneva, 1936). It should be noted that rations have been again reduced since the month of June.

As the official rations do not contain even 50 per cent. of the calories indispensable to the human body, many people are obliged to obtain unrationed food in order to live. They are thus forced to have recourse to the black market, where prices are prohibitive. It was calculated in June that if the price of official rations is roughly 5 francs per person per day, 35 to 40 francs must be spent in the black market in order to obtain an amount of food containing the same number of calories. This expense is completely out of the reach of the great majority of the French population. Incidentally, it is reported that the Germans are the principal profiteers in the black market. The ample rations supplied to the German troops allow plenty of scope for activities of this kind in the Occupied Zone.

(*Inter-Allied Information Committee Report, No. 2*).

Reports of Quaker workers in unoccupied France chart "the slow and inexorable march of famine," describe children "with distended stomachs and thin, spindly legs." Conditions are, in the opinion of competent observers, comparable to those which prevailed in Europe after four years of World War 1.

The infant mortality rate in France increased 45 per cent. in the year 1940 over 1939 and without any doubt 1941 will show another big increase over 1940.

Health officials making comparative studies of children's weight indicate that in the past eight months approximately one-third have lost weight, one-third have remained stationary, and the remaining third have gained about half of normal weight. Most of these latter young people either live on farms or have access to farm produce.

Committee representatives making the rounds of the school canteens report children fainting in the classrooms because they have come to school without breakfast, empty seats because so many have no warm clothes or shoes, able pupils who show no scholastic gains because they are too seriously undernourished to learn.

(*Bulletin on Relief in France, February—March*, 1942).

A study of sixteen families in the Marseille area showed that whereas 2,830 calories were permitted these (pregnant and nursing) mothers daily, they actually consumed only 1,600 calories.

Medical authorities report a considerable increase in premature births and also that French babies of 1941 and 1942 frequently lack vitality and have less resistance to disease.

(*Extract from report of American Friends' Service Committee, August*, 1942).

We are preparing ourselves for a terrible winter, without coal, almost entirely without wood, hardly any potatoes, little bread (my ration is 200 grammes a day), hardly any butter, a few vegetables (but our stock is already running out), no fruit—everything was frozen in May.

We force ourselves not to think about the winter, but about the Spring which will follow.

(*Extracts from letters received from France, 14th Oct., 1942.*)

Public Opinion in Great Britain.

The growth of public interest and opinion in this country on the subject of controlled food relief is reflected in the correspondence reaching the Famine Relief Committee's office, and in the formation of Committees and Groups in all parts of the United Kingdom.

The Committee is unable to meet the current demand for speakers, and there is a large sale of literature and pamphlets. The office is at present in touch with 132 groups of individuals or formally constituted committees in 114 towns and villages.

The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland and the Annual Assembly of the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland have recently passed resolutions urging the Government to pursue the question of controlled food relief to the maximum extent which is possible without assisting the enemy's war effort.

Speaking to his Resolution, which was passed unanimously by the Upper House of Canterbury Convocation on 15th October, the Bishop of Chichester said:

"Europe is in danger of dying. The crisis is graver for Europe and for the world than it has ever been before, and therefore I think it is right that this House should appeal to the whole country for a more urgent faith, a more burning concern for the sufferings of other nations, a greater readiness for sacrifice."

Group in America.

The Committee is in touch with a group in America headed by Mr. John Foster Dulles, Professor Henry P. Van Dusen and Dr. Roswell P. Barnes, who, animated by purely humanitarian motives and with no relationship to any other groups which might be suspected of having political aims, are especially interested and ready to act on behalf of Belgium.

Some technical details of a scheme are given on the next page, and the Committee believes that the action indicated would help in preventing the spread of the tragedy in Greece to other countries in Europe.

SCHEME FOR BELGIUM AND GREECE.

The total population of Belgium and of Greece amounts in each case to about 8 millions, but it is probable that, for various reasons, about 2 millions in each country would be outside the scope of the present scheme of relief. The following calculations are therefore made on the basis of a population of 6 millions only. The classes to whom it is desired to bring additional milk products and vitamins are the children and adolescents who are suffering most severely from shortage of adequate food, the expectant and nursing mothers and the invalids and aged.

It is estimated that of 6 million inhabitants in each country:

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Group 2.	Expectant and nursing mothers would amount to	100,000
Group 3.	Invalids would amount to	600,000

Estimated Yearly Needs of Supplementary Milk and Vitamins for the above three Groups in each country (calculated on the numbers corresponding to a six million population.)

		Kg. yearly millions.	**Tons yearly.*
A.	**Full Cream Dried Milk.**		
Group 1.	1,500,000 children up to the age of 16.. .. 25 gr. dried milk daily, providing: **Protein 6.6 gr., Fat 7.4 gr., Carbohydrate 9.2 gr.=134 calories.	13.69	13,690
Group 2.	100,000 expectant and nursing mothers .. 50 gr. dried milk daily, providing Protein 13.2 gr., Fat 14.8 gr., Carbohydrate 18.4 gr.=268 calories.	1.82	1,820
Group 3.	600,000 invalids .... 25 gr. dried milk daily, providing: Protein 6.6 gr., Fat 7.4 gr., Carbohydrate 9.2 gr.=134 calories.	5.47	5,470
	Total:		20,980
	Add 5% for packing		1,050
			22,030

(If 30 gr. dried milk daily were provided for Groups 1 and 3, the required yearly amounts would be.....*Group* 1. 16,430 tons. *Group* 3. 6,560 tons. The total weight of dried milk would be 24,810 tons plus packing= 26,050 tons yearly.)

B. Vitamins. A "gunshot" capsule of vitamins A, B^1, C, D and G is advised for ease of packing and administration, containing a minimum of:—

4,000 International Units Vit. A
400 " " " D
200 " " " B_1
100 micrograms Riboflavine Vit. G
500 International Units Vit. C
} 10,000 capsules weigh 3 kg.

2,200,000 capsules daily weigh 660 kg.

	kg.	*Tons.*
Total yearly amount	241,000	241

TOTAL TONNAGE REQUIRED FOR EACH COUNTRY:

Dried milk.....	22,030 tons.
Vitamins	241 "
Total per year	22,271 "

or with increased amount of dried milk for Groups 1 and 3:
Total per year .... 26,301 tons.

---

* 1 ton—approx. 1,000 kg.

** Figures taken from Chemical Composition of Foods, McCance and Widdowson. Medical Research Council Special Report, Series No. 235, 1940. (H.M. Stationery Office).

82

The Policy of the Famine Relief Committee.

The first object of the Famine Relief Committee is simply to obtain authentic information. Certain facts are set out in this pamphlet concerning Greece, Belgium, Poland and France. Information is also being collated from other occupied countries, including Norway and Holland.

The second object is to assist groups and individuals in all parts of the country to understand the difficulties involved in schemes of controlled food relief, to supply them with information, and if possible to help them by sending speakers to address them. The Committee does not wish development in this sphere to outstrip the natural growth of public opinion, however, and it is not concerned with agitation or mass publicity of any kind.

The third object is the promotion of schemes for sending food, vitamins and medical aid to occupied countries as opportunity can be found for doing so with reliable control. The immediate policy here is to urge the Government to give serious consideration to a scheme prepared by the Technical Advisory Committee for the shipment from America of dried milk and vitamins. The intention is for Greece and Belgium in the first place.

The Committee is informed that in Belgium the International Red Cross is willing and able to make the necessary arrangements with the Occupying Power and other Governments involved and to provide the personnel required for the necessary control of the distribution. In Greece the International Red Cross and Swedish Red Cross are already controlling the distribution of shipments of grain recently imported for the Greek population. In both countries local medical and welfare organisations are still functioning and these could provide the required medical control of the recipients.

The Governments of Belgium and Greece, respectively, are prepared to pay the cost of the materials and transport. The necessary shipping space appears to be available in neutral ships from U.S.A. to Lisbon. What is needed is navicerts from the British Government to permit the introduction of those goods into Europe.

Practical Suggestions for Action.

It will be seen from the preceding pages that there is no grave objection to the carrying out of this obvious humanitarian duty. It is, however, essential to avoid all public political controversy over what should be a purely humanitarian issue. Accordingly those who desire to give the greatest possible help to the sufferers in the countries affected should do their best to obtain the fullest available authentic information about the facts. What is really needed is a well informed opinion among those whose opinion carries weight in the community.

With this end in view, and in order that the Government may be made aware of the feeling among the public in this country, the following suggestions are offered:

1. Form in your neighbourhood a committee of leading citizens who are willing to look at the question in its moral and humanitarian aspects.
2. Make this Committee's first and most important job the creation of a wisely informed public opinion locally.
3. Get the weightiest and best known sympathisers to write letters to the local press, urging controlled food supplies for German-occupied countries.
4. Arrange a deputation from the Committee to see the local Member of Parliament on the same subject.

It is useless to make collections of foodstuffs in this country, as these cannot be sent. No stocks in this country can be purchased for this purpose, nor is the transfer of funds for purchase elsewhere at present permitted.

The cost of the food necessary for feeding schemes can in some cases be provided by the Governments of the countries concerned, but permission to put them into effect has to be obtained from the British Government.

Nevertheless, to meet the real desire which exists up and down the country to make contributions in money destined for the relief of suffering children in Europe, the Committee has opened a famine relief fund on the definite understanding that any money contributed will be used for help in the German controlled or invaded countries (monies may be earmarked for any particular country) as soon as permission is obtained to use it. Failing this permission before the end of hostilities, it will be used for immediate help and reconstruction in these countries as soon as entry is possible after the war.

Donations for carrying on the work of the Famine Relief Committee will be gratefully accepted.

TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
TO THE
FAMINE RELIEF COMMITTEE.

Mr. John Cadbury	Representative in England of the American Friends' Service Committee.
Dr. Harriette Chick	Division of Nutrition, Lister Institute; Member of the Technical Committee on Nutrition, League of Nations Health Organisation.
Dr. J. C. Drummond.....	Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Food
Mr. Antony Gilpin	General Secretary, International Commission for War Refugees in Gt. Britain.
Mrs. Michaelis-Stern	Hon. Secretary, Society for the Emigration of Jewish Boys and Girls into Palestine.
Mrs. Small de Morsier	Former Secretary of the Save the Children International Union, and their delegate in this country.
Miss E. M. Pye	International Commission for the Assistance of Child Refugees. Vice-Chairman, Friends' Committee for Refugees and Aliens. Former member of League of Nations Advisory Committee on Refugees.
Dr. Audrey Russell Ellis	Medical Director, International Commission for the Assistance of Child Refugees.
Mr. Paul D. Sturge	General Secretary, Friends' Service Council.
Mr. Roger C. Wilson	General Secretary, Friends' War Relief Service.

Registry
No. W2101/4/49

10m
84

Confidential.

Draft.

Miss Wheeldon
Bd of Education

from
Miss Crawfield
T.S.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Central Registry
D.S.L. 3/3
Supplies Dept
(a.a.)
Ltr. 2/2
Ltr. 3/2

18th Feb. 1943.

Dear Miss Wheeldon.

In reply to your letter of Jan 27th regarding the resolution of the Saffron Walden Farmers Relief Club, I enclose a (copy of a) minute which explains the position about Greece and Belgium; and which will, I hope, give you material for ~~for~~ replying to this resolution and any other similar requests which may reach you.

As to whether the figure of 22,030 tins of dried milk is a reasonable ~~figure~~, this is not within our province and I suggest you consult the Ministry of Food. You will notice, however, that the Swedish Committee in Greece have asked for and are being sent 100 tons a month i.e. 1,200 tons a year

year. However it is already being found difficult to find this amount of dried milk and the deficit is being made up with liquid milk which of course takes up much more shipping space. In this connection it may be of interest to note that according to the figures supplied by the Enemy Branch of M. Ec. Warfare the weekly ration of whole milk for children in Belgium is as follows:-

Under 3 yrs (& for nursing mothers)	5. 25 litres (= about 1¼ pints per day)
3 yrs - 6 yrs	3.50 litres (= 4/5 pint p. d.)
6 yrs - 14 yrs	1.75 litres (= 2/5 pint p. d.)

Whole adults of 14 - 18 get 1.75 litres
& skimmed milk a week and
All people 3.50 litres

Yours sincerely

Ld) T. Scrafield

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

86

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(W 2101/4/49).
Confidential.

10th February, 1943.

Dear Miss Wheeldon.

In reply to your letter of the 27th January regarding the resolution of the Saffron Waldon Famine Relief Committee, I enclose a copy of a minute which explains the position about Greece and Belgium, and which will, I hope, give you material for replying to this resolution and any other similar requests which may reach you.

As to whether the figure of 22,030 tons of dried milk is reasonable, this is not within our province and I suggest you consult the Ministry of Food. You will notice, however, that the Swedish Commission in Greece have asked for and are being given 100 tons a month i.e. 1,200 tons a year. Moreover it is already being found difficult to find this amount of <u>dried</u> milk and the deficit is being made up with liquid milk which of course takes up much more shipping space. In this connexion it may be of interest to note that according to the figures supplied by the Enemy Branch of the Ministry of Economic Warfare the weekly ration of whole milk for children in Belgium is as follows:-

Under 3 years (and for nursing mothers)	5.25 litres (= about 1¼ pints per day)
3 years - 6 years	3.50 litres (= 4/5 pint per day)
6 years - 14 years	1.75 litres (= 2/5 pint per day)

Miss R. Wheeldon,
Board of Education.

/While

While adults of 14-18 get 1.75 litres of skimmed milk a week and old people 3.50 litres.

Yours sincerely

Ld) T. Lewfield

42

GENERAL

194

ORDINATION.

W 2196

8 FEB 1943

88

Registry Number W 2196/4/49

FROM Ministry of Food (communicated)

No.

Dated 4th Feb. 1943

Received in Registry 8th Feb. 1943

W: Co-ordination.

Canned meat for Yugoslav Prisoners of War.
Transmits copy of letter from Mr. Browne (Ministry of Food) to Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) of 4th February regarding purchase of canned meat in South America by the Allied Governments

Last Paper.

W 2101.

References.

W 14690/324/48/1941.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

We must first of all see
if ECW.
what reply the ~~Min of Food~~ returns
Min of Food
& ~~the Camps'~~ suggestion

Mr Ward you may like to see what
is in the wind.

RC
5/2/43

This is not a good peg on which to hang the Min of Food's case, as the Yugoslav purchases are usually very small & rather pathetic.

The circular note on W 14690/324/48 of 1941 has not proved a great success, as it was too vague. But Mr Camps has a new idea (perhaps prompted by this letter) of getting the Allied Red Crosses to systematise their purchase abroad by consulting MEW in advance. I told him I thought it could do no harm and probably good for him to try, provided no pressure were applied without consulting. JGW 15/II See

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
Mc 16/2/43	AEH 26/7

Next Paper.

W 2256 (W 3777)

24794 12/42 F.O.P.

W 2756
8 FEB 1943

See written letter from Mr. Camps (M.E.W)
to Mr. Browne (M/Food) Feb 10

See written copy of letter from Mr. Browne
(M/Food) to Mr. Camps (M.E.W) Feb 16,

Copy to Mr. Maclean.

Import Plans Division,

4th February, 1943.

W 2196
8 FEB 1943

90

Dear Camps,

Canned Meat for Yugoslav Prisoners of War.

We were recently informed by your Department that an application had been received for a navicert to permit the shipment of some canned meat bought in Uruguay by the Yugoslav Government for their prisoners of war. I gather that since an urgent reply was requested the navicert was granted and that you would wish to have our views as to the procedure to be followed in similar cases in future.

This question involves a rather difficult issue of principle. I realise that in general you are reluctant to refuse navicerts except on blockade grounds and that such grounds do not apply to supplies for prisoners of war. All the same I think we have good grounds for asking you to make an exception to this principle in the case of South American canned meat. As you know, under the Memorandum of Understanding, the Ministry of Food is the sole buyer of meat in South America for the United Nations. The South American countries however, are naturally not enthusiastic over this idea and are only too willing to sell to competing buyers if they appear in the market. I agree that it is up to us to do what we can to restrain Allied Governments from such purchases, and we are prepared to take any steps which could usefully be taken in this direction. It may be that a Foreign Office circular on the lines of that sent out last year dealing with proposed purchases in the U.K. would be the best course, but I still feel that without your assistance we shall never be able wholly to eliminate independant purchases.

Would you be prepared to agree to refuse navicerts for any purchases of canned meat in South America whatsoever unless they were from us?

/If

R.F. Camps, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
London S.W.1.

W 2196
8 FEB 1943

If we had that sanction in reserve, I think we might approach the Allied Governments with some chance of success.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Maclean whose comments I would welcome.

Yours sincerely,

DENIS BROWNE

JD Copy for E.E.Crowe Esq., Foreign Office 92

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square W.1.

10th February, 1943.

INDEXED W 2196/44/49
12 FEB 1943

Dear Browne,

Thank you for your letter of February 4th on the subject of canned meat purchases in South America for Allied prisoners of war.

We appreciate that in view of your understanding with the various South American countries that you should be the sole buyer of canned meat, the Allied Governments ought to be restrained from making independent purchases for their prisoners; and the refusal of navicerts as long as they continue to do so is obviously the best way of forcing them to buy through you. As you may know by now, on Mathias's instructions we have just refused an application from Buenos Aires covering some 30 tons of canned beef purchased by the Belgian Ministry of Defence in London from Bovril for Belgian prisoners.

However, as you say in your letter, we should be reluctant to continue refusing such navicert applications unless there were blockade reasons for our doing so. I suggest therefore that instead of our turning down these applications when they are submitted, unless informed by you that the purchase is in order, the best course would be for our Embassies in Buenos Aires, Rio and Montevideo to be instructed that in view of the Memorandum of Understanding restricting the sale of canned meat to the Ministry of Food they should not submit any applications to us covering canned meat for allied prisoners of war unless they are assured that the purchase has been made through you. Such an arrangement would enable you to tell the Allied Governments that they will not be able to secure navicert facilities unless they co-ordinate their purchases with you while at the same time letting us out of the difficulty of having to refuse applications which we should ordinarily grant.

D. Browne Esq.,
Import Plans Division,
Ministry of Food,
Colwyn Bay Hotel,
COLWYN BAY, Denbighshire

/If

If you agree, we will gladly send the necessary instructions to the Missions concerned.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Crowe at the Foreign Office who has taken over Macleans' work.

H. A. Campbell

Copy for Mr. Crowe, Foreign Office.

Foodkeeper

3391

Import Plans Division,
Colwyn Bay Hotel,

INDEXED

16th February, 1943.

V 2196/4/49.
19 FEB 1943

Dear Camps,

Canned Meat for Allied Prisoners of War

Thank you for your letter of 10th February. So far as this particular aspect of the question is concerned I think your suggestion will meet the case admirably. Perhaps you would be good enough to see that a telegram on the lines which you suggest goes to our South American Embassies. It will then be up to us to see that the Allied Governments are informed of the arrangements to which we wish them to conform. I imagine that the Foreign Office would wish to be the channel for this communication and perhaps Crowe, to whom I am sending a copy of this letter, will let me know whether he would like me to send him a draft indicating the procedure which we would wish to see followed.

Yours sincerely,

DENIS BROWNE.

W.A. Camps, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

95

Porter No. .....
Issued By .....

Porterage
Cartage

FISH TOTAL

£	s.	d.
	:	:
	:	:

TOTAL

.....
Salesman.

[75706] 26265/164 3000 Bks. 8/39 M&C Ltd. **706**

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 2256

0 FEB 1943

96

Registry Number W 2256/4/49

FROM Mr. Brennell (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Crowe

No. T 551/B

Dated 4th Feb. 1943.

Received in Registry 9th Feb. 1943.

W: Coordination +

Shipping for British Red Cross

The negotiations for the acquisition for the British Red Cross Service of three Portuguese vessels, Congo, Malango and Lobito, seem likely to break down over German insistence on repatriation of Axis seamen. The acquisition of these three vessels would have a special importance if it resulted in more tonnage becoming available for transport of prisoners of war parcels from United States.

Last Paper.

w2196. (w2100)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Yes, we are trying to break down Admty resistance (on W/Tr ppr), but- case ~~mission~~ or other arguments

Mr Crowe.

GHP 15/2

14/2

D

(Action completed.)

mb 15/2/43

(Index.)

AEM 26.

Next Paper.

w2277

T.551/B.

Enclr W 97

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

4th February 1943.

W 2256
9 FEB 1943

Dear Crowe,

I believe that you have had a copy of Benson's telegram of January 31st from Lisbon to the Ministry of War Transport, on the subject of the proposed acquisition for the British Red Cross service of three Portuguese vessels, Congo, Malange, Lobito. As you know, negotiations seem likely to break down over German insistence on repatriation of Axis seamen, to which the Admiralty naturally and strongly object. As I understand from Frazer of Ministry of War Transport that you are interested in the question, you may like to know that from the M.E.W. point of view, the acquisition of these three vessels would have a special importance if it resulted in more tonnage becoming available for transport of prisoners of war parcels from United States. United States have plans for the servicing of Allied prisoners of war which in present conditions would only have the effect of making shipping arrangements increasingly difficult, but which, if they could conveniently be realized, would be welcome both to us and (I think) to you;

I am sending copies of this letter to Gardiner, Frazer, Roberts and Marshall.

Yours sincerely,

R. T. Gwennell

E.E.Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall.
S. W. 1.

44

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 2277

9 FEB 1943

98

Registry Number W 2277/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No.

Dated 1st Feb.,

Received in Registry 9th Feb., 1943

W: Co-ordination

Last Paper.

W2256

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
17/2/43	Aet 24/7

Next Paper.

(W1506 9)

W2301

Canned milk for Norway.

Transmits copy of letter from Mr. Quennell (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to M. Brodtkorb (Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs) of 1st February regarding purchase of canned milk in Switzerland to be distributed under Dr. Ditleff's organization.

(Minutes.)

Stors. 16 Feb.
Northern Dept

E.L.C. 13/2

See within copy of tel to Berne No 1024 Cyfao of March 4.

Northern Dept
Stors
18 Mar

E.L.C. 12/3

See within copy of rel to Berne no 1444 Afar. Mar 27.

E.L.C. 2/4

See within copy of tel to Berne No 1563 Cyfao April 2nd

E.L.C. 12/4

See within copy of tel from Berne No 1982 Cyfao April 15th

" " " " to Berne No 1852 Cyfao April 9th

E.L.C. 9/5

Copy for E. Crowe Esq, Foreign Office

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111

W 2277

9 FEB 1943

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

1st February, 1943.

With reference to your letter of January 27th and to our telephone conversation this morning, I understand that you now wish to purchase 4000 cases of canned Milk in Switzerland costing 230,500 Swiss francs, instead of 3400 cases costing 200,000 Swiss francs. We have no objection to this increase and are telegraphing the British Legation in Berne that both the Treasury and this Ministry approve the transaction and that he may inform the Swiss Bank Corporation accordingly. We assume that the Milk purchased will be distributed by Dr. Ditleff's organization, but should be grateful for your confirmation on this point.

We are glad to have been able to agree to the purchases you contemplate, but feel it proper to add that, since the situation is constantly changing and new considerations may develop, our consent must be taken to apply to this request alone.

P Quennell

I. Brodtkorb Esq,
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Kingston House,
Princes Gate,
London, S.W.7.

F 17/4

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

INDEXED

2277/4/49

T550/12

[CYPHER] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE

No. 1024 ARFAR
4th March, 1943. D. 1.20 a.m. 5th March, 1943.

SSSSS

My telegram No. 509 [Arfar of February 1st: Norwegian purchase of milk in Switzerland].

Norwegians wish to buy 5 tons of tinned meat (25,000 tins of 200 gr. a piece) of Swiss origin, to be financed out of same loan, which it now appears is good for one million Swiss francs.

2. They have promised not to sanction purchases without our agreement, and control use of the loan through their Legation in Berne.

3. You may agree to purchase and export of this meat, provided that supplying firm is approved. You should explain to Swiss authorities that our approval of export applies to this single specific case.

4. Please see my immediately following telegram for a proposed general arrangement with the Mixed Commission of the Red Cross. We will consider later whether it is desirable to bring Norwegian purchases under this, but meanwhile direct dealing with the Norwegian Government is convenient.

OTP

M[illegible] 101

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

227 / 4 / 49

31 MAR 1943

T550/12

INDEXED

[Cypher].

ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE

No. 1444 Arfar

D. 5.15 a.m. 29th March, 1943.

27th March, 1943.

/////

My telegram No. 1024 [Arfar of March 4th: Norwegians' purchases in Switzerland for Relief].

You may agree to purchase and export of 500 kilogrammes of ascorbic acid, value about 180,000 Swiss francs, from Hoffeman La Roche, to be sent to Norwegian Relief Central in Stockholm for forwarding to Norway.

2. Norwegian Legation will be instructed to approach you in due course. Red Cross are not involved.

O.T.P.

M.E.W. FILE NO T550/12
COPY FOR 99 Crowe Esq FO
30/3/43

Copy also for W.L. Fraser Treas.

T550/12.
E E Crowe Esqr,
6/4/43.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

T550/12
[Cypher] W 2277 / 4 / 49 ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM MINISTRY ~~OF ECONOMIC WARFARE~~ TO BERNE

Copy sent to W.O. & Treasy

No. 1563 Arfar
3rd April, 1943 D: 1. 50 p.m. 4th April, 1943

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W p p p
2277

My telegram No. 1444 [Arfar of March 27th: Norwegian Relief purchases in Switzerland]

Norwegians have been offered 10 tons of egg powder stated to be part of 35 tons in all available for export from Switzerland for relief purposes.

2. We have told them that we cannot (repeat not) agree to exports of egg powder from Switzerland.

3. Norwegians have also raised with us the question of charges for forwarding and insurance of goods and apparently a commission required by the Red Cross on all these transactions. Please ascertain and inform me whether any part of these incidental charges accrues directly or indirectly to the enemy as this would raise a major question of principle. We understood formerly that Red Cross transports were made free of cost through enemy territory. Please discuss with Norwegian Legation, who have raised the question. But answer would affect transactions of other allies also.

O.T.P.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

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T550/12/28.
E. E. Clove, Esq.,
25/4/43.
Copy sent W & Trade.

INDEXED

T.550/12/28

[CYPHER] W22/1/4/49 29 APR 1943

ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE

No. 1852. Arfar D. 3.50 p.m. April 21st, 1943.

April 21st, 1943.

bbbb

Your telegram No. 1982 [Arfar of April 15th: Transport and other incidental charges on goods bought in Switzerland for relief].

We are informing the Norwegian Government that we have no objection. Approval does not of course hold good for transport via Hamburg, about which we should wish to be consulted if the case arose.

O.T.P.

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[CYPHER] ARFAR O.B.

FROM BERNE TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Mr. Norton.
No. 1982. Arfar.
15th April, 1943.

D. 7. 50 p.m., 15th April, 1943.
R. 9. 25 a.m., 16th April, 1943.

W W W W W

Your telegram No. 1563 paragraph 3.

Red Cross Mixed Commission has formally assured Norwegian Legation that no part of these charges accrued in any way to the enemy.

2. Transports through enemy territory are made free of charge. Only in the event if goods having to be despatched by ship from Hamburg would reloading charges fall due, and these would undoubtedly be payable to the enemy.

3. Normally transport is by rail all the way. This applies to milk and tinned meat consignments which you have approved.

4. Insurance is with Swiss pool represented by Labaloise. War risks are covered by the confederation. Premiums vary between 2 and 3% according to route taken. Forwarding agents are Jacky Maeder of Basle. Purchase prices are quoted f.o.r. Swiss frontier.

5. Mixed Commission state that their commission of 2% is levied to cover costs of administration as the Commission possesses no funds.

6. Supply price of 25,000 boxes of tinned meat is 42,500 francs. Incidental charges are estimated not exceeding 6%.

7. Norwegian Legation repeat request for lattitude up to 10% and point out that they may otherwise have to cut down quantity of goods purchased to allow for making these charges.

O.T.P.

105

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 2301

9 FEB 1943

Registry Number W 2301/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare

No. (communicated)

Dated

Received in Registry 9th Feb. 1943.

W: Coordination +

Food parcels from French North Africa to France

Transmits copy of telegram from Washington No. 379 Arfar of 30th January. There is a proposal under consideration in State Department for a parcels scheme from Portugal to France. There seems no likelihood that any scheme involving the sending of parcels from North Africa would be considered. Gives details of the scheme.

Last Paper.

W2277 (W1509)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

AR 16/2

French N.A. depts

13/2

13/2

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
No. 20/2/43	30/3/43

Next Paper.

W 2369

RMH.
(Copy)

[CYPHER]

ARFAR (C.B.)

106

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

W 2301

9 FEB 1943

Viscount Halifax.
No. 379 ARFAR.
30th January, 1943.

D. 5.04 p.m. 31st January, 1943.
R. 3.20 a.m. 1st February, 1943.

W 1509

T 550/7/904
E. Browne Esq
4.2.43 F.O

Your telegram No. 264.

In order to avoid rushing Leyman with too many problems at first, I have not yet approached him officially on this question. But I understand that proposal now under consideration in State Department is for a parcels scheme from Portugal on lines indicated in your telegram under reference. There seems no likelihood that any scheme involving the sending of parcels direct from North Africa would be considered. Proposal is that if portuguese scheme goes through for North Africa no similar scheme would be allowed for the French in United States of America on the grounds that total of eight tons per month at present

Copied also to
W.C.O TED.
W.O

permitted /....

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permitted for other occupied countries under existing British and American schemes should be adhered to for France also. There would certainly be American supervision of schemes which would be organised and financed from North Africa, though it might be necessary to release some dollars for the purpose from North African accounts here.

9 FEB 1943

46.

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 2369

10 FEB 1943

108

Registry Number W 2369/4/49

FROM Mr. Rooker (British Mission to French National Committee) to

No. Mr. Simpson. T 567/43.

Dated 5th Feb. 1943

Received in Registry 10th Feb. 1943

W:Co-ordination.

Clothing for children in France.

Transmits copy of letter from French National Committee of 4th February regarding clothing which has been made by French subjects in Equatorial Africa as gifts to the children of destitute families in France. The packages are being held up at Lisbon awaiting for navicerts for transport to Lisbon and thence to France. They will be distributed by the Red Cross.

Last Paper.

(W 3295/62/49) W 2301. 1942

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

18 M.E.W. (Mr Camps) (with enclosed letter) Feb 16.

1 Mr. Rooker (British Mission to French Nat. Cttee) Feb 22.

(Action completed.) mld 1/3/43

(Index.) amf 30/3/43

Next Paper.

(W 3093) W 255/

(Minutes.)

This question was raised as far back as September 1942. At first we stalled altogether; but subsequently agreed — albeit very reluctantly — that these packages of clothing might be sent as part of the American Red X scheme which we sanctioned. While negotiations between the Bishop of Brazzaville and the American Consul were still in progress the remainder of France was occupied.

Now that there is no machinery for control of distribution there can be no question of our agreeing to this.

Draft reply which should go to Mr Camps for concurrence

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

RC 13/2

See

See within copy of tel to Brazzaville to 2 Affairs Feb 5 –

109

7567/43

Enter.

110

12

5th February, 1943.

Aden Feb 1943

W 2369

10 FEB 1943

I enclose copy of a letter from the National Committee referring to clothing that has been made by French subjects in Equatorial Africa as gifts to the children of destitute families in France.

The packages are being held up at Loanda waiting for navicerts for transport to Lisbon and thence to France. They will be distributed by the Red Cross.

Under the circumstances we would recommend that the Ministry of Economic Warfare be pressed to grant the necessary navicerts on humanitarian grounds.

Yours sincerely,

Ripley Rooker

F.L. Simpson, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

COPIE

111

COMITE NATIONAL FRANCAIS

Le Commissaire National
aux Affaires Etrangères.

4, Carlton Gardens,
S.W.1.

1C

D.635

le 4 février 1943.

Mon cher Rooker,

Le Gouverneur de l'Afrique Equatoriale Française nous adresse de nouveau un pressant appel afin qu'un navicert soit établi pour les colis de vêtements destinés par la Croix Rouge de Brazzaville aux enfants de France et qui sont retenus à Loanda depuis plusieurs mois.

Le Ministry of Economic Warfare a déjà été saisi de la question. Il a demandé dès le mois d'octobre, au Consul de Grande Bretagne à Brazzaville des précisions sur le contenu de ces colis. Le Consul qui s'était déclaré très favorable à cet envoi, a sans doute fourni les renseignements nécessaires; toutefois le navicert n'a pas encore été accordé.

Nous nous permettons d'attirer votre attention sur cette affaire qui soulève beaucoup d'émotion à Brazzaville. Nous n'ignorons pas que les règlements du blocus relatifs à l'expédition de vêtements en pays occupés sont très stricts; cependant, il s'agit d'un envoi de faible importance et vous comprendrez certainement qu'en raison de la misère accrue qui règne en France et dont les enfants sont les premières victimes, nous désirerions vivement que la dérogation sollicitée puisse être octroyée. D'autre part, il ne vous échappera pas que l'excellent effet moral qui en résulterait parmi la population de notre colonie est particulièrement à souhaiter dans les circonstances actuelles.

Nous vous serons donc très reconnaissants de tout ce qu'il vous sera possible de faire pour que la demande de la Croix Rouge de Brazzaville reçoive satisfaction.

Sincèrement vôtre,
(signé) J. PARIS.

J. Kingsley Rooker, Esq.,
British Mission to the
French National Committee.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W 2369/4/49

Draft.

Mr Rooker
British Mission
& French
Nat Cttee

From
Le Comte
Fr Liaison Offr
13 Feb

Copy with
enclosure/letter &
Le Camps
Le S.W. for
enclosure

E.L.O.
13/2

112

Feb 1943

Your letter & Simpson
No 7567/43 of Feb 5th about
clothing parcels for France.

You will remember that on
Oct 16th last we telegraphed to
Brazzaville (Tel No 484, copy sent
to Paris under W 13295/62/49)
giving our reluctant agreement to
the despatch of these parcels under
the auspices of the American Red X.
It was stated that this
concession was only possible owing
to the presence of the American
Red X in occupied France. —
— Our reluctance was largely
due to the fear that the it
would ~~at once~~ lead to similar
demands from the Belgian Congo
These fears were fully justified.
The Belgian Red X in the Congo
worked

worried & at once with a similar request, based a ~~the~~ report that such parcels were going to France, ~~fortunately~~ fortunately (we were able to reply that these reports were unfounded & that no parcels had been or were being sent to France.

As at that time the Germans had invaded the unoccupied zone

This consideration together with the all-important fact that unoccupied France — to which the parcels were originally destined — no longer exists clearly make it impossible for us to agree to their despatch now. In telling M. Paris that you may like to add that ~~the Bishop~~ according to our ~~consul~~ information at Brazzaville the Bishop ~~of Bishopsgate~~ has acquiesced in our decision and proposes to store the parcels until they can be sent to ~~the~~ freed French territory

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

W 20~ 114 1pp

1C

INDEXED

Copy

M.E.W. FILE NO. T.550/7.
Copy only FOR E.E. Crowe Esq 70
DATE 8/2/43

T.550/7

[CYPHER] 2369 / 4 / 49. ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BRAZZAVILLE

No. 2 ARFAR D. 12.05 a.m. 6th February, 1943.
5th February, 1943.

0 0 0 0

Your despatch No. 166 to Foreign Office [of December 23rd: relief for France].

We have been approached by Fighting French with a suggestion that this clothing might be sent to International Red Cross in Switzerland for distribution among French children evacuated there. We have no objection to this plan but wish to ensure that it does not conflict with any plans at present maturing at Brazzaville. Please telegraph your views.

O.T.P.

Copy to Mr Rooms ref Ghq 15/2

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GENERAL

W 2551
13 FEB 1943

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Registry Number W 2551/4/49

FROM Mr. Peck (Prime Minister's Dept) to Mr. Millard.

Dated 11th Feb: 1943
Received in Registry 13th Feb: 1943

W. Co-ordination.

Last Paper.

W2369.

References.

W14825/6c/49/1942.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
W 18/3/43	All 24/7

Next Paper.

(W4813)

W2554

Relief for Belgium.

Encloses a copy of a letter from the Belgian Prime Minister to the Prime Minister of February 9th regarding despatch of relief for children in occupied Belgium.

(Minutes.)

In view of the P.M.'s latest minute deprecating any action to cancel up the President's reply, I think all we can do is to ask Mr Peck to reply to the effect that we have, as promised, consulted the U.S. Govt, but have not yet been furnished with their views.

MAB. 16/3
Central Dept

E. E. Cross
17/2

Now see draft by (W). to Washington, which they are anxious to get off as soon as possible.

The point at which there may be some doubt is, I think, para 2(b); but as this

W 285

This does not contain any extra vis-a-vis the U.S. Govt, ~~it~~ it appears to be all right.

North American/Dept pass Central/a.a.

(If the telegram is approved, the Consul will give me a number by phone and asks that it be sent straight off)

E. E. Cox
1892

Tel was approved & sent off vide WB 134.

Dec 19 1912

See within letter from P.S. (Prime Ministers Dept) to the Lord Lieutenant. Dec 17.

General Dept
Entrance

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall. 117

11th February, 1943.

Dear Millard,

I enclose a copy of a letter from the Belgian Prime Minister which arrived simultaneously with Mr.Eden's minute about Norwegian and Belgian relief. I am sending a plain acknowledgment; and will you please take it into consideration together with Monsieur Pierlot's letter of the 30th October. I am also sending a copy to Morrison at M.E.W.

Yours sincerely,

W 2551

13 FEB 1943

G.E.Millard Esq.,
Foreign Office.

COPY

117, Eaton Square
S.W. 1.

Cabinet
du
Premier Ministre

9th February, 1943.

My dear Prime Minister,

You were kind enough to let me know on November the 18th that you were giving careful consideration to my letter of October 30th last and that you would consult the United States Government on the subject of sending limited relief to the children of occupied Belgium on the basis of medical assistance.

I have just been informed that the ship to which I alluded in my letter of October 30th has sailed for the United States. The Belgian Government firmly hope that it will therefore be possible to make use of the opportunity of her return journey and that, by agreeing to deliver the necessary navicerts, the Governments of Great Britain and the United States will allow us to send, to the most destitute among our children in Belgium, the small quantities of vitamins and powdered milk so urgently needed.

I also understand that, in the mind of the American Government, the solution to this problem lies entirely with the British Authorities in London and that a favourable decision taken by them would in no way raise an objection in Washington.

As you are aware, the Belgium Government attach great importance to this matter and could indeed hardly submit to the idea of forsaking all efforts to bring relief, in however small a measure and with all necessary guarantees, to the Belgian children whose health and life are at stake. I have no doubt that in our endeavour we will meet the same

spirit of friendly co-operation of which the British Government have already given us so many proofs in other fields.

I would like to add my sincere congratulations for your happy return from a journey which we have all followed with the greatest interest. We all feel convinced that it has served a most useful purpose in the cause of the common victory we are looking forward to.

Believe me,

my dear Prime Minister,

with highest regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) HUBERT PIERLOT.

The Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10, Downing Street, S.W. 1.

17 February, 1943.

My dear Excellency,

I have received your letter of February 9 which is being considered together with your letter to me of October 30. I am sorry that it is taking so long to let you have a reply on this matter, but I am hopeful that it will soon be possible to reply to you more fully.

Please accept my warm thanks for the kind message you sent me on my return from North Africa and the Middle East.

Yours sincerely,

Winston S. Churchill.

His Excellency Monsieur Hubert Pierlot.

25-1

4 49

17. 2. 43.

V.G.Lawford, Esq.

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GENERAL

W 2554

13 FEB 1943

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1943

CO-ORDINATION

Registry Number W 2554/4/49

FROM Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare)

No. to Mr. Crowe. T 550/G/Z

Dated 11th Feb: 1943

Received in Registry 13th Feb: 1943

W. Co-ordination.

United States relief policy.

Encloses copies of telegrams from Washington No.445 Arfar and No. 446 Arfar of February 5th regarding United States policy for relief for occupied Europe. Encloses a draft telegram to Washington and requests observations as soon as possible.

Last Paper.

W2551

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Mr. Mr Troutbeck
& M. LeRougetel
✓ Feb. 16.

(Minutes.)

In view of the P.M.'s minute & the S/S (submitted separately) it is most important that the U.S.G. should be under no illusion as to our policy.

I should therefore like the words "in principle" should be omitted from para 1 of this draft; which otherwise seems to me all right.

N. A. Dept Mr Sit (see overleaf)

E. Crowe 15/2

I have discussed this letter with Mr Troutbeck & suggested some slight amendments. It is particularly important to make it clear on W'ton that all talk of the "conditions" in which we could

(Action completed.)

Ade. 24/2/43.

(Index.)

Adm 26/7

Next Paper.

W 2630 (W 2794)

send relief through the blockade is beside the mark at present. Since we do not believe that such conditions exist. In order to avoid appearing to stonewall on this point I have asked N.E.W. to insert an additional para at 4(e) in this draft (see my letter to Mr Troutbeck herein) using Governor Lehman's observations in Wilson Bel 541 Arfar as a peg. This should facilitate an approach to the same point from another angle i.e. in the absence of ~~any~~ more reliable data we cannot assess relative requirements in different countries and cannot therefore differentiate in our treatment of them. Still less can we determine how the conditions under which we should (hypothetically) be prepared to agree to such differentiation.

N. American Dept (first)
Southern Dept
Central Dept } a.a. J.H. LeRougetel
16/2.

There are a good many competitors for American foodstuffs at present, including the starving people of the U.S, and it wd. not surprise me if Gov. Lehman presently found that there was not so much public pressure for feeding O.E.T. NMButler 16/2 17/II

Arth Soon

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T.550/G/Z

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

11th February, 1943.

W 2554
13 FEB 1943

Dear Crowe,

I enclose for convenience of reference copies of Arfar telegram numbers 445 and 446 from Washington of February 5th about developments in American policy.

As I mentioned on the telephone, my Minister will be writing to your Secretary of State about this. Meanwhile, however we are anxious to provide our Embassy with some material to help them keep the deliberation on reasonable lines. We cannot of course put up "minimum conditions" as suggested by them, because our present attitude is unconditionally negative.

I should be most grateful if you would let me know as soon as possible whether we may send off our draft telegram of which I enclose a copy.

Yours sincerely

Archibald Campbell.

E. E. Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall,
S.W.1.

T550/G/Z

IMPORTANT. 10th February, 1943. 125

Telegram to H.M.R. Washington.

No. Arfar

Cypher

L.A.D.

Copy correspondence to:

E.E. Crowe, Esq., Foreign Office.

J.E. Wall, Esq., Ministry of Food.

E.D. Frazer, Esq., Ministry of War Transport.

Your telegrams No. 445 and 446 [Arfar of February 5th: American policy about relief]

We appreciate this full and early information regarding American intentions. Since however the present policy of H.M.G. is opposed (in principle) to relief through the blockade for countries other than Greece, we clearly cannot submit conditions as suggested in paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 446 [Arfar], and shall have to seek a directove as to our attitude in the face of these developments.

2. Meanwhile of course we have no reason to object if the Americans proceed to a detailed investigation on their own account before determining their own attitude for the future. It seems to us indeed that Lehman is setting about his business in a very practical and sensible manner. We particularly welcome the recognition that these problems cannot be treated without regard to questions of supply and shipping as well as of blockade, [and that above all decisions cannot be taken on the application of a single ally without reference to the claims of all the others.]

3. We also note with particular pleasure L's promise that in accordance with the pact made between ourselves and the American Government at their solicitation/

solicitation last Autumn, he will not act or assume moral committments without our agreement. We entirely agree with you that it is most important that we should keep in touch with current American deliberations on this question, and suggest that you should emphasize the following general considerations until such time as we are able to give you more definite instructions.

4. a) It would be very dangerous if these deliberations became known to the public, the Allied Governments, the people in occupied territories or the Germans, having regard to the present agreed policy of the British and American Governments and the consequences of raising expectations which are not fulfilled in fact.

b) Whatever may be said for a limited concession the difficulty of confining it within those limits cannot be underestimated. For instance, the supply of food would certainly be followed by strong pressure for the supply also of clothing, which raises quite a different set of problems in respect of the blockade. Moreover the demand for an increase in the supply of food would certainly be most powerful, especially if the food situation in the receiving countries deteriorated. As regards Lehman's expectations about the moral effect of the arrival of American foodstuffs in the occupied countries, he no doubt realises

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that if small quantities only were sent, attention might well be focused less on their arrival than on their insufficiency.

c) The scale and area to be covered by any operation of this kind must be fully appreciated. It would be essential, but very difficult, to secure the employment of a large number of competent neutral controllers; and these would have to enjoy freedom of movement and observation and facilities for transmitting rapid and confidential reports to the blockade authorities if an effective control even of the relief good themselves was to be maintained. In the occupied territories it is useless simply to hand goods over to the Red Cross Societies, which are necessarily subject to enemy pressure. Moreover guarantees capable of supervision by the Diplomatic representatives of a neutral Government are the only ones which could offer the least prospect of success.

d) The fundamental point however is that control of the relief supplies themselves is not enough while the Germans meanwhile are able to manipulate the level of nutrition in the recipient countries. In this connection it should be remembered that the Germans have no reason to favour a scheme which would of its nature be designed to offer no benefit to them. On the other hand they have every reason to wish to prevent it having the moral consequence anticipated in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 445 /Arfar/, and this could best be done by nullifying

its/.....

.....

its practical effect.

5. With regard to paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 445 [Arfar] it is most important that the fundamental distinction between intra blockade relief and relief through the blockade should be understood at the outset. The whole point of the former is that the goods have generally been accessible anyway to the enemy and not cut off by our controls. Thus nothing was added to the resources within his reach, and above all a natural limit on the extension of such schemes was imposed. On the other hand there is no natural limit to the proportions which relief through the blockade might attain in face of a potentially insatiable demand. The fact that Belgium has received disproportionately more than other countries under present arrangements is due partly to geography and partly to the American refusal to release funds for Norway at a time when goods in fairly substantial quantities could still be obtained in Sweden compatibly with our rule. It is particularly necessary that the Belgium scheme should not be taken as a precedent still less as a model, for relief through the blockade, since we have never insisted upon any special conditions of control in Belgium because we knew that to do so would be interpretated as an

admission/.....

admission that effective control was possible in present circumstances, which in turn would have been used to justify a reversal of blockade policy itself.

4 (e) No tariff or [illegible] can be framed by L (see your tel 521 Apr 5th) it is of vital importance to grasp what any relaxation of the blockade in favour of one country would produce ~~in the shape of~~ a demand for similar relaxations elsewhere. Such demands would be fatal to any tariff since it is not possible to assess relative requirements with any certainty. And moreover any action on lines indicated in (d) above would ~~[illegible]~~ render ~~[illegible]~~ data which might have been furnished by ~~[illegible]~~ such data as may be available of all value ~~[illegible]~~ might completely transform situation in every foreign country thereby rendering existing data of any practical value.

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[CYPHER]. LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Viscount Halifax. D. 5.45 a.m. February 6th, 1943.
No. 445. ARFAR. R. 12.30 p.m. February 6th, 1943.

February 5th, 1943.

yyyyyy

Following from Hall.

Lehman and Sayre dined with several of us last night and discussed blockade policy with special reference to the admission of supplies for civilian relief. We had supplied them several days ago with notes describing your policy and the several schemes you had allowed or were being pressed to allow for procuring supplies inside (repeat inside) blockade area. The scheme in your telegram No. 405 was also explained to them.

2. Lehman (and this applies even more strongly to Sayre) appears to be anxious to increase volume of relief to occupied territories and to be genuinely convinced of public pressure here in favour of opening blockade during war. But when pressed to name one single representative American organisation that had passed any resolution in this sense he was obliged to admit that he could not do so. His mind appears to be possessed with idea that presence in occupied countries of American food even in quite small quantities would act as a sort of talisman in maintaining will to resist and that failure of expectations of American beneficence would have a correspondingly depressing effect.

3. He made it clear, however, that it is his firm intention to collaborate fully with you and not (repeat not) to embarrass you by getting ahead in conversations with the European allies along lines with which you may find it difficult to agree. He realised in course of a general discussion about Norway that he might have embarrassed you by discussing plan for Lend-Lease parcels for Polish prisoners with Polish Ambassador before he had consulted you. (Our telegram No. 324) he offered spontaneously an apology if this should have been case and asked that it should be explained that if he had erred it was solely due to ignorance.

4. It emerged from conversation that he, like so many of American officials who have handled these matters hitherto, finds it really difficult to grasp distinction between schemes that involve purchase of relief supplies inside blockade area and those which permit admission of supplies through blockade. Even with financial point kept entirely on one side he could not grasp significance of distinction which you make between for example, the Belgian bulk purchases in Portugal and President's plan for a limited and experimental scheme for Norway based upon supplies sent into Sweden from this hemisphere.

5. See my immediately following telegram.

[CYPHER] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Viscount Halifax
No. 446 ARFAR.
5th February, 1943.

D. 5.51 a.m. 6th February, 1943.
R. 12.35 p.m. 6th February, 1943.

JJJJ

My immediately preceding telegram.

Lehman intends to proceed immediately to make a thorough examination of practical possibility of developing a scheme for relieving children in occupied territories by admitting supplies through blockade. He will ask for an estimate of number of children which it is desirable to feed and of the quantities of supplies necessary to do so. He will then examine whether we can safely take on a continuing and probably increasing liability to make the necessary supplies available from the resources at our disposal and the shipping and transportation problems that will arise.

2. He proposes also to examine the safeguards that ought to be required from occupying Power to see that no indirect benefit accrues to enemy and to make sure that relief supplies sent in are consumed by the ultimate beneficiaries in addition to and not instead of supplies that would have been made available by enemy.

3. Without prejudice to ultimate question as to whether relief supplies are to be sent in at all, it appears to be most desirable that we here should play our part in examining with him these matters. We are informing the Food and Shipping Missions and would like to have as soon as possible your minimum conditions under paragraph 2 above. At moment the Governor's mind runs on safeguarding supplies sent in. But he took point that this might not be sufficient if the Germans withheld as much or more than was sent in to any area.

OUT FILE

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

February 16th 1943.

We have been considering the draft telegram in Camps' letter to Crowe of February 11th, T.550/G/Z, but for the reasons which I explained to you this morning our reply has been delayed.

If you agree, we should like to suggest the following amendments to your draft.

In paragraph 1, line 3, insert "present" before "policy", and omit "in principle".

Paragraph 2, last sentence. Omit "and that above all..." to the end.

Paragraph 4. Insert the following at (e):

"Notwithstanding the view expressed by Lehmann, see your telegram No. 541 Arfar, it is of vital importance to grasp that any relaxation of the blockade in favour of one country would produce a demand for similar relaxations elsewhere. Such a demand would be particularly difficult to resist, since it is not possible to assess relative requirements with any certainty and, moreover, German action on lines indicated at (d) above might completely transform situation in any given country, thereby rendering existing data valueless."

(Sgd.) J.H. LE ROUGETEL.

J.M. Troutbeck Esq., C.M.G.

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1943

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 2630 134

15 FEB 1943

Registry Number W 2630/4/49

FROM Dr. Carl Burckhardt (International Red Cross Committee) to Mr. Roberts

No.

Dated 28th Dec. 1943

Received in Registry 15th Feb. 1943

W : Co-ordination

Relief work by International Red Cross.

Encloses a copy of a letter to Mr. Sullivan of British Legation at Berne, explaining the work being done by the Joint Relief Commission of the International Red Cross for the benefit of women and children victims of the War.

Last Paper.

W 2554.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

M.E.W. Feb 22.

(Minutes.)

Copy to M.E.W.

Central Depts

Southern Depts

E.R.C. 19/2

(Action completed.)

26/2/43

(Index.)

All 26/7

Next Paper.

W2660 (W3498)

COMMISSION MIXTE DE SECOURS
DE LA CROIX-ROUGE INTERNATIONALE

COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE — LIGUE DES SOCIÉTÉS DE LA CROIX-ROUGE

Téléphones { 5 52 20 / 5 52 29 / 4 23 05

Adresse télégraphique : Croimixt Genève

Compte de chèques postaux : I. 79

19 c
FEB 1943
135

GENÈVE, le 28 December 1942

4, COURS DES BASTIONS

W 2630
15 FEB 1943

V. réf.:

N. réf.: L/yz

1C

NAME INDEXED

Dear Mr Roberts,

I beg to send you enclosed copy of a letter which we have just addressed to the Commercial Secretary of the British Legation in Bern, Mr Sullivan, with a view to explaining the work being done by the Joint Relief Commission of the International Red Cross for the benefit of women and children victims of the war.

The letter in question gives a general survey of our activity in this field, and I trust that it will be of interest to you.

With all best wishes for the New Year, I remain

Yours sincerely,

Carl J. Burckhardt

1 enclosure

W. Roberts Esq.,
Foreign Office
London

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C o p y yz

L/yz

REGISTERED

21 December 1942

Dear Sir,

Pursuant to various conversations in the course of which we were able to outline to you the humanitarian activities of the Joint Relief Commission of the International Red Cross, you expressed the desire that we should send you a short account of the main facts which we had brought to your knowledge.

We therefore have the honour to send you the following information which has been brought up to date. You will thus find details on the activities of the Joint Commission up to recent weeks, in particular as regards the use made of the credit of three million Swiss francs, placed at the disposal of the Winter Help of Belgium by the Swiss Bank Corporation.

As you will recall, the Joint Commission was founded towards the end of the year 1940 by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies, in accordance with Article 9 of the Statutes of the International Red Cross, with the object of doing relief work amongst women and children who were victims of the war. For this purpose, an appeal was sent in November 1940 to the principal Governments and National Red Cross Societies throughout the world. The appeal asked for assistance (in money or in kind) or the granting of various facilities (exportation licences, means of transport, etc.).

../..

William John Sullivan, Esq.,
Commercial Secretary to the
British Legation
Thunstrasse 48
B e r n

Donations could be made "without any specified purpose", or, on the other hand, could be sent for a specific country.

The sums received as a result of the Appeal of November 1940 were extremely modest. In the beginning, the Joint Commission had not more than 60,000 Swiss francs to dispose of in its work for women and children in the war-stricken countries.

Beginning with the spring of 1941, larger sums were remitted to the Joint Commission. From that time on, the practice became more general of sending the Commission funds "for a specific purpose", i.e. for a given country. Thus, for instance, the Belgian Government in London, through Count de Kerchove and his organisation : the "Comité de Coordination du Ravitaillement belge à Lisbonne" (Coordination Committee of Belgian Relief in Lisbon), was able to send the Joint Commission during the year 1941 and in successive remittances, a total sum of 1,700,000 Swiss francs.

Two categories of funds may be distinguished amongst the monies received :

Funds coming from outside the blockade (Anglo-Saxon countries),

Funds coming from within the blockade (European belligerent or neutral countries).

Up till 1 November 1942, the Joint Commission had received 9 1/2 million Swiss francs from outside the blockade. Of this amount, 5,150,000 Swiss francs were destined for Belgium, 2,480,000 for Greece, 670,000 for Yugo-Slavia, 600,000 for Poland and 600,000 for the Netherlands.

The transfer of these funds to the Joint Commission was therefore possible, thanks to the agreement of the British Authorities who had asked that no purchase be made in enemy countries. The sums coming from outside the blockade could therefore be spent only in the neutral countries of Europe.

From the practical standpoint, this amounted to a heavy mortgage on the activities of the Joint Commission. The neutral markets were suffering from gradual shortage which in turn resulted in drastic measures of restriction, being taken with regard to exports. Furthermore, the few European countries where certain categories of foodstuffs might be obtained could not be taken into account, because they had to be considered as "enemy". This applied in particular to Hungary and Rumania.

../..

Despite these difficulties, the Joint Commission was able to obtain from neutral countries - in practice, almost exclusively from Switzerland - the requisite export permits for purchase of foodstuffs and pharmaceutical supplies. These purchases amounted on 1 November 1942 to a total of 7,100,000 Swiss francs, of which 3,300,000 were devoted to pharmaceutical products and 3,800,000 to foodstuffs.

If account is taken of the funds which are not yet disbursed, but which are already pledged by definite orders passed, it will be seen that on the date given, there remained available only 900,000 Swiss francs, or thereabouts, out of the 9,500,000 Swiss francs which had been received from Anglo-Saxon countries.

The clause referring to the non-utilisation of these funds in "enemy" countries has always been scrupulously observed.

As a whole, purchases made by the Joint Commission, thanks to sums received from outside the blockade, amount approximately to 1,400 tons (on 1 November 1942).

Out of this total, 400 tons were sent to Belgium and 620 to Greece; the remainder was sent to France, Serbia and Poland. These consignments were especially Swiss milk products and pharmaceutical supplies.

From information received by us, these consignments which were distributed in particular to nursery centres and children's homes, were instrumental in relieving great want. Yet they are small in comparison with the relief consignments sent from outside the blockade by the Allied Governments to the starving civilian populations of Belgium and Greece.

The "Comité de Coordination du Ravitaillement belge à Lisbonne" in particular was able to send to Belgium, up to 1 November 1942, 20,000 tons of Portuguese produce, the exportation of which was authorised thanks to agreement with the British Authorities.

Further, Greece had received by 1 November 1942 about 80,000 tons of foodstuffs (for the most part wheat) from the Near-East and Canada.

The Joint Commission was also able to pursue its activities by means of funds obtained within the blockade area. These comprise mainly donations sent by private individuals of humanitarian organisations in various European countries or deblocked funds which belonged to institutions in occupied countries.

../..

For your information personally, we should like to indicate that the purchases made thanks to these funds amounted on 1st November to approximately 9 million Swiss francs, representing 7,200 tons of foodstuffs, of which 5,000 were sent to Belgium, 700 to Greece and 1,500 to France.

The purchases made were mainly dried vegetables (peas, beans, etc.) of Hungarian and Rumanian origin. It was possible, thanks to these vegetables, to open soup kitchens which served the needs of the most destitute populations in Belgium, Greece and France.

In addition to purchases of foodstuffs and medical supplies, the Joint Commission was able to do useful work as an intermediary, i.e., by organizing transports, transit and in certain cases the distribution of relief consignments from humanitarian organisations overseas.

In particular, the Joint Commission has played an active part in the organisation of relief for Greece. Practically all the consignments of continental European origin which were sent to Greece were done so through the Joint Commission.

Further, and on several occasions, the Joint Commission was called upon to facilitate the forwarding of medical supplies which were sent by the American Red Cross to the Red Cross Societies of Belgium and France, and by the British Red Cross to the Serbian Red Cross. In addition to this, a consignment of 36 tons of medicaments belonging to the Commission for Polish Relief reached Poland through our organisation, and distribution has been begun with the assistance of a delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Dr de Wyss.

It should further be recalled that 50 tons of worn clothing, a gift from the American Quakers to the civilian internees in camps in the south of France, were the object of negotiations. The navicerts which were obtained enabled two first lots of 34 tons to arrive.

A first distribution has been started, organized and supervised by two delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross, MM. Ehrenhold and Mende, acting in behalf of the Joint Commission.

We have mainly concentrated our effort on medical supplies, both because the measures taken by the belligerents in carrying out economic warfare practically put a complete stop to the arrival in Europe of overseas relief, and because

../..

the possibilities of purchase by the Joint Commission continued to decrease on account of the gradual shrinkage of the markets.

A letter from the Ministry of Economic Warfare dated 14 October 1940, addressed to the International Committee of the Red Cross, contains the following passage :

> "His Majesty's Government are prepared in "accordance with the recognised principle "of international law to facilitate the "importation of medical supplies destined "essentially and exclusively for the "assistance of the sick and wounded ..."

A list of "essentially medical" supplies was handed to the Joint Commission which did not fail to consult it when the need arose.

With these specific regulations concerning medicaments in mind, the Joint Commission opened a "Dépôt Sanitaire de la Croix-Rouge" (Red Cross Hospital Supply Depot) at the in-bond warehouse of the goods-station at Geneva. It is proposed to build up here a stock of the most important medical supplies as a reserve in case of emergency (epidemics). The American Red Cross and the Canadian Red Cross have announced that they were going to send several gifts in kind for this Dépôt (two donations of £ 25,000 from the American Red Cross, and one gift of £ 25,000 from the Canadian Red Cross). Unfortunately the navicerts have not yet been obtained.

Despite the fact that medical supplies do not come within the blockade regulations - a rule which the British Authorities have recognised in principle, with only a few exceptions -, we have as yet been unable to make purchases overseas, because it has not been possible to obtain navicerts.

But many purchases of medical supplies have been possible within the blockade.

There now remains to give you a few explanations in regard to the use made of the credit of 3,000,000 Swiss francs which was opened by the Swiss Bank Corporation for the Belgian Winter Help.

The letter which you sent us on 20 June 1942 set out the conditions under which this credit might be used.

Despite the strictness of these conditions, we were able to use this credit to meet the repairs to the 35 "Caritas" (1,180,000 Swiss francs) then, quite recently, to purchase two lots of boots (18,000 pairs, amounting to

../..

220,000 Swiss francs and 15,000 pairs, amounting to 145,000 Swiss francs). The two latter purchases were made after ascertaining for certain that all the conditions were fulfilled (in particular, the fourth clause of your above-mentioned letter : that these quantities should come within the authorized export quotas).

A fresh purchase of Swiss pharmaceutical specialities for the Belgian Red Cross is being planned within the limits of this credit, at least until the "Comité de Coordination du Ravitaillement belge à Lisbonne" is able to transfer more funds to us. The orders will be passed to Swiss firms which are recognized by the British Government.

We think that you will thus have a general survey of the activities of the Joint Commission and that we have answered the questions which were raised during our conversation of 23 July. Needless to say, we are ready at all times to bring the information which we have just given you up to date.

In conclusion, you may percieve that the limits within which the Joint Commission is able to work are extremely narrow, and that it has always scrupulously observed the rules laid down, with the exception of one or two involuntary and quite unimportant errors.

We should like finally to point out an interesting passage in a speech which Mr Dingle Foot, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, made at a meeting of the "Peace Aims Conference" (London, 9 March 1942). Speaking of the blockade, Mr Dingle Foot mentioned three exceptions : relief from overseas for unoccupied France and Greece, and, further, relief for other countries, inasmuch as the purchases were made in neutral countries :

> "We agreed at a comparatively early stage to
> "purchases being made inside the blockade area.
> "We said we had no objection to the surplus
> "products of Switzerland, for example, being
> "purchased and sent to the people who were
> "hungry in the German occupied countries. Of
> "course we could not let through to those neutral
> "countries equivalent foodstuffs. Therefore, the
> "relief of that kind had to be confined to
> "indigenous foodstuffs of a kind which the neutral
> "country did not import through our controls.
> "Subject to these conditions we have encouraged
> "the exports of those particular countries to
> "German occupied countries. Under that arrangement
> "foodstuffs have gone from Switzerland to France
> "and certain other countries in small quantities,
> "from Portugal to Belgium, from Sweden to Norway
> "and from Turkey to Greece".

../..

We should prefer that our practical work be not handicapped by a further tightening of the rules which are in force at present, and which are already very strict. The situation of the markets today is such that the offers which we receive are generally made on a very short option. If each time, before purchasing with the "mortgaged" funds, we had to refer to London, we should run the risk of missing our last remaining chances of relief action.

Should you consider it useful, we shall resume with pleasure our conversations with you, in order to make a joint study of the information which it would be advisable to send to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, so that they may continue to be advised of our activities.

We beg to remain, dear Sir,

Yours very truly,

The Joint Relief Commission of the
International Red Cross

B. de Rougé Carl J. Burckhardt

50

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 2660
15 FEB 1943

143

Registry Number W 2660/4/49

FROM Miss Irene Ward (House of Commons)

No. to Mr. Eden.

Dated 9th Feb.,

Received in Registry 15th Feb., 1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for women and children in Europe.

The Woman Power Committee is going to discuss at its meeting on 16th February the problem of starving women and children in Europe. Enquires whether there are any plans under consideration or whether there is likely to be any possibility of doing anything to relieve the position.

Last Paper.

W2630

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/Miss Irene Ward (H/Commons)/fmw
Sgd S. Feb. 16.

(Minutes.)

I submit a draft reply to Miss Ward

E. C.
15/II

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
wlb 17/2/43	Alt 26/7

Next Paper.

W 2690.

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

ACKNOWLEDGED
11.2.43.

144

9th February 1943

W 2660

Dear Mr. Eden,

The Woman Power Committee which consists, as you may perhaps know, of all the women back bench Members and a considerable number of outside representative women as well, is going to discuss at its meeting on February 16th the problem of starving women and children in Europe which, as you know, is being pretty widely discussed at the present time.

We are all very anxious that the Government should not be embarrassed in any way and I should be grateful if you could give me any information as to whether there are any plans under under consideration or whether there is likely to be any possibility of doing anything, which I very much doubt, to relieve the position.

Yours sincerely,

Dr Emerard

Draft reply submitted

13/2

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W 2660/4/49

Draft.

Miss Irene Ward,

House of Commons.

(from the S. of S)

OUT FILE

145

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

Confidential 16 February, 1943.

Dear Miss Ward.

I am grateful ~~to you~~ for your letter of February 9th ~~in which you inform me of~~ calling my attention to the forthcoming discussion by the Woman Power Committee of the problem of European relief.

2. As I am sure you know, we agreed over a year ago to the despatch of relief to Greece and supplies of wheat, pulse and dried milk from Canada are being distributed in that country at the rate of 18,000 tons a month under the supervision of a Swedish-Swiss Commission. Conditions in Greece, however, have always been recognised as being far worse than anywhere else in Europe, probably because the Germans realised that they had nothing immediate to gain by keeping the population in even reasonable health. Such extreme conditions have not prevailed and do not at present prevail in any other of the occupied countries of Europe and neither the Cabinet nor the United States Government, with whom our blockade policy is agreed, have felt able to consent to similar relaxations in their favour.

3. It is a cardinal principle of His Majesty's Government that the enemy are responsible for feeding the population of the countries which they occupy and the Germans have tacitly admitted this principle, although they have of course everywhere reduced supplies to a minimum for bare existence. If we were to agree to send relief supplies through the blockade, we at

once/

once risk undermining the whole ground of principle and giving the Germans an excuse for withdrawing or withholding still more supplies from all occupied countries, in the knowledge that as conditions deteriorate we shall arrange for food to come through the blockade. Such a development would not only entirely defeat the whole of our blockade policy, but it would present a problem in supply and shipping which we should be quite unable to solve.

4. As I have already said, our policy in these matters is laid down in close agreement with the United States Government who are equally determined with us that nothing shall be done which will weaken our blockade of the enemy. Both Governments are however fully aware of the plight of the civilian population of occupied Europe and especially of the children and they are constantly considering the possibility of bringing them some degree of relief.

Yours sincerely. 19 ii

Sd) Anthony Eden.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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(W 2660/4/49) Confidential 16 Feb 1943.

OUT FILE

1C

Dear Miss Ward.

I am grateful for your letter of the 9th February calling my attention to the forthcoming discussion by the Woman Power Committee of the problem of European relief.

2. As I am sure you know, we agreed over a year ago to the despatch of relief to Greece and supplies of wheat, pulse and dried milk from Canada are being distributed in that country at the rate of 18,000 tons a month under the supervision of a Swedish-Swiss Commission. Conditions in Greece, however, have always been recognised as being far worse than anywhere else in Europe, probably because the Germans realised that they had nothing immediate to gain by keeping the population in even reasonable health. Such extreme conditions have not prevailed and do not at present prevail in any other of the occupied countries of Europe and neither the Cabinet nor the United States Government, with whom our blockade policy is agreed, have felt able to consent to similar relaxations in their favour.

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/blockade.

Miss Irene Ward, C.B.E., M.P.

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Yours sincerely

(Sd) Anthony Eden.

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GENERAL

W 2690

15 FEB 1943

149

CO-ORDINATION

Registry Number W 2690/4/49.

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare.

No. T 550/25.

Dated 11th Feb.,1943.

Received in Registry 15th Feb.,1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Relief purchases in Switzerland.

Transmits copy of telegram to Washington No.552 Arfar February 10th. The Belgian and Yugoslav Governments have again pressed for replies regarding relief purchases in Switzerland. Outlines the present position. Proposes to approve the financial aspect of the Belgian, Dutch and Yugoslav requests. Asks for United States reply by February 11th.

Last Paper.

W 2660

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See within copy of tel to Washington No 84 Arfar Jan 18

MAPB. 24/2

Central
Soultzer / depts
28/2

L.E.C. 19/2

See within copy of letter from Mr. Campo (M.E.W.) to Mr Fraser (Treasy) of Feb 26.

MAPB. 6/3

Central & Dept
Soultzer J.W.L. 8/3

L.E.C. 8/3

See within copy of letter from Mr Fraser (Treasy) to Mr. Campo (M.E.W.) of March 5

MAPB. 11/3

Central
Soultzer 12/3

L.E.C. 11/3

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
Pub 24/2/43	Alt 26/2

Next Paper.

W 2792 (W 3900a)

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.

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W 2690
15 FEB 1943

T550/25

[CYPHER] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 552 ARFAR. D. 12.15 a.m. 11th February, 1943.
10th February, 1943.

£ £ £

IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 84 [Arfar of January 9th: relief purchases in Switzerland].

Both the Belgian and Yugoslav Governments have again pressed for replies. Our prolonged silence is causing a most painful impression. Question raised in my telegram No. 479 [Arfar of February 5th] may also call for an urgent decision.

2. Our position is as follows.

(a) We are committed to allow these transactions in principle by a decision taken and communicated to the Americans in April 1941. This has been frequently quoted since to the Allied Governments concerned. We cannot therefore refuse assent in the present cases unless convincing practical reasons can be shown and explained to them. We cannot find such reasons, as the Treasury is prepared in the circumstances to facilitate remittances within the limits indicated.

(b) We fully share the Americans view about the need to conserve scarce currencies. In fact the Treasury is clear that we cannot assume any considerable further commitments for intra-blockade relief purchases in any neutral European country apart from those already existing in Portugal and those now proposed in Switzerland and Turkey.

(c) We have been and still are anxious to discuss the general question with the Americans, and the above will show you that it should not be difficult to reach a mutually acceptable arrangement. But the delay which has occurred makes it imperative to secure an early and favourable answer to the particular propositions now before us.

3. We therefore propose that we should approve the financial aspect of the Belgian, Dutch and Yugoslav requests mentioned in my telegram No. 6444 [Arfar of December 5th] within the limits there explained, and also the Yugoslav proposal mentioned in my telegram No. 479 [Arfar of February 5th]. The commodity aspect would then still remain to be settled. In our communications

6492

/ to .....

Copy also to W L Frost Esq Treas.

T550/25
E E Crowe Esq. F.O.
11/2/43

to the Allied Governments in question we should take this opportunity of warning them that present conditions will certainly restrict and may prohibit an extension of remittances for these purposes to neutral European countries, thus clearing the ground for the future. We should then work out definite limits in consultation with the Treasury and the Americans to cover the amount of each neutral currency which could (if at all) be allocated to this class of relief purchases over a given period ahead.

4. We feel obliged to answer our questioners without further delay. Please, therefore ask urgently for United States concurrence before February 18th. We feel sure that United States authorities will recognize our proposal as a practical effort to reach a reasonable solution; that they will appreciate our difficulties; and that they will not suspect us of rushing them in view of the time which has elapsed since our telegram No. 6444 [Arfar of December 5th].

to the Allied Governments in question we should take this opportunity of warning them that present conditions will certainly restrict and may prohibit an extension of remittances for these purposes to neutral European countries, thus clearing the ground for the future. We should then work out definite limits in consultation with the Treasury and the Americans to cover the amount of each neutral currency which could (if at all) be allocated to this class of relief purchases over a given period ahead.

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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T550/25

[CYPHER] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 84 ARFAR. D. 3.45 p.m. 9th January, 1943.
9th January, 1943.

M1

£ £ £ W2690/4/49

IMPORTANT.

My telegram No. 6444 [Arfar of 5th December: European Relief].

I am becoming increasingly embarrassed by absence of reply to my telegram and must beg you to impress upon the United States authorities the urgent need for a statement of their views.

2. The latest approach has been from the Yugoslav Government who have asked for the release of 440,000 Swiss francs for the purchase in Switzerland of milk (and possibly cheese) to the value of 300,000 francs and quinine to the value of 140,000, for the Yugoslav civil population. In view of past assurances to the Yugoslav Government (the latest one contained in a letter from the Prime Minister to the Yugoslav Prime Minister of July 12th) that we have no objection to the despatch of foodstuffs from within the blockade area provided that they are not of a type imported through the blockade, I should find it very difficult to refuse the application for milk and cheese. I trust therefore that the United States Government will agree to our releasing the necessary Swiss francs for this part of the purchase. This would not, of course, be additional to the lump sum for all Allied relief purchases mentioned in paragraph 6 of my telegram under reference.

3. I should, of course, have to refuse the application for quinine for reasons well known to you, but would like to say that there would be no objection to quinine substitutes.

4. In replying to the Yugoslav Government as above I would propose to add that we are hoping to agree with the International Red Cross a list of goods, with quantities, which may be bought in Switzerland and exported as relief to occupied territories and that in the meantime I can give no assurance that unlimited further quantities of milk products or indeed of any particular commodities will be permissible.

5. I attach great importance to being able to reply to the Yugoslav Government without undue delay.

M.E.W. FILE NO. T550/25
COPY FOR. Miss Laffyn
DATE 15.2.43 F.D

Copies to:
T550/28a
T550/25
T550/20

2690 4 49. MM

#59

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

T.550/Z

26th February, 1943.

INDEXED

W 2690

W 1692

With reference to our telegrams number 6444 Arfar of December 6th, number 84 Arfar of January 9th and number 552 Arfar of February 10th to Washington about transfers for relief purchases in Switzerland, I now enclose a copy of Washington telegram number 668 of February 20th indicating that the State Department agree to the Belgian, Dutch and Yugoslav requests in their financial aspect. The reference to telegram number 655 quoted at the head of this telegram is irrelevant, and I am therefore not enclosing a copy of it.

This means that you could now tell the various applicants that the means of financing their immediately proposed purchase will be available, if and when the purchases themselves are approved by this Ministry. In so doing, perhaps you would be kind enough to indicate that present conditions will certainly restrict and may prohibit further remittances of the kind, as proposed in paragraph 3 of our telegram number 552 Arfar to Washington. It also seems clear that, since the claims of other Allies besides the Belgians may be considerable, it is not possible to promise the Belgians any definite monthly allocation for the remainder of the year. They will obviously have to take a

fair/

W. L. Fraser, Esq.,
H.M.Treasury,
S.W.1.

fair share only of what is available, and what is available is limited to £500,000 worth of Swiss francs in all.

I am afraid that when the Allies in question come round to us for approval of their transactions, they are liable to be subjected to further delays for the reasons explained in my letter T550/19/28/A of December 4th. This however will be our sorrow, and I imagine that you will be glad to feel that your duty is fulfilled. Needless to say it is most important that no actual transfers should be authorised until we give the word.

There remain two further points. First, as a matter of procedure, I think you will agree that it will save you a lot of trouble in future if Allied applications to transfer money to Europe for these purposes are made to us in the first instance. This would leave us to carry our own baby, and all you would have to do when people come to you would be to tell them that they must settle with us first.

The second point arises from paragraph 3 of our telegram number 552 Arfar to Washington. I think it is generally agreed that the Allied purchases if carried beyond a certain point will eat up foreign exchange which simply cannot be afforded in present circumstances. On the other hand it is quite certain that the demand to be allowed to make such purchases will steadily increase, as the various Allies are gradually getting themselves organized on the same lines as the Belgians. It therefore seems very important that we should determine in advance just how far we can go in allowing remittances, and this would be true even were it not desirable to avoid further friction with the Americans. I hope therefore

that/ . . .

that you will be able soon to make some suggestions (on the lines of the last sentence of paragraph 3 of our telegram number 552) covering the amounts which we could reasonably allow to be transferred to Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Sweden. Switzerland thank goodness is already settled. We could then discuss the estimates together and be at peace with the Americans for a long time to come.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Crowe at the Foreign Office.

Sgd. W a Campos.

1550

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[CYPHER] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Viscount Halifax.
No. 668. ARFAR.
20th February, 1943.

D. 1.01 a.m. 21st February, 1943.
R. 8.00 a.m. 21st February, 1943.

q q q

IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 655 paragraph 3.

State Department in written reply signed by Lehman say they have no objection to Belgian and Dutch transactions (your telegram No. 6444) nor to Yugoslav transaction (your telegram No. 84) so far as purchase of milk, cheese and quinine substitutes is concerned. They doubt, however, whether exportable surpluses of foodstuffs and other supplies indigenous to Switzerland are available in appreciable amounts. This no doubt will be made clear in discussions of the commodity aspect of the problem to which you will now be proceeding.

2. United States Government are themselves receiving an increasing number of requests for facilities for transfer of funds for similar purposes and assume that His Majesty's Government would interpose no objection should the United States Government decide to grant facilities for such transfers on a greater scale than in the past.

3. My telegram under reference paragraph 2. In written reply State Department suggest that despatch of parcels to Czechsin concentration camps should not be sanctioned.

4. Letter follows.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF MR. W. L. FRASER.

157

F.17602

2690 4 49

5th March, 1943.

9 MAR 1943

Dear Camps,

I want to thank you for the offer which you made in your letter of 26th February to arrange the allocation between the Allies of money (within an overriding limit of £½ million) which the U.S. and we have now agreed may be transferred to Switzerland for relief purchases there.-

I need not, of course, emphasize that we do not regard this sum as one which must be spent in any circumstances and I know that you will not approve any proposals which they put to you unless you are quite satisfied that they are justified from all aspects, and not merely unobjectionable from the blockade point of view.

Perhaps the most convenient procedure would be for you to agree with us generally, in the first instance, a rough allocation of remittances among the Allies which would, of course, have to be subject to modification from time to time. Then, when any particular requests were made to you, it would be sufficient for you to let us have a note saying what amount you considered could be approved. I shall, accordingly, refer the various applicants to you as quickly as possible, and I think you will find them all rather anxious to proceed after the long delay, but no doubt you will be able to appease them.

Regarding the question of fixing a maximum for purchases in other countries, I have been talking this matter over with Harmer and we have come to the conclusion that it is not practicable. We rather feel that the matter should first be approached from the angle of what the Allies could be allowed to spend from the blockade point of view, and we should then have to consider to what extent we could fit the remittances in. It seems to us that our financial policy has of necessity to be a rather hand-to-mouth one which may vary from time to time according to circumstances.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Crowe (Foreign Office).

Yours sincerely,

W. A. Camps, Esq.
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

(sgd) W. L. Fraser.

52.

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GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 2792

17 FEB 1943

Registry Number } W 2792/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare.

No. T 550/G/Z

Dated 16th Feb.,1943

Received in Registry } 17th Feb., 1943.

W : Co-ordination

Last Paper.

w2690 (w2554)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Relief for Europe

Transmits copy of telegram from Washington No. 447 Arfar of 5th February regarding the position of the present relief schemes of the Germans decide to shorten their lines by withdrawing from one or more of the occupied territories, leaving His Majesty's Government with the problem of relieving and rehabilitating these territories while hostilities are still going on in other parts of Europe.

(Minutes.)

Sec Minute on W.318

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
9/3/43	All 26 1

Next Paper.

(w4098)

w2996

W 2792
17 FEB 1943

159

[Cypher]. SPECIAL ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Viscount Halifax. D. 12.05 p.m. 6th February, 1943.
No. 447 Arfar
5th February, 1943. R. 6.15 p.m. 6th February, 1943.

////

Secret.

My immediately preceding telegrams.

Following from Hall for Drogheda and Vickers.

Having regard to both the quality [sic] of foods and the shipping space available to the Allies, it appears to me that we may find ourselves in the course of this year in a most embarrassing position if the Germans decide to shorten their lines by withdrawing from one or more of the present occupied territories leaving us with the problem of relieving and rehabilitating these territories while hostilities are still going on in other parts of Europe. If we were to fail to find quickly a satisfactory solution to the problem with which we would be confronted, political consequences might be serious in Europe and the effect upon our own food supplies and shipping might be such as to curtail our own war effort.

2. Has the possibility of this occurring been examined by the appropriate committee of Chiefs of Staff? If it has not, I suggest it might be worth giving it some urgent consideration as potential demand that any limited German withdrawal might make upon our resources, particularly shipping, seems to me to be one factor that ought to be taken into serious consideration by Lehman when he is examining the practical possibility of sending relief supplies into occupied territories. It might be really difficult for us if we had already worked up relief scheme for Norway, Holland and Belgium for example, to be obliged to continue these at a time when a German withdrawal from, say, a large area of France was placing an immense strain upon our resources in meeting the needs of liberated territory.

3. This may sound to you somewhat unreal but I feel we shall be wise to make Lehman face in the near future all problems that may arise before he commits himself to relief plans that may later break down because of increasing pressure upon our limited resources.

4. May I have your views?

O.T.P.

M.E.W. FILE NO. 1550/9/7.
COPY FOR General Division
DATE 10/2/43.

53

GENERAL

1943

W 2796
17 FEB 1943
160

Registry Number W 2796/4/49

FROM Lt.Col.Sir C. Headlam, M.P. to Mr.Law.

No.

Dated 11th Feb.,1943.

Received in Registry 17th Feb.,1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Relief for Belgium and France.

Encloses a copy of a letter from some of his constituents regarding relief for Belgium and France. Enquires whether it is true that food and neutral shipping are available and if so, whether navicerts will be granted.

Last Paper.

W 2792.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft for ltr to Sir C. Headlam from Mr Law Feb 16.

(Minutes.)

Ltr written

E.H.C. 2/42

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
mb 4/3/43	AHH 26/7

Next Paper.

W 2845 (W5573)

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

I read over the attached
draft reply to Mr Camps. M. E.W.;
for his approval. He suggested the
amendments contained in manuscript.

E. E. Crowe.
1972

Mr. Law
Gen. Dept.

162

W. 2796

17 FEB 1943

Dear Law

reference enclosed: I should be grateful if you would let me know whether the statement which I have marked in paragraph 2 is correct? and, if so, whether it is intended to issue the navicerts?

Sincerely yours

Cuthbert Headlam

163

(COPY)

21, Eldon Place,
Newcastle.
February 8th, 1943.

Dear Sir,

We, the undersigned members of your constituency, are deeply concerned at the state of famine in the occupied countries of Europe, and most earnestly ask you to support any practicable scheme for relief.

As you are probably aware, the Famine Relief Committee, under the chairmanship of the Bishop of Chichester, has put forward a scheme for sending monthly consignments of vitamin capsules and dried milk for children under sixteen, expectant and nursing mothers, and people suffering from deficiency diseases in Belgium and France. The food and neutral shipping, and necessary organisation for distribution are all available; the sole remaining obstacle is the absence of navicerts from the British Government.

We understand that a meeting is to be held at the House of Commons on Wednesday, February 17th, for members of both Houses, at which the Archbishop of Canterbury is to speak on Famine Relief in Europe. We hope that you will attend the meeting, and do all in your power to urge the Government to take immediate action in the matter.

Yours faithfully,

DIANA M. LALL	19, Eldon Place
C.E. MALLIN	"
JANET MULHOLLAND	21, Eldon Place
H.P. MULHOLLAND	"
O.E. PAGE	29, Eldon Place
B.S. PAGE	"
BRIAN STANLEY	20, Framlington Place
AUDREY STANLEY	"

Lt.-Col.
Sir C. Headlam, D.S.O., M.P.

164

Registry No. W 2796/4/49

E.E.C.

Draft.

Lieut.-Col. Sir Cuthbert Headlam, D.S.O., M.P. House of Commons, S.W.1.

OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

February, 1943.

Thank you for your letter of February 11th about relief schemes for Belgium and France.

As regards the specific statements made by your constituents in their letter to you are concerned, the question is far from being as simple as these would make it appear. ~~The quantities~~ of milk which the Famine Relief Committee has suggested sending to Belgium and Greece alone are very considerable and we here have no information at all to show that they would in fact be available. The statement about shipping is equally open to question. Neutral shipping allocated to the various Red Cross organisations are at present fully engaged in transporting supplies for prisoners of war and while it is not impossible that arrangements could be made for shipping relief supplies, it is hardly correct to say that such shipping is now available. On the other hand, it is definitely not the case that the necessary organisation for distribution exists. The American Red Cross had, it is true, a small organisation in unoccupied France distributing small quantities of supplies to children; but since the German invasion of the unoccupied zone ~~this organisation has, of course, ceased to exist.~~ ~~Moreover,~~ Any such organisation to function effectively would have to be on a scale which would enable it

not/

(From Mr. Law.)

H.M.G. have no information to show that either food or shipping are available and I find it hard to believe that if in fact they were this information would not have been brought to our notice. Nor are we aware of the existence of any organization adequate to control distribution

15/2

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

not only to control the distribution of the relief supplies but also to ensure that the enemy did not either increase requisitions of local produce or reduce quantities of imports from other enemy or enemy-occupied territory.

All this goes to show that far from the absence of British navicerts being the only remaining obstacle to the despatch and distribution of relief, there are many problems to be solved before the stage of navicerts is reached. ~~There~~ are, however, ~~a~~ further considerations of a wider character which makes such a statement even wider of the mark. ~~[As you probably know, our blockade~~ policy is closely concerted with that of the U.S. Government and the latter is just as opposed as we are to anything which will weaken our joint blockade of the enemy. Furthermore, the two Governments are pledged not to introduce any modifications in their policy without mutual consultation and agreement. To attribute an obstruction to the British Government therefore ~~is quite unjustified.]~~ ~~Moreover, it may be worth pointing out~~ in the event of the necessary consent being given to the shipment of supplies to occupied Europe, these will almost certainly be drawn in large measure from the U.S. in which case U.S. export licences would be required and not British navicerts.

Moreover whole Our blockade policy is closely concerted with that of the U.S. Govt and you will doubtless have seen from the latest public pronouncements that it is also strongly opposed to any relaxation of the blockade of the enemy.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(SGD.) RICHARD LAW.

166

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W. 1.
16th February,
1943.

Thank you for your letter of February 11th about relief schemes for Belgium and France.

As regards the specific statements made by your constituents in their letter to you are concerned, the question is far from being as simple as these would make it appear. His Majesty's Government have no information to show that either food or shipping are available and I find it hard to believe that if in fact they were this information would not have been brought to our notice. Nor are we aware of the existence of any organisation adequate to control distribution. Any such organisation, to function effectively would have to be on a scale which would enable it not only to control the distribution of the relief supplies but also to ensure that the enemy did not either increase requisitions of local produce or reduce quantities of imports from other enemy or enemy-occupied territory.

All/

Lt.-Col. Sir C. Headlam, Bt., DSO., MP.

All this goes to show that far from the absence of British navicerts being the only remaining obstacle to the despatch and distribution of relief, there are many problems to be solved before the stage of navicerts is reached. Moreover, our whole blockade policy is closely concerted with that of the United States Government and you will doubtless have seen from the latter's public pronouncements that it is also strongly opposed to any relaxation of the blockade. In the event of the necessary consent being given to the shipment of supplies to occupied Europe, these will almost certainly be drawn in large measure from the United States in which case United States export licences would be required and not British navicerts.

I return herewith the enclosure to your letter.

(SGD.) RICHARD LAW.

54

168

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 2845

19 FEB 1943

Registry Number W 2845/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare

No. T 550/9/2

Dated 16th Feb.,1943

Received in Registry 18th Feb., 1943.

W : Co-erdination

Relief for Europe.

Transmits copy of the telegram from Washington No. 541 Arfar of 10th February regarding relief schemes for Europe.

Last Paper.

W 2796.

References.

(Minutes.)

W 3134

Sent to W'k : W 2551

19/2

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
25/2/43	Alt 26/7

Next Paper.

W 2865 (W3188)

W 2845

18 FEB 1943

169

[CYPHER] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Viscount Halifax
No. 541 Arfar
10th February, 1943

D. 3.05 p.m. 11th February, 1943
R. 10.25 p.m. 11th February, 1943

ddddddd

My telegram No. 446. W 2554

High Commissioner had a further long talk last night with Governor Lehman and his rapidly expanding senior staff. The latter are being recruited partly from the ranks of professional humanitarians and powerfully reinforce the Governor's own predisposition in favour of an experimental scheme to feed shildren with milk products and vitamins sent from United States. He recognises that a great many points of detail will have to be settled before anything can be done. But he is not impressed with argument that we cannot continue to refuse relief to children of other European Allies once we have started to relieve any one of them. He is confident that any scheme which may be started can be kept within manageable proportions.

2. He now has at his disposal a staff of high pressure organisers who have literally no other duties than to examine possible schemes. We are doing our utmost to get from them the views of United States Government on various schemes, including child evacuation plan, that have already been put by us to State Department. But it is not possible to hold off discussion of their own schemes. May I have therefore, as soon as possible, some indication of your mind about the kind of conditions that we would have to require from the Germans as a [grp. undec. ?prior] condition to admitting relief supplies and also sort of arrangements for supervision that you would require?

3. We are, and will be, at pains to make it clear that any discussion of schemes is without prejudice to question whether supplies to be sent through blockade at all.

4. I think the best way of handling the whole business will be to press Lehman to pay a visit to London in the near future. In this connexion please see my telegram No. 688 to Foreign Office.

O.T.P.

M[illegible] No. T550/9/7
O[illegible] General Division 7-0
DAT[illegible] 16/2/43 (0)4

55

1943

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 2865 170

18 FEB 1943

Registry Number W 2865/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare.

No. T 550/G/Z.

Dated 16th Feb: 1943.

Received in Registry 18th Feb:1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Relief for occupied Europe.

Transmits copies of telegrams from Washington No 562 Arfar and No 563 Arfar of February 12th giving the text of an allegation made by Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson in an article in "Colliers" weekly magazine to the effect that His Majesty's Government admitted relief to Greece in the first instance only because Turkey took the issue out of their hands. They also call for action from America for other occupied countries.

Last Paper.

W 2845

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See minutes

E.C.S. 19/2

See within copy of tel to Washington no 659 Arfar. Feb 18.

Political Dept 27/2.

E.C.S. 25/2

D

(Action completed.)

nfb. nfb 1/3/43 19/2/43.

(Index.)

ACH 26/2

Next Paper.

W 2882.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

See attached telegrams

This story of Turkish black-mail to induce us to open to Turk relief has cropped up before ~~and~~ but we have hitherto taken little notice of it; but coming in its present form I think it is clear (and H.C.W agrees) that we must say something about this.

There seem to be three ways of doing this:-

(1) We might ask News Dept to arrange for someone to call on interview with the Turkish Ambassador and ask for explanation of this story.

(2) We might concoct our own reply and send it to the Turkish Ambassador with Mr Hoover's article; say that with his concurrence we propose to issue it; and suggest that he might associate himself with it & issue way, e.g. a statement that was issued with the approval of the Turkish Embassy

(3) We could telegraph to Constans and ask them to try to get the Turkish Govt to issue the true story.

On the whole I prefer (2) but

News Dept / first for obs.
Sanctuary
? Southern (do not appear to be concerned with)

E. Crowe
16/2
I

I don't much like bringing the Turkish Govt into this either here or in Angora. We shd find it difficult to prove that the they have tapered this story, as we apparently think they have.

The remedy seems to lie in Washington. Lord Halifax seems to think (§ 3 tel.) that he could nail the lie at Geneva material.

P.B.Ikin
16/3.

I have so informed

Mr Campbell who will reply

E.C.
17/3

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

W 2865
18 FEB 1943

173

[CYPHER]. LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Viscount Halifax
No: 562 ARFAR
February 12th, 1943.

D. 12. 49 a.m. February 13th, 1943.
R. 7. 10 a.m. February 13th, 1943.

11111

IMMEDIATE

My immediately following telegram contains the text of an allegation made by Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson in an article which appears in "Colliers" weekly magazine today to the effect that His Majesty's Government admitted relief to Greece in the first instance only because Turkey took the issue out of their hands.

2. The authors go on to describe conditions, particularly in Norway, Belgium and Poland and call for action from America in view of the fact that "This is not a British problem, We Americans are also blockading these people. It is an Allied problem and we are an Ally. From the form of recent announcements it would appear that the relief problem had been transferred from London to Washington". They urge that the first step in Governor Lehman's task should be measures to save the small democracies.

3. Would you let us know whether, and if so in what terms, we should reply to Mr. Hoover's version of the story of Turkish relief of Greece.

M.E.W. FILE No. 1550/C/2
COPY FOR Mr E.E. Crowe
DATE 16/2/43

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(1)

ARFAR. O.B.

En Clair Viscount Halifax (WASHINGTON) to M.E.W.

D. M.L.T., 12th February, 1943

R. 1. 50 p.m., 13th February, 1943

No. 563 ARFAR

My immediately preceding telegram. Food is being sent through Blockade to starving Greeks we can rejoice this heroic people being saved from annihilation occupied by Axis armies Greece being fed through Allied Blockade and under neutral supervision and operation is certified by our Government not to benefit Axis it receives approval help our Government as Americans we can rejoice in wisdom that has led to this total reversal our Government policy on relief it has proved workable in Greece although on scale our Government described "Still woefully inadequate" so we warranted hoping for further and early action first - it imperative there be immediate increase volume aid to Greece if that gallant people is to be saved second-time has come decide (before it too late) what we going do for 50,000,000 starving people (including some 12,000,000 children) Belgian, Holland, Norway, Poland indeed March events is accelerating at such rate as justify hope action before this article appears but if there no such motion a little straight from shoulder speaking may be help bringing realisation of some moral political obligations any event this article will serve its purpose to advocate action if we still lagging to justify and support Government if it is moved not quickly decisively but slowly increasing trickly help to Greece began Summer 1941. Its beginning is significant one day August London Times printed brief paragraph to effect Foreign Office had consented open the blockade for certain quantities food go to suffering population Greece second of writers this article Mr. Hugh Gibson was in London at request of two of occupied countries to try persuade British open blockade so as allow feeding the other small democracies he at once deluged questions from exiled Governments as to foundation this report he was astounded at other but was given explanation that same afternoon he received visit from Turkish Ambassador an old friend who came talk about another problem during asked if report was true and if he knew how it had come about Ambassador replied it was true and he had brought it about because if he said although Turks Greeks had been great enemies they had settled their quarrels and were both determined go on being friends when disaster overtook Greece and wholesale starvation spread throughout country Turkish Government considered it had moral obligation to its neighbour Ambassador was instructed approach British Government and urge relief operations be allowed for Greeks due course he received customary reply enumerating usual arguments against any help populations under Nazi occupation this unfavourable reply was forwarded to Ankara and short time later came telegram instructing Ambassador inform Foreign Office that on such and such date such and such ships loaded with food would sail from such and such ports in Turkey for such and such ports in Greece this aid the trick most countries could not carried it off this way but Turkey is highly important neutral that could not be antagonised not only were ships allowed go through to their destination but when experience proved operation involved no danger to Allied armies that in no way benefited Nazis volume relief was

increased/

M.E.W. FILE No. 1550/G/1
COPY FOR Mr E. E. Crowe.
DATE 16/2/43

increased and financial facilities were provided by Britain America whole operation was regularized by agreements setup by Swedish Swiss authorities and placed under guardian-ship International Red Cross exactly as writers this article had proposed eighteen months before civilization may well be grateful to hunt for opening door to reason and compassion whole problem was bogged down in Governmental refusal examine possibilities relief this was all more baffling because whole question relief had been thoroughly tested during last war by feeding ten millions Belgians Frenchmen living under German armies occupation.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

2865/4 wtt 49 HP

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

20 FEB 1943

MEW. FILE NO. 1550/G/Z

COPY FOR Mr Craik (and)

DATE 19/2/43

INDEXED

(T 550/G/Z)

[CYPHER].

LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON

No: 659 ARFAR
February 18th, 1943.

D. 5. 30 p.m. February 18th, 1943.

11111

IMPORTANT

Your telegram No. 562 [Arfar of February 13th: Hoover-Gibson article].

We do not think it would be advisable to issue démenti without further provocation. Should you be questioned, however, on the subject of this article, you can state with confidence that it is false in every particular: that no (repeat no) communication of the kind described was made by the Turkish Government to His Majesty's Government: and that the only basis for the story is that the Turkish Government, in response to a request by His Majesty's and Greek Governments, generously consented to make certain supplies available for purchase on behalf of the starving Greek population.

2. We leave it to you, however, to decide whether it might not be advantageous to invite such a question through your connexions with the American press.

56

GENERAL

1943

INATION.

W 2882

18 FEB 1943

177

Registry Number W 2882/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated).

No.

Dated 10th Feb.1943

Received in Registry 18th Feb.1943

W : Co-ordination.

Relief for Norway.

Transmits copy of a letter to Mr. Riefler (United States Embassy) from Mr. Troutbeck (Ministry of Economic Warfare) of 10th February enclosing a draft of a letter to the Commercial Counsellor at Stockholm regarding relief for Norway from Sweden. Requests his views.

Last Paper.

W2865

(Minutes.)

Var Attn Dept 24/2

Eco 25/2/43

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
20/2/43	Att 24/2

Next Paper.

W2953 (+3271)

T550/12

With the Compliments of Mr. J.M. Troutbeck.

Ministry of Economic Warfare,

Berkeley Square House,

Berkeley Square, W.1.

10th February, 1943.

W 2882

18 FEB 1943

I enclose a copy of a draft letter to our Commercial Counsellor at Stockholm, about which I should be grateful for your views. The papers referred to in the draft are not enclosed as they are bulky and largely irrelevant. The question asked by Mr. Mitcheson to which this is a reply is stated at the end of the first paragraph of the draft.

The question has risen because of recently aroused Swedish interest in the relief of Norway. Considerable funds have been collected in Sweden, and the Commercial Counsellor is frequently faced with requests that he should approve the issue of Swedish export permits for various foodstuffs etc. which Swedish donors want to send. There is of course a good deal of ill feeling if all such requests are refused or if a decision on them is very long delayed. On the other hand we have to stick to our rules.

As you know, the general rule regarding relief exports from neutral European countries has required that these shpuld contain nothing of a kind which was imported into the supplying country through the blockade. This rule was established from experience in Portugal, and it does not exactly or conveniently apply to a country such as Sweden where the War Trade Agreement is on a somewhat different basis. We feel that we should not agree to the export of any goods whose export from Sweden is categorically prohibited. This excludes goods on List "A". On the other hand the War Trade Agreement restricts exports of most other goods to the limits of normal trade. Obviously this restriction is difficult

to/

W. Riefler, Esq.,
American Embassy,
Economic Warfare Division,
40 Berkeley Square, W.1.

With the Compliments of Mr. J.M. Troutbeck.

to enforce in the case of small items sent for humanitarian reasons to an Allied people. This being so, and as nearly all important varieties of foodstuffs are on List "A" and therefore excluded, we think the best course would be to give Mr. Mitcheson some latitude on this point.

2882 FEB 1943

2. The object really is to avoid a lot of fuss over trifles and enable the Commercial Counsellor to give quick decisions. But you have an obvious and immediate interest in the question at the present time, and we should like to be sure that this will not cut across your arrangements before taking any further action on the draft.

(Signed) J.M. Troutbeck.

T550/12

Draft letter
to

J. Mitcheson, Esq.,
C.M.G.,

British Legation,
Stockholm.

Many thanks for your note of January 22nd about humanitarian exports from Sweden to Norway, which has just reached me after a slower journey than my own. Please refer also to paragraph 2 of your telegram No: 17 Arfar of January 19th, in which you enquired whether applications to export foodstuffs from Sweden might be approved provided the goods were of Swedish origin and not on list "A".

This has been very fully and heartily discussed here, with the result that we can give you the following rule. You will see that it is essentially a simplified form of the suggestions made in my minute to you of January 18th.

1) You may agree, without reference here, to exports from Sweden for relief in Norway or in any other occupied country, provided a) that the goods consist only of foodstuffs or pharmaceutical products which are not on list A, and have not been imported, nor are of a kind being imported, into Sweden through our controls.

b) that they are paid for with funds locally subscribed for in Sweden, and are sent as a gift.

c) that the application is supported by the representative of the Allied Government concerned and that the goods are consigned to a bona fide relief organisation approved by him.

d) that it is made plain in each case that we reserve our full rights under the War Trade Agreement and that consequently your consent in any given case to any humanitarian export of the kind in question cannot be quoted by the Swedes as justifying any other interpretation of that agreement than that which we ourselves assert.

e) that you report details of all exports agreed by you under this heading.

2)/

2) If you are asked to approve an export of goods which have been or are to be paid for with funds originating from any other country than Sweden itself, you should pass no comment on any aspect of it, explaining that such transactions are in a different class from Swedish gifts, and you should refer all particulars (including also the origin of the goods) for consideration here. If it is intended to employ funds from the United States, it would be as well for your U.S. colleague to transmit the same information to his Government.

You will notice that we wish to maintain our view that goods on the A list should not be approved for export under this heading even if they are of enemy origin. The reason for this is partly that it provides a simpler rule, but also that it is not to our advantage that Swedish money should be spent in enemy territory.

You will also see that we are prepared in these cases to waive our rights to restrict the export of certain exports not on List A within the limits of normal trade. We do not however wish to accept the theory that gifts (as opposed to trade) are in principle exempt from such restrictions, since this would commit us to approving similar gifts to enemy territory. Hence the general reservation made above concerning our rights under the War Trade Agreement.

I suggest that you should discuss this with the U.S. Legation before informing us whether you intend to act upon it. If the rule explained is adopted, it would no doubt be as well to make it clear to the Swedes and to Ditleff and to the Swedish organisationsworking for relief in Norway what classes of exports will definitely not be allowed. It will leave our hands freer however if you do not give the impression that exports not excluded on principle will necessarily and invariably be agreed on principle.

I am pursuing the question of the small exports of clothing and so forth which you would like to be allowed to agree. Meanwhile it is clear that such exports should not be agree

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 2953 182

19 FEB 1943

Registry Number W 2953/4/49

FROM Miss Wheeldon (Board of Education)

No. to Miss Scurfield

Dated 15th February, 1943

Received in Registry 19th Feb: 1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for occupied countries.

Refers to Miss Scurfield's letter of February 10th (W 2101/4/49) Encloses a draft minute about relief for occupied countries which it is proposed to send to each of the President's enquirers.

Last Paper.

W2882 (W 2101)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/Miss Wheeldon (B/Ed.) for Miss Scurfield. Feb 25.

(Minutes.)

I have re-shuffled this note and made a few alterations. I think it is now all right.

E. C. 23/2

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
W.O. 4/3/43	AEH 26/2

Next Paper.

W 2971

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Feeding the Occupied Countries

and the U.S. Govt

Both His Majesty's Government have always maintained that the responsibility for feeding the civil population of the occupied countries rests solely with the occupying power. With the exception of Greece, Germany has accepted this responsibility.

2. Food conditions in Greece however have always been far worse than those of other occupied countries (except probably Poland, which is of course inaccessible) and recognition of this fact is given by the Greek Relief Scheme, which has been working in one form or another since the second half of 1941.

3. The food which is sent to Greece is distributed in accordance with the needs of the population and practical possibilities by a Swedish-Swiss Commission, which sees that the conditions on which we agreed to send relief to Greece - e.g. that food stuffs produced in Greece are reserved for the civil population - are fulfilled.

4. As a result of recommendations made by the Commission, the original allotment has been considerably increased, and any further recommendations which they may make, for either altering the items within the total allotment or increasing it would, of course, be sympathetically considered.

5. Conditions in other occupied countries are not comparable with those in Greece, and a relief alone scheme for one country/could not be justified on the facts.

6. To send food to one country/ would therefore involve ~~therefore,~~ means/

means sending it to other countries as well, ~~and a major change of policy.~~ His Majesty's Government have fully considered this from every angle and ~~have~~ indeed evolved ~~and considered~~ plans similar to that propounded by the Famine Relief Committee long before the Committee came into being. They are, however, absolutely convinced, on the evidence before them, that the time is not ripe for a major change of policy. In particular, they do not consider it warrantable at the present time, by abandoning their contention that the enemy is solely responsible for feeding the territories he has over-run, to encourage him to withhold the supplies which he at present sends to ~~the occupied~~ these territories ~~- which they almost certainly would do if we started to send relief -~~ and thus create widespread famine conditions which they would not be in a position to alleviate ~~consistently with our intention to pursue the war to a victorious conclusion.~~ without detriment to the war effort.

Spain cracked & they hoped it would be almost certainly bowed.

7. In view of the fact that His Majesty's Government is fully alive to all the considerations - humanitarian and otherwise- involved, and has this question under constant review, it is to be hoped that His Majesty's Government and the United States Government will be trusted to deal with the problem in the right way and at the right time, in accordance with the information available to them.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Your ref: W2101/4/49. Dept. Wd. this minute be all right to send a enquirers? T.S. 15/2.

Board of Education,
14, Belgrave Square,
London, S.W.1.

~~Board of Education,~~
~~Brunhaome Bone Hotel,~~
~~Bournemouth, Hants.~~

15th February, 1943.

W 2953

Dear Miss Scurfield,

Many thanks for your letter and minute on the subject of food for the occupied countries.

I have extracted some of the information contained in the minute and propose - if you agree - to send a copy to each of the President's enquirers. In view of the fact that your envelope was marked Secret, and your letter Confidential, I thought I had better trouble you to vet this shortened version, so that I do not give away more than I should. If you think that it would be better for this information to be contained in a letter, rather than a minute, I will of course send it out like that.

I am sorry to put you to this further trouble. Would you

Miss T. Scurfield,
Foreign Office.

be kind enough to let me know over the telephone whether you agree or not?

Yours sincerely,

Rita Wheeldon.

In draft for 1 Defence -19a

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Feeding the Occupied Countries.

GREECE.

Food conditions in Greece have always been far worse than those of other occupied countries (except probably Poland, which is of course inaccessible) and recognition of this fact is given by the Greek Relief Scheme, which has been working in one form or another since the second half of 1941.

The food which is sent to Greece is distributed in accordance with the needs of the population and practical possibilities by a Swedish-Swiss Commission, which sees that the conditions on which we agreed to send relief to Greece - e.g. that food stuffs produced in Greece are reserved for the civil population - are fulfilled.

As a result of recommendations made by the Commission, the original allotment has been considerably increased, and any further recommendations which they may make, for either altering the items within the total allotment or increasing it would, of course, be sympathetically considered.

BELGIUM.

Conditions in Belgium are not comparable with those in Greece, and a relief scheme for Belgium alone could not be justified on the facts. [any scheme would have to include at least Norway and probably Yugoslavia and France.]

His Majesty's Government have always maintained that the responsibility for feeding the civil population of the occupied countries rests solely with the occupying power. With the exception of Greece, Germany has accepted this responsibility [and has sent quite considerable quantities of food to Belgium for the civil population.]

To send food to [Belgium], therefore, means sending it to other countries as well, and a major change of policy. His Majesty's Government have fully considered this

from every angle and have indeed evolved and considered plans similar to that propounded by the Famine Relief Committee long before the Committee came into being. They are, however, absolutely convinced, on the evidence before them, that the time is not ripe for a change. In particular, they do not consider it warrantable at the present time, by abandoning their contention that the enemy is solely responsible for feeding the territories he has over-run, to encourage him to withhold the supplies which he at present sends to the occupied territories - which they almost certainly would do if we started to send relief - and thus create widespread famine conditions which we should not be in a position to alleviate consistently with our intention to pursue the war to a victorious conclusion.

In view of the fact that His Majesty's Government is fully alive to all the considerations - humanitarian or otherwise - involved, and has this question under constant review, it is to be hoped that His Majesty's Government and the United States Government may be trusted to deal with the problem in the right way and at the right time, in accordance with the information before them.

12th February, 1943.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W2933/4/49.

OUT FILE

189

Despatched 25 Feb. 1943. M.

Draft. Mrs Wheeldon

Telegram.

Miss Campbell

Thank you for your letter of Feb 15th & which you enclosed a suggested note & our reply to enquiries about relief. Our previous note on which your summary was based was intended as a reply to the specific appeal of the Famine Relief Ctee for Greece & Belgium, and we have somewhat modified it to make it suitable for general use

Ld) T. Campbell. 24/2

190

W.2953/4/49.

25th February, 1943.

OUT FILE

Dear Miss Wheeldon,

Thank you for your letter of February 15th in which you enclosed a suggested note to serve as a stock reply to enquiries about relief. Our previous note, on which your summary was based, was intended as a reply to the specific appeal of the Famine Relief Committee for Greece and Belgium, and we have therefore somewhat modified it to make it suitable for general use.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd) T. Garfield.

Miss E. Wheeldon.

26a

6C

Feeding the Occupied Countries.

191

Both His Majesty's Government and the United States Government have always maintained that the responsibility for feeding the civil population of the occupied countries rests solely with the occupying power. With the exception of Greece, Germany has accepted this responsibility.

2. Food conditions in Greece however have always been far worse than those of other occupied countries (except probably Poland, which is of course inaccessible) and recognition of this fact is given by the Greek Relief Scheme, which has been working in one form or another since the second half of 1941.

3. The food which is sent to Greece is distributed in accordance with the needs of the population and the practical possibilities by a Swedish-Swiss Commission, which sees that the conditions on which we agreed to send relief to Greece - e.g. that food stuffs produced in Greece are reserved for the civil population - are fulfilled.

4. As a result of recommendations made by the Commission, the original allotment has been considerably increased, and any further recommendations which they may make, for either altering the items within the total allotment or increasing it would, of course, be sympathetically considered.

5. Conditions in other occupied countries are not comparable with those in Greece, and a relief scheme for one country alone could not be justified on the facts. To send food to one country would therefore involve sending it to other countries as well. His Majesty's Government have fully considered this from every angle and indeed evolved plans similar to that propounded by /the Famine Relief Committee/ long before /the Committee/ came into being. They are, however, absolutely convinced, on the evidence before them, that the time is not ripe for a major change of policy. In particular they do not consider it warrantable at the present time, by abandoning their contention that the enemy is solely responsible for feeding the territories he has over-run, to encourage him - as he almost certainly would - to withhold the supplies which he at present sends to those territories, thus creating widespread famine conditions which His Majesty's Government would not be in a position to alleviate, without detriment to the war effort.

6...

6. In view of the fact that His Majesty's Government is fully alive to all the considerations - humanitarian and otherwise - involved, and has this question under constant review, it is hoped that His Majesty's Government and the United States Government will be trusted to deal with the problem in the right way and at the right time, in accordance with the information available to them.

58

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 2971

20 FEB 1943

193

Registry Number W 2971/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare

No. (communicated) T 550/G/Z

Dated 18th Feb: 1943.

Received in Registry 20th Feb:1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Relief for occupied Europe.

Transmits copy of telegram from Washington No 611 Arfar of February 17th stating that representative Joe Lesinski introduced in Congress a resolution calling for the immediate setting up of a food relief system for Belgium, Norway, Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the Netherlands. The system suggested would be similar to that now employed for the relief of Greece.

Last Paper.

w2953

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

8/3

N S A. Stores gmd

Northern

Central depts

Southern 9/3 18/3

24/2

(Action completed.)

16/3/43

(Index.)

Aff 1 26/7

Next Paper.

w3016

1944

(3) (47) LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

W. 2971

20 FEB 1943

En clair. LORD HALIFAX (WASHINGTON) to F.O.
D NLT 16th February, 1943
R .11.15 a.m. 17th February, 1943

No 611 ARFAR

Press Agencies carry the following item this afternoon representative Joe Lesinski introduced in Congress a resolution calling for the immediate setting up of food relief system for Belgium Norway Poland Greece Jugoslavia and the Netherlands the resolution suggested calls for "rigid safeguarding of the Relief so no military advantages accrue to the civil population or armed forces of invading nations" The system suggested would be similar to that now employed for the relief of Grrece under arrangements with the International Red Cross and the Governments of Sweden and SSwitzerland which had been in effect for the last six months and "has been certified by the State Department as having worked satisfactorily and without benefit to Germany" The relief agreements would be worked out by the United States through the Secretary of State with the cooperation of the Governments of Great Britain Sweden and Switzerland and "Accredited representatives of the Governments concerned" -

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/8/7
COPY FOR Mr Bowe F.O. only.
DATE 18/2/48.

FEB 1943
W 5911

561

60

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 3071

22 FEB 1943

196

Registry Number } W 3071/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No.

Dated 18th Feb.,

Received in Registry } 22nd Feb., 1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for Belgium and Norway.

Transmits a Censorship submission containing an extract from a letter from K. Bonde, Stockholm to Madame Carlier regarding relief for Belgium and Norway.

Last Paper.

W 3016.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/Mr. Leroy Lewis (Censorship) from Mr. Howe Feb. 22

& Mr. Campos (M.E.W.) Feb. 22.

(Minutes.)

Seen with thanks

E.L.C. 24/2

(Action completed.)

24/2/43

(Index.)

All 26/7

Next Paper.

W3092

I mentioned this intercept to you on the telephone.
Please see particularly passage marked.

18:2:43

Ref. 477.....

Date. 17-2-43.

W 3071

22 FEB 1943

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.
CENSORSHIP SECTION.

Receipt and Distribution Unit.

Herewith is H04P0 165.1.7/4-3 .....
specially asked for by you. ~~Please return this. ..... in an envelope addressed to me personally, leaving this slip attached.~~

C Pope
PP.

(Sgd) E. M. KEELO
Room 831
Ext: 2868

Mr. Campbell ..... Release Section.

9C

198

IS/17.2.43 /5868

WH. 11.2.43.

POSTAL & TELEGRAPH CENSORSHIP. SUBMISSION NO. HOL/PO/16517/43.

P.C.72.
TERMINAL MAIL AIR

From. K.BONDE
VARTAVAGEN 12
STOCKHOLM
SWEDEN

To. MADAME CARLIER
CARRINGTON HOUSE
HERTFORD STREET
LONDON, W.1.

Date of letter 11.1.43

Language: Swedish

ORIGINAL LETTER

SUBMITTED TOP

RETAINED IN I.R.B.

Comment T.R.B. (for action)
Copy M.E.W. "
" INF. " Copy AC (Red X mail)
B.B.C. "
P.I.D. " CHA
D.R.W. " I.S.R.
P/O.

Addressee was on the Private Miscellaneous list required, by S.E. but now cancelled.

SWEDISH ORGANIZATION FOR FOOD RELIEF TO NORWAY & BELGIUM - POSSIBLY CONNECTED WITH L'OEUVRE SUEDOISE.

(1) This organisation is prepared to provide food relief for Norway and Belgium - if safe-conduct ships can be obtained for the purpose - in spite of the RED CROSS if they should not be willing to collaborate.

(2) Low Morale in KARELIA.

(3) New German song, broadcast from BEOGRAD and other stations, seems to have softening effect on its hearers.

Extract translated.

" Yesterday the 10th I received your letter of 30.12. and then it had been to HOTEL COSY first. It is a long time since I have received a letter so quickly. You said a great deal in your letter, and the result was that today I went up to see STJERNSTEDT at the RED CROSS KBRA is in FINLAND, so I am rushing round on my own. I learned one

/for

Operating Unit HOL.PRI | Section Fl.4.T.8. | Examiner 1787 | D.A.C. 760 BMDP for BB | Date. 6.2.43.

or two things there, amongst others, that both BJORN and KARSEK made frantic efforts to secure ships with safe conduct and that they are certainly not leaving a stone unturned but making a great fuss in the hope of finally getting these ships for both BELGIUM and NORWAY. In my own personal opinion, I think it will be more difficult to secure them for NORWAY as there is no precedent there whatsoever. No committee has been able to send food to them as we have done to BELGIUM and there is no "OEUVRE SUEDOISE" to receive the food, and I do not know what guarantees there are that it will reach its destination. I quoted part of your letter to S - T where you wrote that one should not try to get the people concerned to alter their policy, but only to try to get the food through to BELGIUM just the same, by-passing the official policy, so to speak. He turned pale. Apparently they have coupled BELGIUM and NORWAY. The idea that we should be able to get help through to BELGIUM on our own, seemed thoroughly to horrify him. When I was with him, one of the Heads at the FOREIGN OFFICE phoned, and wanted information about the activities of THE RED CROSS. He told him a certain amount and then said: "We are not in charge of BELGIUM, KNUT BONDE is, though it is EBBA BONDE who appears to be. He is the one who does all the work. Would you like to speak to him, he is here now." And that is how all came about that when I was at the RED CROSS I gave an account of what we have done. He asked for facts and photos. I promised him them. Then I went up to the office itself opposite the OPERA HOUSE, and there I gave them both posters, photos and facts in profusion. Listen, they are all to be sent to the SWEDISH TRAVEL BUREAU in LONDON, where a BELGIAN display window is to be set out, so now you must get into touch with the travel bureau through OLGA, or whoever you like, and see to it that the propaganda for BELGIUM is properly arranged. But let us now be serious. I pointed out to the RED CROSS that after all I am "the one" who is fully prepared to co-operate with them, that soon we will have no possibility of getting any other money besides what I can get through ANDRE or others like him and that I considered they should try to start up fetching our food from the ARGENTINE and that when they had succeedbd in getting this food I would willingly co-operate with them. He said that next time the BELGIAN COMITEE had a meeting he would insist on my presence, as I etc. That is all I wanted of him...for the time being. But now I want all sorts of other things. I want the Bishop and MISS PYK and several others to make strenuous efforts to see that we get the ships that our representatives have been agitating about for so many months. And then I want ANDRE to get permission to give the money, he has already earmarked for us and which is there if only it could be sent. When the thing gets going, I want to go to LONDON on behalf of the RED CROSS, wearing RED CROSS uniform, and negotiate the whole matter with different authorities on behalf of the RED CROSS. Now I suppose I shall just have to sit back and wait and see what happens....

It is supposed that EBBA who has been ill in ABO has now gone to KARELIA (FJARR KARELEN). It is a strange country. The population is certainly FINNISH, but they were converted to Christianity.

(P.T.O.)

by RUSSIA and BYZANTIUM and are GREEK CATHOLICS. Of course one does not know how much religious freedom there is in RUSSIA at the present time and if religion has any meaning but it is considered that it will be very difficult to fit them in with the FINNS, who generally speaking, do not fall in with anyone. CALLAS daughter, who returned after Christmas, says that everything is in an awful state there. Her mother and sister only cry, and everyone else does the same. They think the situation hopeless. It has been like that since the WINTER WAR. It will be a hard nut to crack one day but that also can be got over, I suppose you know that there is a new song by LILI MARLEEN. It is called "Everything passes, Everything goes, After every December, May alsways follows" (written in GERMAN in letter) It is the most touching song I have ever heard. It is broadcast every evening from BEOGRAD and other stations. You have probably heard it. The aunts turn it on every evening now and have a quiet cry over it. CALLAS plays it, but so far the SWEDISH public does not know it, but it probably will".

(Ex.Note: STJERNSTEDT is a high official in the RED CROSS in STOCKHOLM.)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W3071/4/49.

OUT FILE

+1C

201

Draft.

Mr Ivor Lewis

P.O.

Conservative.

Telegram.

Despatched M.

22nd Feb., 1943.

[Dean L-L]

Will you please look at your submission No HOL/P.O/1651/7/43 which covers an extract from a letter to Miss Carlin, Carrington House, Hertford St from K. Borden of Stockholm?

You will see from this that the Swedish Red X are planning to send publicity material for a campaign in favour of Belgium which the Swedish Travel Bureau in London. We do

Copy to Mr Lamps

North Regional Office
Ref: 202

do not consider that such a campaign is really a legitimate activity of the Enrolled Force Bureau and, unless you see any objection, we shall be glad if you will pass to us before release any such publicity material that may be ready for

Yours sincerely

(Sgd.) E. E. CROWE

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

GENERAL

1943

[redacted]

F.O.
371

CO-ORDINATION

FILE No. 4

Pps. 3092 - 4311

CLOSED
UNTIL
1972

36510

61

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 3092

22 FEB 1943

2

Registry Number W 3092/4/49

FROM Mr. Foot (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Crowe.

No.

Dated 19th Feb., 1943.

Received in Registry 22nd Feb., 1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Relief for occupied Europe.

Transmits a record of a conversation between Mr. Dingle Foot and Mr. Barclay Acheson, a leading member of the Editorial Staff of Reader's Digest on the 18th February during which the question of relief for occupied Europe and in particular, Norway, was discussed.

Last Paper.

W 3071

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel Washington No 1388 March 2.

8/17. E.W. March 3.

36510

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
3/3/43	Aff 26/7

Next Paper.

W 3093.

(Minutes.)

See within Mr. Harvey's minute of Feb. 22nd.

If neither Mr Foot nor Mr Brendan Bracken has had any effect on Dr Acheson I doubt if there is anything more we can do. I think the way of trying to make him see reason.

It might however be worth a short telegram to Mr Winant warning them of what he is likely to be up to and telling them of the encouragement given to him to open up the question of child evacuation to Sweden.

N. A. Dept
Mr Harvey

E. E. Crowe
24/2

I agree. Dr Acheson will no doubt lobby Gov. Lehmann.

N Butler
1/3.

D W H 1/3

24448 10 42 F.O.P.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Minutes.

Entn 3

General Department. N. American Dept

? Readers Digest

/-owner

Lady Reading rang me up this morning to say that she had had a conversation with Dr. Bartlett Acheson, part ~~editor~~ of the Literary Digest, who had just been in Sweden arranging for the publication of his paper there. Whilst in Sweden he had become obsessed with a scheme for putting Sweden on the map by getting her to undertake the protection and maintenance of children from Norway, Greece etc. On his return to America he was anxious to raise money for this purpose and it was his idea that M. Boheman should be the administrator of the scheme in Sweden. He had seen both Mr. Bracken and Mr. Foot but they had not had any particular effect on him, and Lady Reading wondered whether if the scheme were thought to be undesirable some step should not be taken at an early stage to squash it. Dr. Acheson, who was only staying here for another week, was a man of great energy and influence in the United States and if he launched his scheme there he would certainly raise a great deal of money for the purpose and bad blood might be expected to ensue if at a later stage it was necessary for H.M.G. to weigh in and stop it.

I thanked Lady Reading and said that I would let the Department know for such action as they thought suitable. Dr. Acheson is staying at the Dorchester.

CRW

22nd February, 1943.

3092
2 FEB 1943

M.E.W., 19/2/43

Enter 4

COPY FOR R.E. CROWE, ESQ., FOREIGN OFFICE. WITH MR. D.M.FOOT'S COMPLIMENTS.

I received a visit yesterday from Mr. Barclay Acheson, a leading member of the Editorial Staff of the Reader's Digest. He has just returned from Sweden, where he has been investigating the possibility of the Digest starting a Swedish edition, and is leaving shortly for Spain, where a similar project is under consideration. At the end of the last war Mr. Acheson was food administrator in Turkey under Mr. Hoover. He is also gathering material for articles to be published in the Digest.

(2) Mr. Acheson referred particularly to his proposed new editions, and asked whether we could give him the name of a friendly Spanish publisher. I said I thought that the Ministry of Information would probably know more about this than M.E.W., but I would make enquiries and see whether we could tell him what he wanted.

(3) Mr. Acheson had visited Finland as well as Sweden, and had had interviews with Messrs. Ryti, Ramsay and Tanner. Whereas Ryti apparently expected the defeat and collapse of Germany, Tanner was inclined to think that the war would end in a compromise. Mr. Acheson had apparently had conversations with all three on the subject of how Finland could extricate herself from the war. He had taken the line that the Finns had already missed one 'bus, since they should have got out before the tide turned so decidedly in favour of Russia. He had tried to impress on them that they must not miss another. I said that the great difficulty appeared to me to arise out of the Finnish food situation, and out of the acute shortage which would follow if German supplies were withheld. Mr. Acheson agreed, but said that he had found a good deal of discontent in Finland with the quality of the foodstuffs imported from Germany.

(4) Mr. Acheson then came to the main purpose of the interview, which was to discuss relief. He made it clear that he had no sympathy with Mr.Hoover who, he thought, was simply advocating relief for political reasons.But he himself had had considerable experience of famine-stricken areas, and what had impressed him most was the lifelong hatred which was felt by the mothers of under-nourished children for those whom they considered responsible, and the effects on the children themselves in after life. He was not advocating a relief scheme as a humanitarian enterprise, but in order that this intense bitterness, which might continue over many years, should be directed towards the Germans,and nottowards the Allies. For this purpose he felt that supplies

should/

should be obtained from South America, and carried to Norway on neutral ships. The Swedes would be responsible for seeing not only that these imports remained untouched by the Germans, but that there were no reductions in Norwegian rations. This, he thought, would not be so difficult in the case of Norway as it might be elsewhere. German deliveries of wheat had been fixed for several months in advance, and it would be clear that the conditions of the scheme were not being observed if the amounts scheduled did not materialise. The Swedes, he was confident, would welcome such an undertaking. They were feeling ashamed of themselves. While they felt that they had taken no part in resisting German frightfulness, they were not prepared to imitate Mussolini and enter the war at the last stage, when it appeared that the issue was virtually decided.

(5) In reply, I outlined some of our principal objections to relief schemes, and dwelt particularly on the difficulties with which the Germans would be confronted if they had a bad harvest, and if they failed in their attempt to exploit the Ukraine. I said that although there had been some measure of recovery, due to ~~this~~ last year's excellent harvest, and although the German rations were now, on the whole, sufficient, there had been a most startling decline in imports from Occupied Europe, and the German food front was vulnerable. In these circumstances we were naturally anxious not to relieve them of any of their responsibilities. It was also necessary to consider the position which might arise if any area of Europe were invaded by the Allied armies. The Germans would certainly scorch the earth with the greatest thoroughness, and we should need to fulfil our pledge, given by the Prime Minister in 1940, that food would be sent to every liberated area. In the last war he would remember how the Germans had destroyed everything on the French soil which they had evacuated, and had even cut down all the fruit trees. This argument appeared to impress Mr. Acheson, who had seen the devastated area of France shortly afterwards.

(6) Mr. Acheson then said that as a result of his experience he was opposed to any scheme which separated children from their parents. I said that I saw the objection to a permanent separation, although there were circumstances, such as those which had prevailed in Greece, in which the separation was probably the only alternative to death from famine. I asked, however, Mr. Acheson's views on the Swiss arrangement, whereby Belgian children had been received for a period of three months, and then returned to their homes after they had been restored to health and strength. Mr. Acheson/

as/

was very favourably inclined to schemes of this kind, and asked whether it would not be possible to arrange for Norwegian children to visit Sweden in the same way. If we were agreeable he would like to get in touch with his friends in Stockholm(he had in mind particularly Prince Bernardotte) and ask them to put forward such a suggestion to the British Government. How would we regard such an approach? I said that in principle we were well disposed towards evacuation schemes. I obviously could not give an undertaking there and then, and moreover the United States Government would need to be consulted. But, with these provisos, I should like to see the Swedes put forward such a suggestion. After some further discussion it was arranged that Mr. Acheson should tell his friends in Sweden that he had gathered the impression that a proposal of this kind coming from the Swedish Government would not be unwelcome in London. He was not to say, however, that he had gained the impression from M.E.W.

19th February, 1943.

Mr. Troutbeck

The Director-General

The Minister

Copies to
Mr. Camps
Mr. Collins & Mr. Villiers

Mr. Camps

Foreign Office

Mr. Nicholls
Press Section
Office

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. w3092/4/49

11.30 L 2/3/43

7

OUT FILE ✓

Draft. Telegram

Washington

1388.

March 2nd.

Cypher T

Dept 1

Copy to F.E.W.

MB 2/3

to British Press

Dr Barclay Acheson of the Readers Digest is returning to Washington after a visit to Sweden as a result of which he is taking an active interest in relief problems. Our principal objections to relief through the blockade have been explained to him; but he does not appear to have been convinced and he may therefore start lobbying Gov. Lehman & trying to raise funds for this purpose.

On the other hand he seemed impressed by the account given him of our proposed children evacuation scheme and too

to Lisbon

6.30p.

8

he agreed to suggest to
~~him that he would encourage his~~
that they should
Swedish friends & (sent forward
such a scheme for the reception
of Norwegian children.

RHC 2/3

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM OUT FILE 9

(Cypher) DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 1388. D: 11.30.p.m. March 2nd, 1943.

March 2nd, 1943.

------oOo------

Dr. Barclay Acheson of the Readers Digest is returning to Washington after a visit to Sweden as a result of which he is taking an active interest in relief problems. Our principal objections to relief through the blockade have been explained to him; but he does not appear to have been altogether convinced, and he may therefore start lobbying Gov. Lehmann and trying to raise funds for this purpose.

On the other hand he seemed impressed by the account given him of our proposed child evacuation scheme and he agreed to suggest to his Swedish friends that they should put forward such a scheme for the reception of Norwegian children.

62.

GENERAL

W 3093

22 FEB 1943

10

1 & 3

CO-ORDINATION.

Registry Number } W 3093/4/49

FROM Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr.Crowe

No. T 550/7

Dated 19th Feb. 1943

Received in Registry 22nd Feb.1943

W : Co-ordination

Clothing for children in France.

Refers to Foreign Office letter of 16th February (W 2369/4/49).

Encloses copies of telegram to Brazzaville No. 2 Arfar of 5th February, telegram from Brazzaville No.3 Arfar of 9th February and also a letter from Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr.Mélamède of 13th February regarding despatch of clothing from French Equatorial Africa to children in France. Suggests that the draft to Mr. Rooker might be amended in view of this correspondence.

Last Paper.

W3092 (W2369)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/Mr. Rooker (British Mission to French Nat. Cttee) from Mr Crowe Feb 25.

(Minutes.)

Send draft as amended

French Mission a.a.

24/2

(Action completed.)

26/3/43

(Index.)

Arf. 30/3/43

Next Paper.

W 3118

W 3093

11

T.550/7

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

22 FEB 1943

19th February, 1943.

Dear Crowe,

Would you please refer to your W.2365/4/49 covering a draft letter to Mr. Rooker about clothing which the people in French Equatorial Africa want to send to children in France.

I find we have been guilty in not keeping you fully posted about this affair. A man named Mélamède, who deals with Red Cross matters came to see me recently about it, and I now enclose copies of the papers which have resulted. These are our telegram number 2 Arfar to Brazzaville of February 5th, Brazzaville's reply number 3 Arfar of February 9th, and a letter from myself to Monsieur Mélamède.

In view of this you might like to amend the last sentence of your draft to omit the words from "according to our Consul....." onwards, and read instead "we should favourably consider a proposal to send these goods to the International Red Cross Committee in Switzerland for the benefit of French children who are receiving hospitality in that country, provided of course that the International Red Cross is willing to accept them". This suggestion was made recently to the Ministry of Economic Warfare by Monsieur Mélamède of the Fighting French Forces.

Yours sincerely,
Anthony Campbell.

E. E. Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

T.550/7

/CYPHER/

A R F A R (O.B.)

12

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BRAZZAVILLE.

No. 2 ARFAR.
5th February, 1943

D. 12.05 a.m. 6th February, 1943

OOOO

Your despatch No. 166 to Foreign Office /of December 23rd: relief for France./

We have been approached by Fighting French with a suggestion that this clothing might be sent to International Red Cross in Switzerland for distribution among French children evacuated there. We have no objection to this plan but wish to ensure that it does not conflict with any plans at present maturing at Brazzaville. Please telegraph your views.

Spain T 552/7

13

[Cypher.] ARFAR (O.B.).

FROM BRAZZAVILLE TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Mr. Parr.
No. 3 ARFAR.
9th February, 1943.

D. 2.20 p.m., 10th February, 1943.
R. 12.15 a.m., 11th February, 1943.

::::::::::::::

Your telegram No. 2.

Discussions between the Governor General and local Red Cross have elicited the fact that most of these parcels are earmarked for specific families, although it may prove a proportion could be made available for refugee French children in Switzerland. I shall be informed later.

O.T.P.

T. 550/7

14

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

13th February, 1943.

You will remember that we discussed the other day what should be done about the consignment of childrens clothing which has been collected in French Equatorial Africa, and which the people there want to send to France.

The suggestion was that the goods might instead be forwarded to Switzerland to be used to help French children who are receiving hospitality there.

I now learn that most of the goods are in parcels addressed to particular families. It is thought that some proportion could be made available for refugee French children in Switzerland.

I/

Monsieur Bernard Melamede,
3, St. James's Square,
S.W.1.

T. 550/7

14

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

13th February, 1943.

You will remember that we discussed the other day what should be done about the consignment of childrens clothing which has been collected in French Equatorial Africa, and which the people there want to send to France.

The suggestion was that the goods might instead be forwarded to Switzerland to be used to help French children who are receiving hospitality there.

I now learn that most of the goods are in parcels addressed to particular families. It is thought that some proportion could be made available for refugee French children in Switzerland.

I/

Monsieur Bernard Melamede,
3, St. James's Square,
S.W.1.

15

I am afraid that it would n be possible to allow the parcels to go forward to France. But perhaps the despatch of some part of the goods to Switzerland would help a solution. Shall I now leave the matter with you?

(W.A. Camps)

Registry No. W 3093/4/49

25m 16

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

25th February, 1943.

Out File

Draft.

Mr. Rooker,
British Mission
to French
National Committee

Your letter to Simpson No. 7567/43 of 5th February about clothing parcels for France.

You will remember that on 16th October last we telegraphed to Brazzaville (telegram No. 484, copy sent to Peake under W 13295/62/49) giving our reluctant agreement to the despatch of these parcels under the aegis of the American Red Cross. In that telegram we stated that this concession was only possible owing to the presence of the American Red Cross in occupied France. Our reluctance was largely due to the ~~fact~~ fear that it would lead to similar demands from the Belgian Congo. These fears were fully justified. The Belgian Red Cross in the Congo weighed in at once with a similar request, based on reports that such parcels were going to France. As at that time the Germans had invaded the unoccupied zone we were fortunately able to reply that these reports were unfounded and that no parcels had been or were being sent to France.

This consideration together with the all-important fact that unoccupied France - to which the parcels were originally destined - no longer exists clearly make it impossible for us to agree to their despatch now. In telling M. Paris this you may like to add that ~~according to our Consul at Brazzaville the~~ Bishop has acquiesced in our decision and proposes to store the parcels until they can ~~be sent to freed French territory~~.

(Sgd.) E. E. CROWE.

24/2

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

[Sent marked
remarks with
Camp's letter
W 3093]

OUT FILE

17.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

25th February, 1943.

(W 3093/4/49)

Your letter to Simpson No. 7567/43 of 5th February about clothing parcels for France.

You will remember that on 16th October last we telegraphed to Brazzaville (telegram No. 484, copy sent to Peake under W 13295/62/49) giving our reluctant agreement to the despatch of these parcels under the aegis of the American Red Cross. In that telegram we stated that this concession was only possible owing to the presence of the American Red Cross in occupied France. Our reluctance was largely due to the fear that it would lead to similar demands from the Belgian Congo. These fears were fully justified. The Belgian Red Cross in the Congo weighed in at once with a similar request, based on reports that such parcels were going to France. As at that time the Germans had invaded the unoccupied zone we were fortunately able to reply that these reports were unfounded and that no parcels had been or were being sent to France.

This consideration together with the all-important fact that unoccupied France - to which the parcels were originally destined - no longer exists clearly make it impossible for us to agree to their despatch now. In telling M.Paris this you may like to add that we should favourably consider a proposal to send these goods to the International Red Cross Committee in Switzerland for the benefit of French children who are receiving hospitality in that country, provided/

J. Kingsley Rooker, Esq., M.C.,
British Mission to the French National Committee,
3, Cleveland Row,
S.W.1.

provided of course that the International Red Cross is willing to accept them. This suggestion was made recently to the Ministry of Economic Warfare by Monsieur Mélamède of the Fighting French Forces.

(E.E. Crowe)

63

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 3118

23 FEB 1943

19

Registry Number W 3118/4/49

FROM Lord Selborne (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Secretary of State.

Dated 16th Feb. 1943

Received in Registry 23rd Feb. 1943

W : Co-ordination.

Anglo-United States relief policy.

It appears that the whole question of Anglo-United States relief policy may have to be reviewed at some time in the near future. Suggests that the consent of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister should be obtained for His Majesty's Government's co-operating with Governor Lehman in examining the problem. Gives details of safeguards which would be required from the Axis before any relaxations to present relief policy could be allowed.

Last Paper.

W 3093 (W 2845)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel Washington No 1362. March 1.

8. Lord Drogheda (M.E.W.) March 2.

D

(Action completed.)

nfd. 8/4/43.

(Index.)

Alt 26/7

Next Paper.

(W 3134)

(Minutes.)

See minute attached & action suggested thereon

25/2.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RELIEF.

Since the Prime Minister decided against returning to the charge with President Roosvelt on the general question of relief (Flag A.) he has received a further letter from M. Pierlot urging him to agree to the shipment of vitamins and dried milk for Belgian children (Flag B.).

In the meantime recent telegrams from Washington indicate that Governor Lehman has now been authorised to deal with the problem of immediate, as distinct from post war, relief, and that he is greatly impressed with the desirability of increasing the volume of relief to occupied territories. He is supported by a rapidly expanding staff recruited partly from the ranks of professional humanitarians who may be expected powerfully to reinforce the Governor's own predisposition in favour of some experimental scheme, the effect of which may well be to defeat the main purposes of the blockade. Governor Lehman is now a member of the staff of the State Department, and as a close personal friend of the President's his views are likely to determine those of the Department. In view of the Prime Minister's veto (Flag A.), we are debarred from taking any initiative at Washington, but as Lord Selborne points out in his letter (Flag C.) "by maintaining a purely negative attitude, we should not in any case have the smallest chance of preventing a breach of the blockade if the Americans set their hearts on making one".

In order to avoid a dangerous stalemate M.E.W. on February 17th concerted with us a fairly detailed instruction to their representative Mr. Hall, which has been used by him to some purpose in discussion with Governor Lehman. In this telegram (Flag D.) we explained at some length the difficulty of initiating limited relief through the blockade, and as a result we have been told that the quality of the discussions has improved.

In the meantime Governor Lehman has been invited to come to England for discussions of post-war relief. It is, I understand, by no means certain that he will come, but M.E.W. have suggested that whether he comes or not it might be useful if Mr. Dingle Foot were to go to Washington (Mr. Law's minute of February 9th Flag E.). If he were to go it would almost certainly create the impression that we were taking some initiative in regard to relief, and therefore I doubt whether such a course is desirable.

I agree DL

The present position is that we are compelled to adopt a carefully negative attitude in all our discussions with Governor Lehman and his organisation. The M.E.W. are convinced, and I think with good reason, that we shall not be able to do so indefinitely. Unless we can be authorised to discuss upon their merits such schemes as the Americans may

/produce

produce, we must expect sooner or later to have some ill-considered proposal fired at us in such a way that we cannot turn it down, or even to find that the Americans have committed themselves to such a scheme without consulting us at all. In either case our blockade policy would probably be undermined. I have therefore drafted the attached telegram for the guidance of H.M. Ambassador, in the hope that it will not be found to conflict with the Prime Minister's last decision.

J.G. Lawrence.

February 25th 1943.

Pr. Lawrence 27/2
Private Secretary

J.W.M. Churchill

I agree.

Feb 28

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Mr Tebbs
Mr Rowe-Dutton for advice
4/22
7/2

TEL. No.:
GROSVENOR 4060.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE,
LONDON, W.1.

(Sir Thos Leeper)

W. 3118

25 FEB 1943

16th February, 1943.

My dear Anthony,

You will have seen from telegrams Nos: 443, 446 and 541 Arfar from Washington (of which I enclose copies for your convenience) that it appears likely that the whole question of Anglo-U.S. relief policy may have to be reviewed at some time in the near future. For the moment, however, we are, of course, bound by the Cabinet decisions of 27th April and 2nd June last, and in these circumstances we cannot set forth our "minimum conditions" as suggested in paragraph 3 of telegrams No. 446. At the same time I agree with the Embassy that we should co-operate with Lehman in examining the problem, since it would prove exceedingly inconvenient were he to work out, without reference to us, some scheme that we felt to be totally unsuitable. By maintaining a purely negative attitude we should not in any case have the smallest chance of preventing a breach of the blockade, if the Americans set their hearts on making one.

In asking for permission to co-operate with Lehman in his deliberations, I do not think that we could add any further evidence to the case for limited relief, as it was presented by you to the

Cabinet/

Cabinet twice during last year. We here have no information that leads us to believe that conditions in occupied Europe are materially worse, except insofar as the effects of malnutrition are bound to be progressive. (This may, of course, be quite considerable).

It is true that, pending a reply by the President to the Prime Minister's telegram on the subject of Norwegian relief, we cannot be sure whether Lehman's proposal corresponds to American policy. But the intervention of the President is a strong reason why we should be glad to divert the discussion on to the lines proposed by Lehman, which seem to ensure a very full examination of all the implications involved before any relief is admitted through the blockade.

We cannot respond to Lehman's initiative and participate with the Americans in this review of the whole position without obtaining the consent of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister. Can you do this before you leave for Washington ? It would certainly be advantageous if, as suggested by Washington, at any early stage Lehman was invited to come over here and discuss the matter. I understand that Leith-Ross has already telegraphed to that effect in replying to Washington telegram No. 21 Relief, of which I also enclose a copy. But I

should/

should like to make the same point in reply to Washington telegram No. 541 Arfar.

You will see from the telegrams enclosed that our people in Washington are particularly anxious to know what kind of safeguards we should require from the Axis before agreeing to any relaxations of the present policy. I feel for my part that it is impossible to lay down detailed conditions at this stage. My Department is already in communication with yours as to the terms of a telegram which will indicate the chief points that ought to be borne in mind when the problem is being examined. To Washington's specific request for an indication of our prior conditions I would propose (subject of course to the Cabinet agreeing to our co-operating in Lehman's examination at all) to reply that the detailed safeguards would of course have to be worked out carefully for each country, but the general intention would be to secure (a) that the supplies actually reach the recipients for whom they are intended and do not bring relief either to the Axis Powers or to inhabitants of the occupied countries who are working for the Axis and (b) that the relief supplies do not involve any reduction in the supplies already being provided to the occupied countries by the Axis or any increase

in/

in the amount of supplies being taken from such countries by the Axis. But it seems equally important to ensure that the Americans do not concentrate upon one selected Ally to the exclusion of others.

Yours ever,

Winston.

The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

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[CYPHER]. LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Viscount Halifax. D. 5.45 a.m. February 6th, 1943.
No. 445. ARFAR. R. 12.30 p.m. February 6th, 1943.

February 5th, 1943.

yyyyyy

Following from Hall.

Lehman and Sayre dined with several of us last night and discussed blockade policy with special reference to the admission of supplies for civilian relief. We had supplied them several days ago with notes describing your policy and the several schemes you had allowed or were being pressed to allow for procuring supplies inside (repeat inside) blockade area. The scheme in your telegram No. 405 was also explained to them.

2. Lehman (and this applies even more strongly to Sayre) appears to be anxious to increase volume of relief to occupied territories and to be genuinely convinced of public pressure here in favour of opening blockade during war. But when pressed to name one single representative American organisation that had passed any resolution in this sense he was obliged to admit that he could not do so. His mind appears to be possessed with idea that presence in occupied countries of American food even in quite small quantities would act as a sort of talisman in maintaining will to resist and that failure of expectations of American beneficence would have a correspondingly depressing effect.

3. He made it clear, however, that it is his firm intention to collaborate fully with you and not (repeat not) to embarrass you by getting ahead in conversations with the European allies along lines with which you may find it difficult to agree. He realised in course of a general discussion about Norway that he might have embarrassed you by discussing plan for Lend-Lease parcels for Polish prisoners with Polish Ambassador before he had consulted you. (Our telegram No. 324) he offered spontaneously an apology if this should have been case and asked that it should be explained that if he had erred it was solely due to ignorance.

4. It emerged from conversation that he, like so many of American officials who have handled these matters hitherto, finds it really difficult to grasp distinction between schemes that involve purchase of relief supplies inside blockade area and those which permit admission of supplies through blockade. Even with financial point kept entirely on one side he could not grasp significance of distinction which you make between for example, the Belgian bulk purchases in Portugal and President's plan for a limited and experimental scheme for Norway based upon supplies sent into Sweden from this hemisphere.

5. See my immediately following telegram.

[CYPHER] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Viscount Halifax
No. 446 ARFAR.
5th February, 1943.

D. 5.51 a.m. 6th February, 1943.
R. 12.35 p.m. 6th February, 1943.

JJJJ

My immediately preceding telegram.

Lehman intends to proceed immediately to make a thorough examination of practical possibility of developing a scheme for relieving children in occupied territories by admitting supplies through blockade. He will ask for an estimate of number of children which it is desirable to feed and of the quantities of supplies necessary to do so. He will then examine whether we can safely take on a continuing and probably increasing liability to make the necessary supplies available from the resources at our disposal and the shipping and transportation problems that will arise.

2. He proposes also to examine the safeguards that ought to be required from occupying Power to see that no indirect benefit accrues to enemy and to make sure that relief supplies sent in are consumed by the ultimate beneficiaries in addition to and not instead of supplies that would have been made available by enemy.

3. Without prejudice to ultimate question as to whether relief supplies are to be sent in at all, it appears to be most desirable that we here should play our part in examining with him these matters. We are informing the Food and Shipping Missions and would like to have as soon as possible your minimum conditions under paragraph 2 above. At moment the Governor's mind runs on safeguarding supplies sent in. But he took point that this might not be sufficient if the Germans withheld as much or more than was sent in to any area.

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[CYPHER] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Viscount Halifax
No. 541 Arfar
10th February, 1943

D. 3.05 p.m. 11th February, 1943
R. 10.25 p.m. 11th February, 1943

ddddddd

My telegram No. 446.

High Commissioner had a further long talk last night with Governor Lehman and his rapidly expanding senior staff. The latter are being recruited partly from the ranks of professional humanitarians and powerfully reinforce the Governor's own predisposition in favour of an experimental scheme to feed shildren with milk products and vitamins sent from United States. He recognises that a great many points of detail will have to be settled before anything can be done. But he is not impressed with argument that we cannot continue to refuse relief to children of other European Allies once we have started to relieve any one of them. He is confident that any scheme which may be started can be kept within manageable proportions.

2. He now has at his disposal a staff of high pressure organisers who have literally no other duties than to examine possible schemes. We are doing our utmost to get from them the views of United States Government on various schemes, including child evacuation plan, that have already been put by us to State Department. But it is not possible to hold off discussion of their own schemes. May I have therefore, as soon as possible, some indication of your mind about the kind of conditions that we would have to require from the Germans as a [grp. undec. ?prior] condition to admitting relief supplies and also sort of arrangements for supervision that you would require?

3. We are, and will be, at pains to make it clear that any discussion of schemes is without prejudice to question whether supplies to be sent through blockade at all.

4. I think the best way of handling the whole business will be to press Lehman to pay a visit to London in the near future. In this connexion please see my telegram No. 688 to Foreign Office.

O.T.P.

COPY

CYPHER

SPECIAL (RELIEF)

29

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Viscount Halifax
No. 21 RELIEF
10th February, 1943.

D. 2.37 a.m. 11th February, 1943
R. 3.00 a.m. 11th February, 1943.

IMPORTANT

Your telegram No. 17 Relief.

State Department is still waiting for Soviet Ambassador to receive instructions. They have been told that my present instructions from you should enable us to make progress at next meeting of Ambassadors and that, while you still think events will show it to be unwise to circulate draft agreement in a form which is not likely to be acceptable to a number of other United Nations, nevertheless you do not wish to cause any further delay and I will have suggestions to make when the meeting is held. I have asked Acheson not to show his position on (2 grps. undec.) Committee until we have all tested out Russian position. This he seemed to be willing to do.

2. A number of my advisers are increasingly concerned about difficulties which may arise later if Governor Lehman continues his present extensive activities in connexion both with stockpiling for post-war and with plans for immediate relief, through blockade, of children in occupied territories. (My telegram No: 446 to Ministry of Economic Warfare). They feel it is most desirable he should, before he commits himself much further, make first-hand contact with Allied Governments in London whose minds on these matters are not always particularly well represented in Washington. My advice would be that you should urge now that Lehman should plan to pay a visit to London immediately after the draft agreement has been approved for circulation to other United Nations and before (repeat before) full meeting is held here to consider it. It would be made clear that we do not expect him to attempt to negotiate draft but are of the opinion that its adaption at his meeting might be made easier if he could at this stage make himself known/

known to Allied Governments in London and see at first-hand the work of Leith Ross's Committee.

3. If you agree I will impress this upon President who takes a keen interest in Lehman's work.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

J.H. Le R. OUT FILE

1/3 5h 31

February 1943.

Draft. TELEGRAM.

Lord Halifax,
WASHINGTON.

Saffhel K/OTP

No 1362
March 1st

Copy to M.E.W.

NB. 26/2.

North American Dept. first.

26/4

Your telegram No. 654 Arfar.

I am glad to hear that the quality of discussions with Lehman has improved.

2. While we have at present every reason for wishing to discourage consideration of schemes likely to involve a breach of the blockade, we feel that if you are compelled to adopt an entirely negative attitude there is a serious risk of our finding ourselves committed sooner or later to some ill-considered ~~scheme~~ plan which would in fact undermine our whole blockade policy.

3. You should therefore be prepared to consider on their merits any reasonable proposals which Lehman may put forward, subject of course to the understanding that you are not at liberty to commit yourself without prior reference to me.

H.pm

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[Cypher]. DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 1362 D. 6.00 p.m. 1st March, 1943.
1st March, 1943.

//////

Your telegram No. 654 Arfar.

I am glad to hear that the quality of discussions with Lehman has improved.

2. While we have at present every reason for wishing to discourage consideration of schemes likely to involve a breach of the blockade, we feel that if you are compelled to adopt an entirely negative attitude there is a serious risk of our finding ourselves committed sooner or later to some ill-considered plan which would in fact undermine our whole blockade policy.

3. You should therefore be prepared to consider on their merits any reasonable proposals which Lehman may put forward, subject of course to the understanding that you are not at liberty to commit yourself without prior reference to me.

O.T.P.

64

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION

W 3133

23 FEB 1943

33

Registry Number W 3133/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No. T 550/G/Z

Dated

Received 19th Feb. 1943

in Registry 23rd Feb. 1943

W: Co-ordination.

United States relief policy.

Transmits copy of telegram to Washington No. 639 Arfar of 17th February giving His Majesty's Government's attitude towards United States relief policy.

Registry

Last Paper.

(W3118)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

25/2

(Action completed.)

vde 8/4/43

(Index.)

Aeh 26/1

Next Paper.

(W 3134)

OUTWARD. TELEGRAM

34

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W 3133

T550/G/Z

[CYPHER] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON 23 FEB 1943

No. 639 ARFAR.
17th February, 1943. D. 7.50 p.m. 17th February, 1943.

SSSSS

IMPORTANT

(W 2554 W 2554)

Your telegrams No. 445 and 446 [Arfar of February 5th: American policy about relief].

We appreciate this full and early information regarding American intentions. Since however the present policy of His Majesty's Government is opposed to relief through the blockade for countries other than Greece, we clearly cannot submit conditions as suggested in paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 446 [Arfar], and shall have to seek a directive as to our attitude in the face of these developments.

2. Meanwhile of course we have no reason to object if the Americans proceed to a detailed investigation on their own account before determining their own attitude for the future. It seems to us indeed that Lehman is setting about his business in a very practical and sensible manner. We particularly welcome the recognition that these problems cannot be treated without regard to questions of supply and shipping as well as of blockade.

3. We also note with particular pleasure promise that, in accordance with the pact made between ourselves and the American Government at their solicitation last Autumn, he will not act or assume moral committments without our agreement. We entirely agree with you that it is most important that we should keep in touch with current American deliberations on this question, and suggest that you should emphasise the following general considerations until such time as we are able to give you more definite instructions:

4. a) It would be very dangerous if these deliberations become known to the public, the Allied Governments, the people in occupied territories or the Germans, having regard to the present agreed policy of the British and American Governments and the consequences of raising expectations which are not fulfilled in fact.

b) Whatever may be said for a limited concession, the difficulty of confining it within those limits cannot be underestimated. For instance, the supply of food would certainly be followed by strong pressure for the supply also of clothing, which raises quite a different set of problems in respect of the blockade. Moreover the demand for an increase in the supply of food would certainly be most powerful, especially if the food situation in the receiving countries deteriorated. As regards L.'s expectations about the moral effect of the arrival of American foodstuffs in the occupied countries, he no doubt realises

/that

Copied to
J. E. Wall Esq. F.O.
E. O. Frazer. Esq M.W.T.

M E W. FILE No. T550/G/Z
COPY FOR E K Crane Esq
DATE 19/2/43

that if small quantities only were sent, attention might well be focused less on their arrival than on their insufficiency.

c) The scale and area to be covered by any operation of this kind must be fully appreciated. It would be essential but very difficult, to secure the employment of a large number of competent neutral controllers; and these would have to enjoy freedom of movement and observation and facilities for transmitting rapid and confidential reports to the blockade authorities if an effective control even of the relief goods themselves was to be maintained. In the occupied territories it is useless simply to hand goods over to the Red Cross Societies, which are necessarily subject to enemy pressure. Moreover guarantees capable of supervision by the diplomatic representatives of a neutral government are the only ones which could offer the least prospect of success.

d) The fundamental point however is that control of the relief supplies themselves is not enough while the Germans meanwhile are able to manipulate the level of nutrition in the recipient countries. In this connexion it should be remembered that the Germans have no reason to favour a scheme which would of its nature be designed to offer no benefit to them. On the other hand they have every reason to wish to prevent it having the moral consequence anticipated in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 445 [Arfar], and this could best be done by nullifying its practical effect.

e) Notwithstanding the view expressed by Lehman, see your telegram No. 541 [Arfar], it is of vital importance to grasp that any relaxation of the blockade in favour of one country would produce a demand for similar relaxations elsewhere. Such a demand would be particularly difficult to resist, since it is not possible to assess relative requirements with any certainty and, moreover, German action on lines indicated at (d) above might completely transform situation in any given country thereby rendering existing data valueless.

5. With regard to paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 445 [Arfar] it is most important that the fundamental distinction between intra blockade relief and relief through the blockade should be understood at the outset. The whole point of the former is that the goods have generally been accessible anyway to the enemy and not cut off by our controls. Thus nothing was added to the resources within his reach, and above all a natural limit on the extension of such schemes was imposed. On the other hand there is no natural limit to the proportions which relief through the blockade might attain in face of a potentially insatiable demand. The fact that Belgium has received disproportionately more than other countries under present arrangements is due partly to geography and partly to the American refusal to release funds for Norway at a time when goods in fairly substantial quantities could still be obtained in Sweden compatibly with our rule.

/It

It is particularly necessary that the Belgium scheme should not be taken as a precedent, still less as a model, for relief <u>through</u> the blockade, since we have never insisted upon any special conditions of control in Belgium because we knew that to do so would be interpretated as an admission that effective control was possible in present circumstances, which in turn would have been used to justify a reversal of blockade policy itself.

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GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION

W 3134

23 FEB 1943

Registry Number W 3134/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated).

No. T 550/G/Z

Dated

Received in Registry 23rd Feb. 1943

W:Co-ordination.

Anglo-United States relief policy.

Transmits copies of telegram to Washington No. 672 Arfar of 18th February and telegram from Washington No.654 Arfar of 19th February regarding parcels for prisoners of war, child evacuation scheme and Governor Lehman's attitude towards general relief question.

Last Paper.

(W 3133).

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

23/2

See within copy of tel to Washington No 690 Arfar. Feb 20.

See within copy of tel to Washington No 904 Arfar March 6.

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
W.O. 8/4/43	Aetl 26/7.

Next Paper.

(W 3135).

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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Sec to 38

M E W. FILE No. T550/G/Z
COPY FOR Mr Crowe
DATE 20/2/43

T.550/G/Z.

[CYPHER].

SPECIAL ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 672 ARFAR.
18th February, 1943.

D. 11 p.m. 18th February, 1943.

rrrrrr

W 3134

23 FEB 1943

IMMEDIATE.

W 3133

My telegram No. 639 [Arfar of February 17th: Anglo-American policy towards Relief agitation].

Belgian Prime Minister has written expressing the hope that a decision may be reached on request put forward in his letter of October 30th (see Foreign Office telegram No. 6983 paragraph 3 (b) [of November 12th]) in time for supplies to be loaded on the CARITAS, which is due shortly in United States. W1461/62/49

2. For the purposes of a reply we should like to know urgently (a) whether we are right in supposing that sufficient parcels for prisoners of war are available to fill the vessel as always intended (b) whether from the information already at your disposal you see any propsect at all of an early American decision on the question of child evacuation (see your telegram No. 541 [Arfar of February 10th] paragraph 2).

3. Please also advise us whether Lehman's attitude on general relief question is likely to determine that of State Department and administration as a whole, and whether this attitude is likely to be influenced in either direction by the intervention of Mr. Hoover.

39

[Cypher] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Viscount Halifax,
No.654 ARFAR.
19th February,1943.

D. untimed 19th February,1943.
R. 8.5 a.m. 20th February,1943.

888888

IMMEDIATE.

Your telegram No.672.

There are more than sufficient parcels for prisoners of war to fill the Caritas on its first eastbound voyage.

2. Lehman's first act after his authority over immediate relief questions had been confirmed was to send his principal assistant to see Hall this morning to draw up a list of urgent questions upon which a prompt decision was needed. In addition to other matters the child evacuation schemes both to Switzerland and Sweden were re-examined in detail. The reception they received was sympathetic. It seems reasonable to expect that Lehman will agree to a detailed examination of plan with the Swiss and Belgian Governments. The obstacle which he anticipates is a refusal by Germans to allow the children to be moved. His aide took point that it would be advantageous to place onus for refusal on Germans.

3. Lehman is at present a member of staff of State Department and as he is known to be very close indeed to President his views are likely to determine those of State Department. It is difficult to tell how far he will be influenced by Hoover type of agitation. He has a personal respect for the ex-President's administrative ability and is predisposed to bring aid to children if he can do so without harming the war effort. He and his principal Aide Osborne are impressed by difficulties of doing anything at all adequate and your telegram No.639 for which we are exceedingly grateful arrived just in time for this morning's meeting. It had some effect if only in showing how deeply you had studied problem and how many problems need to be solved before Lehman commits himself one way or other. It would seem to be unwise to go further than this at moment. Quality of our discussions has improved and there is a very marked desire to improve our collaboration in these particular matters.

M.E.W. FILE No. 1550/9/3
COPY FOR E.C. Lascelles Esq only
DATE 22/2/43

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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M.E.W. FILE No. T.550/19/28
COPY FOR Miss Sanders F.O.
DATE 6/3/43

V 3134/4/49
8 MAR 1943

T.550/19/28.

[CYPHER]

LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 690 ARFAR.
20th February, 1943.

D. 1. 0 p.m. 20th February, 1943.

JJJJ

IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 672 [Arfar of February 18th], paragraph 2(b).

Swiss Minister has again referred to the proposed child evacuation scheme in which his Government is now evidently keenly interested. He suggested that a proportion of Jewish children might with advantage be included.

2. Please mention this to United States authorities, as they may share our view that this is a valuable opportunity of bringing some relief to the suffering Jewish population of Europe, for whom much sympathy is felt both here and in United States.

3. You might also point out that in our view the inclusion of Jewish children who are in particular distress deserves to be considered, whether they are in Germany or in the occupied territories.

4. Swiss Minister is anxious for early progress to be made with the scheme. He was told of course that no definite decision had yet been taken.

OTP.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM 41 2 (2)

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W 3134 & 69

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/G/Z.
Foreign Office copy
DATE 8.3.43

T550/g/Z

[CYPHER.] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 904. Arfar.
6th March, 1943. D. 7. 30 p.m. 6th March, 1943.

W W W W W

IMPORTANT.

W3134

My telegram No. 672 [Arfar of February 18th] and your telegram No. 654 [Arfar of February 19th: Relief for Belgium].

W3134

No answer has yet been given to Belgian Prime Minister. We feel it undesirable to give him a completely negative reply if United States Government are likely at an early date to agree to our discussing child evacuation schemo with Belgians, or if in the fairly near future they are likely to press for milk shipments to children. But a reply of some kind cannot be delayed much longer.

2. As a result of F.O. telegram No. 1362 you will probably be exchanging views with Governor Lehman in the near future, and this should afford you an opportunity to discover his present attitude towards both the above questions. We assume that you will keep us fully informed and we are particularly anxious to get prompt indication of authoritative United States views on the evacuation scheme.

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W 3135 / 4 / 49

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 3180

24 FEB 1943

43

Registry Number W 3180/4/49

FROM Mr. Quennell (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Crowe.

No. T.550/80

Dated 20th Feb.,

Received in Registry 24th Feb., 1943

W: Co-ordination

Anti-malarial drugs for French Red Cross in Indo-China.

The French wish to send to the French Red Cross in Indo-China supplies of anti-malarial drugs in one of the diplomatic exchange ships. There is no Ministry of Economic Warfare objection to these shipments so proposes to statethat Ministry of Economic Warfare agree in this case without prejudice to any future decision.

Last Paper.

W 3135

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Copy to Mr. Gardner (W.O.) for his approval. April 8.

& to Mr. Quennell (M.E.W.) April 8.

(Action completed.) 8/3/43.

(Index.) Alph 27/7

Next Paper.

W 3225 (W 5940)

(Minutes.)

Cos the drugs are anyhow going from inside the blockade. I see no objection.

Thurs. 25/3.

Remark Dept still M.E.W. informed. E.C.S. 25/2

See within copy of letter from Mr. Quennell (M.E.W.) to Mr. Gardner (W.O.) of Feb 22.

See within copy of letter from Mr. Gardner (W.O.) to Mr. Quennell (M.E.W.) Feb 25.

French Dept W.M. 6/3 E.C.S. 5/3

See within copy of letter from Mr. Quennell (M.E.W.) to Mr. Gardner (W.O.) dated 23

E.C.S. 1/4

See further W.O. letter dated

The suggestion of Mr. Quennell

E.C.S. 7/4

~~T555~~ T 550/80

E W C 44

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

20th ~~February~~ 1943.

W 3180

21 FEB 1943

Dear Crowe,

We have received today a telephone message from Dr. Burckhardt informing us that the French wish to send to the French Red Cross in Indo-China the following supplies of anti-malarial drugs on one of the diplomatic exchange ships that travel to and fro:-

Emetine	20 kilograms
Fremaline	340 "

We find that there is no M.E.W. objection to these shipments (though the second shipment seems somewhat large); and with your concurrence we propose/.....

E.E.Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall.
S. W. 1.

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propose to state that we agree in this case, without prejudice to any future decisions. I should add that it is not yet clear whether the goods are to come from France or from Switzerland.

W 3180

Yours sincerely,

R. Gronnell

Tel.No. WHItehall 9400.
Ext.518.

INDEXED 3180 4 49

LONDON, S.W.1. 46

0103/4552 (F.4.P.W.)

25 February, 1943.

Dear Quennell,

Thank you for your letter of the 22nd February, asking for our views upon the proposal to allow the French to send to the French Red Cross in Indo-China anti-malarial drugs on the next exchange vessels returning to the Far East.

Although we have no definite information about any future exchanges that may take place, we believe that there will not be sufficient space on the vessels to carry essential supplies to the prisoners of war of the United Nations, and we would, therefore, be most reluctant to see any of the space used for the carriage of French supplies.

I am sending a copy of your letter to me and of this letter to Roberts at the Foreign Office.

Yours sincerely,

sgd. W. H. Gardner

P.Quennell,Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

COPY

T./ [redacted]

47

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

[redacted] 22nd February, 1943.

Dear Cardner,

We have received today a telephone message from Dr. Burckhardt informing us that the French wish to send to the French Red Cross in Indo-China the following supplies of anti-malarial drugs on one of the diplomatic exchange ships that travel to and fro:-

Emetine	20 kilograms
Premaline	340 "

We find that there is no M.E.W. objection to these shipments (though the second shipment seems somewhat large); and with your concurrence we propose to state that we agree in this case, without prejudice to any future decisions. I should add that it is not yet clear whether the goods are to come from France or from Switzerland.

Yours sincerely,
(SGD.) PETER QUENNELL

W. Cardner, Esq.,
War Office,
Whitehall,
S.W.1.

T550/80

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Copy for E.E.Crowe,Esq.
Foreign Office.

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

INDEXED

23rd March 1943.

3180 4 49
26 MAR 1943

With regard to your letter of February 25th about the proposed shipment to the French Red Cross in Indo-China of certain drugs on exchange vessels returning to the Far East, we have been awaiting the Foreign Office's reaction to this proposal, and meanwhile Dr. Burckhardt has returned to the charge.

We now learn that the Foreign Office, like ourselves, have no objection. You, I understand, do object rather strongly. If you are extremely anxious that the proposal should be turned down, we will, of course, do so. On what grounds, in your view, should we base our rejection of the plan? Alternatively, Camps suggests that we might save space by allowing Emetine but refusing Premaline, against which a valid M.E.W. objection could, if necessary, be produced.

R Quennell

W.Gardner, Esq.,
War Office,
Whitehall.
S.W.1.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W3160/4/49.

Draft. W.

Mr Gardner
COO.

Mr
Mr Cross

Copy Mr Guenault ref.

8 mm
49

+ IC

8 April, 1943.

OUT FILE

Dear Gardner,

From Guenault's letter
of 4th No. T.550780 of March 24th
I gather you have some
objection to the shipment
of a small quantity of drugs
to the French Red Cross in
Indo-China. Although
the total quantity involved
is less than half-a-ton, I
suppose your objection is
due to reluctance to
use Red X shipping space
to help Vichy Frenchmen.

We ourselves do not
lay undue store on quantity

Mem

50

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Neen special facilities. On the other hand ~~would~~ it is definitely our policy whenever possible to accede to requests from the T. R. C.C. and we do feel that to turn down a shipping ~~shipment~~ consignment of this kind to which there is no blockade a political objection would look rather foolish and would not sound at all convincing to the T. R. C.C.

In the circumstances we hope that you will be able to withdraw your objection

Yours sincerely

E.E.C. 7/4

Sd E. E. Crowe.

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FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.

8th April, 1943.

(W 3180/4/49)

Dear Gardner,

From Quennell's letter to you No. T 550/80 of 23rd March I gather you have some objection to the shipment of a small quantity of drugs to the French Red Cross in Indo-China. Although the total quantity involved is less than half-a-ton, I suppose your objection is due to reluctance to use Red Cross shipping space to help Vichy Frenchmen..

We ourselves do not lay undue store on granting them special facilities On the other hand it is definitely our policy whenever possible to accede to requests from the International Red Cross Committee and we do feel that to turn down on shipping grounds a small consignment of this kind to which there is no blockade or political objection would look rather foolish and would not sound at all convincing to the International Red Cross Committee.

In/

W.H. Gardner, Esq.,
War Office.

In the circumstances we hope that you will be able to withdraw your objection.

Yours [illegible]

(E.A. Crowe)

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D.

1943

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 3225

24 FEB 1943

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Registry Number W 3225/4/49

FROM Mr. Troutbeck (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Le Rougetel

No.

Dated 18th Feb. 1943

Received in Registry 24th Feb.1943

W : Co-ordination

Blockade Policy respecting relief.

Encloses a copy of the final version of the note on blockade policy respecting relief. This has been revised after discussion with Mr. Riefler (United States Embassy).

Last Paper.

(W165-67/62/49/1942)
W 3180

References.

(Print.)

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8/ Mr. Troutbeck (M.E.W) (24c.) (P124 - P147)
✓ March 8.

P 148 & P 149 to Mr. Rowe.
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8/ Mrs. Patterson (D.O. Registry)
P No 57. ✓ April 30.

(Minutes.)

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Next Paper.

W 3262.

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WAR (GENERAL). February 24, 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

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[W 3225/4/49] Copy No. 8

Note on Blockade Policy respecting Relief.—(*Received in Foreign Office, February* 24.)

IN the autumn of 1940 the Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons that it was the intention of the British Government to maintain rigorously the blockade of all territories occupied and controlled by the enemy, and to lay squarely upon the shoulders of the enemy the responsibility for providing for the needs of the inhabitants. This policy was reaffirmed in the spring of 1941 in a public statement issued through the British Embassy at Washington at the time of Mr. Hoover's appeal for an official experiment in food relief in Belgium. In the autumn of 1941 the United States Government affirmed a similar attitude. Their declaration referred, however, to territory occupied by the enemy and did not specifically include areas such as the unoccupied zone of France, which, though controlled by the enemy, was not then under formal occupation. This pronouncement of the American Government was founded upon a very definite assertion of the enemy's responsibility for the maintenance of the populations whose countries he had occupied, but it did not, of course, positively assert the intention of the American Government to maintain a blockade of these territories inasmuch as the American Government was not at that time at war. In the autumn of 1942 the two Governments resolved formally upon a joint policy in these matters, and it was agreed that no changes of the practice at that time established should be made unless by common consent.

2. At the end of the winter of 1941 a condition of desperate famine developed in Greece, and the two Governments, not without considerable anxiety, decided in January 1942 that it was necessary to make an exception to the policy which they had so far universally applied. Accordingly a shipment of 8,000 tons of wheat was permitted to pass the blockade to Greece. In announcing this decision, which was taken upon the joint responsibility of the British and American Governments, the determination of both these Governments was reaffirmed in the clearest terms that the general policy of blockade should remain, with this single exception of Greece, unimpaired. Since then the case of Greece has been treated as wholly exceptional; the first 8,000 tons were followed by further occasional cargoes during the spring and summer, and since the end of August 1942 regular shipments of 15,000 tons of wheat monthly have been permitted to pass the blockade under a scheme sponsored by the Swedish Government and governed by conditions agreed by the enemy Powers. These conditions provide not only for neutral supervision and the immunity of food-stuffs imported through the blockade from Axis interference, but also that the native produce of Greece shall be reserved (except where exchanges are approved by the neutral supervisors) exclusively for the use of the Greek population. It has been possible to defend this exception, so far, on the double ground that the need of Greece was incomparably more acute than that of rival claimants, and that whereas in the greater part of Europe the enemy Powers have found it necessary to permit commercial exchanges which have ensured a minimum subsistence to the population, in the case of Greece they have not found it to their interest to take any such measures to avoid the development of a major calamity. It is, therefore, argued on the one hand that since a general importation of food-stuffs into occupied Europe is manifestly impossible, the claims of Greece to be the sole exception are paramount on obvious grounds of need; and on the other hand, that by taking action which they have taken in respect of Greece, the British and American Governments have not relieved the enemy of a burden which he would otherwise have carried himself. The scheme originally provided for the shipment of 15,000 tons monthly of wheat only, and such medical supplies as are ordinarily admissible under navicert to any occupied territory. In December of 1942, however, it was agreed to add up to 3,000 tons of pulse monthly, to this amount, and also 100 tons monthly of powdered milk or the equivalent.

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3. The British Government has been approached on many occasions with requests to admit supplies of food and clothing through the blockade for relief in countries other than Greece. The following are the principal instances which have occurred since the campaign of Mr. Hoover in the United States in the winter of 1940 and early part of 1941 :—

(*a*) In the summer of 1941 the Belgian Government presented a scheme for relief from soup kitchens, similar in its essentials to that recommended by Mr. Hoover. As an appendix to it or as an alternative, they requested the despatch of a small monthly amount of milk and vitamins for children. In the early months of 1942 they reverted to the latter proposition, and on receiving the customary negative they repeated their request in July. After this was refused they again asked, towards the end of 1942, that the British Government should allow a single consignment of 200 or 300 tons of dried milk for children to be shipped from the United States on the ex-Belgian ship, *Caritas I*, which has been assigned to the carriage from America to Europe of parcels for prisoners of war. This request was followed by a strong letter rejecting the grounds on which previous applications were refused, and threatening that the Belgian Government might publicly disassociate itself from the British Government's policy on these questions.

(*b*) In October 1941 the Norwegian Government approached the British Government with a suggestion for sending one parcel to every family in Norway from the United States as a gift of the Norwegian merchant seamen. This request was repeated in October of 1942. It was said to have been laid before the United States Government also, and was presented on this occasion as an experiment which might, if successful, be repeated so as to provide a regular flow of relief. Another plan which was put forward simultaneously proposed the importation of food and clothing into Sweden to be stored there against the admission of relief to Norway at some unspecified later date. These proposals were strongly pressed, and the Norwegian Government threatened to connect them with questions affecting the use of Norwegian ships in the Allied war service.

(*c*) The Yugoslav Government have on several occasions requested permission to send comparatively small consignments of food and clothing to the town of Belgrade or to the area inhabited by the supporters of General Michailovic.

(*d*) Apart from these particular applications by the Allied Governments there have also been agitations by private persons or societies for relief for the Channel Islands and for Jewish sufferers in Eastern Europe. With regard to the latter, the suggestion has been made that Jews in Polish ghettoes should be treated as the equivalent of prisoners of war in camps of internment and receive similar privileges in respect of the blockade.

(*e*) On various occasions requests have been made for the admission of very small quantities of specified food-stuffs through the blockade to be despatched in postal parcels from Portugal to occupied territories. These requests have been frequent and insistent. It is to be noted that there is a very powerful demand in the Belgian Congo for facilities of such a kind.

(*f*) There has also been agitation in this country by British subjects for a modification of the policy of the British Government. In the winter of 1941–42 a movement was started, largely by persons of pacifist tendencies, which resulted in numerous meetings all over the country and, though without any marked general influence, had some effect upon the conscience of the members of some religious denominations. Such general public sympathy as was roused was almost entirely concentrated upon the single case of Greece.

In the spring of 1942 the centre of gravity shifted to a new organisation called the Famine Relief Committee. This body commands a certain volume of support from responsible persons and has been very careful to keep itself apparently free from pacifist associations. The committee's members include representative bishops of the Anglican and Roman Churches and leaders of the Free Churches, as well as certain personalities from the academic and journalistic

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world. The committee presented to the Minister of Economic Warfare during the summer of 1942 a memorandum recommending a detailed project for child relief in Belgium and Greece, to be extended later, if successful, to other occupied countries. It brought forward this project once again towards the end of the year and the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Archbishop of Westminster were induced by the committee to approach the Prime Minister in the matter in their behalf. The committee claims that Dr. Van Dusen and a group associated with him are working on parallel lines in the United States. It will be observed that the sympathy of this organisation is very largely focussed upon Belgium and that its proposals are similar in kind to those put forward by the Belgian Government since the abandonment of their major plan in the summer of 1941. The strength of this movement lies in the fact that it commands responsible and intelligent support and that it recognises that relief action can take place only upon a limited scale and in a form least calculated to confer material benefit upon the enemy. In fact, its main thesis is not readily open to criticism on simple grounds of economic warfare, though the committee is plainly unaware of the practical difficulties of securing an adequate control or limiting a concession once made. The British Government are, however, still convinced that the time is not ripe for any action which would begin a process tending to shift the responsibility for providing for the occupied territories from the shoulders of the enemy Powers on to those of the United Nations, and they believe that there are grave psychological dangers in accepting any commitment in this respect, however small.

4. While the above describes the position of the British Government in respect of food relief (or relief in the form of clothing and so on) for the civilian populations of occupied territories as a whole, there have from the beginning been certain acknowledged exceptions to the principle of total blockade. Thus, the British Government informed the International Red Cross in the autumn of 1940 that "medical supplies in the strict sense of the term" would receive facilities enabling them to pass the blockade to enemy occupied territories. They since more precisely defined the term "medical supplies" as referring to drugs of strictly and solely medical and humanitarian application, and excluding products convertible to other uses, or whose use in medical practice could not be defined as humanitarian in effect. The rule at present applied permits the despatch to occupied territories, under navicert or corresponding authority, of medical products which it is believed can be of no material assistance to the enemy if diverted by them from the intended recipients. The British Government has not granted navicerts under this heading for bandages or cotton wool, blankets, hospital bedding or other textile materials. Nor has it normally granted navicerts for oily and fatty substances, such as castor oil or paraffin, which are utilisable for other than medical purposes. Nor has it commonly granted navicerts for drugs of a strategic application, such as quinine, which is required by the enemy for maintenance in certain circumstances of armies in the field. Moreover, in admitting certain commodities the practice has been to maintain a statistical check in order to ensure that the facilities accorded did not become subject to exploitation. It has also been the practice to require in general that consignments of this nature should be sent through certain accepted channels and not in the way of ordinary commerce.

It should be noted that the above rule has been applied with some flexibility, and that small amounts of normally excluded items have sometimes been admitted.

A large number of navicerts and licences for small consignments have been granted on various occasions; some of the more important instances have been the despatch of a large consignment of medical stores from the United States to Poland in the autumn of 1941, a further substantial consignment from the United States to Belgium in the spring of 1942, and a consignment to Yugoslavia from this country. The Belgian Government recently received a licence for the export from the United States to Belgium of a quantity of certain products considered to be sufficient for the needs of Belgium for a whole year.

5. Facilities have also regularly been granted for food and clothing and other appropriate articles sent to prisoners of war. This derives from the fact that the Geneva Convention provides a machinery offering the prospect of control of distribution and receipt of such gifts, as well as imposing on the detaining Power certain obligations regarding the maintenance of prisoners and the way in which they may be employed.

(*a*) Postal parcels addressed to individual prisoners of war have been regularly permitted to pass the blockade from all parts of the world.

An attempt was at one time made to require that such parcels should be sent in care of the I.R.C. at Geneva, but this was found impracticable on technical grounds as well as unprofitable, in view of the later discovery that parcels so addressed did not, in fact, pass through the hands of the International Committee at all. The British and Imperial Governments have restricted the despatch of postal parcels to individual prisoners from their own territory in accordance with a general policy which aims at supplying British and Imperial prisoners out of a common pool on equitable principles. A similar, but not exactly identical, restriction has lately been adopted in the United States.

(*b*) At an early stage the British Government agreed to grant navicerts for goods of suitable kinds sent as freight, as well as by post, to the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva for general distribution to prisoners of this or that nationality. This arrangement applied, in the first instance, to the despatch of Red Cross standard parcels, crated in large boxes and shipped as freight, instead of being transmitted through ordinary postal channels. It was later extended to allow the despatch of suitable commodities in bulk (for instance, cases of tinned meat or cartons of sugar and so forth, instead of actual parcels of assorted content) in order to save shipping space and help the generosity of donors who had not the facility for packing large numbers of parcels. The British and American Governments have recently agreed, however, that it is important, if abuse of this concession is to be avoided, to require that goods despatched in this manner should be of such a kind and so packed as to be suitable for individual distribution to the prisoners and for direct consumption by them, since otherwise it is plain that such relief would shortly become a substitute for, instead of supplementary to, the rations provided by the detaining authorities. A statistical check is maintained upon all such despatches.

(*c*) The British Government for long found difficulty in permitting the French Government to organise without limit the supply from overseas on a large scale and with official funds of food and clothing for the very numerous French prisoners held in German hands under somewhat ill-defined conditions. Their practice has been to give facilities more or less automatically for gifts from private societies and individuals for French prisoners, but to draw a distinction between these and supplies officially organised as described above.

In the autumn of 1942 it was proposed to exact conditions of stricter control over the disposal of goods sent to French prisoners through the International Red Cross, and thus remove the misgivings felt about the efforts of the Vichy Government to organise despatches for them on a substantial scale. Progress was delayed, however, by the occupation of the Vichy zone by the Germans, and, owing to the uncertainty of the situation which resulted from this event, the British and American Governments agreed to suspend action on a navicert application for about 1,200 tons of food-stuffs bought in Argentina by the Vichy authorities. The latter then threatened to withdraw facilities for the transport of goods for British prisoners through Marseilles and across France. The International Red Cross have since been informed that the navicert applied for in Buenos Aires will be granted subject to special conditions of control of the kind envisaged before the Vichy zone was occupied by the enemy. A reply is awaited.

(*d*) The British Government has felt considerable concern about the ultimate disposal of goods sent to prisoners of war of certain nationalities and has been seeking to learn from the I.R.C. Committee the extent of the control which the committee is really able to exercise over such goods. It has not so far been possible to obtain fully satisfactory information about this. A further difficulty has arisen in that the exact numbers of prisoners of various nationalities whom the I.R.C. is in a position to service are not at present in all cases known, and considerable discrepancies have been noted in figures emanating from different sources. As regards British and American prisoners, much fuller information on all points is available from the reports directly communicated to the Governments concerned by the agents of the protecting Power and the I.R.C. Committee.

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(*e*) Navicerts have not been granted for the despatch of goods to societies or persons in Europe other than the I.R.C. Committee for forwarding to prisoners of war, since it is apparent that any other practice would result in numerous demands by bodies whose activity would not be readily controllable, and who would not themselves have any facilities for verifying the safe arrival of these goods in the hands of the persons for whom they were nominally intended.

(*f*) A problem has recently arisen in connexion with the supply of shipping for carrying goods to prisoners of all Allied nationals from overseas to Europe. The I.R.C. Committee has constituted a shipping company of its own in Switzerland, through which it hopes to acquire for use under its own control ships which are for various reasons not at present employed. There appear to be certain objections to the development of this idea by the I.R.C. Committee, and this matter has also been under discussion between the British and United States Governments. On the other hand, the problem of providing shipping for the prisoners-of-war traffic remains, and it seems desirable to establish a co-ordinated policy in respect of this.

The shipping company of the International Red Cross has, so far, acquired one ship. This is the former Belgian steamship *Frederick*, now called the *Caritas I*. It was formerly at Casablanca, whence it was released by the Armistice Commission on its transfer to the ownership of the I.R.C.C.'s company and to Swiss flag. The British Government agreed to the transfer of ownership and flag on condition—

(*a*) That financial benefit to the enemy should not result.

(*b*) That the ship should be used for transport of cargoes covered by documents issued by the blockade authorities and destined for prisoners of war, with the exception that strictly medical supplies for the civilian population of occupied territories might also be carried. It was further understood that the vessel would run between a United States port and Europe.

The former owners were a Belgian company in Belgium who sold the ship to the I.R.C.C.'s shipping company on the terms that payment should fall due in five years' time or three months after the end of the war, they having an option to take the ship back instead of receiving payment at that date. Extensive repairs proved necessary after the ship arrived at Lisbon from Casablanca, and the cost of these was to be borne as to half by the former owners and as to half by the I.R.C.C.; the latter, however, had to call upon the Belgian Government to pay for their share. The whole transaction was extremely unsatisfactory and confused, partly owing to the unbusinesslike methods of some of the people concerned, and partly to the ambiguous position of the Belgian Government in the deal. Theoretically, they had no part in it, and the transaction was supposed to be between the Belgian owners and the Red Cross only.

The I.R.C.C. later proposed to take over another ship, the Danish *Nancy*, now at Lisbon. They invited the British Red Cross to bear the cost in the general interest of prisoners of war. The British Government was prepared to agree to this provided that—

(*a*) Any payment required by the Danish owners in Denmark was made into an effectively blocked account in Switzerland, the owners at the end of the war having the option of receiving their money or taking back the ship.

(*b*) The ship was used on the Lisbon–Mediterranean route for transport exclusively of parcels for prisoners of war and civilian internees.

The United States Government gave its concurrence to this proposal, albeit without enthusiasm.

The above financial terms were understood to be those proposed by the I.R.C.C., but further enquiry showed that this was not the case. The owners were, in fact, asking not only for the guaranteed return of the ship to them after the war, but also for a substantial hire which was to accumulate meanwhile to their credit in a blocked account. It was also found that the cost of running the ship would be unduly onerous. Negotiations were therefore broken off.

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The general attitude of the British Government to this Red Cross shipping company is as follows :—

No encouragement in general terms can be given, since the company may work to the advantage or disadvantage of the United Nations according as it is directed. On the other hand, it is always possible to consider a particular proposal for the company to acquire a particular ship for a particular purpose under particular conditions, and, indeed, it may be that in some cases the company may be able to help the supply of shipping for prisoners of war while at the same time not conflicting with the interests of our war effort. The British Government is particularly concerned to ensure—

(*a*) That financial benefit to the enemy shall not result from these transactions.

(*b*) That shipping is not acquired by the Red Cross company which might be or become of service to the United Nations in other ways.

(*c*) That shipping controlled by the I.R.C. do not become a factor in promoting demands for relief shipments which would be of a kind unwelcome to the blockade authorities.

6. Civilian internees in enemy and occupied territories have been regarded as eligible for the same privileges as prisoners of war, where appropriate, in respect of the blockade, if they were detained in identical conditions and if the cause of their detention was the simple fact of their being (from the point of view of the Axis) "enemy aliens." The purpose of this limitation has been to keep within the framework of the Geneva Convention as at present applied by the various belligerents, and also to avoid an indefinite extension of blockade privileges to the very numerous categories of prisoners who are detained in various parts of Europe for a wide variety of reasons. It is understood that the principle in question is agreed between the British and United States Governments. The general question of assistance to persons interned under conditions not at present qualifying them for relief requires joint consideration by the British and United States Governments.

It should be noted that in one or two cases the British Government departed from the policy described in allowing relief to be extended experimentally to a class of internees outside the above definition. One such case was that of the refugees and destitute persons of various nationalities detained in a group of camps in the south-west corner of the formerly unoccupied zone of France. In response to a request by the International Red Cross the British Government agreed in the spring of 1941 to permit collective consignments of food and clothing to pass the blockade for distribution in these camps, provided that a resident supervisory staff was installed in the camps by the International Red Cross, the American Red Cross, or the American Friends, and that regular reports were furnished on the working of the arrangement. In December 1941 the International Red Cross secured the agreement of the French authorities to a modified version of these terms, which provided for the collaboration of the International Red Cross and the American Friends in distributing goods in the camps and verifying by subsequent visits that all was well, but did not accept resident supervisors appointed by either of these bodies. This was accepted provisionally, and the American Friends sent an initial shipment of clothing from United States in the first half of 1942; further shipments were to be conditional on the report of this first experiment proving satisfactory. It appears, however, that though the goods reached Marseilles, no distribution in the camps had been effected at the time when the Germans occupied the Vichy zone. The International Red Cross reported about that time that distribution was not advisable since the situation in the camps in question had been transformed by wholesale deportations of their inmates, who were stripped of clothing on crossing the frontier. The future treatment of this class of internees will now require review. Another irregular arrangement was sanctioned by the British Government in the autumn of 1941, when they agreed, at the request of the International Red Cross Committee, to allow food parcels to be sent through the committee to 5,000 maimed or otherwise disabled Greek soldiers in hospitals, as though these men were prisoners of war (which they are not). This decision has caused no embarrassing repercussions in the sense of demands for similar facilities on behalf of wounded soldiers of other nationalities. It could have been defended on the ground that genuine Greek prisoners of war are extremely few and that the conditions in Greece justify this exceptional measure. The decision had, however, caused endless trouble with the Greeks themselves. The

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International Red Cross is taking steps to secure the hospitalisation of a number of the men in question, who had been turned out of hospital, and permission has been given for them to forward parcels meanwhile to these cases also. The nature of this concession is now obscured by the fact that relief on a substantial scale is being allowed to the civilian population of Greece.

7. Apart from these specific exceptions to the general principle described in paragraph 1, there has been also an interpretation of that principle by the British Government which appears to have caused some misunderstandings. In April 1941, at a time when pressure for a general breach of the blockade was very strong, various Allied Governments, notably the Belgian and Norwegian Governments, put forward proposals for the purchase in neutral European countries of goods which had already passed the blockade for despatch for purposes of relief. It was proposed by the Norwegian Government to buy such goods in Sweden, payment being made with dollars hitherto blocked in the United States. The United States Embassy in London enquired the views of the British Government on this proposal and after reflection the British Government replied that they were agreeable in principle to the purchase by Allied Governments or organisations in neutral European countries of goods originating in those countries, and not of a kind which those countries were simultaneously being permitted to import through the blockade controls. The British Government added that they had no objection to the release of dollars for such purchases provided that financial benefit to the enemy did not result, and they explained this phrase to mean that enemy banks or intermediaries or firms should not be employed in the transactions. Thereafter it became the practice of the British Government to encourage purchases of goods for relief within the limits indicated, and frequent reference was made to this concession when negative answers were returned to requests for formal breaches of the blockade. For various reasons very few such transactions materialised except in Portugal, where the Belgian Government gradually developed a purchasing organisation which worked in agreement with the British representatives in Portugal, and was financed from time to time by transfers of funds to Portugal through the Bank of England. These transfers ran at the rate of about £50,000 a month during the last four months of 1941. In February 1942 the Belgian Government requested that funds should be made available up to a quarter of a million pounds a month. It was then explained that this could only be done if the Portuguese Government would agree to permit the Bank of England to convert this amount of sterling into escudos without reducing the amount of escudos which the British Government desired to obtain against sterling for its own purposes. The Portuguese Government agreed to this as a gesture of sympathy towards the Belgians and since then the purchases in Portugal have run at the rate of approximately £200,000 a month or 20 million escudos.

During the autumn of 1941 similar purchases in Turkey were encouraged in the hope that the necessity for a major breach of the blockade in favour of Greece might be avoided. In this case the goods were bought with Turkish pounds available to the British Government from a considerable balance then at their disposal, and the expenditure of Turkish pounds was reimbursed partly by dollar contributions from a relief association in the United States and latterly by the Greek Government in London. The possibility of purchases in Turkey has, however, greatly diminished, and the need for it has become less urgent in view of the adoption of the relief scheme described in paragraph 2 above.

Meanwhile, in the autumn of 1941, the United States Government adopted a new and stricter policy towards the licensing of transfers of dollars to buy neutral European currencies. This policy of the United States Government was in general most welcome and helpful to the blockade policy of the British Government, but in particular cases occasional embarrassment resulted as a result of the latent discrepancy between it and the principle previously adopted by the British Government regarding the legitimacy of buying goods in neutral European countries for relief purposes. The United States Government must have found itself in the position of appearing less sympathetic than the British Government to the requests of certain Allies. On the other hand, the British Government, which had (as explained above) frequently assured the Allies of its readiness to approve such relief transactions, was open to suspicion of having deliberately tried to escape from its own concessions by persauding a friendly neutral to take measures which would make their fulfilment impossible. From this point the British Government ceased to encourage or support proposals for relief purchases in neutral European countries, which would require the licensing of a transfer of dollars by the United States Treasury, except where consent of

the latter had already been obtained. It was, however, obliged by the assurances already given to continue to allow such purchases to be financed by transfer of sterling, in so far as its exchange requirements in the neutral countries in question allowed; this in general precluded purchases in countries whose currency could only be obtained by the Bank of England in immediate exchange for gold.

The resulting position was, of course, unsatisfactory, since (*a*) the discrepancy between United States and British practice remained, with consequent embarrassment to both parties; (*b*) some Allied Governments were placed at a disadvantage compared with others, if their only resources were in dollars, or if the currency of the neutral country from which they desired to buy supplies was only obtainable against dollars or gold. Furthermore, it is believed that the United States Government view with distaste the whole system of intra-blockade relief purchases, for a complex of reasons, of which the chief are: (*a*) a fear that the resulting acquisition of foreign exchange by European neutrals will ultimately be prejudicial to the interests of the "financial" blockade; (*b*) the growing shortage of funds in neutral European currencies required by the United Nations for essential war purposes. The British Government are, of course, substantially in agreement with the United States Government on these points; on the other hand, they are to a certain degree morally committed to the line of policy which they have followed so far, and are also convinced that in certain circumstances the permission to make relief purchases of the kind in question is of great assistance politically to Allied Governments and has in the past contributed largely to the successful maintenance of the blockade. It does not appear that it should be difficult to arrive at a common policy which will be in accordance with the wishes of both Governments. Meanwhile, it is agreed that new commitments should be the subject of joint consultation.

The Belgian Government has asked for funds to spend in Spain, Switzerland and Sweden, as well as in Portugal. It has been agreed that they may have Spanish currency from time to time, provided (*a*) that any allocations of this are deducted from the £250,000 equivalent monthly allowed to them at present for purchases in Portugal; (*b*) that they will be content with such amounts of pesetas as can be obtained across the Anglo-Spanish special account after other requirements have been met.

No Swedish crowns have been made available to the Belgian Government for relief purchases.

They were allowed about a million Swiss francs exceptionally in February of 1942, and at the same time put in a request for a regular monthly allocation of the same amount. They were subsequently informed that a decision on this would depend on the outcome of the financial discussions with the Swiss Government which were in progress. They have reverted to the subject several times, and the matter is now under discussion with the United States Government, together with requests for smaller single sums of Swiss francs which have been received from the Dutch and Yugoslav Governments.

The Yugoslav Government several times during 1941 and 1942 expressed a wish to buy food-stuffs in Turkey for despatch to Yugoslavia. The quantities and cost involved were small, and in accordance with the principle already explained His Majesty's Government consented to these proposals. Nothing materialised, however, until August of 1942, when the Yugoslav Government were preparing a specific plan for purchases of 3,000 tons of food-stuffs in this way. Unfortunately it was overlooked that, while necessary small sums in Turkish £ should be furnished by His Majesty's Government, the only assets with which the Yugoslav Government can reimburse His Majesty's Government are in dollars. Consequently it appears that His Majesty's Government has unwittingly consented for its part, and without consultation of United States Government, to a transaction which would involve a transfer of dollars. No purchase has yet been made, but it seems that the Yugoslav proposal is still active.

In their commodity aspect, those transactions encouraging the despatch of "surplus" produce from neutral European countries to occupied territories are recommended by the fact that they offer at least a prospect of doing some good without the danger of doing much harm, besides being politically helpful to the Allied Governments. The goods are generally accessible, anyway, to the enemy, so that nothing is added to the total of the resources within their reach. The principle applied leaves the blockade ring intact, and affords a clearly defined natural limit which would not exist if imports through the blockade were allowed.

The practical efficiency of such arrangements in relieving distress is admittedly hard to judge, and probably varies according to circumstances. There

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is no doubt that the supplies sent from Turkey to Greece in the winter of 1941–42 saved many people in Athens and Piræus from starvation. On the other hand, it cannot be said whether, for instance, the supplies sent to Belgium from Portugal by the Belgian Government really improved the lot of people in Belgium; since this depends on whether they are supplementary to the total of food-stuffs which the Germans allow Belgium to obtain commercially from inside Europe, or merely replace food-stuffs which would otherwise have been imported under other arrangements.

8. Certain minor points arise in connexion with the principle explained at the beginning of the preceding paragraph :—

(*a*) In the case of Switzerland and Sweden the liberty of these countries to export to enemy and occupied territories is not governed primarily by the question whether the goods proposed are of a type simultaneously imported by them through the blockade, but the terms of agreements concluded with the blockading Governments cover the whole range of their trade and prohibit or limit exports of certain commodities even where these are in themselves produced in surplus by the country in question and not imported through the blockade at all. It is desired to establish in principle that goods may be bought in Switzerland for export as relief to enemy-occupied countries only within the limits within which they might be exported in the course of ordinary trade, unless a special agreement otherwise provides.

(*b*) It was recently discovered that the Swiss Government had been under the impression that exports made from Switzerland by the Joint Commission of the International Red Cross and League of Red Cross Societies of goods bought on the Swiss market were exempt from any restrictions imposed on ordinary exports by War Trade Agreement. It has been explained that such exports are regarded by the British Government as indistinguishable in principle from Swiss commercial exports and therefore subject to the same restrictions and regulations. On the other hand, the British Government thinks it desirable to accord some privileges to the International Red Cross in this respect, and would be prepared to allow it to make extraordinary exports under conditions and within limits fixed in advance. It is understood that the International Red Cross could accept such a procedure as far as food-stuffs are concerned, but wishes to be free to export "medical supplies" obtained in Switzerland without any restriction.

(*c*) It sometimes occurs that charitable societies in neutral European countries wish to send to occupied territories goods bought in their own country with their own funds, but export of which to such destinations is prohibited by War Trade Agreements or cannot ordinarily be approved by the British Government because the goods are of a kind imported by the supplying country through the blockade. In general such transactions have hitherto been obstructed, but consent is occasionally given.

(*d*) The question sometimes arises of the attitude of the British Government to charitable organisations in neutral European countries (chiefly the Joint Commission of the Red Cross) when they wish to spend money in enemy territories to buy goods for relief work in Allied occupied territories. The practice of the British Government has been (i) to refuse their consent where this was necessary to the fulfilment of the transaction; (ii) otherwise to maintain an attitude of disapproval, but not actively to intervene; (iii) not to regard as offenders firms who undertook such transactions on behalf of the International Red Cross, since action, if at all, should be taken against the latter. It is for consideration whether any action is necessary or possible or desirable to prevent the International Red Cross engaging in such transactions, or acquiring by contributions from sources not directly controlled by the United Nations funds which might thus be spent in enemy territories.

9. Finally, there are the so-called "Parcel schemes," of which the history is briefly as follows: The Portuguese postal regulations have so far permitted the despatch to enemy and most occupied territories of small parcels of food-stuffs, commonly sample packets weighing 1 lb. apiece. From the beginning of 1941 onwards firms in Portugal did a brisk trade in these parcels with people overseas who wished to send something to their friends in the enemy-controlled area. The British Government did its best to repress the traffic, chiefly on the two grounds (*a*) that enemy-controlled firms were acquiring valuable foreign exchange from it; and (*b*) that the Portuguese allowed export in these parcels of goods imported through the blockade, whose re-export by other ways could be prevented. The

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latter objection has largely disappeared owing to restrictions imposed by the Portuguese Government on the contents of the parcels. But the traffic by private firms, which still continues, is still viewed with disfavour.

In the summer of 1941 the Belgian Government, as explained under paragraph 3 above, brought strong pressure to bear on the British Government to make a formal breach of the blockade in favour of Belgium. Simultaneously, but separately, they asked that Belgians in Great Britain might be allowed to have parcels sent on their behalf from Lisbon to their families in Belgium. The total amount requested was 4 tons weight monthly, and the transfer of funds involved was a monthly maximum of £3,000. In the circumstances, and having regard to the fact that Allied nationals (and indeed Axis nationals) in most countries in the world were freely able to make such arrangements, the British Government thought it proper to agree to the latter request. They have since continued to combat the parcels traffic, except where specifically authorised as in the above case. But facilities similar to those extended to the Belgians have, of course, been granted to other Allied Governments who have applied for them, and will have to be granted to the remainder if and when these apply.

The essential features of the authorised schemes are—

(*a*) Parcels may be sent, with one or two exceptions, on behalf of persons or organisations in the United Kingdom only.

(*b*) The orders for parcels are handled by offices established for the purpose at London and Lisbon, the former being engaged to follow a procedure laid down by the Trading with the Enemy Department, and the latter to consult the British Embassy about the firms with whom they deal. The use of private correspondence to promote or advertise these schemes is not allowed.

(*c*) The volume of goods authorised to be sent each month is not more than 4 tons, and the maximum special transfer of funds allowed to finance the operation is £3,000 monthly.

The schemes operating are: Belgian (£3,000 monthly); Fighting French (at present less than £3,000 monthly); Norwegian (about £600 monthly. Run secretly); Dutch (operated with embassy funds. There is no special allocation at present); Polish Ministry of Social Welfare on behalf of Jews in Poland (at present less than £3,000 monthly); Polish Red Cross (discovered recently and not formally authorised. Funds available locally at Lisbon are used, and despatches appear to be at the rate of about 4 tons a month). Of the above the Norwegian scheme and that conducted by the Polish Ministry of Social Welfare differ from the remainder in that orders for parcels are not taken from individuals, the recipients being designated by the organisers and paid for at their end out of general funds.

It will be appreciated that a certain number of parcels are almost certainly sent by Allied representatives in Lisbon from funds theoretically allotted for other purposes, and that the organisations in Lisbon also receive remittances and orders from persons living in neutral countries overseas. There is a large unauthorised flow of direct remittances from the Belgian Congo to Lisbon with which it has not seemed necessary or desirable to interfere.

It is understood that the American Government, which has not hitherto permitted the remittance of funds from the United States for purposes such as the above nor allowed persons living in the United States to send orders for parcels to Lisbon, has recently been considering the adoption of a practice generally similar to that outlined. It also appears that new regulations governing the export of parcels from Portugal are now contemplated by the Portuguese Government, but the scope of these is not yet known.

It is not considered here that these schemes, which have certain advantages from the point of view of Allied morale, have any real relation to the question of blockade and relief policy. It is, however, important to keep them within bounds on account of the relative shortage of escudo currency and the administrative complications likely to result if they were unduly extended.

10. In view of the difficulties of admitting food-stuffs through the blockade, the British Government has for some time considered whether a means could be found of helping the Allies by promoting the evacuation of a certain number of children from distressed countries into sympathetic neutral countries such as Switzerland and Sweden.

It is known that both the latter have been prepared in the past to receive Belgian children, though the plans were frustrated by German obstructions.

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Switzerland actually did receive a small number of Belgian children, and a much larger number from France. In the event of the neutrals looking with favour on the idea of further action on these lines, it might be possible to envisage the supply to them of extra quantities of suitable food and clothing to provide for the children.

With the agreement of the American Government this idea has been put informally to the Swiss Government, who have indicated their sympathy. Specific proposals are now under discussion between London and Washington.

It should be added that a plan for the evacuation of children from Greece was actively promoted at the beginning of 1942. Accommodation for several thousand children was prepared in Egypt, and further accommodation promised in various parts of the British Empire. Unfortunately the Italian Government, having consented in principle to the plan, raised objection to the children being received in British territory. Despite this set-back, and despite the somewhat non-co-operative attitude of the Greek Red Cross in Greece, arrangements proceeded for the evacuation of such children as could be accommodated in Egypt and appeared on the point of producing a result when the German advance into Egypt in the middle of the summer made it necessary to abandon the project for the time being. A revival of it is now thought practicable, and the I.R.C.C. have been asked to secure Italian consent to the removal of 2,000 children to a camp which is ready for them in Egypt.

Ministry of Economic Warfare, London,
January 1943.

Telephone:
GROSVENOR 4060.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE,
W.1.

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YOUR REFERENCE.....

W 3225

24 FEB 1943

18th February, 1943.

My dear Jack,

I think you have already had the draft of a magnum opus by Camps about our blockade policy. This has now been revised after discussion with Riefler, and I enclose a copy of the final version herein.

Although it is already slightly out of date, we think it provides such a useful background to the whole Relief question that it would be very useful to have it in print. If you agree could you have it printed and let us have two dozen copies.

Yours ever

Jack Tinsbeck

I. Le Rougetel, Esq.,

Foreign Office.

W3225/4/49 (16326)

Post War (General)

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE ON BLOCKADE POLICY RESPECTING RELIEF. (Recd in FO 7 Feb 44)

Feb 24

Section 1

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In the autumn of 1940, the Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons that it was the intention of the British Government to maintain rigorously the blockade of all territories occupied and controlled by the enemy and to lay squarely upon the shoulders of the enemy the responsibility for providing for the needs of the inhabitants. This policy was reaffirmed in the Spring of 1941 in a public statement issued through the British Embassy at Washington at the time of Mr. Hoover's appeal for an official experiment in food relief in Belgium. In the Autumn of 1941 the U.S. Government affirmed a similar attitude. Their declaration referred however to territory occupied by the enemy and did not specifically include areas such as the unoccupied zone of France which, though controlled by the enemy, was not then under formal occupation. This pronouncement of the American Government was founded upon a very definite assertion of the enemy's responsibility for the maintenance of the populations whose countries he had occupied, but it did not of course positively assert the intention of the American Government to maintain a blockade of these territories inasmuch as the American Government was not at that time at war. In the Autumn of 1942 the two governments resolved formally upon a joint policy in these matters, and it was agreed that no changes of the practice at that time established should be made unless by common consent.

2. At the end of the winter of 1941 a condition of desperate famine developed in Greece and the two Governments, not without considerable anxiety, decided in January 1942 that it was necessary to make an exception to the policy which they had so far universally applied. Accordingly a shipment of 8,000 tons of wheat was permitted to pass the blockade to Greece. In announcing this decision, which was taken upon the joint responsibility of the British and American Governments, the determination of both these Governments was reaffirmed in the clearest terms that the general policy of blockade should remain, with this single exception of Greece, unimpaired. Since then the case of Greece has been treated as wholly exceptional; the first 8,000 tons were followed by further occasional cargoes during the spring and summer, and since the end of August 1942 regular shipments of 15,000 tons of wheat monthly have been permitted to pass the blockade under a scheme sponsored by the Swedish Government and governed by conditions agreed by the enemy powers.

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These conditions provide not only for neutral supervision and the immunity of foodstuffs imported through the blockade from Axis interference, but also that the native produce of Greece shall be reserved (except where exchanges are approved by the neutral supervisors) exclusively for the use of the Greek population. It has been possible to defend this exception, so far, on the double ground that the need of Greece was incomparably more acute than that of rival claimants, and that whereas in the greater part of Europe the enemy powers have found it necessary to permit commercial exchanges which have ensured a minimum subsistence to the population, in the case of Greece they have not found it to their interest to take any such measures to avoid the development of a major calamity. It is, therefore, argued on the one hand that since a general importation of foodstuffs into occupied Europe is manifestly impossible, the claims of Greece to be the sole exception are paramount on obvious grounds of need; and on the other hand, that by taking action which they have taken in respect of Greece, the British and American Governments have not relieved the enemy of a burden which he would otherwise have carried himself. The scheme originally provided for the shipment of 15,000 tons monthly of wheat only, and such medical supplies as are ordinarily admissible under navicert to any occupied territory. In December of 1942 however it was agreed to add up to 3,000 tons of pulse monthly, to this amount, and also 100 tons monthly of powdered milk or the equivalent.

3. The British Government has been approached on many occasions with requests to admit supplies of food and clothing through the blockade for relief in countries other than Greece. The following are the principal instances which have occurred since the campaign of Mr.Hoover in the U.S. in the winter of 1940 and early part of 1941.-

(a) In the summer of 1941 the Belgian Government presented a scheme for relief from soup kitchens, similar in its essentials to that recommended by Mr.Hoover. As an appendix to it or as an alternative, they requested the despatch of a small monthly amount of milk and vitamins for children. In the early months of 1942 they reverted to the latter proposition and on receiving the customary negative they repeated their request in July. After this was refused they again asked, towards the end of 1942 that the British Government should allow a single consignment of 200 or 300 tons of dried milk for children to be shipped from the U.S. on the ex Belgian ship

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Caritas I, which has been assigned to the carriage from America to Europe of parcels for prisoners of war. This request was followed by a strong letter rejecting the grounds on which previous applications were refused, and threatening that the Belgian Government might publicly disassociate itself from the British Government's policy on these questions.

(b) In October 1941 the Norwegian Government approached the British Government with a suggestion for sending one parcel to every family in Norway from the U.S. as a gift of the Norwegian Merchant Seamen. This request was repeated in October of 1942. It was said to have been laid before the U.S. Government also, and was presented on this occasion as an experiment which might, if successful, be repeated so as to provide a regular flow of relief. Another plan which was put forward simultaneously proposed the importation of food and clothing into Sweden to be stored there against the admission of relief to Norway at some unspecified later date. These proposals were strongly pressed, and the Norwegian Government threatened to connect them with questions affecting the use of Norwegian ships in the Allied war service.

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(c) The Yugoslav Government have on several occasions requested permission to send comparatively small consignments of food and clothing to the town of Belgrade or to the area inhabited by the supporters of General Michailovic.

(d) Apart from these particular applications by the Allied Governments there have also been agitations by private persons or societies for relief for the Channel Islands and for Jewish sufferers in Eastern Europe. With regard to the latter, the suggestion has been made that Jews in Polish ghettos should be treated as the equivalent of prisoners of war in camps of internment and receive similar privileges in respect of the blockade.

(e) On various occasions requests have been made for the admission of very small quantities of specified foodstuffs through the blockade to be despatched in postal parcels from Portugal to occupied territories. These requests have been frequent and insistent. It is to be noted that there is a very powerful demand in the Belgian Congo for facilities of such a kind.

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(f) There has also been agitation in this country by British subjects for a modification of the policy of the British Government. In the winter of 1941/42 a movement was started, largely by persons of pacifist tendencies, which resulted in numerous meetings all over the country, and, though without any marked general influence had some effect upon the conscience of the members of some religious denominations. Such general public sympathy as was roused was almost entirely concentrated upon the single case of Greece.

In the Spring of 1942 the centre of gravity shifted to a new organisation called the Famine Relief Committee. This body commands a certain volume of support from responsible persons and has been very careful to keep itself apparently free from pacifist associations. The Committee's members include representative bishops of the Anglican and Roman churches and leaders of the free churches as well as certain personalities from the academic and journalistic world. The Committee presented to the M.E.W. during the summer of 1942 a memorandum recommending a detailed project for child relief in Belgium and Greece, to be extended later, if successful, to other occupied countries. It brought forward this project once again towards the end of the year and the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Archbishop of Westminster were induced by the Committee to approach the Prime Minister in the matter in their behalf. The Committee claims that Dr. Van Dusen and a group associated with him are working on parallel lines in the U.S. It will be observed that the sympathy of this organisation is very largely focused upon Belgium and that its proposals are similar in kind to those put forward by the Belgian Government since the abandonment of their major plan in the summer of 1941. The strength of this movement lies in the fact that it commands responsible and intelligent support and that it recognises that relief action can take place only upon a limited scale and in a form least calculated to confer material benefit upon the enemy. In fact, its main thesis is not readily open to criticism on simple grounds of economic warfare, though the Committee is plainly

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unaware of the practical difficulties of securing an adequate control or limiting a concession once made. The British Government, are, however, still convinced that the time is not ripe for any action which would begin a process tending to shift the responsibility for providing for the occupied territories from the shoulders of the enemy powers on to those of the United Nations, and they believe that there are grave psychological dangers in accepting any commitment in this respect, however small.

4. While the above describes the position of the British Government in respect of food relief (or relief in the form of clothing and so on) for the civilian populations of occupied territories as a whole, there have from the beginning been certain acknowledged exceptions to the principle of total blockade. Thus, the British Government informed the International Red Cross in the autumn of 1940 that "medical supplies in the strict sense of the term" would receive facilities enabling them to pass the blockade to enemy occupied territories. They since more precisely defined the term "medical supplies" as referring to drugs of strictly and solely medical and humanitarian application, and excluding products convertible to other uses, or whose use in medical practice could not be defined as humanitarian in effect. The rule at present applied permits the despatch to occupied territories, under navicert or corresponding authority, of medical products which it is believed can be of no material assistance to the enemy if diverted by them from the intended recipients. The British Government has not granted navicerts under this heading for bandages or cotton wool, blankets, hospital bedding or other textile materials. Nor has it normally granted navicerts for oily and fatty substances such as castor oil or paraffin, which are utilisable for other than medical purposes. Nor has it commonly granted navicerts for drugs of a strategic application, such as quinine, which is required by the enemy for maintenance in certain circumstances of armies in the field. Moreover, in admitting certain commodities the practice has been to maintain a statistical check in order to ensure that the facilities accorded did not become subject to exploitation. It has also been the practice to require in general that consignments of this nature should be sent through certain accepted channels and not in the way of ordinary commerce.

It should be noted that the above rule has been applied with some flexibility, and that small amounts of normally excluded items have sometimes been admitted.

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A large number of navicerts and licences for small consignments have been granted on various occasions; some of the more important instances have been the despatch of a large consignment of medical stores from the U.S. to Poland in the autumn of 1941, a further substantial consignment from the U.S. to Belgium in the spring of 1942 and a consignment to Yugoslavia from this country. The Belgian Government recently received a licence for the export from the U.S. to Belgium of a quantity of certain products considered to be sufficient for the needs of Belgium for a whole year.

5. Facilities have also regularly been granted for food and clothing and other appropriate articles sent to prisoners of war. This derives from the fact that the Geneva Convention provides a machinery offering the prospect of control of distribution and receipt of such gifts, as well as imposing on the detaining power certain obligations regarding the maintenance of prisoners and the way in which they may be employed.

(a) Postal parcels addressed to individual prisoners of war have been regularly permitted to pass the blockade from all parts of the world. An attempt was at one time made to require that such parcels should be sent in care of the I.R.C. at Geneva but this was found impracticable on technical grounds as well as unprofitable in view of the later discovery that parcels so addressed did not, in fact, pass through the hands of the International Committee at all. The British and Imperial Governments have restricted the despatch of postal parcels to individual prisoners from their own territory in accordance with a general policy which aims at supplying British and Imperial prisoners out of a common pool on equitable principles. A similar but not exactly identical restriction has lately been adopted in the United States.

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(b) At an early stage the British Government agreed to grant navicerts for goods of suitable kinds sent as freight, as well as by post, to the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva for general distribution to prisoners of this or that nationality. This arrangement applied in the first instance to the despatch of Red Cross standard parcels, crated in large boxes and shipped as freight, instead of being transmitted through ordinary postal channels. It was later extended to allow the despatch of suitable commodities in bulk (for instance

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cases of tinned meat or cartons of sugar and so forth, instead of actual parcels of assorted content) in order to save shipping space and help the generosity of donors who had not the facility for packing large numbers of parcels. The British and American Governments have recently agreed, however, that it is important, if abuse of this concession is to be avoided, to require that goods despatched in this manner should be of such a kind and so packed as to be suitable for individual distribution to the prisoners and for direct consumption by them, since otherwise it is plain that such relief would shortly become a substitute for instead of supplementary to the rations provided by the detaining authorities. A statistical check is maintained upon all such despatches.

(c) The British Government for long found difficulty in permitting the French Government to organise without limit the supply from overseas on a large scale and with official funds, of food and clothing for the very numerous French prisoners held in German hands under somewhat ill-defined conditions. Their practice has been to give facilities more or less automatically for gifts from private societies and individuals for French prisoners, but to draw a distinction between these and supplies officially organised as described above.

In the Autumn of 1942 it was proposed to exact conditions of stricter control over the disposal of goods sent to French prisoners through the International Red Cross, and thus remove the misgivings felt about the efforts of the Vichy Government to organize despatches for them on a substantial scale. Progress was delayed however by the occupation of the Vichy zone by the Germans, and owing to the uncertainty of the situation which resulted from this event the British and American Governments agreed to suspend action on a navicert application for about 1200 tons of foodstuffs bought in Argentina by the Vichy authorities. The latter then threatened to withdraw facilities for the transport of goods for British prisoners through Marseilles and across France. The International Red Cross have since been informed that the navicert applied for in Buenos Aires will be granted subject to special conditions of control of the kind envisaged before the Vichy zone was occupied by the enemy. A reply is awaited.

(d) The British Government has felt considerable concern about the ultimate disposal of goods sent to prisoners of war of certain

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nationalities and has been seeking to learn from the I.R.C. Committee the extent of the control which the Committee is really able to exercise over such goods. It has not so far been possible to obtain fully satisfactory information about this. A further difficulty has arisen in that the exact numbers of prisoners of various nationalities whom the I.R.C. is in a position to service are not at present in all cases known, and considerable discrepancies have been noted in figures emanating from different sources. As regards British and American prisoners much fuller information on all points is available from the reports directly communicated to the Governments concerned by the agents of the protecting power and the I.R.C. Committee.

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(e) Navicerts have not been granted for the despatch of goods to societies or persons in Europe other than the I.R.C. Committee for forwarding to prisoners of war since it is apparent that any other practice would result in numerous demands by bodies whose activity would not be readily controllable, and who would not themselves have any facilities for verifying the safe arrival of these goods in the hands of the persons for whom they were nominally intended.

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(f) A problem has recently arisen in connection with the supply of shipping for carrying goods to prisoners of all Allied nationals from overseas to Europe. The I.R.C. Committee has constituted a shipping company of its own in Switzerland, through which it hopes to acquire for use under its own control ships which are for various reasons not at present employed. There appear to be certain objections to the development of this idea by the I.R.C. Committee, and this matter has also been under discussion between the British and U.S. Governments. On the other hand, the problem of providing shipping for the prisoners of war traffic remains, and it seems desirable to establish a coordinated policy in respect of this.

The Shipping Company of the International Red Cross, has so far, acquired one ship. This is the former Belgian s.s. "Frederick", now called the "Caritas I". It was formerly at Casablanca, whence it was released by the Armistice Commission on its transfer to the ownership of the I.R.C.C.'s Company and to Swiss flag. The British Government agreed to the transfer of ownership and flag on condition: —

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(a) that financial benefit to the enemy should not result,

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(b) that the ship should be used for transport of cargoes covered by documents issued by the blockade authorities and destined for prisoners of war, with the exception that strictly medical supplies for the civilian population of occupied territories might also be carried. It was further understood that the vessel would run between an U.S. port and Europe.

The former owners were a Belgian Company in Belgium who sold the ship to the I.R.C.C.'s shipping company on the terms that payment should fall due in five years time or three months after the end of the war, they having an option to take the ship back instead of receiving payment at that date. Extensive repairs proved necessary after the ship arrived at Lisbon from Casablanca and the cost of these was to be borne as to half by the former owners and as to half by the I.R.C.C., the latter, however, had to call upon the Belgian Government to pay for their share. The whole transaction was extremely unsatisfactory and confused, partly owing to the unbusinesslike methods of some of the people concerned, and partly to the ambiguous position of the Belgian Government in the deal. Theoretically they had no part in it, and the transaction was supposed to be between the Belgian owners and the Red Cross only.

The I.R.C.C. later proposed to take over another ship, the Danish "Nancy" now at Lisbon. They invited the British Red Cross to bear the cost in the general interest of prisoners of war. The British Government was prepared to agree to this provided that:

(a) any payment required by the Danish owners in Denmark was made into an effectively blocked account in Switzerland, the owners at the end of the war having the option of receiving their money or taking back the ship;

(b) the ship was used on the Lisbon - Mediterranean route for transport exclusively of parcels for prisoners of war and civilian internees.

The U.S.Government gave its concurrence to this proposal, albeit without enthusiasm.

The above financial terms were understood to be those proposed by the I.R.C.C., but further enquiry showed that this was not the case. The owners were in fact asking not only for the guaranteed return of the ship to them after the war, but also for a substantial hire which was to accumulate meanwhile to their credit in a blocked account. It was also found that the cost of running the ship

/would be unduly onerous. Negotiations were therefore broken off

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would be unduly onerous. Negotiations were therefore broken off.

The general attitude of the British Government to this Red Cross Shipping Company is as follows:

No encouragement in general terms can be given, since the Company may work to the advantage or disadvantage of the United Nations according as it is directed. On the other hand, it is always possible to consider a particular proposal for the Company to acquire a particular ship for a particular purpose under particular conditions, and, indeed, it may be that in some cases the Company may be able to help the supply of shipping for prisoners of war while at the same time not conflicting with the interests of our war effort. The British Government is particularly concerned to ensure:

(a) that financial benefit to the enemy shall not result from these transactions;

(b) that shipping is not acquired by the Red Cross Company which might be or become of service to the United Nations in other ways;

(c) that ships controlled by the I.R.C. do not become a factor in promoting demands for relief shipments which would be of a kind unwelcome to the blockade authorities.

6. Civilian internees in enemy and occupied territories have been regarded as eligible for the same privileges as prisoners of war, where appropriate, in respect of the blockade, if they were detained in identical conditions and if the cause of their detention was the simply fact of their being (from the point of view of the Axis) "Enemy Aliens". The purpose of this limitation has been to keep within the framework of the Geneva Convention as at present applied by the various belligerents, and also to avoid an indefinite extension of blockade privileges to the very numerous categories of prisoners who are detained in various parts of Europe for a wide variety of reasons. It is understood that the principle in question is agreed between the British and U.S. Governments. The general question of assistance to persons interned under conditions not at present qualifying them for relief requires joint consideration by the British and U.S. Governments.

It should be noted that in one or two cases the British Government departed from the policy described in allowing relief to be extended experimentally to a class of internees outside the above definition. One such case was that of

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the refugees and destitute persons of various nationalities detained in a group of camps in the South West corner of the formerly unoccupied zone of France. In response to a request by the International Red Cross the British Government agreed in the Spring of 1941 to permit collective consignments of food and clothing to pass the blockade for distribution in these camps, provided that a resident supervisory staff was installed in the camps by the International Red Cross, the American Red Cross, or the American Friends, and that regular reports were furnished on the working of the arrangement. In December 1941 the International Red Cross secured the agreement of the French authorities to a modified version of these terms, which provided for the collaboration of the International Red Cross and the American Friends in distributing goods in the camps and verifying by subsequent visits that all was well, but did not accept resident supervisors appointed by either of these bodies. This was accepted provisionally, and the American Friends sent an initial shipment of clothing from U.S.A. in the first half of 1942; further shipments were to be conditional on the report of this first experiment proving satisfactory. It appears however that, though the goods reached Marseilles, no distribution in the camps had been effected at the time when the Germans occupied the Vichy zone. The International Red Cross reported about that time that distribution was not advisable since the situation in the camps in question had been transformed by wholesale deportations of their inmates, who were stripped of clothing on crossing the frontier. The future treatment of this class of internees will now require review. Another irregular arrangement was sanctioned by the British Government in the Autumn of 1941, when they agreed at the request of the International Red Cross Committee to allow food parcels to be sent through the Committee to 5,000 maimed or otherwise disabled Greek soldiers in hospitals, as though these men were prisoners of war (which they are not). This decision has caused no embarrassing repercussions in the sense of demands for similar facilities on behalf of wounded soldiers of other nationalities. It could have been defended on the ground that genuine Greek prisoners of war are extremely few and that the conditions in Greece justify this exceptional measure. The decision had however caused endless trouble with the Greeks themselves. The International Red Cross is taking steps to secure the hospitalization of a number of the men in question, who had been turned out of hospital, and permission has been given for them to forward parcels meanwhile to these cases also. The nature of this concession is now obscured by the fact that relief on a substantial

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s[illegible]le is being allowed to the civilian population of Greece.

7. Apart from these specific exceptions to the general principle described in para.1 there has been also an interpretation of that principle by the British Government which appears to have caused some misunderstandings. In April,1941 at a time when pressure for a general breach of the blockade was very strong, various Allied Governments, notably the Belgian and Norwegian Governments, put forward proposals for the purchase in neutral European countries of goods which had already passed the blockade for despatch for purposes of relief. It was proposed by the Norwegian Government to buy such goods in Sweden, payment being made with dollars hitherto blocked in the U.S. The U.S. Embassy in London enquired the views of the British Government on this proposal and after reflection the British Government replied that they were agreeable in principle to the purchase by Allied Governments or organisations in neutral European countries of goods originating in those countries, and not of a kind which those countries were simultaneously being permitted to import through the blockade controls. The British Government added that they had no objection to the release of dollars for such purchases provided that financial benefit to the enemy did not result, and they explained this phrase to mean that enemy banks or intermediaries or firms should not be employed in the transactions. Thereafter it became the practice of the British Government to encourage purchases of goods for relief within the limits indicated, and frequent reference was made to this concession when negative answers were returned to requests for formal breaches of the blockade. For various reasons very few such transactions materialised except in Portugal, where the Belgian Government gradually developed a purchasing organisation which worked in agreement with the British representatives in Portugal, and was financed from time to time by transfers of funds to Portugal through the Bank of England. These transfers ran at the rate of about 50,000 pounds a month during the last four months of 1941. In February, 1942 the Belgian Government requested that funds should be made available up to a quarter of a million pounds a month. It was then explained that this could only be done if the Portuguese Government would agree to permit the Bank of England to convert this amount of sterling into escudos without reducing the amount of escudos which the British Government desired to obtain against sterling for its own purposes. The Portuguese Government agreed to this as a gesture of sympathy towards the Belgians and since then the purchases in Portugal have run at the rate of approximately 200,000 pounds a month or 20 million escudos.

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During the autumn of 1941 similar purchases in Turkey were encouraged in the hope that the necessity for a major breach of the blockade in favour of Greece might be avoided. In this case the goods were bought with Turkish pounds available to the British Government from a considerable balance then at their disposal, and the expenditure of Turkish pounds was reimbursed partly by dollar contributions from a relief association in the U.S. and latterly by the Greek Government in London. The possibility of purchases in Turkey has, however, greatly diminished and the need for it has become less urgent in view of the adoption of the relief scheme described in para.2 above.

Meanwhile in the autumn of 1941, the U.S.Government adopted a new and stricter policy towards the licensing of transfers of dollars to buy neutral European currencies. This policy of the U.S. Government was in general most welcome and helpful to the blockade policy of the British Government, but in particular cases occasional embarrassment resulted as a result of the latent discrepancy between it and the principle previously adopted by the British Government regarding the legitimacy of buying goods in neutral European countries for relief purposes. The U.S. Government must have found itself in the position of appearing less sympathetic than the British Government to the requests of certain allies. On the other hand the British Government, which had (as explained above) frequently assured the allies of its readiness to approve such relief transactions, was open to suspicion of having deliberately tried to escape from its own concessions by persuading a friendly neutral to take measures which would make their fulfilment impossible. From this point the British Government ceased to encourage or support proposals for relief purchases in neutral European countries, which would require the licensing of a transfer of dollars by the U.S. Treasury, except where consent of the latter had already been obtained. It was, however, obliged by the assurances already given to continue to allow such purchases to be financed by transfer of sterling, in so far as its exchange requirements in the neutral countries in question allowed; this in general precluded purchases in countries whose currency could only be obtained by the Bank of England in immediate exchange for gold.

The resulting position was of course unsatisfactory, since (a) the discrepancy between U.S. and British practice remained, with consequent embarrassment to both parties; (b) some allied governments were placed at a disadvantage compared with others, if their only resources were in dollars, or

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if the currency of the neutral country from which they desired to buy supplies was only obtainable against dollars or gold. Furthermore, it is believed that the United States Government view with distaste the whole system of intra-blockade relief purchases, for a complex of reasons of which the chief are (a) a fear that the resulting acquisition of Foreign exchange by European neutrals will ultimately be prejudical to the interests of the "Financial" blockade, (b) the growing shortage of funds in neutral European currencies required by the United Nations for essential war purposes. The British Government are of course substantially in agreement with the U.S. Government on these points; on the other hand they are to a certain degree morally committed to the line of policy which they have followed so far, and are also convinced that in certain circumstances the permission to make relief purchases of the kind in question is of great assistance politically to allied Governments and has in the past contributed largely to the successful maintenance of the blockade. It does not appear that it should be difficult to arrive at a common policy which will be in accordance with the wishes of both Governments. Meanwhile it is agreed that new commitments should be the subject of joint consultation.

The Belgian Government has asked for funds to spend in Spain, Switzerland and Sweden as well as in Portugal. It has been agreed that they may have Spanish currency from time to time provided (a) that any allocations of this are deducted from the £250,000 equivalent monthly allowed to them at present for purchases in Portugal (b) that they will be content with such amounts of pesetas as can be obtained across the Anglo Spanish special account after other requirements have been met.

No Swedish crowns have been made available to the Belgian Government for relief purchases.

They were allowed about a million Swiss Francs exceptionally in February of 1942, and at the same time put in a request for a regular monthly allocation of the same amount. They were subsequently informed that a decision on this would depend on the outcome of the financial discussions with the Swiss Government which were in progress. They have reverted to the subject several times, and the matter is now under discussion with the U.S. Government, together with requests for smaller single sums of Swiss francs which have been received from the Dutch and Jugoslav Governments.

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The Jugoslav Government several times during 1941 and 1942 expressed a wish to buy foodstuffs in Turkey for despatches to Jugoslavia. The quantities and cost involved were small, and in accordance with the principle already explained H.M.Government consented to these proposals. Nothing materialised however until August of 1942, when the Jugoslav Government were preparing a specific plan for purchases of 3,000 tons of foodstuffs in this way. Unfortunately it was overlooked that, while necessary small sums in Turkish £ could be furnished by H.M.Government, the only assets with which the Jugoslav Government can reimburse H.M.Government are in dollars. Consequently it appears that H.M.Government has unwittingly consented for its part and without consultation of U.S.Government to a transaction which would involve a transfer of dollars. No purchase has yet been made, but it seems that the Jugoslav proposal is still active.

In their commodity aspect, those transactions encouraging the despatch of "surplus" produce from neutral European countries to occupied territories are recommended by the fact that they offer at least a prospect of doing some good without the danger of doing much harm, besides being politically helpful to the Allied Governments. The goods are generally accessible anyway to the enemy, so that nothing is added to the total of the resources within their reach. The principle applied leaves the blockade ring intact, and affords a clearly defined natural limit which would not exist if imports through the blockade were allowed.

The practical efficiency of such arrangements in relieving distress is admittedly hard to judge, and probably varies according to circumstances. There is no doubt that the supplies sent from Turkey to Greece in the winter of 1941-42 saved many people in Athens and Piraeus from starvation. On the other hand it cannot be said whether for instance the supplies sent to Belgium from Portugal by the Belgian Government really improve the lot of people in Belgium; since this depends on whether they are supplementary to the total of foodstuffs which the Germans allow Belgium to obtain commercially from inside Europe, or merely replace foodstuffs which would otherwise have been imported under other arrangements.

8. Certain minor points arise in connection with the principle explained at the beginning of the preceding paragraph.

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(a) In the case of Switzerland, and Sweden the liberty of these countries to export to enemy and occupied territories is not governed primarily by the question whether the goods proposed are of a type simultaneously imported by them through the blockade, but the terms of Agreements concluded with the blockading governments cover the whole range of their trade and prohibit or limit exports of certain commodities even where these are in themselves produced in surplus by the country in question and not imported through the blockade at all. It is desired to establish in principle that goods may be bought in Switzerland for export as Relief to enemy occupied countries only within the limits within which they might be exported in the course of ordinary trade, unless a special agreement otherwise provides.

(b) It was recently discovered that the Swiss Government had been under the impression that exports made from Switzerland by the Joint Commission of the International Red Cross and League of Red Cross Societies of goods bought on the Swiss market were exempt from any restrictions imposed on ordinary exports by War Trade Agreement. It has been explained that such exports are regarded by the British Government as indistinguishable in principle from Swiss Commercial exports and therefore subject to the same restrictions and regulations. On the other hand, the British Government thinks it desirable to accord some privileges to the International Red Cross in this respect, and would be prepared to allow it to make extraordinary exports under conditions and within limits fixed in advance. It is understood that the International Red Cross could accept such a procedure as far as foodstuffs are concerned, but wishes to be free to export "medical supplies" obtained in Switzerland without any restriction.

(c) It sometimes occurs that charitable societies in neutral European countries wish to send to occupied territories goods bought in their own country with their own funds, but export of which to such destinations is prohibited by War Trade Agreements or cannot ordinarily be approved by the British Government because the goods are of a kind imported by the supplying country through the blockade. In general such transactions have hitherto been obstructed, but consent is occasionally given.

(d) The question sometimes arises of the attitude of the British Government to charitable organizations in neutral European countries (chiefly the Joint Commission of the Red Cross) when they wish to spend money in enemy territories to buy goods for relief work in allied occupied territories.

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The practice of the British Government has been (i) to refuse their consent where this was necessary to the fulfilment of the transaction (ii) otherwise to maintain an attitude of disapproval, but not actively to intervene (iii) not to regard as offenders firms who undertook such transactions on behalf of the International Red Cross, since action if at all should be taken against the latter. It is for consideration whether any action is necessary or possible or desirable to prevent the International Red Cross engaging in such transactions, or acquiring by contributions from sources not directly controlled by the United Nations funds which might thus be spent in enemy territories.

9. Finally there are the so-called "Parcel schemes", of which the history is briefly as follows. The Portuguese postal regulations have so far permitted the despatch to enemy and most occupied territories of small parcels of foodstuffs, commonly sample packets weighing 1 lb. apiece. From the beginning of 1941 onwards firms in Portugal did a brisk trade in these parcels with people overseas who wished to send something to their friends in the enemy controlled area. The British Government did its best to repress the traffic, chiefly on the two grounds (a) that enemy controlled firms were acquiring valuable foreign exchange from it, and (b) that the Portuguese allowed export in these parcels of goods imported through the blockade, whose re-export by other ways could be prevented. The latter objection has largely disappeared owing to restrictions imposed by the Portuguese Government on the contents of the parcels. But the traffic by private firms, which still continues, is still viewed with disfavour.

In the summer of 1941 the Belgian Government as explained under paragraph 3 above, brought strong pressure to bear on the British Government to make a formal breach of the blockade in favour of Belgium. Simultaneously, but separately, they asked that Belgians in Great Britain might be allowed to have parcels sent on their behalf from Lisbon to their families in Belgium. The total amount requested was 4 tons weight monthly, and the transfer of funds involved was a monthly maximum of £3,000. In the circumstances, and having regard to the fact that Allied nationals (and indeed Axis nationals) in most countries in the world were freely able to make such arrangements, the British Government thought it proper to agree to the latter request. They have since continued to combat the parcels traffic, except where specifically authorised as in the above case. But facilities similar to those extended to the Belgians have of course been granted to other Allied Governments who have

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applied for them, and will have to be granted to the remainder if and when these apply.

The essential features of the authorised schemes are:—

(a) Parcels may be sent with one or two exceptions, on behalf of persons or organisations in the U.K. only.

(b) the orders for parcels are handled by offices established for the purpose at London and Lisbon, the former being engaged to follow a procedure laid down by the Trading with the Enemy Department, and the latter to consult the British Embassy about the firms with whom they deal. The use of private correspondence to promote or advertise these schemes is not allowed.

(c) The volume of goods authorised to be sent each month is not more than 4 tons, and the maximum special transfer of funds allowed to finance the operation is £3,000 monthly.

The schemes operating are: Belgian (£3,000 monthly); Free French (at present less than £3,000 monthly); Norwegian (about £600 monthly. Run secretly); Dutch (operated with Embassy funds. There is no special allocation at present); Polish Ministry of Social Welfare on behalf of Jews in Poland (at present less than £3,000 monthly); Polish Red Cross (discovered recently and not formally authorised. Funds available locally at Lisbon are used, and despatches appear to be at the rate of about 4 tons a month). Of the above the Norwegian scheme and that conducted by the Polish Ministry of Social Welfare differ from the remainder in that orders for parcels are not taken from individuals, the recipients being designated by the organizers and paid for at their end out of general funds.

It will be appreciated that a certain number of parcels are almost certainly sent by Allied representatives in Lisbon from funds theoretically allotted for other purposes, and that the organisations in Lisbon also receive remittances and orders from persons living in neutral countries overseas. There is a large unauthorised flow of direct remittances from the Belgian Congo to Lisbon with which it has not seemed necessary or desirable to interfere.

It is understood that the American Government, which has not hitherto permitted the remittance of funds from the U.S. for purposes such as the above nor allowed persons living in the U.S., to send orders for parcels to Lisbon, has recently been considering the adoption of a practice generally similar to that outlined. It also appears that new regulations governing the export of parcels from Portugal are now contemplated by the Portuguese Government, but the scope

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of these is not yet known.

It is not considered here that these schemes, which have certain advantages from the point of view of Allied morale, have any real relation to the question of blockade and Relief policy. It is however, important to keep them within bounds on account of the relative shortage of escudo currency and the administrative complications likely to result if they were unduly extended.

10. In view of the difficulties of admitting foodstuffs through the blockade, the British Government has for some time considered whether a means could be found of helping the allies by promoting the evacuation of a certain number of children from distressed countries into sympathetic neutral countries such as Switzerland and Sweden.

It is known that both the latter have been prepared in the past to receive Belgian children, though the plans were frustrated by German obstructions. Switzerland actually did receive a small number of Belgian children, and a much larger number from France. In the event of the neutrals looking with favour on the idea of further action on these lines, it might be possible to envisage the supply to them of extra quantities of suitable food and clothing to provide for the children.

With the agreement of the American Government this idea has been put informally to the Swiss Government, who have indicated their sympathy. Specific proposals are now under discussion between London and Washington.

It should be added that a plan for the evacuation of children from Greece was actively promoted at the beginning of 1942. Accomodation for several thousand children was prepared in Egypt and further accomodation promised in various parts of the British Empire. Unfortunately the Italian Government, having consented in principle to the plan, raised objection to the children being received in British territory. Despite this set back, and despite the somewhat non-cooperative attitude of the Greek Red Cross in Greece, arrangements proceeded for the evacuation of such children as could be accomodated in Egypt and appeared on the point of producing a result when the German advance into Egypt in the middle of the summer made it necessary to abandon the project for the time being. A revival of it is now thought practicable, and the I.R.C.C. have been asked to secure Italian consent to the removal of 2,000 children to a camp which is ready for them in Egypt.

Ministry of Economic Warfare.

LONDON.

January 1943

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GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 3262

25 FEB 1943

85

Registry Number W 3262/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated).

No.

Dated

Received in Registry 25th Feb. 1943

W : Co-ordination.

Relief supplies for Belgian Congo.
Transmits copy of despatch from Leopoldville to Ministry of Economic Warfare No. 1 of 6th January and copy of telegram to Leopoldville No 1 Arfar Saving of 16th February, regarding the despatch of soap, tobacco, coffee, dried fruits and peanuts by Belgian Congo Red Cross to Geneva for prisoners of War.

Last Paper.

W 3225.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

MAE.
Central 1/3 Dept

(Action completed.)

mb
2/3/43

(Index.)

AEH
27/7

Next Paper.

W 3271

RMH.
(Copy) T572.

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No. 1. (C.6D)
(last despatch in 1942
No. 32.)

W 3262
25 FEB 1943

British Consulate General,
Leopoldville.
6th January, 1943.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith in duplicate copies of letter No. 8603 of 2.1.43. from the Belgian Congo Red Cross.

2. You will note that the main question raised is that of being able to send soap, tobacco, coffee, dried fruits of local origin and peanuts in bulk form to the Red Cross at Geneva where it could be converted into packets or parcels suitable for immediate individual consumption.

3. With reference to my despatch No. 29 of the 4th November 1942 and paragraph 2 of the Red Cross letter enclosed I have already informed the Red Cross on the 4th November that I considered that the "Feculents" would be inacceptable, firstly by reason of its manner of packing in large sacks, and secondly by reason of the nature of the product itself which was not adapted for individual distribution for immediate consumption. However, in my Arfar No. 42 of November 3rd I requested permission that 292 tons of accumulated stocks could be disposed of, and in your Arfar 55 of 9.11.42 you gave permission for these stocks to be sent. I should be glad for your views on the reply which should be given to the arguments adduced in paragraph 2 of Red Cross letter No. 8603.

4. With regard to paragraph 3 of letter 8603, this matter has already been dealt with by your Arfar telegram No. 1 of 4.1.43.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servant,

(Sgd.)

Minister of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
LONDON.

RMH.
(COPY)

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CROIX ROUGE DU CONGO
LEOPOLDVILLE.

LE 2 janvier 1943.

8603.

Monsieur le Consul General,

J'ai l'honneur de vous confirmer ci apres les desirata que notre President Monsieur Wolter et moi-meme vous avons exposes au cours de notre recente visite.

1°) Etant donne les difficultes que nous rencontrons a trouver les emballages necessaires pour constituer les paquets individuels pour les prisonniers de guerre, nous souhaitons tres vivement obtenir des navycerts pour l'expedition collective, en sacs ou en caissés, a la Croix Rouge de Geneva via Lisbonne, des produits suivants: Savon - The - Tabc - Cafe - Fruits secs tels que bananes dessechees et erachides grillees ou non.

Le savon serait en barres ou meme, aventuellement, en pains sous emballage (davon de toilette).

Le the en petits paquets legers; le tabac egalement.

Le cafe, vert ou torrefie, serait en sacs ordinaires. C'est la Croix Rouge de Geneve qui, dans ses entrepots suisses, ferait les manipulations necessaires (Torrefaction, mouture, empaquetage par petites rations conformement aux stipulations britanniques et allemandes).

Les bananes sechees, vu leur fragilite et leur volume, seraient mises en sacs ou caisses.

Quant aux arachides grillees, elles seraient divisees par sachets de un demi kilo tandis que les arachides non decortiquees seraient expediees en sacs.

2°) Nous insistons pour que la question des expeditions de feculents (ris feves) aux prisonniers de guerre soit autorisee par envois collectifs, en sacs du poids que deciderait le Gouvernement de S.M.Britannique.

Ici, comme pour ce qui concerne les produits repris au 1°, c'est la Croix Rouge de Geneve qui fereit les repartitions entre les Oflags et Stalags, en tenant compe du nombre des prisonniers belges.

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Bien qu'il s'agisse de denrees necessitant une preparation, nous conservons l'espoir que votre Gouvernement en autorisera le passage au travers du blocus. La convention de Geneve 1929, en effet, prevoit implicitement l'envoi, aux Prisonniers de guerre, de pareilles denrees, puisqu'elle stipule (Chap.II Art. 11) "que les prisonniers recevront les movens de preparer les supplements elimentaires dont ils disposent".

Or, il s'agit bien ici de supplements, etant donne que les feculents en question seraient avantageusement ajoutes a l'ordinaire des camps, soit par incorporation des feves dans la soupe soit par cuisson collective du riz. La Croix Rouge de Geneve, qui en ferait l'envoi aux "hommes de confiance", aurait facile a nous renseigner au sujet de l'emploi de ces vivres, de telle maniere que leur envoi colliectif dans les camps pourrait etre stoppe si les Allemands venaient a redutre d'autant les rations ordinaires.

3°) ENVOI DE VETEMENTS AUX PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE.

Nous notons votre aimable promesse de faire telegraphiquement les formalites necessaires, vu l'urgence resultant des rigueurs de l'hiver en Europe.

Veuillez croire, Monsieur le Consul General, aux assurance de notre consideration tres distinguee.

LE DIRECTEUR GENERAL
de la Croix Rouge du Congo

(Sgd.) W. VAN REMOORTEL.

Encl 89

T572.

O.I.

BY BAG

S A V I N G R A M

From: Ministry of Economic Warfare.
To: H.B.M. Consular-Officer, LEOPOLDVILLE.

ARFAR SAVING NO: ONE. (En clair) 16th February, 1943.

Your despatch No. 1 of January 6th concerning an enquiry from the Red Cross in the Belgian Congo.

It appears from the enclosure to your despatch that the proposal to have goods despatched in bulk made up into packets at Geneva applies to coffee only.

2. Our comments on the various items listed under paragraph 1 of the letter from the Red Cross are as follows:

a) Soap in tablets or small bars, tea and tobacco in small packets, and toasted peanuts in half-kilo packets would all be eligible for facilities; on the assumption that the packets (eg. of half-kx a kilo) were of a convenient size for individual distribution; and also strong enough to survive the strains of transport and rough handling in distribution. Presumably the small packets would be enclosed in cases of larger size.

b) Peanuts and dried bananas in bags or cases would not be eligible. They could however be made eligible if packed as above.

c) The idea of sending coffee to Geneva for preparation and repacking there is not to be excluded. We should of course wish to receive from the International Red Cross details of the arrangement proposed and the method of subsequent distribution permitted by the Germans.

3. Consideration could also be given to the despatch, in bulk, to Geneva of all the items mentioned under 2(a), (b) and (c) above with a view to the incorporation of them in standard individual parcels of mixed content to be made up there by the International Red Cross.

4. In this connection it should be noted that the British and American Governments have both formed the opinion, founded on experience, that standard parcels of the usual Red Cross types are the only generally safe and satisfactory means of furnishing prisoners of war with the desirable supplements of foodstuffs. The alternative of Foodstuffs packed in the manner indicated under 2(a) above has been found acceptable only within severely restricted limits.

5. With regard to paragraph 2 of the letter enclosed in your despatch, I fear that the goods in question are inadmissible for the reasons already correctly stated by you. We are guided in these matters by the Geneva convention insofar as this lays down conditions under which goods may safely be sent to prisoners of war, and insofar as such conditions actually prevail. There is an evident distinction between goods which can be directly consumed by prisoners or prepared by them privately by simple means (such as tea, or tinned goods of a kind which are improved by heating up) and goods which would necessarily have to be handed in to the kitchens administered by the camp authorities and inextricably confused with the diet ordinarily provided by these authorities.

Copy also for Miss Warner BPCS

The/

M.E.W. FILE No. T572
COPY TO: P.P. Comm Sec F.O.
DATE: 18/2/43

The danger of admitting the latter class of goods in present circumstances is clear enough, especially when it is considered how numerous and how widely scattered the prisoners of war in Germany are. Now would it be easy or convenient to interrupt despatches when the prisoner had become dependent on them by reason of the withdrawal of foodstuffs otherwise provided by the detaining power.

6. It is important that we should be advised beforehand of the scale and nature of any increased programme of despatches from the Congo, as in considering all these arrangements attention has to be given to supplies coming forward from other sources and to the limited transport facilities available between Lisbon and Marseilles.

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GENERAL

W 3271

25 FEB 1943

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1C 13

CO-ORDINATION

Registry Number W 3271/4/49.

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare

No. (communicated)

Dated 23rd Feb., 1943.

Received in Registry 25th Feb., 1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Relief for Norway.

Transmits copy of letter from Mr.Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) ~~and~~ to Mr.Mitcheson (Stockholm) of the 23rd February giving conditions under which relief supplies may be exported to Norway from Sweden.

Last Paper.

W 3262 (W2882)

References.

(Minutes.)

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
24/2/43	5/5/44

Next Paper.

W 3272 (W3693)

Copy for E.E. Crowe Esq
F.O.

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W 3271

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

T.550/12

23rd February, 1943.

Many thanks for your note of January 22nd about humanitarian exports from Sweden to Norway, which has just reached me after a slower journey than my own. Please refer also to paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 17 Arfar of January 19th, in which you enquired whether applications to export foodstuffs from Sweden might be approved provided the goods were of Swedish origin and not on list 'A'.

This has been very fully and heartily discussed here, with the result that we can give you the following rule. You will see that it is essentially a simplified form of the suggestions made in my minute to you of January 18th.

1) You may agree, without reference here, to export from Sweden for relief in Norway or in any other occupied country, provided

(a) that the goods consist only of foodstuffs or pharmaceutical products which are not on list 'A', and have not been imported, nor are of a kind being imported, into Sweden through our controls.

(b)

J. Mitcheson, Esq., C.M.G.,
British Legation,
Stockholm.

W 3271

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(b) that they are paid for with funds locally subscribed for in Sweden, and are sent as a gift.

(c) that the application is supported by the representative of the Allied Government concerned and that the goods are consigned to a bona fida relief organisation approved by him.

(d) that it is made plain in each case that we reserve our full rights under the War Trade Agreement and that consequently your consent in any given case to any humanitarian export of the kind in question cannot be quoted by the Swedes as justifying any other interpretation of that agreement than that which we ourselves assert.

(e) that you report details of all exports agreed by you under this heading.

2) If you are asked to approve an export of goods which have been or are to be paid for with funds originating from any other country than Sweden itself, you should pass no comment on any aspect of it, explaining that such transactions are in a different class from Swedish gifts, and you should refer all particulars (including also the origin of the goods) for consideration here. If it is intended to employ funds from the United States, it would be as well for your U.S. colleague to transmit the same information to his Government.

You will notice that we wish to maintain our view that goods on the 'A' list should not be approved for export under this heading even if they are of enemy

origin/

origin. The reason for this is partly that it provides a simpler rule, but also that it is not to our advantage that Swedish money should be spent in enemy territory.

You will also see that we are prepared in these cases to waive our rights to restrict the export of certain exports not on List 'a' within the limits of normal trade. We do not however wish to accept the theory that gifts (as opposed to trade) are in principle exempt from such restrictions, since this would commit us to approving similar gifts to enemy territory. Hence the general reservation made above concerning our rights under the War Trade Agreement.

I suggest that you should discuss this with the U.S. Legation before informing us whether you intend to act upon it. If the rule explained is adopted, it would no doubt be as well to make it clear to the Swedes and to Ditleff and to the Swedish organisations working for relief in Norway what classes of exports will definitely not be allowed. It will leave our hands freer however if you do not give the impression that exports not excluded on principle will necessarily and invariably be agreed on principle.

I am pursuing the question of the small exports of clothing and so forth which you would like to be allowed to agree. Meanwhile it is clear that such exports should not be agreed.

W. A. Camps.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 3272

25 FEB 1943

Registry Number W} 3272/4/49.

FROM Parliamentary Questions (Sir H. Morris-Jones).
No.

Dated 23rd Feb.,1943.

Received in Registry 25th Feb.,1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Relief for occupied Europe.

Sir H.Morris-Jones, asked the Parliamentary Secretary to Ministry of Economic Warfare whether he had considered the petition signed by over 3,000 residents in Colwyn Bay asking His Majesty's Government to grant permits for such relief schemes of food to enemy occupied territories as could be carried out by International Red Cross.

Mr.Dingle Foot replied that the petition had been considered but as regards the possibility of allowing food to pass through the blockade, nothing could be added to previous statements.

Sir H.Morris-Jones, Mr.Edmund Harvey and Mr.J.Dugdale asked supplementary questions.

Last Paper.

w 3271

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

a-2-43. Gen'l Dept
Northern Section
Southern Section 5/3.

E.R.C. 26/2

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
mb. 6/3/43	ACH 27/7

Next Paper.

W.3493

24794,,12/42 F.O.P.

GENERAL.

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION.

W 3272

25 FEB 1943

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(NI)

* 17. Sir Henry Morris-Jones,—To ask the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, whether he has considered the petition signed by over 3,000 residents in Colwyn Bay asking His Majesty's Government to grant permits for such relief schemes of food to enemy-controlled territories as can be satisfactorily carried out by the International and Swedish Red Cross; and whether he has any statement to make. [*1st Sitting Day after 21st February.*]

F.O. ARE NOT ASKED TO ADVISE

23 FEB 1943

8/9.

Library Please attach reply

E 1242

23 FEB 1943

ENEMY-OCCUPIED EUROPE (FOOD SUPPLIES)

16. **Sir Henry Morris-Jones** asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare whether he has considered the petition signed by over 3,000 residents in Colwyn Bay asking His Majesty's Government to grant permits for such relief schemes of food to enemy-controlled territories as can be satisfactorily carried out by the International and Swedish Red Cross; and whether he has any statement to make?

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare (Mr. Dingle Foot): My Noble Friend has received and considered this petition. As regards the possibility of allowing food to pass through the blockade, I have nothing to add to the many statements I have already made on this subject.

Sir H. Morris-Jones: Could not the Government reconsider this matter; will my hon. Friend say whether, if Swedish and Portuguese shipping is available and it does not affect our war effort, he will reconsider this matter; and does he appreciate the fact that these people will not care whether we win the war at all?

Mr. Foot: I certainly do not agree with the last part of the Supplementary Question. Though shipping is an important consideration, the most important consideration is the benefit, direct or indirect, which the enemy would certainly obtain if there was any raising of the blockade.

Sir H. Morris-Jones: Is it not a fact—these figures have been given to us—that the stuff which has already been sent through has not benefited the enemy in any way?

Mr. Foot: I do not know what figures my hon. Friend has in mind, but I think any importation through the blockade must bring a certain degree of benefit to the enemy.

Mr. Edmund Harvey: Will my hon. Friend assure the House that the Government are keeping the situation under review and have not closed their minds to the possibility of some form of controlled relief?

Mr. Foot: The situation is kept constantly—indeed, daily—under review.

Mr. John Dugdale: Does not the hon. Gentleman agree that there are more valuable duties for our shipping than sending this stuff through blockaded areas?

72.

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 3493

2 MAR 1943

98

Registry Number W 3493/4/49.

FROM Mr.de Sausmarez, (Ministry of Information)

No.

Dated 22nd Feb.,1943.

Received in Registry 2nd March,1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Food and health conditions in Belgium.

Transmits a copy of a memorandum giving the views of Dr. Marteaux on the question of food and vitamin supplies to Belgium and on the state of nutrition and health of the Belgian population.

Last Paper.

W 3272.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Sp/he Compo (M.Ecs) from Mr. Rowe ✓ March 13.

(Minutes.)

This is most interesting.

We are constantly getting enquiries about relief and I should be grateful for Central Dept's guidance as to whether any of this can be used (anonymously of course) as background for replies and if so how much

Central Dept

J.E. Rowe 5/3

Generally speaking, this is the line taken by most Belgians escaping from Belgium; it is infinitely more satisfactory than the line taken by the Belgian Govt and Belgians who have been sitting in

(Action completed.) 15/3/43

(Index.) Allt 24/7

Next Paper.

(W4667)

W 3495

in London for the last 2½ years.

I should have thought it would be a pity to use a single report as background for replies to enquiries, since it makes the whole thing more controversial. Isn't it better to keep it on a general plane? And would it be useful to know what the views of MEW are on the facts? We know that the general attitude of the Belgian population is satisfactory.

AWH 8/iii.

M.E.W. have a copy.

WW by Cleaves

E.H. 12/3

See with copy of letter to Co-ordination Centre, Wilton T 5350/9/2. Inward 2.

E.H. 12/3

100

General Dept may care to enter.

WH 25/2

With the compliments of

Mr. de Sausmarez.

W 3493
2 MAR 1943

22nd February, 1943.

P.W.E./B. 101

21/2/43

FOOD AND HEALTH CONDITIONS IN BELGIUM.

Interview with Dr. Marteaux.

Dr. Marteaux left Belgium in March 1942 and arrived in this country in January 1943. Formerly a Socialist M.P. for Brussels, he broke away from the Labour Party a few years ago and joined the Communists whom he represented from that time onward in Parliament. As a Doctor, he has great experience in the administration of hospitals and of Public Assistance bodies.

In an informal interview Dr. Marteaux expressed quite spontaneously very definite views on the question of food and vitamin supplies to Belgium and on the state of nutrition and health of the Belgian population. His statements may be summarised as follows :

I)- The population is suffering from general under-nourishment manifesting itself in thnsiderable loss of weight, greater morbidity and reduced power of physical resistence of men and women workers, numerous cases of hunger oedema and increased mortality among the sick and aged .But the position should not be exaggerated. It would be quite wrong to say that Belgium is a country where famine reigns in any real sense of the word, and there are undoubtedly several occupied countries in Europe that are far worse off in this respect, such as Greece, Poland,, and so on.The well-to-do people can buy anything they like in the black market, and most people even of moderate income, incl ding workers, contrive to procure in one way or another, through relations in the country, works cantines, various charitable organisations,barter and occasional recourse to the black market, the bare necessities of life.

II)- No estimate of the real state of food supply should be based on the official rations, for in very many cases these are, in fact, not obtainable.

III)- No one but the Germans and the Quislings would dream of blaming the British Blockade for the food shortage which the population attributes entirely to the German occupation and looting. There is no popular demand whatsoever for any relaxation of the blockade which is recognised as an effective weapon in forcing Germany to her knees and liberating the country, to which end the population is perfectly willing to bear its share of the burden in the shape of privation.

IV)- Dr.Marteaux has no admiration nor respect for the campaign, launched under the auspices of the Belgian Government in London, to obtain facilities for the sending of food or vitamins, or even medical supplies from overseas to Belgium. He considers that in an endeavour to gain a cheap popularity in Belgium the promoters of this campaign are apt to disregard the wider interests of the Allied war effort and of Belgium herself.In doing so they incidentally foster a dangerous tendency in certain sections of the Belgian population to await passively assistance from abroad both to overcome the hardships of the occupation and for the defeat of the enemy instead of actively participating in the war effort.

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)- Dr. Marteaux does not believe that mal-nutrition has a debilitating influence on patriotic resistance. On the contrary, hardship and privation daily renew hatred of the invader and are in many cases a direct incitement to action against him.

VI)- Dr. Marteaux considers it in any case quite utopian to expect any real relief to the suffering population from overseas food supplies. These, he thinks, will always be necessarily inadequate to affect the situation, and the Germans would always find roundabout means to take away the equivalent of any food reaching the Belgian population from outside.

VII)- As a medical man Dr. Marteaux has a poor opinion of the utility of synthetic vitamins for an underfed organism, though he thinks they may often furnish a useful stimulant to fairly well nourished persons. In the worst cases of under-nourishment, he thought, the absorption of vitamin tablets might even be positively harmful. Apart from that, there is no real shortage of vitamin products in Belgium, as they can readily be obtained from German supplies and Belgian manufacturers both of whom are making enormous profits out of the popular faith fostered by propaganda, of these products. Those who believe they can render any real service to the suffering Belgian population by supplies from abroad, should send genuine food but not vitamin products.

VIII)- There exists, according to Dr. Marteaux, a genuine shortage of medical supplies in Belgium. But he believes that this shortage could in a large measure be remedied by a better distribution of existing supplies, in particular by making them available to those whose state of health really needs them and by withholding them from those who could at a pinch or even quite easily do without and simply persevere in this matter in their easy-going peace-time habits.

IX)- Dr. Marteaux who was an active member of the Greater Brussels Hospital and Public Assistance Boards and (up to the summer 1941) President of a National Assistance Board, expressed himself in rather bitter terms on certain practices of the Belgian Red Cross and Winter Help Organisations. According to him, a scandalously large proportion of the money received by or collected for these organisations goes to pay for luxurious offices, salaries for their leaders and officials and exaggerated travelling expenses and fees of members of missions they are sending to Portugal and other countries with the ostensible object of trying to obtain food or medical supplies from abroad.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W 349 3/4/40

Draft.

Mr Camps
M.E.W.

from the Crow

103 [illegible]

13th March. 1943.

[My dear Camps]

I understand that
P.W.E. have sent to Leonard
Ingrams a copy of a record of
an interview with Dr Wantrauss
about conditions in Belgium.

I wonder if you have any
independent information which
either confirms or disproves the
substance of this account
so far as food conditions or
shortage of medical supplies
are concerned. If so I should
be very glad if you could let
me have, at your leisure, your
comment

assessment of the true
position

[Yours &c]

Yours sincerely

Ld) D L. Stewart,
per E. E. Crowe.

1243

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

105

D

FOREIGN OFFICE,

S.W.1.

13th March, 1943.

(W 3493/4/49)

Dear Camps.

I understand that Political Warfare Executive have sent to Gerrard Ingrams a copy of a record of an interview with Dr. Marteaux about conditions in Belgium.

I wonder if you have any independent information which either confirms or disproves the substance of this account in so far as food conditions and shortage of medical supplies are concerned. If so I should be very glad if you could let me have, at your leisure, your assessment of the true position.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd) D. L. Crowe

for (D.L. Crowe)

W.A. Camps, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

COPY TO E.E.CROWE, Esq.,
BY BAG.

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W 3691

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

T.550/G/Z

2nd March, 1943.

W3493/4/49

Dear Coordination Centre,

With reference to our letter T.550/G/Z of March 1st about European relief, you may be interested in the enclosed record of a conversation with a Belgian doctor having both technical knowledge and direct experience of conditions in this country.

It seems to us that this hits a large number of nails very hard upon the head.

Needless to say in any use which you may make of this, care should be taken not to identify the speaker.

Yours ever,

(W.A.CAMPS)
M.E.W.

Coordination Centre,
WASHINGTON.

CD P.W.E./B 21.2.43 107

FOOD AND HEALTH CONDITIONS IN BELGIUM

Interview with Dr. Marteaux.

Dr. Marteaux left Belgium in March 1942 and arrived in this country in January 1943. Formerly a Socialist M.P. for Brussels, he broke away from the Labour Party, a few years ago and joined the Communists whom he represented from that time onward in Parliament. As a Doctor, he has great experience in the administration of hospitals and of Public Assistance bodies.

In an informal interview Dr.Marteaux expressed quite spontaneously very definite views on the question of food and vitamin supplies to Belgium and on the state of nutrition and health of the Belgian population. His statements may be summarised as follows :-

1. The population is suffering from general under-nourishment manifesting itself in considerable loss of weight, greater morbidity and reduced power of physical resistence of men and women workers, numerous cases of hunger oedema and increased mortality among the sick and aged. But the position should not be exaggerated. It would be quite wrong to say that Belgium is a country where famine reigns in any real sense of the word, and there are undoubtedly several occupied countries in Europe that are far worse off in this respect, such as Greece, Poland, and so on. The well-to-do people can buy anything they like in the black market, and most people even of moderate income including workers, contrive to procure in one way or another, through relations in the country, works cantines, various charitable organisations, barter and occasional recourse to the black market, the bare necessities of life.

2. No estimate of the real state of food supply should be based on the official rations, for in very many cases these are, in fact, not obtainable.

3. No one but the Germans and the Quislings would dream of blaming the British Blockade for the food shortage which the population attributes entirely to the German occupation and looting. There is no popular demand whatsoever for any

/relaxation

relaxation of the blockade which is recognised as an effective weapon in forcing Germany to her knees and liberating the country, to which end the population is perfectly willing to bear its share of the burden in the shape of privation.

4. Dr. Marteaux has no admiration nor respect for the campaign, launched under the auspices of the Belgian Governmen in London, to obtain facilities for the sending of food or vitamins, or even medical supplies from overseas to Belgium. He considers that in an endeavour to gain a cheap popularity in Belgium the promoters of this campaign are apt to disregard the wider interests of the Allied war effort and of Belgium herself. In doing so they incidentally foster a dangerous tendency in certain sections of the Belgian population to await passively assistance from abroad both to overcome the hardships of the occupation and for the defeat of the enemy instead of actively participating in the war effort.

5. Dr. Marteaux does not believe that mal-nutrition has a debilitating influence on patriotic resistance. On the contrary, hardship and privation daily renew hatred of the invader and are in many cases a direct incitement to action against him.

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7. As a medical man Dr.Marteaux has a poor opinion of the utility of synthetic vitamins for an underfed organism, though he thinks they may often furnish a useful stimulant to fairly well nourished persons. In the worst cases of under-nourishment, he thought, the absorption of vitamin tablets might even be positively harmful. Apart from that, there is no real shortage of vitamin products in Belgirum, as they can readily be obtained from German supplies and Belgian manufacturers both of whom are making enormous profits out of the popular faith fostered by propaganda, of these products. Those who believe they can render any real service to the suffering Belgian population by supplies from abroad should send genuine food but not vitamin products.

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/distribution

distribution of existing supplies, in particular by making them available to those whose state of health really needs them and by withholding them from those who could at a pinch or even quite easily do without and simply persevere in this matter in their easy-going peace-time habits.

9. Dr. Marteaux who was an active member of the Greater Brussels Hospital and Public Assistance Boards and (up to the summer 1941) President of a National Assistance Board, expressed himself in rather bitter terms on certain practices of the Belgian Red Cross and Winter Help Organisations. According to him. a scandalously large proportion of the moneyreceived by or collected for these organisations goes to pay for luxurious offices, salaries for their leaders and officials and exaggerated travelling expenses and fees of members of missions they are sending to Portugal and other countries with the ostensible object of trying to obtain food or medical supplies from abroad.

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GENERAL

1943 CO-ORDINATION.

W 3495

2 MAR 1943

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Registry Number } W 3495/4/49

FROM Mr. Troutbeck, (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Rougetel No.

Dated 25th Feb., 1943

Received in Registry } 2nd March, 1943.

W : Co-ordination

Relief for occupied Europe.

Encloses a copy of a memorandum by Mr. Camps giving the position as regards relief for Belgium and Norway.

Last Paper.

W 3493

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

This memorandum raises in a very cogent form the point put to the Secretary of State by Lord Selborne in his letter of February 16th (W.3118/4/49), flag C. i.e. will the Secretary of State, before he leaves London, obtain the consent of the Cabinet or Prime Minister to a review of the whole relief position with Lehman? In our telegram No. 1362 to Washington on the same paper we have authorised H.M. Ambassador to consider any reasonable proposals on their merits, but he is still debarred from taking an initiative. M.E.W. have had a copy of this telegram and are only partly satisfied with it. While it should prevent the development of a dangerous impasse at Washington, it does not, of course, help M.E.W. or us to deal with increasing pressure here. The latest official petitioner is General de Gaulle, who has apparently been put up to it by Mr. Kerschner. We have temporised hitherto, but cannot do so indefinitely. Sooner or later we must come out with some constructive alternative proposal, such as the child evacuation scheme, or a flat refusal. We cannot, of course, do either without consulting the State Department, and we cannot approach them unless the Prime Minister's consent is first obtained. When the Secretary of State has decided this point he will no doubt wish to reply to Lord Selborne's letter.

M. le Rougetel.

March 5th 1943.

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
10/4/43.	Alt 27/7

Next Paper.

W 3498

We have now heard that Gov: Lehman will be coming to London at the end of this month (W 4036 attached). It will therefore be wise, I submit

4 JAN 35

ought to press for a decision in the meantime either on the broader or the more immediate issue. I have explained to Mr Trenchard why the S. of S. will not be replying to Lord Selborne's letter at present and attach a draft which was handed to Mr Harvey (for the S. of S.) at his request this morning.

M. McKenna
10/3.

Dept.
11/3.
13/3.
11/3

MM
13/iii

W Relief through the Blockade 112

Secretary of State.

The attached memorandum prepared by the Ministry of Economic Warfare summarises recent developments and the present position in regard to relief very clearly.

Since it was written we have received a telegram from Washington, dated 7th March, which is also attached. It sounds a grave note of warning and suggests that in spite of the discretion which H.M. Embassy has been given to discuss the question of relief with Governor Lehman and his organisation, we must be prepared for unpleasant surprises in Washington. On the other hand, the Ministry of Economic Warfare have just heard from Washington that Governor Lehman is leaving for London between the 20th and 25th March and that it has been arranged that Mr. Hall is to accompany him.

Meanwhile, pressure on us and the Ministry of Economic Warfare shows no signs of abating. In addition to the Belgian Prime Minister's last appeal and to the representations of the Norwegian Government, to which we cannot yet send any adequate reply, we have just received an official communication on the subject from General de Gaulle which has apparently been inspired by Mr. Kerschner. We have temporised hitherto, but cannot do so indefinitely. Sooner or later we must come out with some constructive alternative proposal such as the child evacuation scheme, or a flat refusal. It would be well to bear this point in mind in any discussions we may have with Governor Lehman on the subject of relief in its broader aspects.

H. M. Le Rougetel.

10th March, 1943.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Telephone:
GROSVENOR 4060.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE,
W.1.

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YOUR REFERENCE.....

25th February, ~~1943~~

W 3495

My dear Ian

I enclose a copy of a memorandum prepared by Camps on Relief. I am sorry we never sent you a copy before, but I think Drogheda left a copy with Cadogan.

Foot suggests that Law might like to see this paper.

Yours ever

Paul Thornbeck

I. Le Rougetel, Esq., C.M.G.

Foreign Office.

It will be remembered that twice during the Summer the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Economic Warfare recommended to the Cabinet that we should explore, together with the American Government, the possibility of admitting limited quantities of milk and vitamins through the blockade for children in occupied territories. The Cabinet twice declined to approve this proposal, and though it was left open to the responsible Ministers to raise the matter again, the effect of the Cabinet's decision was to re-affirm the policy of total blockade.

The Belgian Government did not accept this negative decision which was communicated to them by the Prime Minister. On July 7th their Ambassador wrote to the Prime Minister renewing their demand for a concession of a kind similar to that already recommended to the Cabinet by the Secretary of State and the Minister of Economic Warfare. As a result, the Foreign Office wrote to No. 10 Downing Street saying that the Secretary of State's views remained unchanged, but that he assumed that the Prime Minister would wish to return a negative answer to the Belgians. The terms of such an answer were suggested. The Ministry of Economic Warfare wrote to No. 10 (on August 6th) agreeing that the Belgians should receive a negative answer to their specific request, but urging that the general question should be discussed with the American Government as early as possible. The Secretary of State and the Prime Minister considered however that the Cabinet's decisions committed us to maintain vigorously an anti-relief policy and precluded even the consideration of any alternative. As no new arguments could be laid before the Cabinet, the matter was accordingly dropped.

This was the position in September of last year. In October the State Department requested our formal confirmation that we agreed with them in holding that the blockade must

be/

be vigorously maintained. They further proposed a view of existing concessions to be carried out jointly by the two Governments.

About the same time the Belgian Government, in a letter of October 30th, reverted to its demands and threatened to disassociate itself from British policy if these demands were not favourably considered. The Norwegians also claimed relief and supported their claims with certain threats. We accordingly asked American approval of the terms of negative replies to both these proposals, and, in view of the State Department's attitude as shortly before expressed to us, we expected a rapid assent.

Meanwhile, however, the President had informally and independently committed himself to sponsor a relief scheme for Norway, and when we received the Americans' comments on our proposal, we found that they were now recommending a negative reply to the Belgians and a promise of relief to the Norwegians. We pointed out that this was impossible; that relief could not be sent to Norway without being allowed also to Belgium; and that the plan amounted to a complete abandonment of their and our previous position. This was on November 24th. Since then no further reply from the State Department has been received.

But on February 6th the Washington Embassy reported that Mr. Lehman, who had now been charged by the American Government to deal with questions of current as well as of post War relief, was in favour of making a blockade concession if practicable, and was proceeding to a careful examination of the possibilities. No particular European country was mentioned in this connection. It appeared rather that Mr. Lehman was dealing with the problem in general terms, and was going to start by assessing its magnitude, the resources available, and the practical possibility of evolving safeguards which would

avoid/

avoid benefit to the enemy from a relief operation. A later telegram from Washington says that Mr. Lehman's inclination in favour of relief is daily growing.

The position that was so clear after the State Department's communication in October has thus become exceedingly complicated. No answer has yet been given to the Belgian and Norwegian Governments' applications, which were made in October last. The Americans are formally committed to do nothing without our agreement, but their policy is clearly diverging from ours, even if the unfortunate intervention of the President is left out of account.

On the other hand it will be observed that Mr. Lehman is setting about his business in exactly the manner which the Minister of Economic Warfare recommended in the letter to No. 10 Downing Street already referred to. His proposal to examine the general implications of a change of policy is in quite a different class from the President's proposal to make an ad hoc concession to one Ally without considering the consequences.

We have now two alternatives. We can either oppose the new American initiative on general grounds, or we can associate ourselves with it. If we do the former, we shall certainly not succeed in causing our opinion to prevail, and when the Americans start relieving Europe we shall be in the undignified position of having tried, but vainly, to frustrate their humanitarian intentions. If on the other hand we welcome Mr. Lehman's proposal to review the position and co-operate with him in it, we shall lose nothing but we shall gain the following advantages.

a.) We stand a good prospect of killing the President's ill considered plan.

b.) We shall be better placed to moderate Mr. Lehman's enthusiasm if it seems to us on inspection unwise; and if examination of the problem reveals concrete objections to a change of present policy, both the Americans and ourselves will have firm ground under

our/

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our feet in dealing with future applications.

c.) We shall be able meanwhile to tell the Belgians and Norwegians and other Allies that the whole question is being submitted to intensive study by the British and United States Governments in no purely negative spirit, instead of simply hashing up the same old arguments which have long ceased to convince them.

The Belgian Prime Minister has now again written to the Prime Minister asking for an answer to his letter of October 30th, and he will have to be given one. He affirms incidentally that the American Government is perfectly ready to agree to a concession.

Since the Americans have taken the initiative in proposing a review of present policy, we clearly cannot refuse to discuss the matter with them. But we must have permission to be objective in these discussions and also to refer to them in communications to the Belgians. If this could be obtained from the Prime Minister before the beginning of next week, it would be immensely helpful.

It is most important that Mr. Lehman should be induced to come over here and talk with us, and we cannot expect either to achieve this or make him take notice of our arguments unless we can indicate that we are ready to discuss the matter with an open mind. We ourselves are not now urging that a concession should be made, but that the case for and against making one should be seriously examined.

M.E.W.

15. 2. 43.

74.

GENERAL

W 3498 118

2 MAR 1943

CO-ORDINATION

Registry Number W 3498/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare, Communicated.

No.

Dated 17th Feb., 1943

Received in Registry 2nd March, 1943.

W : Co-ordination

Last Paper.

W 3495 (W2630)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

5/3/43

(Index.)

AGH 26/7

Next Paper.

W 3512

Relief work by International Red Cross.

Transmits copy of letter from Lord Drogheda (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Dr. Burckhardt (Internation Red Cross) of 17th February referring to Dr. Burckhardt's letter to Mr. Sullivan (W 2630/4/49). Two points require clearing up. The first concerns navicerts for medical supplies and the second concerns the wish that the procedure applying to the use of funds sent to the Commission by the consent of United Kingdom ~~Commercial Corporation~~ and United States Governments should be as flexible as possible.

(Minutes.)

E.P. 5/3

D

24794 12/42 F.O.P.

AL

COPY. for Foreign Office with reference to Dr. Burckhardt's letter of 28/12/42 to W. Roberts, Esq. copied to M.E.W. under Ref. W 2630/4/49.

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MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

17th February, 1943.

W. 3498
2 MAR 1943

Dear Dr. Burckhardt,

Thank you very much for your letter L/YZ of December 28th, in which you enclosed a copy of an account sent to Mr. Sullivan of the work done by the Joint Relief Commission for the benefit of women and children victims of the war. I have read this with the greatest interest. I will not attempt to comment at present on the financial questions involved in these transactions, as they are extremely complicated and the information given in your letter, full though it is, is not in all cases sufficient to enable me to form any opinion. But there are two points which I should like to clear up.

The first of these concerns the medical supplies for which you mentioned that you have not been able to obtain navicerts. We are rather puzzled about this. We had not observed any navicert applications made by your delegates overseas for goods consigned to the Commission and cannot recall refusing any. There was, I believe, some delay over an application to ship some insulin from Buenos Aires, but this only occurred while enquiries were being made of you concerning the ultimate destination of the goods. You will appreciate of course that we are always interested to know this, especially as sometimes despatches of medical supplies are organized independently to particular countries. Supply considerations have also sometimes to be taken into account when navicert applications are made, as well as the purely blockade aspect of them. If you could let me have particulars of the navicerts which have been refused, I should be very glad to make further enquiries and see how this occurred.

/The second

Dr. Carl J. Burckhardt,
Joint Relief Commission of the
International Red Cross.

W 3238

The second point concerns the wish which is expressed in the last paragraph but one of your letter to Mr. Sullivan that the procedure applying to the use of funds sent to the Commission by consent of the British or American Governments should be as flexible as possible. I quite appreciate how important it is to you to receive a quick decision in order not to miss opportunities of purchase which may not recur. On the other hand I know that you will realize that the blockade considerations involved are sometimes very complex and that for this reason we find it difficult to give any broad general rule within which purchases may be automatically authorised. I think that a solution which would meet the needs of both of us could easily be found, and that the best course would be for the Joint Commission to prepare a list of the commodities which it wishes to export from Switzerland during a stated period (say six months or a year). We would then consider this list and indicate which items were approved generally, which were approved within certain limits, and which were excluded for one reason or another. If we then agree between us that funds remitted to the Commission should be spent only as arranged, it would be unnecessary to lay down any further conditions when remittances were made or when you contemplated any particular purchases.

Yours ever sincerely,

(Sgd) DROGHEDA.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 3512

2 MAR 1943

Registry Number W 3512/4/49

TELEGRAM FROM Mr. Mallet, (Stockholm)

No. 24 Saving

Dated 26th Feb., 1943.

Received in Registry 2nd March, 1943.

W : C-ordination

Relief for Norway.

Relief to Stockholm despatch No. 27E of 15th January (W 1338/4/49). The Swedish Government are being subjected to increasing pressure from Swedish public opinion to facilitate export of foodstuffs to Norway for relief for civil population Records conversation between M. Häggl͡of Director of Commercial Division with Commercial Counsellor on this question.

Last Paper.

W 3498 (W 1338)

References.

N663/663/42.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Copied to M.E.W. by Distr. Room

& to Cmpo (M.E.W.) March 6.

(Minutes.)

See W 3810

R.L.O. 1/3

(Action completed.)

mcl 18/3/43

(Index.)

ALH 24/7

Next Paper.

W 3588. (W 3810)

21724 F.O.P.

W

W 3512
2 MAR 1943

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[EN CLAIR] DEPARTMENTAL NO. 2

FROM STOCKHOLM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Mallet
No. 24 SAVING — D. By bag — 26th February, 1943
26th February, 1943 — R. 11.50 a.m. — 1st March, 1943

g g g g g

My despatch No. 27 "E". W 1338

Swedish Government are being subjected to increasing pressure from Swedish public opinion to facilitate export of foodstuffs to Norway for relief of civil population. On February 24th Hägglöf, Director of Commercial Division of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in conversation with Commercial Counsellor described attitude of His Majesty's Government in this matter as obstructive and stated that Swedish Government had been placed in a very awkward position vis-à-vis public because the Swedish press had been encouraged to criticise the Swedish Government for importing fish from Norway (see Mr. Collier's despatch No. 15 of the 1st February) instead of exporting foodstuffs to Norway. During the next few days, he said, he would have to receive a number of delegates from Swedish Relief Associations desiring to obtain export permits for Norway and in view of the press attacks referred to above it would now be necessary for the Swedish Government to make a public statement and possibly to issue a press communique explaining that the blame should really be attached to His Majesty's Government who were making use of the powers conferred upon them under the Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement to obstruct exports of foodstuffs to Norway.

2. Commercial Counsellor pointed out that question was one not merely of War Trade but of clear moral obligation on part of Swedish Government to refrain from exporting to enemy-controlled territory any goods imported through our controls or any goods of a similar type. Moreover His Majesty's Government were not satisfied that danger of foodstuffs in question being used to feed German troops in Norway had been eliminated. Commercial Counsellor also pointed out that War Trade Agreement was a secret document which could not be quoted without your permission and Director accordingly agreed to word announcement in such a way as to avoid mentioning Agreement. Commercial Counsellor urged him to be very careful not to publish anything which might cause irritation in London and Washington and provoke counter-propaganda. Director replied that matters had gone so far that Swedish Government would have to defend itself against the press including certain newspapers obviously influenced by ourselves and Norwegians.

3. If we were to retaliate by supporting Norwegian criticism of Swedish purchases of Norwegian foodstuffs Swedish Government would probably reply on following lines: (1) During 1942 value of foodstuffs, apart from gifts, delivered from Norway to Sweden and vice versa approximately cancel out. Deliveries of medical goods

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2 MAR 1943
F.O. REGISTRY

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Please take ca

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and of gifts of foodstuffs have been one way traffic from Sweden to Norway only. Gifts have far surpassed all other forms of traffic in value. (Statements on these lines are already beginning to appear in Swedish press). (2) As Germans took a fixed tonnage or proportion of Norwegian fishing catch Swedish refusal to purchase part thereof could in no way benefit Norwegians. Argument that Sweden had received stolen goods, if applied in this case, could logically be applied to a large proportion of all trade with Axis. (3) Sweden is importing no foodstuffs from Norway this year. See in this connexion Commercial Counsellor's memorandum to Ministry of Economic Warfare No. 1580 of December 8th last.

4. Please copy to Ministry of Economic Warfare.

[Copies sent to Ministry of Economic Warfare].

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GENERAL

1943

W 3588

3 MAR 1943

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Registry Number W 3588/4/49

FROM General de Gaulle to Secretary of State.

No. d. 145

Dated 26th Feb. 1943

Received in Registry 3rd March, 1943

W : Co-ordination.

Relief for children in France.

Requests that a navicert may be granted for 3,000 tons of dried vegetables and 100 tons of fat from United States of America to Marseilles for children in France. Mr. Neville Lytton is interested in the question. Encloses a copy of a memorandum by Mr Kerschner regarding relief for a French children.

Last Paper.

W 3512 (W 180)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft) to Troutbeck

(M E W.) from to Crowe.

hand. b

(Minutes.)

From the drawn of the enclosure in this letter. I think it is a fair deduction that Mr Kerschner has put General de Gaulle up to write this

Apart from all other considerations it seems impossible to accept the F's assertion that his organisation is still in existence. It is almost certain that the Americans have been informed and we know nothing about the others.

I submit a draft reply

J E. Crowe.
3/3

We must be very careful how we deal with this. The General was quite obviously put up to it by Kerschner but

(Action completed.)

mb 8/7/43

(Index.)

Amf 30/3/43

Next Paper.

W 3645 (W 4087)

W 3326

We must not forget that the Belgian Prime Minister has not yet been answered. M.E.W. are doing all they know to get some kind of light on the subject from Wilton but in the meantime H. Pirelli has only received a colourless interim reply and it would clearly be unwise to go further than this with the F.N.C. Please consult with M.E.W. & send them a copy of this letter under a very brief cover in the above sense.

H.L. Rouquier.
4/3.

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Registry
No.
W 3588/4/49

E.E.C.

F.O.

March, 1943.

Draft.

General de Gaulle.

(From the
Secretary of State)

Suspend -

I have received your letter of 26th February and have carefully considered the proposal which it contains to send a shipment of food to France for feeding 100,000 children, a proposal which I may say has already been made to me before by Mr. Kerschner himself.

While I fully agree with you that in this matter humanitarian considerations are of importance, I fear I ~~do~~ can not go all the way with you in your statement that practical considerations hardly come into the picture. If we could follow the dictates of our hearts and not of our heads the whole matter would indeed be simple. But such a course could hardly be reconciled with the determination, which I know you share to the full, that our first objective is and always must be the defeat of the enemy at the earliest possible moment.

It is for this reason that it is essential to examine most carefully the effect of the proposal which you have now laid before me. You will, I am sure, understand that I am not trying in any way to underestimate the sufferings of the French people when I say that in equity it would not be possible to accede to your request

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French Dept.
first.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

without allowing similar supplies to be sent to other countries in enemy occupation. You quote the case of Greece as a parallel, but we have always taken the view, which indeed we still hold, that the famine conditions prevailing in that country were quite exceptional and justify special concessions. Under present conditions to admit relief supplies to France would therefore also entail admitting supplies to other countries such as Belgium, Holland, Norway and Yugoslavia. The matter, therefore, takes on at once a much larger practical significance than it is accorded in the note by Mr. Kerschner which you enclose in your letter.

As you know, it is one of our fundamental principles in waging this war that the enemy is and must remain responsible for feeding the population of the country which he has overrun. Any relaxation of our blockade of those countries would at once undermine this principle and expose us to the risk which I believe to be a very real one that the Germans will be encouraged to reduce the already inadequate rations which they at present allow in the ~~knowledge~~ expectation that any deficit thus created would be made up the Allies.

This is the nucleus of the problem and makes it, I think, unnecessary for me to enter into the more practical difficulties which would also have to be overcome. I feel, however, that it is only right that

I/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

I should inform you that I have the gravest doubts as to whether in fact the organisation built up by Mr. Kerschner before the occupation of Southern France still exists. It appears highly probable that all the American members of this organisation have been interned and I have no information about the other neutral members which would warrant entrusting to them the distribution of supplies.

However much, therefore, I share your anxiety to do something for the suffering children of occupied Europe, I fear that at present I cannot for these reasons agree to your proposal and I am sure you will appreciate that this decision is only reached as a result of my conviction that any departure from our present policy, with which I may say the United States Government have declared themselves to be in full accord, would be detrimental to our war effort and therefore contrary both to your interests as well as to ours.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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LE GENERAL DE GAULLE.
2. 145

3. CARLTON GARDENS. S.W.1.
WHITEHALL 5444.

W 3588
3 MAR 1943

Le 26 février 1943

Cher Monsieur Eden,

Vous connaissez le triste sort des enfants de France qui n'ont pas assez à manger. Je viens vous demander pour eux une toute petite faveur : un navicert pour 3.000 tonnes de légumes secs et 100 tonnes de graisse qui seraient expédiées des Etats-Unis à Marseille; cela suffirait pour nourrir 100.000 enfants pendant neuf mois. La cargaison est prête, le bateau (suédois) est disponible, 140 personnes de nationalité neutre attendent en territoire français de recevoir et distribuer cette nourriture, comme elles l'ont fait jusqu'à une époque toute récente, grâce à l'organisation quaker du "Famine Relief Fund",

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden,
His Britannic Majesty's
Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs.

67 Brook Street, Londres W.1. (téléphone : Mayfair 2004). Cette organisation a fonctionné d'une manière parfaite dans plusieurs régions du midi de la France, sous le contrôle effectif de M. Howard E. Kerschner, directeur du "American Friends Service Committee".

En somme, on appliquerait dans le cas présent, sur une petite échelle, la méthode adoptée depuis le mois d'octobre dernier, d'un commun accord entre le Gouvernement Britannique et le Gouvernement Hellénique, pour assurer désormais le ravitaillement de toute la Grèce; la seule différence étant que l'organisme de réception et de distribution des vivres, au lieu d'être la Croix Rouge Internationale et ses agents en Grèce, serait le "Famine Relief Fund" et le personnel spécialisé déjà installé en France par M. Kerschner.

M. Neville Lytton s'intéresse à la présente requête; il a eu l'honneur d'en entretenir le Premier Ministre et Madame Churchill,

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ainsi que Votre Excellence.

D'autre part, M. Kerschner a exposé, dans une note ci-jointe en copie, les raisons qui combattent avec succès les objections qui peuvent être tirées de la considération de la rapacité nazie.

Mais il ne s'agit guère de raisonnement. C'est à votre sentiment d'humanité et d'amitié pour la France que je m'adresse, en toute confiance, en vue d'obtenir, dès maintenant, un navicert pour un bateau neutre qui, en apportant à Marseille une cargaison de 3.100 tonnes, sauvera cent mille enfants français de la famine.

Bien sincèrement à vous,

L. de Jouvenel

Laying aside all humanitarian considerations I am sure that the national interest of my country and yours would indicate that we ought to send at least token shipments of foood to the children of the occupied countries of Norway, Belgium, Holland and France. From long experience of feeding 100.000 children in colonies and school canteens in Southern France from 1940 right down to the present time I can speak with more authority as to the situation in that country. This memorandum is confined to a specific project for Southern France, il should benoted as an important consideration that there are nine American Members of our Organisation still there, and that in addition we have about 140 dependable neutrals whom I have personally trained for periods ranging from one to four years. These people can be depended upon to the last degree to execute the proposals herein contained.

I propose that you allow me to employ a Swedish Ship and personally proceed with it to the Fort of Marseille loaded with a cargo of 3.000 tons of dried vegetables and 100 tons of fat. This would be sufficient to permit us to feed our 100.000 children for another nine months. There are three possibilities which might result in connexion with this proposal any one of which would, in my opinion be of great benefit to the Allied cause. I note them as follows:

(1) If the Germans would not give safe conduct for me to proceed in a Swedish Ship with this cargo and deliver it to the members of my Organisation in Marseille, who would meet me on Board the ship (it would not be necessary for me to leave the ship) then we could broadcast to France that I had proposed the shipment of food and that it had been agreed to by the Allied Governments, but the Germans would not permit it. Since everyone in Southern France knows me, and the work which has been donethere, it would become know all over the country that the Allies were still interested in the children of France but that Germany would not permit them to be fed. This would put us in an exceedingly strong propaganda position.

(2) If the necessary guarantees are given and I proceed with the shipment of food and deliver it to my organisation in Marseille the children will be fed. No publicity will be necessary as it will pass by word of mouth through the underground channels throughout the country that I have arrived with food for the children and that the Allies are still interested in caring for their friends. This will avoid the psychological shock which the generous people of France, who are so strongly on our side, are going to experience during the coming weeks when our work has to stop. I have had many Frenchmen say to me "Of course we want you to win the war and we will help you to the limit of our ability, but we know, and you know and we believe Washington and London know, that you could send us a little food for our children without in any way aiding Axis economy. Our children are dying It is not your fault, but you could thwart Hitler's destroying blow to some extent by saving our children".

(3) The third possibility would be for us to send the food and for the Germand to seize it. If they did, such a small quantity would be of no importance, and we would be in the strongest possible position to broadcast to the people of the occupied countries that we are prepared to send them food - that we had indeed sent the first shipment, but that their conquerors had seized it. The propaganda value of this situation would far out-weigh the loss of a handful of food.

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I can state, however, that we have never had the slightest interference on the part of the German Authorities and have never lost a mouthful of food entrusted to our care. From long experience and from a careful study of the situation I am furthermore in a position to state that the supplies which we have had in France have not enabled the Germans to take any greater amount of French Food and have in no way directly or indirectly aided Axis economy. I would not ask your permission to the above if I were not perfectly sure that it is not only good humanitarianism but good strategic policy fromm the standpoint of the Allied war effort.

This memorandum is written as an individual and not on behalf of any organisation or group. I am in position to supply details and supporting proof of my contentions and I am exceedlingly anxious to save the lives of these children as well as make this important contribution to the common cause of the Allied Governments.

-o- -o-

-o-

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W3588/4/49.

Draft.

To Treasury
to F.O.
from
to ~~Churchill~~
Crowe

134 bm

6 March, 1943.

My dear Jack
to Churchill
as I mentioned to you on
the telephone we have received
an appeal to relief from Gen. de
Gaulle and I now enclose
a copy.

I think it is clear that the
General has been put up to
this by Vansittart, a note by
whom he encloses, and we
must therefore be doubly
careful how we deal with
this. Our feeling is that
as M. Pleven has had
nothing more than an interim
reply ~~from the P.M.~~ we cannot

go

so further with the French
Nat. Cotton. The P.M.
told Mr Pirie that he
hoped soon to be able to
give him a considered
reply and I said that
we should simply say that
we & are studying the
proposal contained in his
letter and will let him have
a reply as soon as
possible. Do you agree?

Yours ever
L.E.R. Grove
5/3

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.
6th March, 1943.

(W 3588/4/49)

My dear Jack.

As le Rougetel mentioned to you on the telephone we have received an appeal for relief from General de Gaulle and I now enclose a copy.

I think it is clear that the General has been put up to this by Kerschner, a note by whom he encloses, and we must therefore be doubly careful how we deal with this. Our feeling is that as M. Pierlot has had nothing more than an interim reply we cannot go further with the French National Committee. The Prime Minister told M. Pierlot that he hoped soon to be able to give him a considered reply and I think that we should simply say that we are studying

/the

J.M. Troutbeck, Esq., C.M.G.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

the proposal contained in his letter and will let him have a reply as soon as possible. Do you agree?

(E.E. Crowe)

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GENERAL

W 3645

3 MAR 1943

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Registry Number } W 3645/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare, Communicated.

No. T 550/G/2

Dated 1st Mar., 1943

Received in Registry } 3rd March, 1943.

W : Co-ordination

Relief for occupied Europe.

Transmits copy of letter from Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Co-ordination Centre, Washington of 1st March. Requests from Norway for medical supplies are being increasingly insistent as many common products are no longer available from Germany. This may be due to the fact that policy has been liberal in regard to medical supplies. Black Market prices have tended to fall in many European countries due to general expectation that for humanitarian reasons a relaxation of the blockade may occurr.

Last Paper.

W 3588 (W 3135)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

A.J. 6/3 Clark
Central
Northern
depts
Stores
Shipping

E.C. 5/3

See written copy of letter from Mr. Camps (M.F.W.) to Co-ordination Centre Washington T 550/G/2. March 10.

Received W.O. 20/3
A.J. 23/3. Clark
Central
Northern
depts.

E.C. 9/3

(Action completed) 25/3/43 W6 10/3/43

(Index.) Alt 26

Next Paper.

W 3646 (W 3948)

Copy to: E.E.Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

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MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

T.550/G/Z

1st March, 1943.

W 3645
3 MAR 1943

W 3134

Dear Coordination Centre,

Your telegram number 654 Arfar of February 19th and previous correspondence on the general question of relief.

Two points have been brought to our attention recently, which have some apparent bearing on this matter, and we are accordingly passing the information to you.

1. Requests from Norway for medical supplies are becoming increasingly insistent and the Norwegian authorities have themselves been struck by this. It seems that many common products which used to be available from Germany and elsewhere are now disappearing from stock. This may of course be largely due to German labour difficulties. But it may also be connected with the fact that our policy has been liberal in regard to medical supplies. Both the Belgian and the Norwegian Governments are in contact with the local authorities in their own countries, and both have sent substantial consignments of medical stores through the blockade at various times. It seems to us that the development of these shortages and consequent pressure for supplies from outside may be an instructive example of the consequences of opening a channel for the admission of goods into occupied Europe.

2. A report from a Swedish source states that

Black/

Coordination Centre,
WASHINGTON.

Black Market prices have tended to fall in many European countries during recent months. The reasons for this are said to include Allied successes in Russia and North Africa, but also general expectation that for humanitarian reasons a relaxation of the blockade in favour of civilian populations may occur. Whether this last factor has really had any importance in producing the result described we do not know, but the fact that a change of blockade policy is expected may well be true and is indeed a likely consequence of the uncertain position in which we ourselves have been placed during recent months.

Yours ever,

(W.A.CAMPS)

M.E.W.

C(41) 141

Copy to: E.E.Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

T.550/G/Z

1st March, 1943.

Dear Coordination Centre,

Your telegram number 654 Arfar of February 19th and previous correspondence on the general question of relief.

Two points have been brought to our attention recently, which have some apparent bearing on this matter, and we are accordingly passing the information to you.

1. Requests from Norway for medical supplies are becoming increasingly insistent and the Norwegian authorities have themselves been struck by this. It seems that many common products which used to be available from Germany and elsewhere are now disappearing from stock. This may of course be largely due to German labour difficulties. But it may also be connected with the fact that our policy has been liberal in regard to medical supplies. Both the Belgian and the Norwegian Governments are in contact with the local authorities in their own countries, and both have sent substantial consignments of medical stores through the blockade at various times. It seems to us that the development of these shortages and consequent pressure for supplies from outside may be an instructive example of the consequences of opening a channel for the admission of goods into occupied Europe.

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Black/

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Yours ever,

(W.A.CAMPS)

M.E.W.

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COPY FOR: E.E.Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

with MM

3645 / 4 49.

1 MAR 1943

ENCLOSED

T.550/G/Z

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

10th March, 1943.

B Y B A G.

Dear Coordination Centre,

With further reference to our letter of March 2nd concerning the general relief policy, there are two further matters which we want to bring to your attention.

1. An American friend told us in conversation about some remarks made by a competent psychiatrist (Dr. J. A. Hadfield, who in peace time is a lecturer in psychology and mental hygiene at the University of London) on the subject of the emotional consequences of the War and War measures for the post War period. He was lunching with a party of American Officers and the talk turned about the psychological effects of sending or not sending relief into Europe. He gave it as his view that any supplies slipped in secretly without the knowledge of the Germans would have an excellent effect, but that supplies sent in with German approval would produce a bad psychological effect unless they were very substantial. He expected these consequences, because the Germans would point to the fact that they were not interfering with the goods in question and encourage the people to ask for more and

resent/

Coordination Centre,
WASHINGTON.

resent the smallness of what was actually being done.

I mention this merely as an interesting opinion, and do not of course suggest that it is in any way a decisive argument or that much should be made of it. Nor have we asked Dr. Hadfield to confirm this casually expressed opinion or give us permission to quote him as authority for it.

2. The International Red Cross appears, from various signs which we have noted, to be manoeuvring with more than usual vigour for the position of central agency for civilian relief in Europe. We have also noticed that the propaganda in favour of relief which is being conducted here harps upon the theme that "the food is ready, the ships are ready, the organisation is ready and waiting to undertake distribution; only navicerts from the British Government are lacking". As we have always held strongly that a special organisation would need to be created under special conditions to supervise any relief operation, if we come to the point of allowing one, which involved a breach of the blockade, you may like to bear these phenomena in mind.

Yours ever,

(W. A. CAMPS)
M.E.W.

78

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

145

W 3646

3 MAR

Registry Number } W 3646/4/49

FROM Colonel Burton, M.P.

No.

Dated 23rd Feb: 1943.

Received in Registry } 3rd March, 1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Relief for occupied Europe.

Encloses correspondence from Mr. T.H. Harrison regarding relief for occupied Europe and requests information on the matter.

Last Paper.

W 3645.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Def / Col. Burton M.P. from SW/S. March 2.

(Minutes.)

See minute E.C. 6/3

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
8/3/43	Add 27/7

Next Paper.

W 3691/

146

not exceed 2117 8m.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

W

ACKNOWLEDGED 22.2.43

To:— Foreign Secretary (1) Under Sec.

(Mr. Peter Kellas Loch M.P.

I enclose correspondence from man)

Mr. T. H. Thomson x (2) Enclosure

and shall be grateful if you will give the matter your attention, inform me of the position, and perhaps suggest the lines of a suitable reply.

Please [~~do not~~] acknowledge.

Thurlestone.

20/2/43

W 3646

3 MAR 1943

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

G.E.M.

Draft.
Colonel Burton,
M.P.

(From the Secretary
of State)

General Dept.

March 2, 1943

147

~~February,~~ 1943.

OUT FILE

You sent me on February 20th a letter from a Mr. Harrison who asked for your views on the question of food relief for Europe.

Both H.M.G. and the U.S.G. have always maintained that the responsibility for feeding the civilian population of the occupied countries solely rests with the occupying Power. With the exception of Greece, Germany has accepted this responsibility.

Food conditions in Greece however have always been far worse than those of other occupied countries (except probably Poland, which is of course inaccessible) and recognition of this fact is given by the Greek Relief Scheme, which has been working in one form or another since the second half of 1941.

The food which is sent to Greece is distributed in accordance with the needs of the population and the practical possibilities by a Swedish-Swiss Commission, which sees that the conditions on which we agreed to send relief to Greece - e.g. that food stuffs produced in Greece are reserved for the civil population - are fulfilled.

As a result of recommendations made by the Commission, the original allotment has been considerably increased, and any further recommendations which they may make, for either altering the items within the total allotment or increasing it would, of course, be sympathetically considered.

Conditions in other occupied countries are not comparable with those in Greece, and a relief

scheme/

scheme for one country alone could not be justified on the facts. To send food to one country would therefore involve sending it to other countries as well. H.M.G. have fully considered this from every angle. They are, however, absolutely convinced, on the evidence before them, that the time is not ripe for a major change of policy. In particular they do not consider it warrantable at the present time, by abandoning their contention that the enemy is solely responsible for feeding the territories he has over-run, to encourage him - as he almost certainly would - to withhold the supplies which he at present sends to those territories, thus creating widespread famine conditions which H.M.G. would not be in a position to alleviate, without detriment to the war effort.

I hope that the above will enable you to reply to your correspondent and to convince him of the fact that the Government are fully alive to all the considerations, humanitarian and other-wise, involved.

AR

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

? Eden

149

OUT FILE

2nd March, 1943.

You sent me on February 20th a letter from a Mr. Harrison who asked for your views on the question of food relief for Europe.

Both His Majesty's Government and the United States Government have always maintained that the responsibility for feeding the civil population of the occupied countries rests solely with the occupying Power. With the exception of Greece, Germany has accepted this responsibility.

Food conditions in Greece however have always been far worse than those of other occupied countries (except probably Poland, which is of course inaccessible) and recognition of this fact is given by the Greek Relief Scheme, which has been working in one form or another since the second half of 1941.

The food which is sent to Greece is distributed in accordance with the needs of the population and the practical possibilities by a Swedish-Swiss Commission, which sees that the conditions on which we agreed to send relief to Greece - e.g.

that/

Colonel H.W. Burton, O.B.E., M.P.

that food stuffs produced in Greece are reserved for the civil population - are fulfilled.

As a result of recommendations made by the Commission, the original allotment has been considerably increased, and any further recommendations which they may make, for either altering the items within the total allotment or increasing it would, of course, be sympathetically considered.

Conditions in other occupied countries are not comparable with those in Greece, and a relief scheme for one country alone could not be justified on the facts. To send food to one country would therefore involve sending it to other countries as well. His Majesty's Government have fully considered this from every angle. They are, however, absolutely convinced, on the evidence before them, that the time is not ripe for a major change of policy. In particular they do not consider it warrantable at the present time, by abandoning

their/

their contention that the enemy is solely responsible for feeding the territories he has over-run, to encourage him - as he almost certainly would - to withhold the supplies which he at present sends to those territories, thus creating widespread famine conditions which His Majesty's Government would not be in a position to alleviate, without detriment to the war effort.

I hope that the above will enable you to reply to your correspondant and to convince him of the fact that the Government are fully alive to all the considerations, humanitarian and otherwise, involved.

(Sd.) ANTHONY EDEN.

82.

152

GENERAL

1943

W 3777

5 MAR 1943

CO-ORDINATION.

Registry Number W 3777/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No. T 572

Dated 3rd March, 1943

Received in Registry 5th March, 1943

W : Co-ordination.

Purchases of canned meat by Allied Governments.

Transmits copy of telegram to Buenos Aires No.215 Arfar of 25th February stating that navicerts should not be granted for canned meat bought by Allied representatives for despatch to Allied prisoners of war, unless purchase is shown to have been agreed with Ministry of Food.

Last Paper.

W 3767 (W 2196)

References.

(Minutes.)

JOW 16/3

MW Ward 16/3

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

D

(Action completed.)

MF 18/3/43

(Index.)

ACH 27/7

Next Paper.

W 3807

24794 12 42 F.O.P.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

153

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

NEW FILE No. T572.
COPY to Crowe Esq, FO
DATE 3/3/43

T.572

[CYPHER]

LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BUENOS AIRES

No. 215 ARFAR

25th February, 1943. D. 5.20 a.m. 26th February, 1943.

Repeated to Rio de Janeiro No. 180 Arfar
Montevideo No. 37 Arfar
Caracas No. 28 Arfar

W 3777
5 MAR 1943

sssss

In view of the Memorandum of Understanding, the Ministry of Food are anxious that purchases of canned meat should not be made by Allied representatives in South America independently of themselves.

2. You should therefore not submit navicert applications for canned meat bought by Allied representatives for despatch to Allied prisoners of war, unless purchase is shown to have been agreed with the Ministry of Food. The latter are explaining the position to Allied Governments here.

3. Please yourself explain this to any Allied representatives or organisations who have been buying meat from time to time for this purpose. If in any immediate instances hardship seems likely to result from the ruling, you may despite the above, refer application with explanation of the circumstances.

81

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 3767

5 MAR 1943

Registry Number W 3767/4/49

FROM Mrs. Allington to Mr. Law

No.

Dated 21st Feb. 1943.

Received in Registry 5th Mar. 1943.

W: Coordination +

Relief for children in occupied Europe

Requests information regarding milk for children in occupied Europe

Last Paper.

W 3693

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/Mrs. Allington from Mr. Law Branch 3.

(Minutes.)

See within

E.C. 8/3

See within Letter from Mrs Allington to Mr Law. Mar 5.

E.C. 17/3

(Action completed.)

mb 9/3/43

(Index.)

Action 27

Next Paper.

W3777

24794 12 42 F.O.P.

1) Mr Lowe
2) Gen. Dept.

155

THE DEANERY,
DURHAM.
TEL. 37 DURHAM.

1/W 21/43
W 3767
5 MAR 1943

My dear Dick

It's bad luck for you that I should still feel I've got a grip on you which justifies my bothering you about International Politics! But you must buy us by preserving!

I'm inclined to lash myself up about "Starving Children in the Netherlands & in Greece". Probably a long suffering Christian Government is always doing all it can, but I do want us to know why we can't give them more "parcels"

Which seem to be holding everything up?
An almost unlimited amount of dried milk could not really do the German army much good could it: And though my ignorance of vitamins is profound they sound more useful for babies than soldiers: And is not their our redeeming point about Nazis Which is that they do let prisoners parcels thro. so might it be behave decently about children's food too?

It seems to me - speaking materially - that we must be cooking up quite unlimited hatred against ourselves, if we block all food going to the babies?

THE DEANERY,
DURHAM.
TEL. 37 DURHAM.

Dear Mrs Smith I should ever forgive
ourselves – for take up meaning – of
Children died all round us. Starved
triumphantly by allies: Oh dear
Hitler & all his doings: he succeeds
in making us be hoarse too! –
Shall I start writing back to
M.Ps, & most of the Churches, & a selection
of the Dairies!? How nice it would be to
see you. – How very long ago School House
days are!

Your affte
Hester Armitage

158

Registry
No.

E.E.C.

OUT FILE

F.O.

~~February,~~ 3rd March, 1943.

Draft.
~~Mrs. Alington~~
~~The Very Rev.~~
~~the Dean of Durham,~~
The Deanery,
Durham.

(From Mr. Law).

Thank you for your letter of 21st February.

I quite understand your anxiety about the fate of the children in Occupied Europe, an anxiety which not only I myself but also the Government as a whole fully share. If the matter were as easy as you suggest, and as the public generally seems to believe, I think you can be assured that something would have been done long ago. But it is not: there are all sorts of difficulties connected both with supply and shipping as well as control.

It is, of course, true that the Germans don't interfere with prisoners of war parcels. But there the Axis are open to retaliation and they have to mind their Ps and Qs. But with relief this does not apply and a very extensive control system would be required to ensure not only the distribution of the imported supplies but also that there was no reduction of the rations previously supplied by the Germans. Now that rationing is carried out largely on a calorie basis it is pretty certain that if the Germans were left to themselves they would make reductions in the local rations corresponding to the amount of calories distributed as relief, regardless of the actual nature of the supplies themselves.

As/

DO NOT WRITE ANYTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

As regards the attitude of the people themselves in the occupied countries all our information goes to show that they realise only too well whose fault it is that they and their children are half-starved and they appear not only to bear us no malice but to appreciate that the alleviation of their lot might well postpone the day of their final liberation.

All this does not mean that we are just sitting back and doing nothing. We have the whole situation constantly under review and you may rest assured that as soon as we are convinced that relief is not only practicably possible but can be organised and distributed without detriment to our war effort, we shall not hesitate to send such supplies as we can wherever they are most needed.

In the meantime, public agitation does no good to anyone and I therefore hope that you will not carry out your threat to mobilise the clergy and the dairymaids!

(SGD.) RICHARD LAW.

DO NOT WRITE ANYTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

General Dept.
Would you like to have this answered?

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

10. OUT FILE 3rd March, 1943.

Thank you for your letter of the 21st February.

I quite understand your anxiety about the fate of the children in Occupied Europe, an anxiety which not only I myself but also the Government as a whole fully share. If the matter were as easy as you suggest, and as the public generally seems to believe, I think you can be assured that something would have been done long ago. But it is not: there are all sorts of difficulties connected both with supply and shipping as well as control.

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As regards the attitude of the people in the occupied countries, all our information goes to show that they realise only too well whose fault it is that they and their children are half-starved and they appear not only to bear us no malice but to appreciate that the alleviation of their lot might well postpone the day of their final liberation.

All this does not mean that we are just sitting back and doing nothing. We have the whole situation constantly under/

The Very Reverend
Mrs. Alington.

under review and you may rest assured that as soon as we are convinced that relief is not only practically possible but can be organised and distributed without detriment to our war effort, we shall not hesitate to send such supplies as we can wherever they are most needed.

In the meantime, public agitation does no good to anyone and I therefore hope that you will not carry out your threat to mobilise the clergy and the dairymaids!

(SGD.) RICHARD LAW.

162

THE DEANERY,
DURHAM.

TEL. 37 DURHAM.

March 5/43

3767/4/49.

Dear Dick

How kind it was of you to write to me: Thank you indeed. It is a mistake to expect to go off on such windy expeditions with such whisky influences as yours: - What

Friends we must [illegible]:

[illegible] & [illegible] indeed

[illegible] [illegible]. —

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

80

GENERAL

1943

W 3693

4 MAR 1943

164

CO-ORDINATION.

Registry Number W 3693/4/49.

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare

No. (communicated)

Dated 2nd March, 1943.

Received in Registry 4th March, 1943

W: Co-Ordination.

Relief for Norway.

Transmits copy of letter from Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Brodtkorb (Norwegian Government) of the 2nd March regarding relief for Norway.

Last Paper.

W3691 (W3271)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Northern Dept Foreign Office

Mr Collier, who has been approached about relief for Norway, may like to see W 3271

Thanks.

L. Collier
March 9th.

E.C. 6/3

(Action completed.)

11/3/43

(Index.)

ALH 14/7

Next Paper.

W3767 (W3967)

165

COPIES TO: Mr. Seebohm
Mr. Collins.
E.E.Crowe Esq., - F.O.

W 3693
4 MAR 1943

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

T.550/12

2nd March, 1943.

You may like to have a note answering the various enquiries that you put to me at our last encounter.

1. Our Commercial Counsellor at Stockholm has received, or should receive shortly, instructions which will permit him to agree in certain circumstances to the export of various kinds of vegetables, such as carrots and cabbage from Sweden to Mr. Ditleff's Organization in Norway as gifts from Swedish sympathisers.

2. We are unfortunately not able for reasons of principle to approve the export from Sweden to Norway of woollen or cotton materials, and our Commercial Counsellor at Stockholm has now, I think, instructions to that effect.

3. The proposal which you mention that 830 tons of oats which were due to be sent from Norway to Sweden under a commercial arrangement, should be retained in Norway for use by Mr. Ditleff's Organization has been considered here, and it seems probable that it will not be found necessary at this stage to insist upon these oats being sent to Sweden as originally intended. In that event they will no doubt be available for use by Mr. Ditleff's Organization in Norway. I should explain that this

is/

T. H. Brodtkorb, Esq.,
Offices of the Royal Norwegian Government,
Kingston House,
Princes Gate.

is a somewhat unusual case, and I expect that a stricter line would have to be taken if it should occur again, as the transaction is strictly speaking contrary to the rule governing these proceedings.

4. We shall be able to agree to the export from Switzerland of the five tons of Viande Hachee about which you enquired, and I am informing our Legation at Berne accordingly with the request to get in touch with yours. There will also be no difficulty about the further purchases of preserved milk which you mentioned to me as contemplated in addition to that of the 4,000 cases already arranged. If you will let me have the particulars, I will notify our Legation at Berne. Needless to say, this assumes that the firm from whom purchase is to be made will be approved by our Legation.

5. I am afraid that, as I anticipated, it would not be possible for us to approve the purchase of "Pruneaux" of Croatian origin, nor the purchase in Switzerland of sardines originating in Portugal.

As regards the Swiss purchases, I should explain that everything about them is rather complicated and the position is that exports of milk in certain circumstances are at present in order, but whether they continue to be so depends upon the nature of our trade agrangements with the Swiss. The meat is worse still, because some meat is imported into Switzerland from Axis countries, so that if regular purchases of it in Switzerland for relief were encouraged, the result might be to increase the Swiss expenditure in Axis countries with corresponding financial advantage to the enemy. It is clear however that this need not worry us in so far as the present small transaction is concerned.

Please/

Please let me know if there is any further information which you would like to have. I am very glad to see that the list above does not consist entirely of negatives.

(W.A.CAMPS)

83.

GENERAL

-ORDINATION.

W 3807

6 MAR 1943

168

1943

Registry Number W 3807/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare

No. (communicated)

Dated

Received in Registry 6th Mar. 1943.

W: Coordination +

Relief purchases in Switzerland

Transmits copy of telegram to Berne No. 1025 Arfar of March 4 stating that the Treasury is able to make certain sums of Swiss francs available for relief purchases by Allied Governments in Switzerland. The Red Cross Mixed Commission should be asked whether they are prepared to accept certain limited remittances on certain conditions. Purchases of milk and chease may be approved with reference home.

Last Paper.

W 3777

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
vlo 23/3/43	Alld 27/7

Next Paper.

(W 6472)

W 3808

(Minutes.)

Cent Aff MSPS 15/3
Dept
P/W Dept 17/3

E.C.E. 11/3

See within copy of tel to Berne No 1195 Arfar March 13

E.C.E. 14/3

See within copy of tel from Berne No 1544 Arfar March 25.

E.C.E. 2/4

See within copy of tel to Berne No 1450 Arfar March 27
" " " " tel from Washington No 1129 Arfar March 29

E.C.E. 3/4

See within copy of tel to Berne No 1525 Arfar April 1st
" " copy of tel to W/Tm No 1319 Arfar April 3

E.C.E.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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W3807
6 MAR 1943
W 169

T.550/19/28/A.

(CYPHER) LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE

No. 1025. Arfar. D. 3.50.a.m. March 5th, 1943.
March 4th, 1943.

Repeated to Washington No. 850 Arfar.

------oOo------

My telegram No. 4610 Arfar [of November 14th; Purchases in Switzerland by the International Red Cross]. No more has been heard from the Red Cross Mixed Commission or from the Swiss. Meanwhile the Treasury is able to make certain sums of Swiss francs available for relief purchases by Allied Governments in Switzerland, and the United States Government has now withdrawn its objections to limited transfers for this purpose. The commodity aspect of the matter however remains to be settled.

2. Please therefore enquire of Red Cross Mixed Commission whether they are prepared to accept certain limited remittances on the following conditions:

a) The funds may be spent only in Switzerland, and with firms approved by you, and on goods approved by you.

b) You are to be given full details of all purchases immediately as they are made.

3. You may for the time being approve without reference here purchases under this arrangement of milk and cheese of Swiss origin. We are prepared to consider other items when submitted to us with a view to adding them to the approved list. Meanwhile all items other than those mentioned should remain subject to reference here.

4. You should make it plain to the Swiss authorities that the fact that we are prepared to agree to certain exports of milk and cheese in this connexion and in the circumstances prevailing at present does not in any way affect our general attitude on the question of Swiss exports of dairy produce, or our view that exports from Switzerland made by the International Red Cross are no different, for the purposes of the War Trade Agreement, from exports made by any other concern. A satisfactory control of such exports is a prerequisite to the opening of any quota for fodder.

[OTP].

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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61 170

M1

W 3807 4 49

T550/25

[Cypher]. LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE.

No. 1195 ARFAR. D. 11.40 p.m. 14th March, 1943.
13th March, 1943.

Repeated to Washington No. 1027 Arfar.

*** * ***

61 3807

My telegram No. 1025 [Arfar of 4th March: Allied relief purchases in Switzerland: T550/19/28a].

Jugoslav Government are remitting 300,000 Swiss francs with our agreement to their Legation at Berne to buy condensed milk offered to them some time ago by the Red Cross for despatch to Jugoslavia.

2. They are instructing their Legation to obtain your approval before authorising purchase. Please therefore contact their Legation and ensure fulfilment of 2(a) and 2(b) of my telegram under reference.

3. We have adopted this procedure instead of waiting for reply to my telegram No. 1025 [Arfar of 4th March] because Jugoslavs wish to conclude their deal in the next few days. It may however be preferable to continue on same lines making Allied Legation's responsible to you instead of Red Cross.

O.T.P.

M.E.W. FILE No. T 550/25.
COPY FOR E E Crowe, Esq.
DATE 17/3/43.

Copy also for W L Fraser Treas

171

M.E.W. FILE No. T 550/25
COPY FOR PCC Home F.O.
DATE 30/3/43

M1 W

W 3807/4/49
1 APR 1943

[CYPHER] INDEXED ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM BERNE TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Mr.Norton
No.1544 ARFAR
25th March, 1943

D. 7.40 p.m. 25th March, 1943
R. 7.10 a.m. 26th March, 1943

X X X X

W

Your telegram No.1,195.

Yugoslav Legation have not yet been advised of remittance. Purchases will be effected by Red Cross Mixed Commission in co-operation with Dr.Moatchanin. Mixed Commission has already suggested four firms as likely suppliers all of whom I approve.

2. I am requesting Yugoslavs and Mixed Commission to implement conditions stated in your paragraph 2.

OTP

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

W 172

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

W 3807 / 4 / 49 with MP.

(T 550/19/29A)

[CYPHER].

LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE

No: 1450 ARFAR
27th March, 1943.

D. 3. 55 p.m. 29th March, 1943.

W 11111
3807/4/49

My telegram No. 1195 Arfar [of March 13th: purchases in Switzerland by the International Red Cross].

We have agreed to Belgian Government remitting in current year funds up to 2,000,000 Swiss francs to their Legation in Berne, to be released to pay for purchases approved by you.

2. Apart from the fact that funds may be remitted before specific transactions are proposed, arrangement will be the same as that with the Yugoslavs described in my telegram under reference. Belgians prefer this procedure to that suggested in my telegram No. 1025 [Arfar of March 4th]. Belgian Legation will be instructed to consult you accordingly.

W3807

3. Paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 1025 [Arfar] still applies. Details of transactions agreed without reference here should of course be reported by telegram.

O.T.P.

173

3807 4 49

[CYPHER] ARFAR O.B.

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Viscount Halifax
No. 1129 ARFAR
29th March 1943.

D. 1.16 a.m. 30th March 1943.
R. 9.15 a.m. 30th March 1943.

Repeated to Berne telegram No. 13 (FOREIGN OFFICE please pass).

T T T T

W 3807/4/49

Your telegram No. 1195 to Berne.

Corps Diplomatique have expressed [?group undec:] interest in being informed of comments of His Majesty's Legation at Berne on the assumption of responsibility for securing compliance with conditions prescribed for intra-blockade relief operations. (See your telegram No. 1025 to Berne paragraph 2.)

2. They assume that the British Legation at Berne is consulting with the United States Legation there on this matter.

[Repeated to Berne No. 1498 ARFAR].

OTP

S.o.
T350/19/28a
(27/Aug)

3807 4 49. M

17 APR 19..

INDEXED
AMPAR (U.K.)

174

1.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO AMPAR

No. 1325 AMPAR
1st April, 1943. D. 6.15 p.m. 2nd April, 1943.

Repeated to Washington No.1316 AMPAR

Your telegram No.1974 (Letter of March 26th: Relief purchases in Switzerland).

I presume reference is to my telegram No.1025 (Letter of March 4th).

2. Remittances are in Swiss francs. Some of them in restricted.

3. You will see however from my telegram No.1024 (Letter of March 4th) paragraph 4 and my telegram No.1193 (Letter of March 13th) paragraph 3 that procedure now in force and apparently preferred by Allies is for funds to be remitted to their Legation's instead of to Red Cross. Please let me know if you see any disadvantage in continuing this or any strong advantage in making remittances to Red Cross instead.

4. Please also discuss these arrangements with your United States colleague and keep him informed.

MT.

M.E.W. FILE No. T350/19/28A.
COPY FOR CC Grove Esq.
DATE 6/4/43.

Copy sent to W.L. Fraser
6/4

INDEXED

40 T550/19/28A. O.B. Despatched 12 noon 3/4/43

Telegram sent: WASHINGTON. ARFAR 1319
repeated: BERNE. ARFAR 1544

3807/4 49 MI

ARFAR Addressed WASHINGTON ARFAR 1319

Repeated BERNE 1544 Your 1129 Arfar
of March 20th: relief purchases in Switzerland

Please see my 1525 to Berne

M.E.W. FILE No. T.550/19/28A.
COPY FOR E.E. Foreign Exp.
DATE 6/4/43.

84

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 3808

176

Registry Number W 3808/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No. T 550/12

Dated

Received in Registry 6th March, 1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for Norway

Transmits copy of despatch from Reykjavik No. E.W.7. of 3rd February stating that nothing further has been heard of the proposal to purchase foodstuffs in Sweden for the relief of distress in Norway.

Last Paper.

W 3809 (W157)

References.

(Minutes.)

Sweden 10 mar

K Bgt

E.C.O. 5/3

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
11/3/43	30/3/43

Next Paper.

W 3810

24794, 12 42 F.O.P.

BW
T550/12

Copy for E.E. Crowe F.O. from Mew. 177

British Legation
Reykjavik.

E.W.7.

3rd February 1943.

W 3808
6 MAR 1943

Sir,

Ref Sent on 28/12.

With reference to your despatch T.550/12 of the 28th December regarding the "Norway Fund", I have the honour to report that nothing further has been heard of the proposal to purchase foodstuffs in Sweden for the relief of distress in Norway. The Committee have not made their findings in the matter known, if indeed they have ever considered it as a practicalble utilisation of the funds. Should it appear however that serious attention is being paid to the proposal, the guidance which you have been good enough to give will be of great value. I take this opportunity of informing you, as an instance of the manner in which the "Norway Fund" is kept alive, (with of course the most meritorious motives), that the author Friedrich Brekkan has stated his intention of turning over the profits of his new book "Niu Systur" to the benefit of the Fund.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant

(Sgd) R. ROSS

The Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
London.

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GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION

W 3810

6 MAR 1943

Registry Number W 3810/4/49

TELEGRAM FROM
Mr. Mallet (Stockholm)

No. 189

Dated 4th March, 1943

Received in Registry 6th March, 1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for Norway.

Refers to Stockholm telegram No.24 Saving of 26th February (W 3512/4/49). ,Criticism of Swedish Government for obstructing relief to Norway has been on the increase and a confidential report has been received that the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his quarterly confidential press conference attempted to defend Swedish Government by placing the whole of the blame on His Majesty's Government and United States Government. This will provide Germany with useful propaganda weapon in Sweden and Norway. Suggests ways of conteracting this.

Last Paper.

W 3808 (W 3512)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8/ Mr. Campbell (M.E.W.) Branch 6.
Dep/ Mr. Mallet (Stockholm) from Mr. le Rougetel Branch 11.
8/ Mr. Campbell (M.E.W.) Branch 11.

D

(Action completed.) wd 13/3/43

(Index.) Allied 24/7

Next Paper.

W 3885 (W 4198)

(Minutes.)

We cannot do anything to relieve pressure on H.M. Ministers unless & until we have a policy which is not entirely negative.

Meanwhile it is high time we explained the delay in dealing with the suggestion in his despatch of January 15th which is repeated at the end of his telegram. I attach a short draft.

N. Dept. 4/3.
N.A. Dept. MB. 8/3

J.H. le Rougetel 8/3.

W

[Cypher].

DEPARTMENTAL W.2.3810

179

6 MAR 1943

FROM STOCKHOLM TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Mallet.
No. 189.
4th March, 1943.

D. 7.30 p.m. 4th March, 1943.
R. 12.15 a.m. 5th March, 1943.

vvvvvv

My telegram No.24 Saving. W 3512

Criticism of the Swedish Government for obstructing relief to Norway has been on the increase and I have received confidential report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his quarterly confidential press conference last week attempted to defend the Swedish Government by placing the whole of the blame on His Majesty's Government and United States Government.

2. He is reported to have referred first of all to the stopping of safe conduct traffic by the Germans, as the result of action taken by British and American Governments and to have stated that if the Germans had not stopped safe conduct traffic we should certainly have done so. (Fuller report saving by bag).

3. Referring to Norwegian relief, he defended the Swedish Government by the statement that His Majesty's Government and United States Government and the war trade agreement with Great Britain prevented food exports to Norway and however much the Swedes wished to help the Norwegians, the Allies prevented it by insisting that any food exports to Norway must be compensated by more or less similar qualities or value of food stuffs being imported from Norway.

4. According to my informant, the Minister for Foreign Affairs' presentation of the case caused great sensation amongst the journalists present, many of whom were thereby won over to support the Government's attitude. This may result in less public criticism of the Swedish Government over Norwegian relief, but it will inevitably provide the Germans with useful propaganda weapon against us in Sweden and Norway. Swedish working class has been contributing very largely to relief funds and will naturally expect to know how the money is being used. The alternative for us seems to be between relaxing the restrictions or finding some new publicity argument which will give hope to the subscribers that money collected will be used eventually for some form of useful relief.

O.T.P.

8 MAR 1943
F.O. REGISTRY

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W3810/4/49

Draft 6/3.

To: Mallet
Stockholm

(from Mr. Le Rougetel)

I have suggested one addition. NB.
N.A.) Both first
Northcroft 4/3

Copy Mr. Campbell
NEW.

10a
180

Confidential: 11th March, 1943

Dear Mallet.

As I think you know the subject of relief through the Blockade has been under very active consideration here for some time. When your dist N.° 27E of Jany 15th was received I thought of sending you a summary of recent developments, if only by way of explaining why we did not feel able to endorse your suggestion for ~~figuring~~ increased publicity for the enlightenment of the Swedish people. A draft on

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

in fact
Incerlines was prepared
but became out of dati almost
as soon as it was written, although
be ~~[illegible]~~ but still as far as ever from
a definite solution. →
In the meantime we have received
your Savrig tel No. 24 of Feby 26th
& your tel No. 189 of March 4th.

The present position
is ~~[illegible]~~ substantially the same, but
we ~~have~~ heard from Washington
that Lehman is now etc responsible
for immediate as well as for
post-war relief. He is
supported by a high-pressure
organization which is itching
to get to work as soon as

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W ~~3502/4/49~~

Draft.

182

~~March, 1949~~

as
possible and Washington
have been authorized to ~~discuss~~ examine
with them ad referendum any reasonable
proposals for immediate relief
i.e. either through or inside the
blockade. In this way we
may before long find some
issue from the deadlock of
recent months. Once we are
agreed upon a common policy
which is not, ~~at present~~ as at present,
completely negative, ~~we~~
~~should be possible to consider~~
~~to some purpose~~ shall be
able to consider the most

? add
or again his organisation
may experience the ob-
structive capacities of
other Departments.
NB.
~~[illegible]~~.

RP.

Suitable manner of making
explaining it
~~to Known~~ to those who
are immediately concerned.
~~interested~~.

I am afraid all this
is most unhelpful But
it may be of some comfort
to you to know that
we are under increasing
pressure (more) to let us
~~to make a~~ than for
to find a ~~Some Kind of~~ Constructive
Solution.

Yours ever

Sd) J.A. Salmond.

P.S. We now learn that Mr Lehman will be coming to London at the end of March.

P.S. You may like to see the enclosed memo. of Camps which sets out the whole position very clearly

Sd/ 8/3

Print - War (General)
7b 24. section 1

WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE W

183

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OUT FILE

(W 3810/4/49)

Confidential

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

11th March, 1943.

Dear Mallet.

As I think you know the subject of relief has been under very active consideration here for some time. When your despatch No.27E of 15th January was received I thought of sending you a summary of recent developments, if only by way of explaining why we did not feel able to endorse your suggestion for increased publicity for the enlightenment of the Swedish people. A draft on these lines was in fact prepared but became out of date almost as soon as it was written, although we were still as far as ever from a definite solution. In the meantime we have received your saving telegram No.24 of the 26th February and your telegram No.189 of 4th March.

The present position is substantially the same, but we hear from Washington that Lehman is now to be responsible for immediate as well as for post-war relief. He is supported by a high-pressure organization which is itching to get to work as soon as possible and Washington have been authorized to examine with them ad referendum any reasonable propocals for immediate relief i.e. either through or inside the blockade. In this way we may before long find some issue from the deadlock of recent months or again his organisation may experience the obstructive capacities of other Departments!

Once we are agreed upon a common policy which is not, as at present, completely negative, we shall be able to consider the most suitable manner of explaining it to those who are immediately concerned.

I am afraid all this is most unhelpful but it may be of some comfort to you to know that we are under increasing pressure here and not less anxious than you to find a constructive solution.

Yours ever,

(J.H. Le Rougetel)

P.S. You may like to see the enclosed memorandum by Camps which sets out the whole position very clearly.

P.P.S. We now hear that Lehman will be coming to London at the end of March.

V.A.L. Mallet, Esq., C.M.G., C.V.O.,
Stockholm.

p6 1

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 3885
8 MAR 1943

185

Registry Number W 3885/4/49

TELEGRAM FROM Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen. (Angora)
No. 322

Dated 17th Feb: 1943

Received in Registry 17th March, 1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for Yugoslavia

Requests that Queen Marie of Yugoslavia may be informed from Lord Carlisle that the scheme for Yugoslavian relief is in readiness to proceed as soon as authority is received from London. In view of the Queen's stipulation to Lord Carlisle that she did not wish the scheme to proceed until she was satisfied with proper, distribution, requests that her authority may be obtained.

Last Paper.

W3810. (W 2013)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel: Angora 182 to Foreign Office 24 Feb.

9) Sir G. Rendel. no. 44 26th Feb.

copy to M.E.W. as W4468

(Action completed.)

11/3/43

(Index.)

All 26/1

Next Paper.

(W 3886)

~~W 3659.~~

(Minutes.)

See also Angora telegram 323 of 17 February

Sorting Dept

You may like to inform Sir G. Rendel.

A[illegible] R.

Seen by Mr. Howard. 11/ii

We know nothing about this scheme & it is not likely that Sir G. Rendel knows any more. Ought we not therefore to find out what it is all about, whether it fits in with M.E.W.'s blockade policy etc? Then we can ask Sir G. Rendel to pass these messages on.

MR 19/2.

I have spoken to Sir G. Rendel about this & he will see this paper before any action is taken. A[illegible]R. 19/ii

21724 F.O.P.

Sir G. Rendel

[illegible] 19/2

W(Eur)

INDEXED

19c

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[CYPHER].

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM ANGORA TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen
No. 323
17th February, 1943.

D. 11.50 p.m. 17th February, 1943.
R. 9.30 a.m. 18th February, 1943.

rrrrrr

My immediately preceding telegram and your telegram No. 21 Encom.

Scheme for Yugoslav relief from Turkey in readiness to be proceeded with as soon as Yugoslav Ambassador receives confirmation from his Government and Lord Carlisle receives authority to commence purchases.

OTP.

4C

19 FEB 1943 43

FEB 1943

187

There are two Societies which may be involved in this. One is the Yugoslav Relief Society which is run by Princess Romanovsky-Pavlovsky (with the support of Queen Marie), and is discussed in the correspondence of which the most important paper appears to be R 7581/2295/92 (though there are also later papers). The other is the Yugoslav Red Cross, which is run by Queen Marie. Both Societies have shown an inclination to romp ahead and to embark on wild schemes for Yugoslav relief quite independently of our blockade policy. Queen Marie is certainly capable of taking any independent action without consulting us.

On the other hand it is possible that one of the Societies have been acting through the Yugoslav Ambassador in Ankara, and that the scheme is quite legitimate.

My own inclination would be to ask Sir Hughe Knatchbull Hugessen for further information. If we hold up the telegram, or, in sending it in to Queen Marie, accompany it with critical enquiries, it will probably not lead to any useful result, and merely annoy Her Majesty to no purposes. I therefore suggest that in view of previous difficulties, we should like, before passing on the message, to have further particulars of the scheme concerned.

G. W. Rendel

20th February, 1943.

Draft tel: sent 24.2.43.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

W(ats)

188

[Cypher]

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM ANGORA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen
No.322.
17th February, 1943.

D. 11.48 p.m. 17th February, 1943.
R. 6.45 a.m. 18th February, 1943.

[ ] [ ] [ ]

Please inform Queen Marie of Yugoslavia from Lord Carlisle that the scheme for Yugoslav relief is in readiness to proceed as soon as authority is received from London. In view of the Queen's stipulation to Lord Carlisle that she did not wish the scheme to proceed until she was satisfied with proper distribution, please seek her authority.

O.T.P.

W 3885
8 MAR 1943

W 2806
19 FEB 1943

FEB
F.O. REGISTRY

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.W ~~2895/2896/48~~
3885 / 4/49

C.C.

Draft.

H.M. Embassy,
Angora.

Telegram.

No. 282.

24 Feb

Cypher K/OTP

Departmental No.1.

Copy H
Sir G. Read
Southern Dept.

7.2.43

OUT FILE

189

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

Despatched 7.40 p.m. *M.*

25 February, 1943.

Your telegram No. 322 of February 17th.

In view of previous difficulties I should like before passing on the message to Queen Marie of Yugoslavia from Lord Carlisle to have further particulars on the scheme ~~concerned~~ and what it is proposed to do in the way of relief.

A.W.G.R.

190

OUTWARD TELEGRAM.

(W.2896/2896/48)

[CYPHER] DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO ANGORA.

No. 282. D. 7.40 a.m. 25th February, 1943.
24th February, 1943.

q q q

Your telegram No. 322 of February 17th.

In view of previous difficulties I should like before passing on the message to Queen Marie of Yugoslavia from Lord Carlisle to have further particulars on the scheme and what it is proposed to do in the way of relief.

(O.T.P)

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 3886

8 MAR 1943

191

Registry Number W 3886/4/49

TELEGRAM FROM Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen. (Angora)

No. 414.

Dated 2nd March, 1943.

Received in Registry 4th March, 1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Relief for Yugoslavia.

Refers to Foreign Office telegram No.282 of the 4th February (W 3885/4/49). Proposal is to send eventually up to 3,000 tons of foodstuffs. Distribution in Yugoslavia would be by Red Cross. Yugoslav Ambassador has in hand a scheme for transport and distribution.

Last Paper. (W 3885) ~~W 2896~~

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Copy to M.E.W. as W 4468

(Minutes.)

We must have tel. No. 21 ENCOM, & then consult M.E.W.

A.W.G.R. 4/iii

General Dept 5/3.

Sutton 8/3

Please see W 2073 which shows that M.E.W. are already in consultation with W'hall & Yugoslavia Centrana, about which I gather it is clear that these two papers (W ~~2896~~, ~~W3655~~) deal with the same question and, both as I am to inform the already extensive number of our relief papers, I think we ought to take them on. E.H. 5/3

I agree. A.W.G.R. 5/iii

(Action completed.) 26/3/43

(Index.) Alt 26/3/7

Next Paper.

W3900 (W4468)

[CYPHER].

DEPARTMENTAL No. 1.

192

FROM ANGORA TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen.
No. 414.

D. 8.17 p.m. March 2nd, 1943.
R. 7.50 a.m. March 3rd, 1943.

March 2nd, 1943.

yyyyyy

Your telegram No. 282.

Proposal is to send eventually up to 3,000 tons foodstuffs mentioned in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 21 ENCOM (with the addition of olive oil). Distribution in Yugoslavia would be by Red Cross. Yugoslav Ambassador has in hand scheme for transport and distribution. Pending authority from London no purchases have been made.

O.T.P.

W 3886
8 MAR 1943

W 3659
4 MAR 1943

MAR 1943
F.O. REGISTRY

88

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 3900

8 MAR 1943

193

Registry Number W 3900/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No. -

Dated 6th March:1943

Received in Registry 8th March:1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for occupied Europe.

Transmits copy of telegram from Washington No.668 Arfar of 26th February stating that in written reply signed by Governor Lehman, the State Department say they have no objection to Belgian and Dutch transactions nor to Yugoslav transaction so far as purchase of milk, cheese and quinine substitute are concerned. United States Government are themselves receiving an increasing number of requests for facilities for transfer of funds for similar purposes and assume that His Majesty's Government would interpose no objection should United States Government decide to grant facilities for such transfers.

Last Paper.

W 3886 (W 2690)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See within copy of tel to Washington No 777 Arfar Feb 26

See within copy of tel to Washington No 784 Arfar Feb 27

MOFA 10/3

Central Dept

E.C. 10/3

See within copy of tel to Washington No 849 Arfar of March 4

See within copy of tel to Washington No 1026 Arfar March 13.

E.C. 24/3

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
WB. 20/3/43	All 26/7

Next Paper.

W3904.

194

M.E.W. FILE No. 1574
COPY FOR Miss Sanders G.D.W.F.O.
DATE 6/3/43

[CIPHER] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Viscount Halifax.
No. 668. ARFAR.
20th February, 1943.

D. 1.01 a.m. 21st February, 1943.
R. 8.00 a.m. 21st February, 1943.

q q q

W 3900
8 MAR 1943

IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 655 paragraph 3.

State Department in written reply signed by Lehman say they have no objection to Belgian and Dutch transactions (your telegram No. 6444) nor to Yugoslav transaction (your telegram No. 84) so far as purchase of milk, cheese and quinine substitutes is concerned. They doubt, however, whether exportable surpluses of foodstuffs and other supplies indigenous to Switzerland are available in appreciable amounts. This no doubt will be made clear in discussions of the commodity aspect of the problem to which you will now be proceeding.

2. United States Government are themselves receiving an increasing number of requests for facilities for transfer of funds for similar purposes and assume that His Majesty's Government would interpose no objection should the United States Government decide to grant facilities for such transfers on a greater scale than in the past.

3. My telegram under reference paragraph 2. In written reply State Department suggest that despatch of parcels to Czechsin concentration camps should not be sanctioned.

4. Letter follows.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

W 3900 / 4 / 49

4 MAR 1943

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

T574

~~T574/22/017~~

T574

E E Crowe Esq F.O.

2/3/43

Copy also for W L Fraser Esq Treasury

[Cypher] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No.784 ARFAR. D. 5.10 a.m. 28th February, 1943.
27th February, 1943.

C C C

Your telegram No.668 [Arfar of February 20th: Belgian, Dutch, Yugoslav and Czech requests] paragraph 3.

We are informing Czechs in accordance with your telegram No.655 that they may spend up to 3,000 pounds sterling monthly in Portugal like other Allies participating in parcels schemes. Figure of 4000 pounds in my previous telegram was an error.

2. Please explain to State Department, however, that we should find it hard to justify specific exclusion of people in concentration camps. Parcels can be sent to civilians in enemy and occupied territories under these schemes, and it surely makes no difference whether they are in detention or not. But if the Czechs raise the question, we shall enquire if delivery can be ensured.

3. We hope in any case that proposal in our telegram No.671 [Arfar of February 18th] will be accepted. We have been fully aware for two years past of the dangerous possibilities of "civilian internees", and should not make the present proposal unless we thought it would work.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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W 196

W 3900/4/49

4 MAR 1943

T550/25

[CYPHER]

LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON

No. 777 ARFAR
26th February, 1943. D. 7.10 a.m. 27th February, 1943.

sssss

Your telegram No. 668 [Arfar of February 20th: Allied relief purchases in Switzerland].

Your paragraph 1. This decision is much appreciated.

2. Your paragraph 2. Assumption is of course correct. We hope however that transfers will not be authorised until machinery for control of purchases and rule governing the commodity aspect of such transactions in the several neutral countries is established. We shall communicate further about this. We also hope that limits to the scale of such expenditure may be agreed (see paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 552 [Arfar of February 10th]).

3. Yugoslav Government inform us that they have since applied to United States authorities for the 440,000 Swiss francs mentioned in my telegram No. 84 [Arfar of January 9th]. We assume that this particular transaction will not however be dealt with here.

4. Please confirm urgently that American consent applies also to financial aspect of transaction mentioned in my telegram No. 479 [Arfar of February 5th]. We are anxious to clear this matter up.

5. Your paragraph 3. We are replying separately on this.

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/25
COPY FOR L L Crowe Esq F.O.
DATE 2/3/43

Copy also for W L Fraser Esq Treas

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

M1

W 197.

W3900/4 49 cuts 7pp

T550/19/28 A

[CODE (R)] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON

No. 849. Arfar D. 11.20 p.m. March 4th, 1943.
March 4th, 1943.

bbbb

My telegram No. 777 [Arfar of February 26th: relief purchases in Switzerland] paragraph 2.

Please see my immediately following telegram, which was discussed with the American Embassy here.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM 198

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

T550/25

3900/4 49 M1 2b/1 with 777

[Cypher]. LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 1026 ARFAR. D. 5.55 a.m. 15th March, 1943.
13th March, 1943.

*** * ***

My telegram No. 777 [Arfar of 26th February: Allied relief purchases in Switzerland] paragraph 3.

Please see my immediately following telegram. Jugoslavs have been told that they may not buy quinine in Switzerland. They do not appear to contemplate purchase there of quinine substitutes, which would indeed be wasteful of Swiss francs. This explains reduced remittance.

O.T.P.

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/25
COPY FOR E E Stone, Esq. H
DATE 17/3/43

89

GENERAL

1043

CO-ORDINATION.

W 3904

8 MAR 1943

199

Registry Number W 3904/4/49

FROM Foreign Office Minute (Mr. Le Rougetel)

No. -

Dated 3rd March:1943

Received in Registry 8th March:1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for Belgium.

The Ministry of Economic Warfare are very much worried about the reply still pending to the Belgian Prime Minister on relief. They have suggested the attached draft telegram to Washington. Considers that the Ministry of Economic Warfare should be asked to drop this idea at present.

Last Paper.

W 3900.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/ Mr. Trouttbeck (M.E.W.) from Mr. Le Rougetel 3 March

(Minutes.)

See written.

The telegram as re-drafted has been sent by M.E.W.

E.L.C. 12/3

(Action completed.)

Mr. 13/3/43

(Index.)

All 24

Next Paper.

W 3948

Minutes.

W 3904

8 MAR 1943

200

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

M.E.W. are very much worried about the reply still pending to the Belgian P.M. on relief (W 2551 (Flag B)). They have suggested the attached 3/t telegram to W'ton. I have proposed a ~~subst~~ redraft of para 2, but am far from happy about para 3 which cannot be ironed up so as not to seem an incitement to Mr Hall to prod the U.S. authorities on this delicate issue. However carefully we choose our words the impression is bound to be conveyed that we are trying to make up the State Dept's mind for them. Nothing but harm can come of this and I think we must ask M.E.W. to drop the idea for the present. We can jolly them (M.E.W.) along by

saying that something is bound to come of the action suggested in para 2. However this may be it will be fatal to show infallibility when all positive suggestions - however misguided - are coming, or likely to come, from the Other side.

N.A. Dept. MB. 3/3.
M: Rongelen
M: Lansdowne 4/3.

J.H. Le Rougetel
3/3.

Central Dept (a.a.)

I agree: let us try to persuade M.E.W. not to press their point for the moment.

N.B. Lamb
4/11.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

202

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No;

Despatched *M.*

March, 1943.

Draft.

Washington.

Telegram.

No.....

ARFAR.

My telegram No. 672 Arfar [of 18th February] and your telegram No. 654 Arfar [of 19th February: relief for Belgium].

No answer has yet been given to Belgian Prime Minister. We feel it undesirable to give him a completely negative reply if U.S. Government are likely at an early date to agree to our discussing child evacuation scheme with Belgians, of if, in the near future, they are likely to press for milk shipments to children. But a reply of some kind cannot be delayed much longer.

2. ~~[The conversations which you will no doubt be holding with Governor Lehman]~~ ~~As a result~~ of Foreign Office telegram No. ~~you may~~ will probably be exchanging views with Senator Lehman before long and this should afford you an opportunity to discover his present attitude to both questions, ~~and we should like to be promptly informed. In particular, a prompt reply on the~~ evacuation scheme. ~~would be welcome.~~

2. As a result of F.O. tel No. you will probably be exchanging views with Governor Lehman in the near future & this should afford you an opportunity to discover his present attitude towards both the above questions. We assume that you will keep us fully informed & are particularly anxious to get an early indication of authoritative U.S. views on the evacuation scheme.

3. Since it is evident that a final decision upon the major question agreed by both Governments is not to be expected in the near future, and since anticipations raised meanwhile of a change of policy may have dangerous consequences, please enquire whether/

whether we may reply to such questions that the whole matter is and will remain subject to constant review by the British and U.S. Governments jointly, but that neither (repeat neither) has found reason to change its conviction that an alteration of policy is impractical at the present time.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

N.A. Dept (a.a.) 10/3

OUT FILE

Enter

204

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

March 5th 1943.

This is by way of confirming our telephone conversation this morning regarding your latest draft telegram to Washington on the subject of relief, which Camps read out to Crowe by telephone yesterday.

We are not at all happy about your third paragraph, which is in effect an attempt to persuade the U.S. Government to commit themselves to a statement of policy. No matter how anodyne the statement may be, or how tactfully the suggestion may be conveyed, it seems to us more likely than not that it will irritate the Americans at the present juncture. What is more, a move of this kind simply cannot be dressed up to square with the Prime Minister's injunction that we are to abstain from all initiative so far as relief is concerned.

If, however, your paragraph 2 were expanded and made a shade more specific, it should, we feel, stand a very good chance of attaining our immediate purpose, i.e. to secure material for a more adequate reply to M. Pierlot which, incidentally, will also be needed in dealing with a similar approach to our Secretary of State by the French National Committee. The following is the form of words we should like to substitute for your paragraph 2:-

"2. As a result of F.O. telegram No 1362 you will probably be exchanging views with Governor Lehman in the near future, and this should afford you an opportunity to discover his present attitude towards both the above questions. We assume that you will keep us fully informed and are particularly anxious to get an early indication of authoritative U.S. view on the evacuation scheme."

(Sgd.) J.H. LE ROUGETEL.

J.M. Troutbeck Esq., C.M.G.

90.

1940

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 3948

9 MAR 1943

205

Registry Number W 3948/4/49

TELEGRAM FROM
Lord Halifax
(Washington)
No.
1120
Dated 7th Mar. 1943.
Received in Registry 9th Mar. 1943.
W: Coordination +

Anglo United States relief policy

Refers to Foreign Office telegram No.1362 1st March (W 3118/4/49) The position has been carefully explained to Governor Lehman, but no scheme has as yet been suggested. Some elements in the State Department are convinced that His Majesty's Government have made their series of blockade concessions in order to acquire political credit with the European Allies. There are reasons to believe that a plan is now being worked out with the Norwegians on the lines of the President's original scheme.

Last Paper.
W3930 (W3645)

References.
W 3661/49/48

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)
8) Mr Campbell (MEW).
Mar. 9.

(Minutes.)

I think the only people who give us any credit for our relief work are the Swedes, who in turn get the credit in public and from the Greeks for our scheme.

In the rest there is some considerable doubt as to the degree of our unpopularity in other occupied countries; but we have most certainly not acquired any "kudos".

It is most regrettable that the Americans should be working on any scheme for our country alone — and that probably not the worst off — but there is nothing within the framework of our present policy which we can do unless

(Action completed.)
w/e 8/4/43

(Index.)
Alt 26/1

Next Paper.
W3967.
(W4668)

unless and until the Americans themselves invite our views or inform us of what they propose.

NA Central/dept
11/3.
N. A.

[Copy sent to M.E.N.] E. Crowe. 9/3

Far from having acquired credit with our European allies for such minor concessions as have been made (outside Greece) we are regarded as the villains of the piece. Relief inside the blockade is not popular in the U.S. because it involves the sale of dollars in certain cases, but this is hardly a major consideration & it would be interesting to know why the impression exists that we have been earning cheap popularity at America's expense. The Americans have not put forward any concrete proposal and so, in spite of this warning message, it is not possible to suggest any further action at present.

I doubt whether we are unpopular as the Press in the occupied countries as distinct from the Govts in London. J.M. 9/3

Perhaps the reference is not to specific relief concessions but to our generally more helpful & forthcoming attitude to the Allies e.g. Mr Lie's recent remark to Mr Biddle that the Norwegians were at least treated by the British as gentlemen in contrast to the high-handed treatment they received from the Americans. 9/3 EX.

207

Ex-Governor Lehmann wi' dat kerk wi' about a fortnight and we ought to be able to clear up many things wi' talks with him; but the "out-standing" suspicions need a different kind of treatment.

The paragraph wi' the last sentence of para. 3 wi' the reason why I have doubted whether the agitation would count to much just yet.

M Botha
11/3.

11/3

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

208

W 3948

9 MAR 1943

[CYPHER] DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Viscount Halifax
No. 1120
7th March, 1943

D. 8.13 p.m. 8th March, 1943
R. 3.00 a.m. 9th March, 1943

kkkkk

IMMEDIATE

Your telegram No. 1362. W 3118/4/49

Your basic position has been carefully explained to Lehman. The lines laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 of your telegram under reply are being followed but no scheme has as yet been suggested to us.

2. In the course of conversation some of Lehman's officers have told us frankly that some elements in the State Department are convinced that we have made our series of blockade concessions which permit movements of goods inside the blockade area in order to acquire political credit with our European Allies and that United States Government has been out-smarted by us. As these officers, who are fresh to Washington, describe the situation we may well be faced in this field with the same kind of action and for the same reasons as Welles took over the refugees, see my telegram No. 1048. W (auto) 3661/20/[illegible]

3. There are some reasons for thinking that a plan is now being worked out with the Norwegians along the line of the President's original scheme. My telegram No. 6210 of 1942. It is not out of the question that something previously agreed with the Norwegians may be sprung upon us at very short notice. Should this happen I do not think that the State Department can justifiably plead the pressure of American public opinion. The Hoover agitation has fallen very flat and only the extremist McCormick press continues to refer to his plans for feeding children in occupied Europe now. These papers find themselves in the paradoxical position of objecting to shipments of food out of America under Lend-Lease to belligerent Allies because of growing shortages here, while at same time they advocate shipments to enemy occupied countries.

4. If we are shortly to be pressed by United States to change our basic position and agree to schemes of controlled relief for children in occupied territories now the reason will be not pressure of public opinion but partly because the President has committed himself further than he should have done to the Norwegians and State Department fear that we have acquired undue political credit with European Allies by what we have already done.

WAR CABINET F.O. REGISTRY

9!

1943

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W. 3967

10 MAR 1943

209

Registry Number W. 3967/4/49

FROM Mr. Collier (British Embassy to Norway)

No. 30.

Dated 8th March, 1943

Received in Registry 10th March, 1943

W: Co-ordination

Last Paper.

W 3948 (W 3693)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
11/3/43.	M. H. 11/12

Next Paper.

(W 4790)

W 3981

Relief for Norway

Records a conversation with the Norwegian Prime Minister on 4th March, Monsieur Nygaardsvold raised the question of relief for Norway and said that it had been reported that the food situation in Norway was so bad that the resistence of the population to German and Quisling demands could hardly survive another winter. Monsieur Lie was going to discuss this matter with President Roosevelt and Monsieur Nygaardsvold hoped that if United States Government approved the plan for relief of Norway, His Majesty's Government would raise no objections on grounds of general blockade policy.

(Minutes.)

I have spoken to the Camps (who I know has consulted the Treasury) about this and the M. E. W. view is that we cannot give the Norwegian P.M. the assurance for which he has asked.

Mr Collier should accordingly reply to M. Nygaardsvold as follows:-

1) We have laid down a general rule for purchases of relief supplies in neutral European countries, whereby we only allow the export of such local products as do not have to be replaced either directly or indirectly by goods imported through the blockade. (Imported goods are of course excluded). Under this rule the quantities of food available

M 356

in Sweden are not likely to be great but we have already authorized the C.S. in Stockholm to approve export of such supplies of this kind as are purchased with funds raised in Sweden.

2) We are not prepared to give any undertaking on the hypothetical question raised (M. N.; but suggest that the U.S. authorities be asked by M. Lie to discuss the matter with us. [It is not likely that in fact we should raise any objection to the use of dollars for relief purchases (written the rule under (1) above) but there is the possibility that the Norwegians might use our contingent agreement as a lever with the Americans who are already very suspicious that we are trying to curry favour with the occupied countries at American expense]

N. a letter 11/3.
N. a. Dept MB. 11/3.
Mr Collier

G. E. Clarke
11/3

M: Collier has seen the earlier p.p. on this file and in view of Gov: Lehman's impending visit

211

W 14036

Visit to London will advise the Norwegian Govt to hold their hand meanwhile.

M. Lit
11/3.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

No. 30.

W 3967
10 MAR 1943

Enclosure

W 212

BRITISH EMBASSY TO NORWAY,

c/o FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.,

8th March, 1943.

Sir,

I have the honour to report that when I called on the Norwegian Prime Minister (who is in charge of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs during the absence of M. Lie) on March 4th M. Nygaardsvold, after a further reference to the question of the Stockholm air service, on which I am reporting separately, said that he would like to impress upon you the continued urgency of the question of relief for Norway. The greatly increased flow of refugees into Sweden, of which he had spoken in connexion with the air service, was due, according to his information, not only to the fear of the application of the new Quisling labour decrees, but also to the steady and rapid deterioration of the food situation throughout Norway and especially in the larger towns. As I would be aware, his two daughters were in Norway, and he had recently had letters from them saying that as they were in a country district they could still manage, though they suffered from a great shortage of fats, but that the situation in the towns was becoming really terrible; and this news had been reinforced by the testimony of a refugee of complete reliability - a certain Captain Löwedal, who had just escaped from the town of Christiansand and had reported that the food situation was so bad that the resistence of the population to German and Quisling demands could hardly survive another winter, though it was being kept up now by the hope that an allied invasion of Europe if not of Norway itself, would have driven the Germans out before the end of the year. Long before then, however, the food shortage would have become sufficiently serious, in his opinion, to exercise an appreciably depressing effect on morale.

2. This, said M. Nygaardsvold, was one reason why he wished to raise the relief question again. Another reason was that Major Nielsen, Minister without Portfolio in the Norwegian Government, had recently had conversation with an important British personage - he could not remember the name but thought it might have been Lord Leathers - who had remarked that he presumed the Norwegian Government no longer regarded relief as an urgent matter since they had not recently raised it officially with the British Government. It was true that the Norwegian Government had not raised the question lately, partly because they had been hoping for the success of the scheme for secret deliveries which had been worked out by Sir Charles Hambro's organisation but which had been rendered impracticable by the cessation of the Gothenburg traffic, and partly because they had understood that the decision of all relief schemes had now largely been transferred to Washington. It now looked, however, as though the stoppage of the Gothenburg traffic would be permanent; and they had accordingly instructed the Minister for Foreign Affairs to take up at Washington the alternative plan for purchasing goods in Sweden for distribution in Norway by approved

agencies./

The Right Honourable,

Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,

etc., etc., etc.

agencies. This would be one of the matters which M. Lie would discuss with President Roosevelt; and M. Nygaardsvold hoped that when I next saw him I could at last give him an assurance that if the United States Government approved it in principle His Majesty's Government would not raise objections on grounds of general blockade policy. It was possible - and indeed probable - that even if both the United States and British Governments agreed to it, the scheme would be wrecked by German refusal to give the necessary guarantees; but it was of importance from the political point of view that the Norwegian people should be able to put the blame for the failure of any such scheme on the shoulders of the Germans and not be given any excuse for putting it on the shoulders of the allies. He felt that this was a most important consideration which should on no account be overlooked in any general review of the question.

3. I promised to report to you what His Excellency had said to me; and I shall be grateful for instructions on the attitude which I should adopt if he should raise the question again when I see him this week - which will be probably on the afternoon of March 11th next.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

Lawrence Collier

92.

1943

GENERAL

W 3981

10 MAR 1943

214

CO-ORDINATION.

Registry Number W 3981/4/49

TELEGRAM FROM Lord Halifax, Washington.

No. 1139
1140

Dated 8th March:1943

Received in Registry 10th March: 1943

W: Co-ordination

Milk for children.

Bishop Tucker President of Federal Council of churches announced "that the Archbishop of Canterbury had asked His Majesty's Government to permit a scheme to send dried milk and vitamins to children and expectant mothers of certain Nazi occupied countries". He added that American church leaders have been urging the United States Government to adopt similar proposals.

Last Paper.

W3967

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel. Washington to 1709 March 16.

8 (cases) to Camps (M.E.W.) March 17.

D

(Action completed.)

MB 19/3/43

(Index.)

AEH 27/7

Next Paper.

W4017

(W4736)

(Minutes.)

Draft reply

Arm 18/iii
N.A. Dept

E.E. Comyns
10/3

21724 F.O.P.

215

W

W 3981

[En clair] DEPARTMENTAL NO.2.

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE 10 MAR 1943

Viscount Halifax.
No.1139.
8th March, 1943.

D. Untimed 8th March, 1943.
R. 1.35 p.m. 9th March, 1943.

c c c

Bishop Tucker, President of Federal Council of Churches, announced yesterday according to the press "that the Archbishop of Canterbury has asked him to H.M.G. permit a strictly limited scheme to send dried milk and vitamins to children and expectant mothers of certain Nazi occupied countries". He added that American church leaders have been urging the United States Government to adopt similar proposals (see my immediately following).

WAR

216

[Cypher] DEPARTMENTAL NO.2.

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Viscount Halifax.
No.1140.
8th March, 1943.

D. 10.59 p.m. 8th March, 1943.
R. Untimed.

c c c

My immediately preceding telegram. W

May I take it that position is still as given in your telegram No.7108 and that Archbishop of Canterbury has not associated himself with any such appeal. If there has been an appeal from famine relief committee or some other body I should like to receive details.

194

1943

WAR CABINET REGISTRY

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.W 3981/4/49.

J.H.L.R.

Draft.

H.M. Ambassador,
Washington.

Telegram.

No....1709

Cypher March 16 T

Departmental No 2.

Distribution

American Department and Mr. Law first.

(Off agreed with M: Camps (MEW.)

Copy to:

M.E.W.

Rd. 15/3.

217

OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

Despatched 11/30 *M.*

March 16 1943.

Your telegrams Nos 1139 and 1140 of March 8th: activities of Famine Relief Committee.

2. The situation has not changed materially since the despatch of my telegram No 7108, nor so far as we are aware have the Archbishops made any public statement for or against the recommendations of the Committee.

3. The Committee has however embarked on a widespread publicity campaign which has secured a measure of public approval, and pressure on His Majesty's Government to agree to some form of relief, especially for children, has been maintained.

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W. 5981/4/49

OUT FILE

[Cypher].

DEPARTMENTAL NO.2.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 1709.
16th March, 1943.

D. 11.30 p.m. 16th March, 1943.

**** * ****

Your telegrams Nos. 1139 and 1140 [of 8th March: activities of Famine Relief Committee].

2. The situation has not changed materially since the despatch of my telegram No. 7108, nor so far as we are aware have the Archbishops made any public statement for or against the recommendations of the Committee.

3. The Committee has however embarked on a widespread publicity campaign which has secured a measure of public approval, and pressure of His Majesty's Government to agree to some form of relief, especially for children, has been maintained.

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1043

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 4017

10 MAR 1943

219

Registry Number W 4017/4/49

FROM Bishop of Hereford to Secretary of State.

No. -

Dated

Received in Registry 24th Feb:1943 10th Mar:1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for occupied Europe.

Encloses a copy of a Resolution regarding supplies of vitamins and dried milk for mothers and children in Greece, Belgium and France, which was carried unanimously at a meeting of Ministers of Religion at Hereford.

Last Paper.

W3981

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/ Bishop of Hereford from Mr. Mellard Feb 23

Dft/ Bishops of Hereford from S of S. March 4

(Minutes.)

See written

E.E. 15/3

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
Mrd. 26/3/43	Acts 27/7

Next Paper.

W4036.

Original entered W 3990 / 49 / 48

W 4017
10 MAR 1943

Copy.

THE PALACE,
HEREFORD.

24th February, 1948.

220

Dear Mr. Eden,

At a Meeting held at the Palace, Herefore yesterday afternoon, over which I presided, the Resolution set out on the enclosed paper was proposed by the Dean of Hereford, seconded by the Abbot of Belmont, supported by the Rev. J.E. Thomas and unanimously carried with the approval of twenty-six Ministers of Religion working in Hereford representative of the Church of England, the Roman Catholic Church and the Evangelical Free Churches. I was requested to inform you of what had been done and to express the hope of the Meeting that His Majesty's Government may be able shortly to inform Parliament that effective steps have been taken in this matter. We are convinced that the consciences of Christian people of all denominations are deeply concerned to secure that our country should without delay do all that is possible to help those threatened with massacre and famine for reasons both of humanitarian duty, and also of political expediency.

Copies of the Resolution are being sent to the Minister of Economic Warfare and to our Member of Parliament.

Believe me,
Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) Richard Hereford.

The Right Hon.
Anthony Eden, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

This Meeting of Ministers of Religion of all denominations working in the City of Hereford assures His Majesty's Government of its fullest support for measures undertaken with a view to

(a) providing help and temporary asylum whether in our own territories or in those of allied or neutral Powers, to Jews and others in danger of massacre who are able to escape from enemy or enemy-occupied countries; and to this end assuring the Governments of neutral States in which such refugees seek sanctuary of British readiness to provide present financial assistance and food supplies, where these are necessary, and to secure ultimate settlement of these refugees in the post-war period.

(b) providing Navicerts for neutral ships to carry supplies of vitamins and dried milk for starving mothers and children in Greece, Belgium and France, to be distributed under the supervision of the International Red Cross.

It further urges that, if as many lives as possible of innocent victims are to be saved, the measures taken should be immediate, and also on the largest and most generous scale compatible with the requirements of military operations and security.

It is also convinced that the carrying out of such measures will strongly influence world opinion and assure it of the sincerity of British belief in the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

222
11a

2C.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

25th February, 1943.

I write on Mr. Eden's behalf to acknowledge the receipt of your letter to him of 24th February, to which Mr. Eden will be replying himself as soon as possible.

(Sgd.) G.E. Millard.

Private Secretary.

The Right Reverend
The Lord Bishop of Hereford.

2C. 223

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

4th March, 1943.

Thank you very much for your letter of February 24th in which you enclosed two resolutions, passed at a meeting in Hereford of Ministers of Religion, representing the Church of England, the Roman Catholic Church and the Evangelical Free Churches, on the subject of the persecution of the Jews and relief for occupied Europe.

In reply, I am enclosing copies of a statement made by the Deputy Prime Minister in answer to questions in the House of Commons on January 19th and of a statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in answer to Arthur Greenwood on February 3rd in which he announced that the Government of Palestine have agreed to admit from Bulgaria 4,000 Jewish children with 500 adults to accompany them and are also prepared to admit to Palestine Jewish children with a proportion of adults to the limit of immigration permissible for the fifth period ending on the 31st March 1944.

This/

The Right Reverend
the Lord Bishop of Hereford.

This will show that apart from the substantial contribution by the Government of Palestine, His Majesty's Government are in consultation with other Governments most immediately concerned to see what concerted measures can best be taken to help the victims of this persecution.

I need hardly say that the only real remedy for racial persecution lies in an Allied victory and that at the present critical stage of the war our means cannot possibly equal our desire to help; but that within these limitations His Majesty's Government with the Allied Governments will, as in the past, do everything in their power to bring help and security to the victims of Nazi policy.

As regards relief for the occupied countries, both His Majesty's Government and the United States Government have always maintained that the responsibility for feeding the civil population of the occupied countries rests solely with the occupying power. With the exception of Greece, Germany has accepted this responsibility.

Food/

Food conditions in Greece however have always been far worse than those of other occupied countries (except probably Poland, which is of course inaccessible) and recognition of this fact is given by the Greek Relief Scheme, which has been working in one form or another since the second half of 1941.

The food which is sent to Greece is distributed in accordance with the needs of the population and the practical possibilities by a Swedish-Swiss Commission, which sees that the conditions on which we agreed to send relief to Greece - e.g. that food stuffs produced in Greece are reserved for the civil population - are fulfilled.

As a result of recommendations made by the Commission, the original allotment has been considerably increased, and any further recommendations which they may make, for either altering the items within the total allotment or increasing it would, of course, be sympathetically considered.

Conditions in other occupied countries are not comparable with those in Greece, and a relief scheme for one country alone could not be justified on the facts. To send food to one country would therefore involve sending it to other countries

as/

as well. His Majesty's Government have fully considered this from every angle. They are, however, absolutely convinced, on the evidence before them, that the time is not ripe for a major change of policy. In particular they do not consider it warrantable at the present time, by abandoning their contention that the enemy is solely responsible for feeding the territories he has over-run, to encourage him - as he almost certainly would - to withhold the supplies which he at present sends to those territories, thus creating widespread famine conditions which His Majesty's Government would not be in a position to alleviate, without detriment to the war effort.

I hope that the above statement of the position will help you. It suffices, I think, to show that His Majesty's Government as well as the United States Government are fully alive to all the considerations, humanitarian and otherwise, involved.

(Sd.) ANTHONY EDEN.

94 -

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

227

W 4036

11 MAR 1943

Registry Number } W 4036/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated).

Dated

Received in Registry } 11th March, 1943

W : Co-ordination

Governor Lehman's visit to United Kingdom.

Transmits copy of telegram from Washington No.874 Arfar of 7th March stating that Governor Lehman is leaving for London between 20th and 25th March. Hopes that Mr. Hall will be able to go with him.

Last Paper.

W 4017

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

N.A. NB. 11/3 (marked N. Dept. for early.)
Norfolk 2 7/3. Dept.
A.J.B. 3/3
Sinclair 3.
E. & R. 11/3
P. of W. 11/4

See W 3495/4/49
minutes hereon.

11/3.

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
8/4/43	Alt 27

Next Paper.

W 4089

W 4036

228

[CYPHER] ARFAR (PERSONAL)

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Viscount Halifax D. 2.35 a.m. 8th March 1943.
No. 874 ARFAR R. 9.05 a.m. 8th March 1943.

7th March 1943.

T T T T

Foreign Office telegram No. 1087 to me.

Personal for Lord Selborne.

Lehman is leaving for London between 20th and 25th March. I hope that you will agree that Hall should go with him. He is on excellent terms with Lehman and I am sure his presence would contribute to things moving smoothly to useful results.

229

Draft telegram to H.M.R. WASHINGTON

No. Arfar

En clair

O.B.

Your telegram No: 874 [Arfar of 7th March]

I agree.

Mr. Wallis Rifkind
to see twice 2/4th

95

GENERAL

230

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 4087

11 MAR 1943

Registry Number W 4087/4/49

FROM Mr. Quennell (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Crowe.

No. T 550/7

Dated 10th March, 1943.

Received in Registry 11th March, 1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Relief for children in France.

Refers to Mr. Crowe's letter of March 6th (W 3588/4/49). Encloses a draft reply to General de Gaulle also draft of telegram to Washington about relief for children in France.

Berne has been asked whether they have any confirmation of a report to the effect that Marshal Petain has dissolved the Quaker organization in France and confiscated its funds.

Last Paper.

W 4036 (W 3588/)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

M.E.W. has telegraphed to Berne asking if they can confirm a report that the American Relief organization in France has been broken up.

I think we might await Berne's reply to this.

E. E. Crowe 12/3

Yes J 13/3.

(See amendment in file to Wilson agreed with Mr Campbell).

(Action completed.)

Quell 13/4/43

(Index.)

RWF 30/3/43

Next Paper.

W 4098 (W 4311)

T.550/7.

231

W 4087
11 MAR 1943

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

10th March, 1943.

Dear Crowe,

Thank you for your letter of March 6th, enclosing General de Gaulle's appeal. We agree that, while an answer from the Prime Minister to Pierlot is pending, the best we can do is to send the General an interim reply, which we feel should be couched in not too hopeful terms. We attach a suggestion of the line which we think might be adopted and a draft telegram which, if you concur, we propose to send to Washington.

Meanwhile we have telegraphed Berne, enquiring if they have any confirmation of a report in the Swiss press to the effect that Marshal Petain has dissolved the Quaker organization in France and confiscated its funds.

Yours sincerely,

R. L. Bremell

E.E.Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall.
S.W.1.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. T.550/7

Draft. Letter to
General de Gaulle.

Telegram.

232

10 March 1943.

Thank you for your letter of February 26th, in which you propose a scheme of limited relief for French children and enclose a memorandum on the same subject by Mr. Howard Kirschner.

I fear that a proposal of the type you outline presents many serious difficulties. I have, however, invited the Minister of Economic Warfare to give his views on the subject, in conjunction with the American authorities responsible for questions of blockade policy. I will get in touch with you again as soon as I have had an opportunity of studying their conclusions.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. T550/7

Draft.

Telegram.

H.M.R.
WASHINGTON.

ARFAR NO.....

L.A.D.

CYPHER.

Mr. Crowe to concur

233

10th March 1943.

Telegram no: 1362 from Foreign Office [of March 1st: blockade policy].

The Foreign Secretary was approached on February 26th by General de Gaulle apparently at the instigation of Howard Kerschner, with an appeal for the revival of Howard Kerschner's plan for feeding 100,000 French children over a period of nine months. For this purpose he asks for navicerts for 3,000 tons of dried vegetables and 100 tons of fat. He announces that both the cargo and the shipping space, in a Swedish vessel, are ready and that 140 neutral organizers would be prepared to undertake distribution. Pending the Prime Minister's reply to Pierlot, we ~~propose that the~~ are sending the General ~~be sent~~ an interim reply couched in slightly discouraging terms, ~~stating that we are seeking American views on the matter.~~ and adding in his ear that the matter is being considered by the competent British & American authorities.

2. Please discuss with American authorities the/ reply to be returned to this proposal which, for obvious reasons, we are not inclined to favour.

3/.....

3. Meanwhile, have you any information to bear out a report in Swiss press so far unsubstantiated that the Quaker organization has been dissolved and its funds confiscated by Marshal Petain?

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

T 550/7

[Cypher[ARFAR (O.B.).

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE

Geneva correspondent of Scottish Daily Express reported on February 28th that American Quaker organisation in France had been dissolved by order of Marshal Pétain and its property transferred to the French Red Cross. Can you ascertain if this is true, and if it applies to the French organisation built up by the American Quakers and not merely to the withdrawal of American personnel.

O.T.P.

96

GENERAL

236

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 4093

12 MAI 1943

Registry Number W 4098/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No.

Dated 6th March, 1943.

Received in Registry 12th March, 1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Relief for Europe.

Transmits copy of telegram to Washington No 841 Arfar of March 3rd referring to Washington telegram No 447 Arfar February 6th (W 2792/4/49) and stating that it is considered to be most unlikely that there will be any deliberate withdrawal from any part of the occupied territories until the last possible moment. Since the possibility of such a withdrawal cannot be entirely ruled out it is an argument which may be useful.

Last Paper.

W 4087 (W 2792)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

E L Gibson 17/3

(Action completed.)

nlb 18/3/43

(Index.)

Aff 27/7

Next Paper.

W 4167

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

237

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

W. 4098

Enter 12 MAR 1943

(T 550/G/Z)

[CYPHER]

SPECIAL ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON

No. 841 Arfar
3rd March, 1943

D. 3.20 p.m. 4th March, 1943

ddddddd

SECRET

Following for Hall. W 2792/4/49

Your telegram No. 447 [Arfar of 6th February].

The appropriate Committee consider it most unlikely that there will be any deliberate withdrawal from any part of the occupied territories until the last possible moment. Nevertheless since the possibility of such a withdrawal cannot be entirely ruled out, it is an argument which you may find it useful to employ at some stage.

O.T.P.

MEW. FILE No. T 550/G/Z
COPY FOR Mr. Le Rougetel (Cairo)
DATE 12.3.43

97

238

GENERAL

W 4157

13 MI 1943

1943 CO-ORDINATION

Registry Number W 4157/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare, Communicated.

No. T 550/Z

Dated 10th Mar., 1943

Received in Registry 13th Mar., 1943

W : Co-ordination

Allied relief purchases within the blockade.

Transmits copy of letter from Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Fraser (Treasury) of 10th March regarding Allied transfers for buying relief goods inside the blockade. Requests Treasury views on the use of currencies other that Swiss francs.

Last Paper.

W 4098.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

E.C.E. 18/3

See within copy letter from Mr. Fraser (Treasury) to Mr. Camps (M.E.W.) F1/602. 13/3/43

See within copy of letter from Mr. Fraser (Treasury) to Mr. Camps (M.E.W.) 13/3/43.

E.C.E. 23/3

(Action completed.)

mb 23/3/43

(Index.)

Alch 27/7

Next Paper.

W 4198 (W4849)

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

Encl 239

COPY FOR:
E.E.CROWE, Esq.,

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

T.550/Z

W 4157

13 MA 1943

10th March, 1943.

copy attached

Many thanks for your letter F. 17602 of March 5th about Allied transfers for buying relief goods inside the blockade.

As regards the £500,000 worth of Swiss francs we should propose not to raise the question of particular allocations with the Allies except the Belgians, who have specifically asked for one. I am writing separately about the Belgian question, which has, as you know, already been discussed. We shall warn the others that supplies are very short when dealing with their first applications, so that they will not be surprised later if remittances suddenly have to stop.

Perhaps I should explain that our generous offer to bear the brunt of Allied attacks on this subject do not apply only to applications for Swiss Francs, but to applications for other currencies as well. I imagine that you will give this proposal an equally hearty welcome. Of course we should not encourage any applicants without first having ascertained your views. But for this purpose it would obviously be most useful if we could have a reasonably accurate idea of your views regarding the various currencies in advance. Moreover, we have

W. L. Fraser, Esq.,
Treasury,
Whitehall,
S.W.1.

told/

told the Americans with your concurrence (see paragraph 3 of telegram number 552 Arfar of February 10th) that we would work to a limit in each case. I quite see that such a limit must be provisional. I feel sure that you and Harmer will do what you can to meet us over this by giving us your preliminary views on the financial possibilities as regards pesetas, escudos, kronor and Turkish pounds.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Crowe at the Foreign Office.

(W.A.CAMPS)

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF MR. W. L. FRASER.

241

F.17602

W 4157 / 4 / 49

5th March, 1943.

Dear Camps,

I want to thank you for the offer which you made in your letter of 26th February to arrange the allocation between the Allies of money (within an overriding limit of £½ million) which the U.S. and we have now agreed may be transferred to Switzerland for relief purchases there.

I need not, of course, emphasize that we do not regard this sum as one which must be spent in any circumstances and I know that you will not approve any proposals which they put to you unless you are quite satisfied that they are justified from all aspects, and not merely unobjectionable from the blockade point of view.

Perhaps the most convenient procedure would be for you to agree with us generally, in the first instance, a rough allocation of remittances among the Allies which would, of course, have to be subject to modification from time to time. Then, when any particular requests were made to you, it would be sufficient for you to let us have a note saying what amount you considered could be approved. I shall, accordingly, refer the various applicants to you as quickly as possible, and I think you will find them all rather anxious to proceed after the long delay, but no doubt you will be able to appease them.

Regarding the question of fixing a maximum for purchases in other countries, I have been talking this matter over with Harmer and we have come to the conclusion that it is not practicable. We rather feel that the matter should first be approached from the angle of what the Allies could be allowed to spend from the blockade point of view, and we should then have to consider to what extent we could fit the remittances in. It seems to us that our financial policy has of necessity to be a rather hand-to-mouth one which may vary from time to time according to circumstances.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Crowe (Foreign Office).

Yours sincerely,

W. A. Camps, Esq.
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

(sgd) W. L. Fraser.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF MR. W. L. FRASER.

242

TREASURY CHAMBERS.

INDEXED

4157 4 49

17th March, 1943.

Dear Camps,

Harmer and I have been discussing your letter to me of 10th March regarding Allied relief purchases in Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Turkey.

We still feel that this is primarily a blockade matter on which you and Washington must make up your minds first as to what supplies could be made available in the neutral countries without injury to the blockade and how badly they are needed in the various occupied countries.

We feel this would give us some idea of the magnitude of the question and we then could consider jointly with the Americans whether on exchange grounds the purchases are practical.

W.A. Camps, Esq.
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

I am

I am sorry we cannot be more forthcoming than this but it seems to us that anything else would be putting the cart before the horse.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd) W. L. Fraser.

P.S. I am sending a copy of this letter to Crowe at the Foreign Office.

98

1943

GENERAL

244

W 4193

13 Mar. 1943

CO-ORDINATION

Registry Number W 4198/4/49

FROM Mr. Quennell (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to

No. Mr. Crowe. T 550/12.

Dated 12th March, 1943

Received in Registry 13th March, 1943.

W : Co-ordination.

Swedish relief for Norway.

Refers to Stockholm telegram No. 189 March 4th, (W 3810/4/49). Considers that His Majesty's Government should not allow themselves to be intimidated or induced to relax over policy by any propaganda campaign. Suggests that the goods and money available in Sweden should be used for the reception of Norwegian children in Sweden. Encloses draft telegram to Washington.

Last Paper.

W4157 (W3810)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Mr. Quennell (M.E.W.) from Mr. Crowe March 22

(Minutes.)

I don't really see how we can tell the Swedes that we would warmly welcome their Norwegian children unless we are prepared to offer them something. We have had nothing to do with collecting either the money or the supplies and have therefore no real locus standi.

If M.E.W. want to say something to Stockholm I think it would be better to suggest to Mr Mallett that he should reply to Swedish agitators a Mr Gulpin to the effect that they are - & should be fully aware of the reasons why we are at present unable to relax our ban on relief through the blockade and

(Action completed.)

mb 10/4/43

(Index.)

Acth 24/7

Next Paper.

W4311 (W5409)

and that they would be much more profitably employed in trying to arrange for Norwegian children to come to Sweden to be fed up than in conducting a campaign which can only result in useless bad feeling + bitterness. This sort of thing said in conversation is very different from a formal communication such as the N.C.W. suggest and, moreover, does not think need reference to W'hall. Such reference would at present be difficult.

In connection with this & Stockholm I think that in view of the K/S's visit to W'hall & the forthcoming visit of Gov. Lehman to this country, we should say that this is what should be said if anything is required: but that unless a pitched contrivance and/or it means it would be better to leave well alone.

E. Cross.
1/3

Then if short list to Stockholm on the above lines (cf. my letter to Mr Rollet in W 3810)

Northcliffe Dept
N. A. M. Bn
19/3.

1813.

J. H. W
12/3

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

W 4198/4/49

Draft. telegram

Stockholm

No.....

Cypher

Deptl. 1

246

March, 1943.

Your telegram No. 24 Saving [of 26th February] and your telegram No. 189 [of 4th March: relief for Norway].

Please see Le Rougetel's letter of 11th March.

In view of Lehman's visit to this country and the Secretary of State's visit to U.S.A. we would prefer not to embark on any discussion with the Swedes.

If however you feel that some reply to the Swedish agitation is called for you should take the line in informal conversation that the Swedish authorities are well aware of our reasons for not allowing relief through the blockade and that instead of starting acrimonious discussions which can only lead to bad feeling and bitterness it would be far better to try to arrange to receive Norwegian children in Swedish homes to which purpose the funds and supplies already available in Sweden could be devoted. You should not of course

suggest/

suggest that His Majesty's Government would assist by relaxing the blockade in Sweden's favour.

247

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

T550/12.

Enclosure 248

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

W 4198

12th March 1943.

Dear Crowe,

W 3810 W 3512

Please see Saving 24 of February 26th and telegram No: 189 of March 4th from Stockholm to you on the subject of Swedish relief for Norway.

After discussing this matter in some detail, we feel very strongly that we should not allow ourselves to be intimidated or induced to relax over policy by any propaganda campaign of the kind that Legation appears to anticipate. We think the Legation should be so informed. But since the Swedish Government's argument implies that goods and money are available in Sweden for Norwegian relief, we think it would be convenient to tell them that, although we cannot approve the despatch of goods through the blockade, either directly or indirectly, to German-controlled territories, they would have our cordial approval were they to employ the goods and money at their disposal for the reception of Norwegian children in Sweden.

We enclose for your concurrence a telegram drafted on these lines to Washington.

Yours sincerely,

R. R. Enfield

E.E.Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall.
S. W. 1.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. T550/12.

Draft. Telegram to

H.M.R.
WASHINGTON.

Telegram.

12th March 1943. 244

Stockholm Legation reports increasing pressure on Swedish government by public opinion to facilitate despatch of foodstuffs from Sweden to Norway. Swedish Government threatens to lay blame publicly on Anglo U.S. anti-relief-policy. We do not feel we should allow ourselves to be influenced but should like to be in a position to inform Swedes that, although we cannot approve despatch of goods through the blockade, we should warmly welcome move to use the goods and money which they have evidently at their disposal, for the reception of Norwegian children in Sweden. Objections to removing children from their parents could be met if the former were received for a limited period of recuperation instead of permanently.

2. We should welcome the early views of the State Department about this. We hope they would readily support such a communication to the Swedish Government. You will observe that no problem of finance or extra imports arises, but if the Swedes made some progress on their own, we could later consider helping them to extend the work.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W4498 14/40

Draft
Mr Cadogan
from
Mr Cross

Naval Ops 19.3.
N. Dept
19/3

250 22nd

22nd March, 1943.

[My dear Cadogan]

Your letter No T550/12
of March 12th about
relief for Norway

We are a bit nervous
about your draft Ltr. to
W'hall as we fear that
if we make any formal
démarche to the Swedes
on the lines you
suggest they will expect
us to do something in
the way of offering them
extra supplies. Min. of

Combd

course we cannot do.
Whatever as we have had
with to do with collecting
either. The money & the
supplies we really have
no reason stands.

The view of the C/S's visit
to U.S.A. & Lehman's fuller
conversation with him
on this country, we would push
not to say anything at
the moment. But if
Mallett feels that he
must do something to
counter criticism
(illegible)
we see no harm in his
speaking unofficially
as the views of the
embassy

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

Draft.

252

enclosed draft Telegram.
This does not seem to
us to require prior
consultation with W'ton.

If you agree with
the Telegram should we
send it & would you
prefer to make it Confe?

Yours sincerely

(SA) E. J. Crowe.

251

OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

22nd March, 1943.

(W 4198/4/49)

My dear Quennell.

Your letter No. T 550/12 of 12th March about relief for Norway.

We are a bit nervous about your draft telegram to Washington as we fear that if we make any formal démarche to the Swedes on the lines you suggest they will expect us to do something in the way of offering them extra supplies. This, of course we cannot do. Moreover as we have had nothing to do with collecting either the money or the supplies we really have no locus standi.

In view of the Secretary of State's visit to United States of America and Lehman's forthcoming visit to this country, we would prefer not to say anything at the moment. But if Mallett feels that he must do something to counter criticism we see no harm in his speaking unofficially on the lines of the enclosed draft telegram. This does not seem to us to require prior consultation with Washington.

If you agree with the telegram should we send it or would you prefer to make it Arfar?

Yours sincerely

(E.E. Crowe)

P. Quennell, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W4198/4/49.

254

March. 1947.

Draft. telegram

Stockholm

No

Cypher

Dept 1

Your tel No 72 Saving [of Feb 26th] and your tel No 189 [of March 4th: relief for Norway]

Please see Mr Noel-Baker's letter of March 11th.

In view of Lehman's visit + this country and the S/S's visit to U.S.A. we would ~~do not~~ put not ~~book~~ to embark on any discussions with the Swedes.

If however you feel that some reply to the Swedish aide-mémoire is called for you should take the line in informal conversation that the Swedish authorities are well aware of our reasons

repeat W'ton

Northern Dept
N. de MB.
19/3.

reasons for not allowing
relief through the blockade
and that instead of starting
recriminations discussions
which can only lead
to bad feeling and
bitterness it would
be/better to try to
arrange to receive
Norwegian children
in Swedish homes to
which purpose the funds
and supplies already
available in Sweden could
be devoted. You should
not of course suggest
that H.M.G. would assist
by relaxing the blockade in
Sweden's favour.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

99

256

GENERAL

W 4311
16 MAR 1943

Registry Number W 4311/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated).

No. T 550/7

Dated 14th March, 1943

Received in Registry 16th March, 1943

W : Co-ordination.

American Quaker organisation in France.

Transmits copy of telegram to Berne No. 1142 Arfar of 11th March enquiring if it is true that the American Quaker organisation in France has been dissolved by order of Marshal Petain and its property transferred to the French Red Cross.

Last Paper.

W 4198 (W 4087)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

(Action completed.)

nil
19/3/43

(Index.)

AUH
27/7

Next Paper.

W 5-27 6)

W4420

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

T550/7

[Cypher] ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE

No. 1142 Arfar
11th March, 1943

D: 12. 15 a.m. 12th March, 1943

p p p

Geneva correspondent of Scottish Daily Express reported on February 28th that American Quaker organisation in France had been dissolved by order of Marshal Petain and its property transferred to the French Red Cross. Can you ascertain if this is true, and if it applies to the French organisation built up by the American Quakers and not merely to the withdrawal of American personnel?

O.T.P.

M.E.W. FILE COPY FOR
DATE 14/3/43
1. T550/7
E.P. Crowe Esq F.O.

WY 4311
16 MAR 1943

GENERAL

1943

F.O.
371

CO-ORDINATION

FILE No. 4

Pps. 4420 -5573



CLOSED
UNTIL
1972

36511

100

GENERAL

W 4420

18 MAR 1943

2

Registry Number W } 4420/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare

No. (Communicated). T 550/17

Dated

Received in Registry 18th Mar. 1943

W : Co-ordination.

Relief supplies for Latvia.

Transmits copy of letter from Mr. Quennell (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Hudson (British Red Cross) of 15th March giving a list of relief supplies which may be shipped to Latvia.

Last Paper.

(W 12526/62/49 1942)
W 4311

References.

(*Minutes.*)

22/3

15/3

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

36511

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
23/3/43	ACH 27/4

Next Paper.

(W 7366/W4445)

24994 2'43 F.O.P.

T550/17

EK 3

Copy to E.E.Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

15th March 1943.

W 4420
18 MAR 1943

I understand that you have been in touch with Mr. Warburton of the Ministry of Supply on the question of relief supplies for Latvia.

We have examined the list of items it is proposed to send and regret to inform you that only the following are permissible from an M.E.W. point of view:

CALCII	LACTAS	100 Kgs.
"	BROMODUM	50 "
	ENEMAS	500

also reduced quantities of olive oil and castor oil. We can discuss the exact amount at a later stage, when your plans have materialized further.

Would you be kind enough to let us know what previous consignment we approved for despatch to Latvia, as we can find no record of it on our files?

R. Quennell

A.R.G.Hudson,Esq.,
War Organization of the British Red Cross
and order of St.John of Jerusalem,
9, Grosvenor Crescent,
S. W. 1.

101

4

GENERAL

1943 CO-ORDINATION

W 4445
18 MAR 1943

Registry Number W 4445/4/49

FROM Parliamentary Question (Mr.E.Harvey)

No.

Dated 16th March,1943.

Received in Registry 18th March,1943

W: Co-Ordination.

Food supplies for occupied Europe.

Mr. Edmund Harvey asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare whether the working of the relief scheme for Greece was satisfactory; whether dried milk and vitamins were now available in Greece; and whether further measures for controlled food relief were under consideration for other occupied countries. Mr.Foot replied that relief foodstuffs had been imported into Greece without interference and that dried milk and vitamin tablets had been approved. As regards the third part of the question, the matter was constantly under consideration. Mr.Harvey, Mr.Stokes and Mr.Mander asked supplementary questions.

Last Paper.

W 4420

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

a+p 20/3
Central
Naval Sec/ dept
Southern 24/3.

Eco 15/3

(Action completed.)

mb
27/3/43

(Index.)

All
27/7

Next Paper.

W4468

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

GENERAL.

5

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION.

* 9. Mr. Harvey,—To ask the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, whether the latest Reports received on the working of the measures of food relief in Greece under the supervision of the International Red Cross and the Swedish Red Cross continue to be satisfactory; whether dried milk and vitamins are now available for Greece; and whether further measures for controlled food relief for children, nursing mothers and expectant mothers are under consideration for any other countries under German occupation, in view of the increasing suffering amongst the civilian population. [*1st Sitting Day after 14th March.*]

IND

ANSWERED 16 MAR 1943

REPLY WITHHELD.

F.O. ARE NOT ASKED TO ADVISE

1028/9

Liban Pl. attach reply

E 1573

W 4445

18 MAR 1943

ENEMY-OCCUPIED COUNTRIES (FOOD SUPPLIES)

37. **Mr. Edmund Harvey** asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare whether the latest reports received on the working of the measures of food relief in Greece under the supervision of the International Red Cross and the Swedish Red Cross continue to be satisfactory; whether dried milk and vitamins are now available for Greece; and whether further measures for controlled food relief for children, nursing mothers and expectant mothers are under consideration for any other countries under German occupation, in view of the increasing suffering amongst the civilian population?

Mr. Foot: My latest information is that the relief foodstuffs imported into Greece through the blockade have been distributed without interference by the occupying authorities. The Neutral Commission has also entered into certain agreements with the occupying authorities for the protection of Greek native produce, though I am not yet able to say how far such agreements are proving effective for their purpose. The monthly shipments to Greece include condensed milk, and the addition of vitamin tablets has also been approved, though none have yet been shipped. As regards the third part of the Question, this matter is constantly under consideration. But it is necessary to take account not only of the possible benefit to the persons whom it is desired to help, but also of the benefit, direct or indirect, to the enemy.

Mr. Harvey: In regard to the last part of the Question, has my hon. Friend's attention been called to the publication of the Belgian Information Office "Our Daily Bread," and the especially urgent need of Belgium for food for children, infants and nursing mothers? The whole future of Belgium is at stake.

Mr. Mander: Can my hon. Friend state whether it is still the policy of the Government that the maintenance of the blockade is one of the essential weapons for the winning of the war?

Mr. Foot: Except for the special exception made in the case of Greece, our blockade policy remains as stated by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in August, 1940.

Mr. Stokes: Is my hon. Friend aware that if the Government pursue this policy and do not send food to the starving people, the war will end with the Germans being sleek and fat and all our friends starving and down and out?

102

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 4468

19 MAR 1943

7

Registry Number ~~W 4468/4/49~~

TELEGRAM FROM
Mr. Sterndale Bennett
No. (Angora)
547
Dated 17th March: 1943
Received in Registry 19th March: 1943
~~W. Co-ordination~~

Relief for Yugoslavia.

Refers to Angora telegram No.414 2nd March (W 3886/4/49). Mr. Infeld, of the International Red Cross Mixed Commission of Relief, has arrived in Angora to facilitate despatch of relief to Belgrade. He states that starving population of Belgrade have been promised this relief for months past and disappointment is very keen at its non-arrival.

Last Paper.
W 4445 (W3886)
~~W 4445 (W3886)~~

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)
15 M. E. W. (by Camps) with W3885 & W3886. March 19
~~Ist Angora to 695 Cancelled May 7.~~
Tel) Angora 732. May 2.
Tel Angora to 790 May 21

(Minutes.)

Copy (with W 3885 & 3886) sent to the Camps Sec. for info
24
Sec 1913

See within Angora tel to 592. March 25

See W4838 Sec 26/3

See within tel fm. Angora to 855 May 4. Arable X.

W Sec 7/5

See within Angora tel to 909 May 10.

See within Angora tel to 938. May 15

The trouble is that Ankara tel No 855 referred to Ankara desp. No 647: we took this to mean telegram No 547 (W4468), but it really meant despatch No 147 (X4413).
Transfer Ankara tel No 855
16

(Action completed.)
Feb. 24/3 1943
31/3

(Index.)
Alt 26/1

Next Paper.
W 4550
~~W 4550 (W 4838)~~
~~(W 4838)~~

8

? C C

to the appropriate ~~Consular~~ C.B file and cancel our tel to Ankara No. 695

Emb A.2/S.

cc Dept for Consular dept. 2/5

L. Troutman.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No. ~~D4468/4/49~~

Draft. tel.

Ankara

No 695

~~Secret~~

Code

7/5/47

Files

12.20 pm 9

9.5.47

Now made +

Your tel 855 [repeated to Athens: supplied to Leopoldville]

Please see my tel No 213

Caption [of Cap 9th]

EC 9/5

10

OUT FILE

[CODE] (R) FILES.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO ANGORA.

No. 695. D. 12.20 a.m., 9th May, 1943.
7th May, 1943.

3 3 3

Your telegram No. 855 [of May 4th: supplies for Yugoslavia].

Please see my telegram No. 213 Arfar [of April 9th].

W

11

W 4468
19 MAR 43
DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

[CYPHER]

FROM ANGORA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Sterndale Bennett
No. 547
17th March, 1943.

D. 10.48 p.m. 17th March, 1943.
R. 11.45 a.m. 18th March, 1943.

SSSSS

My telegram No. 414. W 3886/4/49

M. Imfeld, of International Red Cross Mixed Commission of Relief, has arrived in Angora to facilitate despatch of relief to Belgrade.

He states that starving population of Belgrade have been promised this relief for months past and disappointment is very keen at its non-arrival. He begs that you will give a decision one way or the other quickly.

OTP

MAR 19 43
F.O. REGISTRY

W

W 4468/4/49

12

[En clair]

FILES

26 MAR 1943

FROM ANGORA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Sterndale Bennett
No. 592
25th March, 1943.

D. 7.35 p.m. 25th March, 1943.
R. 4.05 a.m. 26th March, 1943.

:-:-:-:-:-:

Grateful early reply my telegram No. 547. W 4468/4/49

26 MAR
F.O. REGISTRY

[CYPHER] FILES

W 4468/1/49
12 MAY 1943

FROM ANGORA TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir H.Knatchbull-Hugessen, D. 11.51 p.m. 10th May 1943
No. 909
10th May 1943 R. 11.15 a.m. 11th May 1943

Your telegram No. 695.

Please check reference to your Arfar 213 which is not understood.

O.T.P.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No. ~~13468/4/49~~

Draft. Telegram

Canberra

No 432

May 12

Cyphon

Files

OUT FILE 729 13/5

14

Your tel No 909 [of May 10th: relief to Yugoslavia]

Actn tel 213 of April 10th

~~If~~ stated that U.K. Co. had been authorised to purchase certain goods up to about £100,000. including transport costs; and asked if Aust export

Eggo 12/5

[CYPHER] FILES

OUT FILE

15

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO ANGORA

No.732 D. 7.29 a.m. 13th May, 1943

12th May, 1943

X X X X

Your telegram No.909 [of May 10th : relief for Yugoslavia].

Arfar telegram No.213 of April 10th stated that United Kingdom Commercial Corporation had been authorised to purchase certain goods up to about £100,000 including transport costs; and agreed to their export.

O.T.P.

16

W 4468/8/48

20 MAY 1943

[Cypher] FILES

FROM ANGORA TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen
No. 933
15th May, 1943.

D. 9.33 p.m. 18th May, 1943.
R. 3.20 a.m. 20th May, 1943.

:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:

Your telegram No. 732 appears to deal with Yugoslav relief whereas your telegram No. 695 refers to my telegram No. 855 dealing with Griffiths rent.

Please check reference in your telegram No. 695 to my telegram No. 855 which appears incorrect.

O.T.P.

MAY 20 1943 F.O. REGISTRY

8

OUT FILE

17

A. N. A.

Ankara

Tel No 490

May 21

Code

Files.

Your tel No 933 [of the 15th May.

Verification of references]

Cancel my tel No 695. Question of rent dealt with in my tel No 661.

Shuster 21/5.

18

OUT FILE

[Code R] FILES

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO ANGORA.

No.790. D. 2.25 a.m. 22nd May, 1943.
21st May, 1943.

c c c

Your telegram No.933 [of the 15th May: verification of references].

Cancel my telegram No.695. Question of rent dealt with in my telegram No.661.

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GENERAL

1943

W 4550

20 MAR 1943

19

Registry Number W 4550/4049

FROM Ministry of Economic (communicated)

No. T 550/25

Dated

Received in Registry 20th Mar. 1943.

W: Coordination +

Yugoslav Relief purchases in Switzerland

Transmits copy of letter from Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires to Lord Selborne (Ministry of Economic Warfare) of 22nd February regarding purchases of condensed milk and quinine in Switzerland for despatch to Yugoslavia.

Last Paper.

W 4468 (w 236)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See within M.Ec.W. comment, copy of a letter from Lord Selborne to the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires of Mar 3rd

M.Ec.W. comment. Copy of a letter from Mr Campbell to M. S. Protitch (Yugoslav Emb.) of Mar 15

23/3

22/3

(Action completed.)

24/3/43

(Index.)

30/3/43

Next Paper.

W 4451.

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

RMW.COPY

copy for Foreign Office

ROYAL YUGOSLAV EMBASSY T550/25

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for M.E.W.

195 Queen's Gate,

London,S.W.7.

W 4550

22nd. February, 1943.

20 MAR 1943

My dear Lord Selborne

I am very sorry to have to trouble you again on the subject of your letter No. T550/25, of the 5th January last.

We have instructed our Ambassador in Washington to take the necessary steps with a view to obtaining permission for the transfer of 440,000 Swiss francs, destined for the purchase of condensed milk (and possibly cheese) and quinine.

We are still awaiting the reply of the competent American authorities, hoping that the request will be accepted.

With regard to the quinine, you will remember that you gave me the reasons why permission for the transfer of the sum of 140,000 Swiss francs cannot be accorded. I venture, however, to give you some information which I have received from the competent Yugoslav quarters in London on this subject. They state

"The concern and assumption of British circles that the occupying authorities in Beograd would appropriate the consignment of quinine sent to the Serbian Red Cross in Beograd through the delegate of the International Red Cross in Geneva, because of their shortage of this commodity, is unfounded as the Serbian Red Cross Society received, on the 5th May, 1942, a similar consignment in perfect order.

"From a Note which we received in that connection from the Commission Mixte de la Croix-Rouge Internationale de Geneve, of the 15th May, 1942, it is evident that the negotiations of that Commission with the German authorities were completed on the 15th August, 1941, when the first consignment was sent. Up to the 15th May, 1942, nine consignments had been forwarded from Geneva, to the total value of 250,000 Swiss francs; acknowledgments of receipt by the Serbian Red Cross having been received in Geneva for the first two consignments.

"According to the agreement which the Commission has with the German authorities it is practically unthinkable that those authorities would allow themselves to requisition drugs, as the International

Red/

W 4550
CPC

Red Cross would immediately enforce sanctions against Germany or the German Red Cross.

"We therefore consider that the Royal Yugoslav Government should again approach the competent quarters in Great Britain with a view to obtaining the transfer of money to Geneva, emphasising that quinine is a much more efficacious medicament than the synthetic atabrin and that the quinine from Geneva could be transported to Beograd much more quickly than atabrin, which could only be bought either in this country or in America and even to Geneva could only be brought after considerable delay."

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd)

The Right Honourable
Lord Selborne,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

Ministry of 22 W
Economic Warfare
with enc

Copy for E. L. Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

INDEXED

W 4570/ 4/ 49.
- 6 MAR 1943

3rd March, 1943.

My dear Chargé d'Affaires,

Thank you for your letter of February 22nd about the desire of your Government to remit certain sums to Switzerland to buy goods for despatch to your country.

The information on the subject of quinine which you were good enough to bring to my attention has been most carefully considered, but I am afraid that we should not be able to modify our attitude on this point. The position is that we could not, for reasons of principle, give permission for this commodity to pass the blockade into occupied Europe in the ordinary way, having regard to its high strategic value to the enemy, and to the fact that for strictly humanitarian purposes it could be replaced by substitute products which are not open to equal objections from the point of view of the blockade. You will appreciate that in these circumstances we cannot sanction the despatch of a consignment to Yugoslavia without changing the fundamental principle which we have always followed in these matters, and I fear that the conditions of control described in your letter are not such as would justify an exception. This being so, we could not facilitate the export of quinine from Switzerland as an alternative, since we are

obliged /

25

obliged on principle to object to such exports from Switzerland to the enemy occupied area. Moreover, quinine is a commodity of which Switzerland has imported certain quantities through our controls.

I am very glad, however, to be able to inform you that considerable progress has been made in regard to the general question of transfers of funds to Switzerland for the purphase of such goods as we are able to approve. If you could arrange for the appropriate services of your Government to discuss the outstanding technical details with my Officers, I hope that an early arrangement may be concluded.

Believe me, yours sincerely,

(Sgd) Sellonne

Monsieur Vladimir Milanovitch,
Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires,
Royal Yugoslav Embassy,
195, Queen's Gate,
S.W.7.

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Copies for: E. E. Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

W.L.Fraser, Esq.,
Treasury.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

T.550/25

13th March, 1943.

4550 4 49.

I promised to write and confirm the arrangement made with you when you were kind enough to visit me this morning in connection with the wish of your Government to remit 300,000 Swiss Francs to your Legation at Berne to be spent on condensed milk which will be bought from the Red Cross and forwarded to Yugoslavia for relief of children in your country.

I have telegraphed to our Legation at Berne informing them that you are making this remittance, and that you are being kind enough to instruct your Legation to obtain their agreement before authorising the purchase of the goods. I have also told them that we are agreeable to the export of this milk from Switzerland, so that only the question of the supplying firm will remain to be settled.

I understand that your Ministry of Finance will be approaching Mr. Fraser of the Treasury to arrange the remittance.

(W.A.CAMPS)

Monsieur D. Protitch,
Royal Yugoslav Embassy,
195, Queens Gate,
S.W.1.

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GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 4551
20 MAR 1943

Registry Number W 4551/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No. T 550/19/28/H

Dated 15th Mar. 1943.

Received in Registry 20th Mar. 1943.

W: Coordination +

Belgian relief purchases in Switzerland

Transmits copy of letter from Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Vicomte Obert de Thieusies (Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affiars) of 15th March regarding Belgian relief purchases in Switzerland.

Last Paper.

W 4550

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Central Dept
MARS
23/3

L.R.C.
23/3

See within
Copy of letter from Mr. Obert de Thieusies (Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to Mr. Camps (M.E.W.) March 20.
Copy of letter from Mr. Quennell (M.E.W.) to Mr. Vicomte Obert de Thieusies March 2)

L.C.R.
24/3

D

(Action completed.)

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24/3/43.

(Index.)

Act 1
24/3

Next Paper.

W 4589

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

Copies to: W. L. Fraser, Esq.,
Treasury.

E. E. Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

W 4551
20 MAR 1943

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE
Berkeley Square House
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

T.550/19/28/A

15th March, 1943.

You may be glad to have a note of the upshot, as I understand it, of our discussion on Tuesday about purchases to be made in Switzerland for Belgium.

1. You would like to arrange for funds to be placed at the disposal of the Belgian Legation in Berne, to be released to pay for purchases made by the Mixed Commission of the International Red Cross Commission, when these were approved by both you and us. For this purpose, your Legation at Berne would receive instructions to finance only such transactions as were agreed by our own Legation.

2. We are for the time being able to approve purchases of milk and cheese of Swiss origin for export as relief to Belgium, since at present the Swiss are not importing through the blockade the animal feeding stuffs to which such exports depend. Our Legation at Berne will have instructions to this effect. If it is desired to buy other goods in Switzerland for export to Belgium the

procedure/

Monsieur le Vicomte Obert
de Thieusies,
Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
103, Eaton Square,
London,
W.1.

W 4551
MAR 1943

procedure would be for your Legation to refer the list of commodities in question to you. You would then discuss the matter with us, and we should instruct our Legation accordingly. If it were thought advisable, our Legation might in some cases be invited by yours to forward proposals with its comments. I should hope that it would be found possible quite quickly to establish a list of commodities purchase of which could be agreed out in Switzerland without the need to refer every individual transaction here.

3. The provision of Swiss Francs for these purposes raises, as you know, various questions of some difficulty, and there are a number of other parallel claims to be considered. For this reason it is difficult at the present stage to fix a monthly allocation for any considerable period ahead. It is clear however that the total available for your purchases in the next twelve months can be at least 2 million Swiss Francs, and this sum could accordingly be made available to your Legation at Berne, for expenditure in the way described above, at any time. We could examine later in the light of experience, and of the possibilities of the Swiss market, whether any increase in this sum could be arranged, though it could evidently not be promised now.

I have shown this to Mr. Fraser at the Treasury who agrees with it, and I imagine that Baron Boel will be in touch with him to arrange the machinery of transfer. I will myself telegraph to Berne as soon as you give the word.

(W.A.CAMPS)

T550/19/28A.

4551/4/49 31 MAR 1943 M1 28

Copy for -

Ministry of Economic Warfare,

E.E. Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

INDEXED

Berkeley Square House,

Berkeley Square, W. 1.

27th March, 1943.

I am writing on behalf of Camps to thank you for your letter of March 24th, on the subject of relief purchases in Switzerland, and to confirm that we are telegraphing our Legation in Berne in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of your letter, and asking them to expect an approach from your Legation. Perhaps I should add that, while most purchases will no doubt be made through the Mixed Commission of the Red Cross, this is not a condition of the arrangement. But we are of course concerned with the status of firms from whom goods are bought.

D. Orenell

Monsieur le Vicomte Obert de Thieusies,
Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres de Belgique,
105, Eaton Square, S.W. 1.

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COPY.

MINISTERE
des
AFFAIRES ETRANGERES
et du
COMMERCE EXTERIEUR
de
BELGIQUE.

INDEXED

105, Eaton Square,
London,
S.W.1.

March 24th 15

B/1412

Doss: 500/107

Dear Mr. Camps:

Many thanks for your letter of March the 15th concerning the purchases to be made by us in Switzerland.

As I have told you, we can't agree that two million Swiss Francs can cover our needs for a considerable period of time but we consider that the best thing is to accept it as a first allocation which shall allow us to examine the real possibilities and we reserve the right to open up the question again later on.

As for the disposal of this sum, we shall be quite satisfied if the purchases are made by the International Red Cross and paid by our Legation in full agreement with your Legation in Switzerland. We note with satisfaction that you are instructing your Legation about the actual possibilities of milk and cheese and that you hope to establish a list of commodities which could be bought without referring here. In the other instances the matter would be settled here between us.

We are informing the International Red Cross through Count de Kerchove of the arrangements made and, would be grateful if you could give your Legation in Berne the necessary instructions.

I am communicating this to Baron Boell

Mr. Camps,
Ministry of Economic Warfare,

who/

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who will arrange with Mr. Fraser about the machinery of transfer. We will then give the necessary instructions to our Legation in Berne both as to the disposal of the money and as to the actual purchases by the International Red Cross and the necessary contact with your Legation in Berne.

Yours sincerely,

(signed) Obert de Thieusies.

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GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 4589

22 MAR 1943

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Registry Number } W 4589/4/49

FROM
Netherlands Ambassador.

No. 869 To Mr. Lawford

Dated 17th March:1943

Received in Registry } 22nd March: 1943

W: Co-ordination

Food situation in the Netherlands.

Encloses a memorandum on the food situation in the Netherlands.

Immediate action should be taken to improve the situation.

Last Paper.

W 4551/

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/Letter to Ambassador from Mr. Lawford March 18

(Minutes.)

NOAS. 26/3

Central Dept.

There is nothing we can do until the question of general policy is decided.

E.H. 24/3

D

(Action completed.)

26/3/43

(Index.)

ALK 27/7

Next Paper.

(W6222).

W4592.

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

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NETHERLANDS EMBASSY.

21A, PORTMAN SQUARE,
LONDON, W.1.
TELEPHONE: WELBECK 3751.
W 4589

No. 869.

22 17th March, 1943.

Acknd.

Mr Le Rougetel.

18 March

Dear Mr. Lawford,

When I last saw Mr. Eden I told him I had seen Lord Selborne on the subject of the undernourishment of children in my country. Mr. Eden was interested in this subject, but as he was going to the United States, we decided to resume our conversation after his return. At the same time I promised Mr. Eden a survey concerning the situation, which I enclose herewith.

Although the facts speak for themselves, it does not mention the arguments why we think immediate action in this sphere is imperative, but I hope to have the opportunity to submit them to Mr. Eden as soon as he returns.

Yours sincerely,

V.G. Lawford, Esq.,
The FOREIGN OFFICE
S.W.1.

NOTE ON THE FOOD SITUATION IN THE NETHERLANDS.

(February 1943)

1. Food deficiencies.

In the following survey it is assumed that in the Netherlands official rations give a fairly accurate picture of the food situation. As a rule rations are obtainable, but, unlike in other occupied Western European countries, outside the rations additional sources of supply, which could be of any substantial value to the average diet are unknown.

Edible products can only be bought on rationcards, except fish, fruits and vegetables, which however are available, if at all, in such minute quantities, that they can hardly be counted as a contribution to the diet. As to fish 80% of pre-war consumption was dependent on fishing at sea; since the occupation the sea going fishing fleet has been utilised for other purposes. To a lesser extent home production of vegetables has fallen, but export - before the war some 35 % of domestic production - rose since 1940 to 80 %. Still worse is the situation as regards fruits. For fruits the Netherlands were normally a net importer to the extent of over 60 % of home consumption. At present domestic consumption has been reduced to that which is unsuitable for export or for canning. In 1940 and also in 1942 citrusfruits were imported from Italy and Spain; according to information from a Dutch fruit importer in 1943, these imports did not exceed 2 % of normal requirements.

The black market must be regarded as a local feature. There are several circumstances in the Netherlands, which have impeded illicit trade in foodstuffs with the result that only a few privileged benefit by it. These circumstances are long experience in matters of "crisis"-control over production and marketing of foodstuffs, specialised cultivation according to regions and dense concentration of the consumer's population in urban districts. This has been more fully explained in a note on "Food conditions in occupied Holland", handed to Lord Selborne on March 1st. by Mr. Kerstens.

Until now there was little mention in the press of the food-situation in countries like the Netherlands and it seems logical to assume that the general public is more impressed by spectacularly low starvation rations how limited the areas concerned might be, than by conditions which reveal planned poverty for all, which is the case in the Netherlands.

With the aid of official ration lists - as appearing regularly in the newspapers - the following figures have been calculated, showing in energy values allocations to normal consumers:

Rations for normal consumers in the Netherlands.

(including allowances for non-rationed foodstuffs)

August	1940	2450	calories
January	1941	2110	"
May	"	1960	"
January	1942	1670	"
May	"	1590	"
February	1943	1520	"

The figures indicate a constant and rapid decline since 1940. To regard them as an indication of really available food seems, however, too optimistic. According to information from medical sources based on actual information among the urban population - by no means restricted to local situations but spread all over the country - the level of 1500 was already reached in January 1942, so that in view of the further decline, as shown by the above figures an average calory intake of 1350 in February 1943 seems nearer to the truth.

Especially among the town-population the rations are not always available in time. If serious shortages occur, announcements are published in the local press, that the rationcards are extended over a longer period. Actually this means a reduction in rations. Repeatedly this has been the case with fat and potatoes. Since spring 1942 when compulsary slaughter of cattle started on a large scale, increasing difficulties have arisen with the milk supply as well.

Annexes I - V give details about the allocation of foodstuffs to the various consumers and age groups.

These data are summarized in the following table, showing deficiencies for the age groups concerned in comparison with League of Nations standards (weighed averages):

Rations for various consumers' groups in the Netherlands during February 1943.

	Energy value in calories	Proteins in grammes		Fat in grammes	Ca in milligrammes
		total	(an.)		
Children 0 - 4 years					
Standard L.o.N.	1000	45	(38)	...	1000
rations Febr. '43	1420	54	(32)	32	1075
deficiency(-),surplus(+)	+	+	-	...	+
Children 4 - 14 years					
standard L.o.N.	2400	67	(45)	...	1000
rations Febr. '43	1720	58	(21)	32	670
deficiency in %	- 30%	-17%	-54%	...	- 33%
Adolescents					
standards L.o.N.	3300	97	(56)	...	1000
rations Febr. '43	1850	61	(14)	23	475
deficiency in %	- 45%	-40%	-75%	...	- 50%
Expect. and nursing mothers (during 26 weeks)					
stnadard L.o.N.	3300	110	(68)	125	1500
rations Febr. '43	2100	78	(30)	37	1050
deficiency in %	- 40%	-30%	-56%	-70%	- 50%
Other adults +)					
standard L.o.N.	3000	70	(35)	90++)	750
rations Febr. '43	1520	51	(14)	20	440
deficiency in %	- 50%	-30%	-60%	-75%	- 40%

+) extra rations for heavy workers are not taken into account
++) pre-war figure.

The table shows, that adolescents, children and expecting and nursing mothers are, notwithstanding extra allowances, on the whole worse off than the other groups of the population. The comparatively favourable figures for the very small children are misleading. It should be noted in this connection, that nursing mothers receive their additional rations only during a period of six weeks, which is far shorter than what is considered necessary. The list moreover shows, that the greatest deficiency in the diet for women and children consits of proteins, especially animal protein. As regards fats shortage, already last year medical authorities were concerned especially for the growing youth; at that time fat rations were still higher than they are now. The unreliable milk-position is the more serious as mothers and children depend for their fat- and protein-intake - as the figures in annexes II - V show - at present already from 30 - 50 % on milk.

Exact figures cannot be given with regards to vitamins. The diets however are seriously deficient which can be understood from the great shortage of leafy vegetables, the absence of fruit and fish-oil and the fact that milk for women and children is not whole milk, but milk adjusted to 2½% butterfat.

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According to private information, the charge for a vitamin injection was in November 1942 f. 7,50, for 50 tablets A,B,C,and D f. 25. In some schools vitamin tablets have been distributed free of charge, but it is admitted even in the press, that this is done on far too small a scale to be of any practical effect.

2. Health Statistics.

Official figures are scarce and now partly out of date. They generally cover 1941 when foodconditions, although serious, were not as alarming as at present.

Mortality rate. Excluding direct victims of the war the general death rate has increased since 1939, according to "Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek" (Central Bureau of Statistics), in 1941 as follows:

for children 0 - 4 years of age by 31 %
" " 5 - 14 " " " " 27 %
" adolescents " 43 %
" adults " 14 %

Causes of death. From the same source are the following figures indicating the increases of death rates for various diseases in 1941 in comparison with 1939:

1.	influenza	by 124 %
2.	tuberculosis	" 47 %
3.	bronchitis	" 36 %
4.	pneumonia	" 20 %
5.	contagious diseases (other than 1 and 2)	" 98 %
6.	diseases of the respiratory tract (other than 4)	" 36 %
7.	diarrhoe and enteritis	" 54 %
8.	all other diseases	" 4 %

Contagious diseases. Concerning the spread of contagious diseases some figures are also revealed for 1942. Dysenteria, dyphteria,and typhoid fever come into the foreground, typical diseases caused by undernourishment.

Cases of contagious diseases.
(in index figures)

	1939	1941	1942 (4 months)
scarlet fever	100	70	83
diphteria	100	430	1170
dysenteria	100	480	653
typhoid fever / paratyphoid	100	94	225
poliomegelitis	100	101	330
cerebrospinal meningitis	100	222	82

Other diseases. As to the other diseases it is known from statements by doctors and others that medical circles in Holland are more and more concerned about the increase of the following diseases:
Rachitis: Lack of fish oil and absence of calcium are responsible for the rapid spread of rachitis. In the summer of 1942 examination of Rotterdam schoolchildren by the Medical Health Service has shown that only 36 % received sufficient vitamins to prevent rickets.
Tuberculosis. The yearly report of "Nederlandsche Vereeniging tot bestrijding der Tuberculose" (Netherlands Tuberculosis Society) mentioned an increase of mortality by tuberculosis in 1941 in comparison with 1940 by 34 % . The increase affects especially tuberculosis of the respiratory tracts and of the bronchial glands.

The "Nederlandsche Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde"(Netherlands Review of Medicine and Surgery), of June 6th. 1942, draws attention to the increase of tuberculosis in the Northern provinces. The council of

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Emmen - a town of ± 50.000 inhabitants - in view of the increase of cases of tuberculosis during the first quarter of 1942 - voted for f. 30.000 on the Budget, nearly double the amount which was expended for tuberculosis during 1941.

The Director General of Public Health - member of the Nazi party - "ascribes", according to items in the "Maandblad van het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek" (Monthly Review of the Central Bureau of Sta tistics), of Aug./Sept. 1942 - "the alarming increase in the incidence of tuberculosis in the Netherlands mainly to the fact, that now more people than before apply for examination, so that a greater number of cases are revealed". He "regrets the growing shortage of sanatorium accomodation."

Scabies, hitherto virtually unknown, is now rampant owing to the shortage of soap.

A tide of ill health is sweeping the country, while the falling rations and the ever decreasing power of resistance to disease is aggraviting the situation alarmingly.

3. First objectives with relief.

The necessity to raise the protein level in the diet for children in the Netherlands cannot be stressed too much and calls for immediate relief.

Whole milkpowder as well as dehydrated eggs are the most suitable foodstuffs for this purpose. Both these products moreover are an important supplement to the shortage of fats, minerals and the vitamins A and the B-group of the rations.

H.M.Covernment is concerned in the first place with the children in big cities and for industrial townships proper.

According to the latest cencus the urban population in the Netherlands can be estimated as follows:

in towns over 100.000 inhabitants	2.500.000
in suburbs and residential towns proper	800.000
in industrial agglomerations	1.100.000
total "urban" population	4.400.000

of which the following categories of children and expectant and nursing mothers require relief:

	Relief population	Protein-deficiences in grammes per day.
children 0 - 4 years	450.000	-
" 4 - 14 "	890.000	10
adolescents 14 - 21 years	570.000	36
nursing and expectant mothers	90.000	32
	2.000.000	17 (weighed average)

This requires a monthly supply of:

4.000 m. tons of whole milkpowder
or
2.000 m. tons whole milkpowder and 1.000 m. tons dehydrated eggs.

FOOD CONDITIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS.
(February 1943)

ANNEX I

Rations for normal consumers per week.

	Quantity in grammes	Energy value in calories	Proteins in grammes total	(animal)	Fat in grammes	Ca in milligrammes.
bread and cakes	1800	4554	162	(-)	3	275
butter, margarine etc.	146	1085	-	(-)	120	21
meat (incl.bones)	200	245	27	(27)	7	14
potatoes	4000	1960	60	(-)	-	390
sugar	250	950	-	(-)	-	-
jams, syrup etc.	125	321	-	(-)	-	14
cheese	75	146	25	(25)	4	698
flour	70	251	7	(-)	-	13
farinaceous products	150	513	18	(-)	3	30
pulses	63	173	13	(-)	1	82
		10.198	312	(52)	138	1537
skimmed milk	1300	468	46	(46)	--	1560
total per week		10.666	358	(98)	138	3097
total per day		1.520	51	(14)	20	440

ANNEX II

Rations for nursing and expectant mothers (during 26 weeks)

	Quantity in grammes	Energy value in calories	Proteins in grammes total	(animal)	Fat in grammes	Ca in milligrammes
Standard ration		10.666	358	(98)	138	3.097
extra:						
milk (2½ % fat)	3.500	1.925	122	(122)	87	4.200
bread or	700	1.771	63	(-)	1	110
farinaeous products or	700	2.398	84	(-)	7	140
bread and	500	1.265	45	(-)	1	75
butter	125	928	-	(-)	103	-
recapitulation		1.771	63	(-)	1	110
		2.398	84	(-)	7	140
		2.193	45	(-)	104	75
		6.362	192	(-)	112	325
average		2.121	64	(-)	37	108
Standard ration		10.666	358	(98)	138	3.097
extra milk		1.925	122	(122)	87	4.200
extra other food		2.121	64	(-)	37	108
Total per week		14.712	544	(220)	262	7.405
Total per day		2.100	78	(31)	37	1.050

FOOD CONDITIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS.
(February 1943)

ANNEX III

Rations for children (0 - 4 yrs.)

	Quantity in grammes	Energy value in calories	Proteins in grammes Total	(Animal)	Fat in grammes	Ca in milligrammes
Bread and cakes	900	2.277	81	(-)	1	138
butter, margarine etc.	100	740	-	(-)	80	14
meat (incl.bones)	100	122	13	(13)	3	7
potatoes	2.000	980	30	(-)	-	195
sugar	250	950	-	(-)	-	-
jams, syrup etc.	125	321	-	(-)	-	14
cheese	75	146	25	(25)	4	698
flour	70	251	7	(-)	-	13
farinaceous products	150	513	18	(-)	3	30
pulses	63	173	13	(-)	1	82
rice	125	445	9	(-)	-	10
cacao powder (fatless 2/3 sugar)	38	163	2	(-)	-	11
		7.081	198	(38)	92	1.212
milk ($2\frac{1}{2}$ % fat)	5.250	2.887	183	(183)	130	6.300
skimmed milk	-	-	-	(-)	-	-
Total per week		9.968	381	(221)	222	7.512
Total per day		1.420	54	(32)	32	1.075

ANNEX IV

Rations for children (4 - 14 yrs.)

	Quantity in grammes	Energy value in calories	Proteins in grammes Total	(Animal)	Fat in grammes	Ca in milligrammes.
Bread and cakes	1.800	4.554	162	(-)	3	275
butter, margarine etc.	200	1.486	-	(-)	144	25
meat (incl.bones)	200	245	27	(27)	7	14
potatoes	4.000	1.960	60	(-)	-	390
sugar	250	950	-	(-)	-	-
jams, syrup, et c.	125	321	-	(-)	-	14
cheese	75	146	25	(25)	4	698
flour	70	251	7	(-)	-	13
farinaceous products	150	513	18	(-)	3	30
pulses	63	173	13	(-)	1	82
		10.599	312	(52)	162	1.541
milk($2\frac{1}{2}$ % fat)	2.625	1.444	92	(92)	65	3.150
skimmed milk	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total per week		12.043	404	(144)	227	4.691
Total per day		1.720	58	(21)	32	670

ANNEX V

Rations for adolescents (14 - 21 years).

	Quantity in grammes	Energy value in calories	Proteins in grammes total	(animal)	Fat in grammes	Ca in milligrammes
bread and cakes	2.200	5.566	198	(-)	4	337
butter, margarine, etc.	200	1.486	-	(-)	144	25
meat (incl.bones)	200	245	27	(27)	7	14
potatoes	6.000	2.940	90	(-)	-	585
sugar	250	950	-	(-)	-	-
jams, syrup, etc.	125	321	-	(-)	-	14
cheese	75	146	25	(25)	4	698
flour	70	251	7	(-)	-	13
farinaceous products	150	513	18	(-)	3	30
pulses	63	173	13	(-)	1	82
		12.591	378	(52)	163	1.798
skimmed milk	1.300	468	46	(46)	-	1.560
total per week		13.059	424	(98)	163	3.358
total per day		1.866	61	(14)	23	479

OUT FILE 39

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

18th March, 1943.

I write to thank Your Excellency very much for your letter No. 869 of March 17th, in which you were so good as to enclose a note on the food situation in the Netherlands, about which you had spoken to the Foreign Secretary.

I will of course show this note to Mr. Eden as soon as he returns; and it will meanwhile be studied by the department, who will, I am sure, be very glad to have this information.

(Sd.) V. G. LAWFORD

His Excellency,
The Netherlands Ambassador.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

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22 MAR 1943

Registry Number W 4592/4/49

FROM House of Lords Debates. (extract).

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W 4592
22 MAR 1943

HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES
18 MAR 1943

FOOD SITUATION IN JERSEY AND GUERNSEY.

LORD PORTSEA had the following Notice on the Paper: To ask His Majesty's Government, whether any progress has been made in the supply of food for children in Jersey and Guernsey, and whether any information has been received as to the position as regards food at present available for these children; whether His Majesty's Government accept the principle that kinship should entitle these children to preferential treatment and whether His Majesty's Government will again consider the offer made to take a ship and food to the islands and will take steps for negotiations to be opened with the German Government accordingly; and to move for Papers.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, thanks to the Red Cross I have received a reply to a message which I sent last summer to Jersey. Fully to understand these Red Cross messages, it must be remembered that there is a twenty-five-word maximum and it is necessary to know something about the mode of thought of the sender and also of the person who replies. This reply comes from my nearest relative, a lady of nearly my own age, and it tells its own story. The story is: "Planting in the garden for food." That means that she is forced to dig and to plant in order to get food to remain alive. She is doing that at the age of about eighty. I hope your Lordships will understand what must be the comforts of living in that country at this moment! I have also read a Red Cross summary written by prisoners of war in Stalag XVII, and it says this:

> "We are dining at eight. Bacon and beans, meat rolls, vegetables, tinned pears, custard, tea, coffee, Ovaltine, biscuits and cheese and cigarettes. We are always eating heartily. Parcels of food arrive safely. They are not eaten by the Germans, and cigarettes are not stolen."

Your Lordships may remember that the Government have said in this House that food could not be sent to occupied territory such as the Channel Islands because the Germans would steal it.

Speaking in the House of Commons the other day, Mr. Foot said that his latest information was that relief foodstuffs imported into Greece through the blockade had been distributed without interference by the Germans. If this is the case, where does the Government's information come from, and, without wishing to be rude, I should like to ask what it is worth. We cannot send food to the Islands which are occupied territory because, we are told, the Germans would steal it, and here we have a Government official telling us that "everything arrived safely and is distributed equally." The daily papers tell us that the Germans shoot food stealers. We might learn a lesson from them; some of the stories of criminal cases that we read in the papers are very distressing. There was a very informing letter in a newspaper quite recently from a noble Lord, and there were several from Dr. Gilbert Murray and Mr. Wickham Steed. These are persons of distinction, and they call in

[Lord Portsea.]

The Times for aid for Greece—occupied territory—and say there is no suggestion that supplies so sent would be seized by the enemy. It appears that it is much better from the material point of view, healthier also, to be a prisoner of war in Germany than to be a people left in their own land under the enemy's heel, left as helots by the grace of the Government.

These letters, none of them more than six weeks old, synchronized with letters from the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, whose loss we deplore, and from the Archbishop of Canterbury, and with a powerful appeal by the Archbishop of York in the Church of St. Martin's-in-the-Fields on behalf of the Norman Islanders. It was given to a closely packed and appreciative audience. I shall not read these letters, but I may quote a sentence:

"Starvation is more widespread and even more terrible than has been stated. In no country under enemy occupation is food sufficient to maintain health. In many it is insufficient to keep the people alive."

How many Island children can live from among those who do escape disease and death, and worse? What kind of a generation can grow up to build the new world for which we are now fighting, a new Heaven and a new earth and—do not forget it—a new hell, a hell of our own fashioning, of our own contriving? I met the other day a very interesting and capable man, Mr. Kerschner, the Director of the American Friends' Service. He writes:

"The German has never taken any of our foods. Neither has the fact that we brought all the food into France enabled him to take away the equivalent of French food."

Where is the Government's case. All this is surely evidence. Will it be accepted by the Rip van Winkles of the Government?

Your Lordships will recollect that I had the sad duty of giving most of these facts to your Lordships last year. Our Government have relaxed the blockade—that apparently is their cornerstone—and hence the principle of the blockade. Food is sent to Greece and to Belgium—occupied countries—to aliens and to foreigners, to all except our own people. Why not to our own people? Mr. Foot tells us in another place that the Government are sending a hundred tons of dried milk each month to Greece. Last week's paper told us that four Swedish vessels had arrived at the Piraeus with a cargo of 20,000 tons of grain, vegetables and medical supplies, and Tuesday's paper told us that small bags of coffee from the Belgian Congo have been dropped by the R.A.F. on the villages in occupied Belgium. Each bag bears a label with the description in French and in Flemish:

"The Belgian Congo does not forget you. This is distributed by your friends of the R.A.F. Long live Belgium!"

The Belgian Congo remembers: we do not—only the R.A.F.

We heard in this House on February 25 last that the Government do not like to be outdone in generosity—generosity to foreigners, to Greeks and to Belgians; and they are Shylocks to our own. Perhaps the Government argue that His Majesty's subjects must be lumped together, or indeed put after foreigners and aliens; no preferential treatment for own own. But do we not owe them more? We deserted them, including a number of young officers and men who, having fought at Dunkirk, were given Service leave to Jersey and Guernsey, and were forgotten in those Islands and are now in Greek internment and concentration camps. Do we not owe more to those of our own blood who fought for us, and are fighting for us, who are part of us, who speak and who pray in the same language and use the same form of worship, than to aliens? The men of our own race are placed after and below foreigners. Have our kindred any rights or claims to preferential treatment? They have the right, thank God! to fight alongside our men, gloriously shoulder to shoulder for England, as our young men are doing and our old men would if they could, and have always done. There are some who love England and her honour yet. I do.

I am told that the Government are acting on a principle, the bedrock principle of blockade, and so refuse to modify the rules for our own. Yet we are sending to Greece and to Belgium food which ought to be sent to our islands. Mr. Foot said the other day in another place:

"Except for the special exceptions made in the case of Greece, our blockade policy remains as stated by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister in August, 1940."

That is to say, quite clearly, the Government break the blockade for foreigners and aliens, and refuse to do it for those

people who are their own kin, their own blood, people of their own race whom they have—shall we say abandoned? It is not an English principle to leave our own in the lurch, to do nothing for them while we do the very best for aliens. It is not holding to our traditions, to our birthright and to principles to do these things; and those principles have made our country respected, loved, feared, and great.

If the great Dominions had indulged in the same caution and casuistry, where should we be? They would be helping, I suppose, the Axis. Had the Norman islanders so acted—and they had royal sanction for not serving outside their own islands—we should be without many brave fighting men. We should not have read the wonderful story of that very gallant Guernsey man earning the Victoria Cross the other week in Libya. To prove that the Norman islanders are not backward in their service of His Majesty, there are two recipients of the Victoria Cross in this war alone. The Government say that the islands are of no strategic value or importance. If they repeat that statement to-day, and add what the poor deluded men in the islands believe in—loyalty, faith, honour, and all these words, but words only, vain phrases made to betray simple and honest men—what then? Then I trust that your Lordships will take a hand and induce the Government, in their own words, to " think again."

The Government, your Lordships, are aware, have no constitutional right—of course they have the right of might—to give up the islands. The islands belong, in the fullest sense of the word, to the Crown. There was even a moment—it is now centuries ago—when our Crown was thought to be bargaining with the Crown of France for the sale of the islands. The French knew their value. But now our islands, which command the Channel, are lost. Oh, my Lords, I am treading a stony path, and I should faint by the way if I had not some of your Lordships' sympathy in the face of Government indecision, apathy, caution, and worse. " The path of caution," said the great Elchi, whom only people of my age, perhaps, remember at all, " leads but to disgrace." I cannot be silent. I seem to hear the cries of these little starving children, and I know they are starving. I seem to feel their hands touching mine. My Lords, you are powerful, you are doing your chosen and arduous work. You truly represent the people of this country. You are doing your work without fear and without pay—that cursed political payment which is, to my mind, politically degrading. You can think for the country, you can fight for the country, you can act for the Empire. I appeal to you in the name of innocence—innocence suffering untold misery. Let it be before it is too late for the children.

There is talk—perhaps more than talk—of bringing the most murderous of our enemies to justice. The atrocities of the Axis people are terrible, but the Axis destroys only the bodies of its enemies—thousands, may be even millions. In my view our Government are destroying not only the bodies but the spirit, the faith, the very soul of our own people. They are creating a precedent and a reproach, if not an ignominy, which will attach to us as long as our history lasts. I do not think the Government recognize or realize, or perhaps do not trouble about, the far-reaching effect and repercussions of this act of desertion, this act of surrender, of giving up part of the possessions of the Crown—and that in panic—and remaining (that is the worst part) unrepentant. We can sneer at Pétain. A few days ago a Minister of the Crown stated in another place, " If the House of Commons thinks otherwise, then the Government must think again." Those words made my heart beat with joy, for I grasped they were extracted by fear, political fear, fear of Parliament and of the people. You, my Lords, can induce the Government to think again and to redeem the honour of this country and of her Parliament. Some love England and her honour yet. We do, all of us here.

The noble Lord, Lord Snell—I will guarantee he is not influenced by fear; I trust him, I wish to call him friend—said last week, as to accepting a percentage of a particular Report and making definite findings and immediate promises thereon, on behalf of the Government:

> " The decisions arrived at are not final. Parliament can at any time it pleases call upon the Government to report progress in the carrying out of the Report."

That was a question of *panem et circenses*, not a question of honour, the nation's honour. Is it possible that any Govern-

[Lord Portsea.]

ment can be prepared to yield to the voice of its noisier followers—and that in a matter of immediate promise of social reform with money which is not yet their own—and stand up and refuse, time after time, to listen to the claims, the right of the people of any part of His Majesty's Dominions to insist on fair treatment, if it be only to save them from starvation, even at the cost of what they call in the East the Government's "face"? The Government, of course, act collectively, a private Member acts individually. "What scoundrels we should be," said Cavour, "if we did, in our own individual capacity, that which we are prepared to do as a Government." He was not an Englishman. Your Lordships can induce the Government to think again and to redeem our honour, conveyed to it collectively and individually by the people who elect them and who pay them. You can insist that the Government's first mistaken decisions should not be final.

The people of the Norman Islands, as your Lordships are aware, are the subjects of an ancient monarchy and of a still more ancient dukedom, and this is of very great importance from their point of view. There was a Royal Proclamation bidding them remain in their own islands. They trusted, they doubted not at all, they obeyed the message sent them, and they are in hell. They are slaves for the first time in our history by the deliberate act of the Government of a free people. Who did this thing? Who betrayed the islands? I know who did not, who could not have done so; that is the man who said we entered into this war only for honour and to do our duty and to defend the right, and that we mean to hold our own. We prepared to conquer or to perish. We were united in that solemn majestic hour; we were all equally resolved at least to go down fighting. We cast calculation to the wind. No wavering voice was heard. We faced our duty, and by the mercy of God we were prepared to die. This man did not sell us or his own honour. I do not know the name of the "thing" who did sell us, and, indeed, I am glad not to. From my point of view, it would have been a good thing had he not been born. He is to me indescribable save in the savage terms that George Washington applied to the colleague who betrayed him, which are, of course, known to your Lordships.

But let it be betrayal, desertion, panic abandonment—no blacker page ever fouled the history of any British Government. No, not even the record of the 40,000 Loyalists who supported us, fought for us, and were cast out of the Thirteen Colonies and left to perish. It is true that in those days we had France, Spain and Holland on our backs, but even that was no excuse for such an act of perfidy. There can be no excuse, and yet the descendants of those 40,000 remained loyal and are loyal to this day. We could not sell them twice because they were too far away and too powerful. Their descendants are fighting for us now. Have the Government, I wonder, considered the future position, the status and the liberties of the Norman Islands at the end of this war? More war is certain. Let no man delude himself that we are in for an everlasting peace. Go back to Isaiah 2,000 years, to find out when you turn your swords into ploughshares, when nation shall not act against nation, and there shall be no more war. Are the Government determined to sell us, to cast away the most loyal of the loyal, and close the Channel against themselves—the Channel where once every foreign ship dipped its ensign?

Many reasons have been given to justify the Government's later policy. Leaflets, the Government said, could not be dropped lest anyone found in possession of a leaflet should be shot. The islands might suffer if anything so "spectacular"—that was the word—were done. Indeed, the islanders might be deprived of the radio. The radio has gone. We feared the spectacular and for this reason we landed on the small island of Sark. We captured a few prisoners, we bound their hands and we tried to slip them past a German post in silence. The prisoners, though they were bound, bolted, and to avoid alarming the German post we shot the prisoners as they escaped. It does not do to laugh; it is a hard laugh. Hypocrisy is the only evil which walks invisible except to God. Now our own proud people are starving and sweating blood, and a Government can be found unwilling to make any effort. Not so much as a word of encouragement or hope or help is sent to them. Yet the Government send greetings, praise, comforts, food to every alien country and to every foreigner.

Bear with me, my Lords, I am giving my heart's blood drop by drop, as I know

your Lordships would do were you in my place. I am so conscious of the inadequacy of my advocacy, so crushingly conscious of it, and I am a new member, but, as was said nearly 400 years ago, my "armour is my honest thought and simple truth my utmost skill." I have asked repeatedly in this House, and privately, for some word of encouragement to be sent to my country, even to the sending of leaflets, as I have just stated. Not a sound. There is a grand New Zealand division which has received the country's and the Government's thanks, and most deservedly so. "On behalf of the Government and the people of the Homeland," said the Prime Minister, "I give you their exceptionally warm-hearted thanks and wish you Godspeed. Not a sound, not a whisper, has reached the Islands' division, more numerous if more scattered, no less brave and efficient than the New Zealanders. Not a whisper has reached them or their parents, wives or children. And they are serving and offering all that they have and all that they are.

A further point and the last. This is as to the ship to carry food to the islands. It would have to be Jersey because Guernsey is so fortified and has such a tremendous strength of German troops in it that it would be difficult to ask the Germans to allow us to go to Guernsey direct, but they would allow us to go from Jersey to Guernsey which, comparatively, is no distance. As to a ship to carry food to the Norman Islands, since making this suggestion to the Government, I have had several ships offered me, and very crowded crews, including women who are as brave as their mankind. The ship would have to be manned by two or three Germans, and they would have to be Germans who are invalid prisoners of war —I have mentioned that before—now interned in this country. That ship is ready, and so am I. I have heard nothing whatever from the Government since making that suggestion to them except "The Germans would shoot you." I will take that risk gladly. I have shown that the German does not steal our parcels—not even our tobacco. You cannot read the daily papers without seeing innumerable cases of cigarettes and tobacco meant for recruits stolen in this country. The German would not steal them because he knows if he did there would be no more sent. As I have said before, he is no fool.

The German Government would have to be consulted, but are we too proud to right a wrong? The German has shown himself in the islands to be very well disciplined, decent in behaviour and to have many soldierly virtues—in the islands. Will the Government not try to arrange matters with the German authorities? Will they not allow individual help or will they continue down the path leading to everlasting dishonour, the path which I heard Sir Edward Grey say led to death, destruction and damnation? When the war is over, when the war is won, has the Government I ask any plan for the future of the islands and for the feeding of these people. President Roosevelt said within the last weeks:

> "We cannot escape history, no personal significance or insignificance can spare any one of us. The fierce treatment through which we pass will light in honour or dishonour to the latest generation."

Some love England—we all do, I hope—and it is because of that pride of England that I as an Englishman call upon the Government to be worthy of the Empire and to be worthy of the country. I ask the Government to be true to themselves and to do their manifest duty.

THE MINISTER OF ECONOMIC WARFARE (THE EARL OF SELBORNE): My Lords, we all have such a deep regard for the noble Lord who has just spoken and we all have such a great admiration for the heroism of the people of the Channel Islands and sympathy for them in the very distressing conditions in which they are at the present moment, that I can assure the noble Lord it is no pleasant task that falls to me to deny him or them that which we should like to give if it were within our power. I can assure my noble friend, if he will allow me so to call him—we were colleagues in another place for many years—that he is labouring in this matter under some very severe misapprehensions which I will endeavour to remove in the short time that your Lordships can spare me, and that he is not helping our fellow subjects in the Norman Islands by hysterical misstatements in your Lordships' House. I regret to have to say so, but there is no other correct description of parts of my noble friend's speech.

[The Earl of Selborne.]

My noble friend asked for a word of encouragement. He asked what were the plans for the future. I can assure him that the moment it is militarily possible we shall reoccupy the islands, and the moment we have reoccupied them we shall feed them and bring to them all the services that the people of the British Isles at present enjoy. Preparations to that end are of course being made in common with the other preparations we are making in regard to the problem of feeding reconquered Europe. What I regret so much about by noble friend's speech is the hysterical manner in which he talks about the " betrayal " of the Channel Islands. He knows perfectly well we were driven out of that part of our country by superior forces on the Continent.

LORD PORTSEA: My noble friend knows that we left the islands before the Germans arrived.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE: That does not alter the truth of what I have said. Anybody can tell with the history of Crete in front of us that in face of a local Air Force superiority such as the Germans had in 1940 in that part of France, it was physically impossible to hold the Channel Islands. If we had remained there the sole result would have been the slaughter of a great many of the Channel Islanders. By that evacuation we saved them a great deal of misery. It was impossible for us to hold those islands as long as German Air Force superiority in France was what it was in 1940.

LORD STRABOLGI: Will the noble Earl allow me to interpose a moment? I am sure he does not want that to go on record. Is he aware that that argument would have justified the evacuation of Kent, which was nearer to a superior German Air Force than the Channel Islands?

THE EARL OF SELBORNE: The Channel Islands are islands and every support to them must be sent by sea in ships subject to air attack from the enemy, whereas Kent could be reinforced from the land. Therefore the two positions are not at all analogous. The nearest analogy which this war affords is the case of Crete. It all happened nearly three years ago, but I do regret that my noble friend should speak about " betrayal." It was no more a betrayal than any other of the many defeats which this country suffered at that time by reason of entering into a European war with inadequate preparations.

I am however concerned, principally, with his charge against His Majesty's Government of treating—I think that I am not misrepresenting him when I say this—of treating the Channel Islanders worse than we treat some of our Allies. He laid great stress on the fact that prisoners of war in prison camps in Germany were getting their food parcels without interference from the Germans, and he asked why the same thing should not apply in the case of the Channel Islanders. Let me make the position clear. There is undoubtedly a great shortage of food in the Channel Islands, there is very considerable distress and discomfort, but there is no famine or anything that could in the least be accurately described as famine. My noble friend is quite mistaken in thinking that people are dying as a result of lack of food or that their health is being impaired.

LORD PORTSEA: Would the noble Earl give his justification for that statement so far as it relates to children?

THE EARL OF SELBORNE: I can assure my noble friend that I have very accurate information on these matters.

LORD PORTSEA: So have I.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE: I cannot give publicly the source of my information, I can only tell the noble Lord that when I went to the Ministry of Economic Warfare a year ago I was very much surprised at the amount of information I found there in regard to all the countries of Europe. That information comes constantly before me, and I am satisfied that the state of affairs in the Channel Islands is as I have described. The food situation is undoubtedly far worse in Poland and in Occupied Russia than it is in Western Europe.

LORD PORTSEA: What have we to do with Poland?

THE EARL OF SELBORNE: My noble friend asks, what have we to do with Poland? In the first place the people of Poland are our very gallant Allies, and we are in this war with them until the end. In the second place, I think it is

important to realize that the food shortage, and the food situation generally, is much more serious in some parts of Europe than in others. The noble Lord has said that the Royal Air Force dropped some coffee in Belgium, and he has asked why cannot we do the same thing for the Channel Islands. My Lords, there has been no appreciable quantity of food delivered to Belgium in that way. My noble friend is under a complete misapprehension if he thinks that we are feeding Belgium, and not feeding the Channel Islands. The dropping of the few bags of coffee which have been dropped in Belgium is in the nature of propaganda. It is like the dropping of leaflets, and it is not intended to be a serious contribution towards solving the food problem in Belgium. It is meant simply to give encouragement. If my noble friend thinks that a gesture of that sort would have important results if it were made in the Channel Islands, I will see that his suggestion is considered in the proper quarters.

With regard to Greece, as your Lordships know, the case is quite different. A year ago, before I had anything to do with economic warfare, a position of acute famine was reached in Greece, and it is the terrible fact that many thousands of people died there as a result. It was in order to alleviate that situation that His Majesty's Government consented to allow the blockade to be broken, and a system of food relief has been set up in Greece under the charge of the Red Cross and a neutral Swedish Commission which has made all the difference between life and death to the people of Greece. Even now, with all that relief going into the country, I do not think that it would be fair to say that the people of Greece are as well fed, at this moment, as are the people of the Channel Islands.

The noble Lord spoke about parcels reaching prisoners of war in prison camps. Of course there is no analogy there at all. These parcels are sent under an international Convention, the Geneva Convention, which provides most elaborate machinery under which the Red Cross International Organization handles parcels, sees that they get to the prisoners, has the right of inspecting the prison camps, and ensures that the transaction is checked at every stage. Through this medium English people are allowed to send parcels to their relatives who are prisoners in Germany, and German people are allowed to send parcels to their relatives who are prisoners in Great Britain. That is a very old organization. The Germans, it is true to say, so far as I know, have respected that part of the Convention, and food can be sent in that way to prisoners of war who are Channel Islanders as well as to others who are subjects of His Majesty without any fear of the Germans interrupting the supply.

The noble Lord cited the case of Dr. Kershner and what he had done in the matter of sending food into France. I do not know if my noble friend is aware of it, but when Dr. Kershner played an important part in sending food to France it was to Unoccupied France that the food was sent, and it was sent there at a time when America was a neutral country, so the situation was entirely different from that which obtains on the Continent to-day. Even so I very much doubt if it can truthfully be said that that food all reached the people of France. What I mean is not that the actual food was intercepted, but that its being sent there did make it easier for the Germans to extract food from Occupied France. That is the real problem, and it is a problem to which my noble friend did not address himself. If you allow a hundred tons of food to go to the Channel Islands, or to any of the other occupied territories, the people for whom that food is intended may very well receive it, but the Germans are able to take an equivalent amount of food out of the country.

That is what happened in Belgium in the last war. During the last war, there was an elaborate organisation, sponsored by Mr. Hoover, which brought a great deal of food from America to Belgium. The Belgians got the food which Mr. Hoover brought, but Ludendorff, in the book which he wrote after the war was over, boasted that the Germans had taken very good care to take out the equivalent amount of food from Belgium. They took out the exact equivalent of what the Americans brought in, so that the unfortunate Belgians were not benefited by this philanthropic endeavour at all. The only country which was benefited was Germany. That is the root trouble with all these blockade problems. It is impossible for us to give this help to our fellow-countrymen and to our Allies who are under the German heel

[The Earl of Selborne.]
without benefiting the enemy. The noble Lord may ask why it was possible in Greece but not elsewhere. The answer is that affairs had reached in Greece a state for which there has been no parallel in any other part of Europe, and the Germans were willing to enter into undertakings and guarantees, including permitting the scheme to be administered by a neutral country, which have enabled food to be sent to Greece under safeguards which do not exist elsewhere. Even then, I do not think that it can be said that this effort has not been of some indirect assistance to the enemy. The alternative, however, was the most appalling starvation of thousands of our allies in Greece.

That is all that I can say about the matter. Until the Channel Islands are reconquered, it is impossible to send food there without the Germans either seizing it or seizing an equivalent quantity of food produced on the islands. I am sure that the Channel Islanders themselves would be the last people to demand that they should have preferential treatment over our Allies in this matter, any more than the people of London demanded that they should not be bombed as the people of Rotterdam had been. The suffering that all the occupied territories endure causes the greatest heartburning to all your Lordships, and to every member of the Government. Everything that we can do to alleviate their suffering without helping the enemy, we shall do; but, if the result of our efforts would be merely to increase the food supplies available to the Germans, we should in fact be prolonging the war and therefore injuring the very people whom we want to help.

LORD PORTSEA: My Lords, I must thank the noble Earl, who was kind enough to remind me that we are old friends, for a great deal of what he has said. It gives me confidence that my authorities and my remarks themselves are much stronger than even I had hoped, for, past master as he is in the art of replying to a debate, I cannot say that he has made out a case which in any way convinces me, or even persuades me. He spoke of the bombing of Jersey and the bombing of Crete, but he spoke of them in the reverse order. Guernsey is thirty miles from the coast of Normandy; Dover is twenty miles from the coast of France. We hold Dover, we are told, because it is not an island. My geography must be wrong, because I have always understood that we are an island, and a very small island at that. If it was possible to hold Dover, which is a very important military station, it should have been possible to save Guernsey, which was further from the French coast and had no value at the time as a military station. Jersey would not have been worth the bombs which the enemy might have scattered over it. There is only one small town, and, if it had to be rebuilt later, it would be a very good thing indeed both for the town and for the island. That blood would have been shed there is no doubt, but I have always understood that that is the object of war. When in my young days I used to do battle with a friend, I was perfectly satisfied if I made his nose bleed; that was my object in fighting. I did not go in for battle to wash my hands in rose water.

My noble friend objects to the word "betrayal." I do not hold to any particular word, but what is betrayal? Every young islander of suitable age and strength was on this side of the Channel fighting for the Crown. The older men were trained soldiers, and every man had his rifle. There were guns, and there was a rock fort built at the cost of a million pounds not a hundred years ago. The arms and ammunition were taken away, the guns were taken away. The flag was hauled down; the flag with the cross of Normandy and the cross of St. Andrew was hauled down by British hands, and we ran away and left the people there. I do not pretend to be a master of the English language, or indeed a master of anything, but what is that if it is not betrayal? It is abandonment, certainly; it is desertion, presumably. I say that it is betrayal. If I had a friend in Jersey and we had been the only inhabitants, and I had said to him: "My dear boy, the Germans are coming to-morrow, and I am off by plane"—if I had done that, I should not be addressing your Lordships now, and I should not be very proud of myself. A baser betrayal has never occurred in English history—and we have done some little things that I can remember. I can remember 1878, when we sent Sir Garnet Wolsey to tell the people of the Transvaal that as long as the British Union Jack was flying we would give protection to the Transvaal. Then a few Boers came in and joined us, and four

years later the flag was hauled down, and the people had their throats slit. That was not betrayal; that was abandonment. What does it matter what it is, if you leave your friends in the lurch? That is the main point.

My noble friend will hold that the position of our own people, our own blood, in the Norman Islands, and of the people of Greece and of Poland or elsewhere are on the same plane. Well, of course, that ends the matter so far as I am concerned, because I say they are not. If I had to choose between my noble friend and any Pole, any Belgian, any Greek—if it were Leonidas himself—I should drop them and help my friend. That may be idiosyncrasy on my part; it may be even hysterical. I do not think so, and as long as I have those opinions so long will I hold that we have betrayed those islands, and that we should help them.

I thank my noble friend for the suggestion that we would drop coffee. It is not a question of the mere pounds of coffee; it is the fact that the islander will know that he is not forgotten, that he has not been betrayed. He will say: "I still count for something. I am the property, the absolute apanage of the Crown, and the Crown, through the Government, has not forgotten me and is doing what is possible and will continue to do what is possible, besides bombing us"—because of course the Government have shown that little kindness to the islands. They have bombed Jersey harbour and killed a few Germans. Well, that was at any rate an indication that they valued Jersey and had not forgotten it. But I do not want them to remember it in that regard any further. I thank my noble friend for his kind words, and more still for the kind sentiments that I seem to feel lurk behind his words. I know that he is in an official position and he cannot give me all the things I ask for. But at any rate he does give me that comfort that he is thinking, and the Government are thinking, of the islands, and that they will in good time do their best for those unfortunate people. I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

GENERAL.

House of Lords.

47

PARLIAMENTARY

~~QUESTION.~~ Motion.

The Lord Portsea — To ask His Majesty's Government, whether any progress has been made in the supply of food for children in Jersey and Guernsey, and whether any information has been received as to the position as regards food at present available for these children; whether His Majesty's Government accept the principle that kinship should entitle these children to preferential treatment and whether His Majesty's Government will again consider the offer made to take a ship and food to the islands and will take steps for negotiations to be opened with the German Government accordingly; and to move for Papers. ~~2nd~~ Sitting Day after 14th Feb.

1st - - - 28th.

U.

ANSWERED 18 MAR 1943
REPLY ATTACHED.

755/770

P.C. NOT ASKED TO ADVISE

Library Pl attach reply

L.C. 15/2

107

48

GENERAL

W 4665

23 MAR 1943

CO-ORDINATION.

Registry Number } W 4665/4/49.

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No.

Dated 20th March, 1943.

Received in Registry } 23rd March, 1943

W: Co-Ordination.

Anglo-United States relief policy.

Transmits copy of telegram to Washington No.1088 Arfar of 18th March stating that it is most important that Governor Lehman should come prepared to discuss his views on current relief policy. Everything should be done to prevent any relief scheme for Norway being adopted or announced before discussions have taken place with Lehman.

Last Paper.

W 4592 (W3948)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

x

(Action completed.)

mb. 24/3/43

(Index.)

All 26/3

Next Paper.

W4667 (W4686)

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

49

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

W 4600

23 MAR 1943

T550/G/Z

[CYPHER]

SPECIAL ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON

No. 1088 ARFAR

18th March, 1943. D. 10.15 p.m. 18th March, 1943.

SSSSS

IMMEDIATE

W

Your telegram to the Foreign Office No. 1120 [of March 7th: Anglo-American relief policy].

In the circumstances we think it most important that Lehman should come prepared to discuss with us his views on current relief policy. Please suggest this to him and do anything you can to prevent any relief scheme for Norway being adopted or announced before we have been able to talk to L.

T550/G/Z
E. E. Crowe Esq (Ag)
20/3/43

50

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group.....FO.....

Class.....371.....

Piece.....36511....

Following document(s) retained in the Department of origin under Section 3 (4) of the Public Records Act, 1958

W4667/4/49

109

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

51

W 4686

23 MAR 1943

Registry Number W 4686/4/49.

FROM Lord Selborne (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Prime Minister.

No.

Dated 15th March, 1943.

Received in Registry 23rd March, 1943

W: Co-Ordination.

Anglo-United States relief policy.

Considers that only Greece is in urgent need of relief. The President recently gave the Norwegians some promise of help and there is reason to fear that the Americans are working out with the Norwegian Government a plan for sending relief to Norway. Gives reasons why His Majesty's Government should prevent such a plan being agreed by Americans on their own. Encloses draft telegram to Washington suggesting that relief policy should be discussed with Governor Lehman during his visit to London. Requests Foreign Office views as soon as possible.

Last Paper.

W4667 (W4665)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See within copy of minute by Prime Minister

Dem 28/III
N. American Dept
Northern Dept 30/3/43.
Political "
M&R "
"

23/3.

(Action completed.)

8/4/43.

(Index.)

All 26/1

Next Paper.

W4736 (W5158)

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Minutes.

52

W

In the absence of the Secretary of State Lord Selborne has addressed this letter to the Prime Minister. He wishes it, however, to be dealt with in the same way as a letter to the Secretary of State and asks that it should be treated as very urgent.

No. 10 would like our views and recommendations and if possible a draft reply, before submitting the letter to the Prime Minister.

15th March, 1943.

Please attach to minute of PM.

Sir O. Sargent

Please see the above minute by the Private Secretaries' Dept.

If you agree it would seem sufficient to send to Mr Le Rougetel's minute and draft: Lord Selborne's letter is self explanatory.

15th

Please attach Lord Selborne's letter of 11th March to Mr Le Rougetel's minute and draft reply.

LO

53

The Foreign Office is in complete agreement with the views expressed in the attached letter from Lord Selborne and has noted with interest the statement in the last paragraph, that no scheme of relief, however limited, could in fact be put into operation before the autumn.

A draft reply is attached concurring in the terms of the proposed telegram to Washington (which being in the ARFAR series is for M.E.W. not F.O. to despatch).

15th March, 1943.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Minutes.

54

General Dept.

Some days ago the Minister of Economic Warfare wrote to the Prime Minister in his capacity as Acting Foreign Secretary to ask his approval for a telegram to be sent to Washington on the subject of Mr. Lehmann's approaching visit to this country, with a view to inviting the latter to discuss with us at once questions of sending relief to enemy-occupied countries through the blockade. Can you tell me whether this tel. has now been despatched, or whether the matter is still before the Prime Minister?

March 17th, 1943.

I have reminded No. 10.

R. 18/3

The letter in question was sent back to the P.M. on March 16th under cover of the attached minute (P.M. 43/60) suggesting Concurrence in the terms of the draft telegram which L^d Selborne proposed sending to W'ton.

18/3.

COPY

Ministry of Economic Warfare,

Berkeley Square House,

Berkeley Square,

W 4886
W.1.
23 MAR 1943

My dear Prime Minister,

I am sorry to trouble you with that distasteful topic, Relief; but I must do so as you have taken charge of the Foreign Office.

We, and the Americans, are under increasing pressure from Allied Governments and humanitarian bodies. I am not satisfied that any occupied country, except Greece, is in urgent need of relief; and, therefore, though the position is deteriorating everywhere, I think we could maintain the present position if we could be sure of American support.

But, as you know, the President recently gave the Norwegians some promise of help, and we have reason to fear that the Americans are working out with the Norwegian Government a plan for sending relief to Norway.

I think it most important to try to prevent such a plan being agreed by the Americans on their own, because:-

(a) it would be impossible to prevent its extension to other countries:

(b) it might be on far too large a scale;

(c) the arrangements to control the food imported under it might be wholly inadequate.

We know that Lehman, whom the President recently appointed to take charge of immediate relief questions, is making a thorough examination of the possibilities of admitting supplies through the blockade for the relief of children. He is coming to England very shortly to talk about post-war relief. I think that we should take advantage of his visit to discuss his views on immediate child relief problems, so as to see that any plans he is

formulating ....

formulating are limited to what is practical and least harmful to the blockade.

Halifax has already been authorized to consider, without of course committing H.M.G., such proposals as Lehman may put forward in this connection, and we must clearly be ready to do the same in London. I suggest, however, that there is a real danger of some capricious and ill-digested scheme being adopted and published by the White House, and the most likely means of averting this danger is to invite Lehman to discuss with us, while he is here, any proposals he may have in mind. I therefore ask for Foreign Office concurrence in the immediate despatch to Washington of the telegram which I enclose in draft.

I should add that in my opinion the time needed to make the arrangements for transport and control of shipments, and the negotiations with the Axis, would prevent any relief scheme, however limited, being put into operation before next Autumn.

Yours sincerely,

SELBORNE

"I approve the telegram. But this implies no change in policy.

W.S.C
18.3"

The Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, C.H., M.P.,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street, S.W.1.

COPY

57

IMMEDIATE

to

H.M.R.

WASHINGTON

NO. ARFAR

(CYPHER)

Your telegram to the Foreign Office No. 1120 (of March 7: Anglo-American relief policy).

In the circumstances we think it most important that Lehman should come prepared to discuss with us his views on current relief policy. Please suggest this to him and do anything you can to prevent any relief scheme for Norway being adopted or announced before we have been able to talk to L.

"W.S.C
18.3."

J.H. L. R.

F.O.

March, 1943.

Lord Selborne.

I entirely agree with the view expressed in your letter of the 15th March regarding relief. Everything possible should be done to prevent the U.S. Government from committing themselves to an ill-considered plan for sending relief through the blockade. I therefore concur in the draft telegram to Washington enclosed in your letter.

P.M./43/60.

59

PRIME MINISTER.

The Foreign Office is in complete agreement with the views expressed in the attached letter from Lord Selborne and has noted with interest the statement in the last paragraph, that no scheme of relief, however limited, could in fact be put into operation before the autumn.

A draft reply is attached concurring in the terms of the proposed telegram to Washington.

(Signed) O. SARGENT.

16th March, 1943.

Sir O. Sargent. 60

10, DOWNING STREET,
WHITEHALL,
18th March, 1943.

Sary 18/3

COPY OF MINUTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER.

Reference: P.M./43/60 (Lord Selborne's letter of 15.3.43 about food relief for occupied countries.)

"I approve the telegram. But this implies no change in policy.

W. S. C.

18.3."

4686/4 49

Copy also sent to: Lord Selborne.

uo

61

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 4736
24 MAR 1943

Registry Number W 4736/4/49

FROM Mr. Camps(Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. le Rougetel
No. T 550/G/Z.

Dated 23rd March,1943

Received in Registry 24th March,1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for Europe

Refers to Foreign Office telegram to Washington No. 1709 of 16th March(W 3981/4/49). Encloses draft telegram of correction to telegram under reference. Has included particulars of what the Famine Relief Committee proposes to do.

Last Paper.

W 4686 (W 3981)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Washington to 2029. March 27

(Minutes.)

? approve

Mr. Grey's first

25/3.

E.K. Cowan. 26/3

Sent E.K. 27/3

(Action completed.)

31/3/43

(Index.)

Alt 27/3

Next Paper.

W 4790

T.550/G/Z

62

Eliason

W 4736
24 MAR 1943

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,

23rd March, 1943.

Dear Le Rougetel,

Please refer to your telegram number 1709 to Washington of March 16th under your reference W3981/4/49. We spoke on the telephone about this and I had to confess to having misled you from ignorance.

I enclose herewith a draft telegram of correction. As I find Washington has not had particulars of what the Committee proposes, I have put in a bit about this as well.

Yours sincerely,

W. A. Camps.

J. H. Le Rougetel, Esq., C.M.G., M.C.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. ~~1.550/12~~

Draft.

Telegram.

H.M.R. WASHINGTON

NO. 2029. march 27

CYPHER

23rd March, 1943.

OUT FILE

63

My telegram no. 1709 of March 16th: Attitude of Archbishops to Famine Relief Committee.

I much **regret** that it was overlooked in replying to your enquiry that on February 17th the Archbishop of Canterbury addressed a meeting of members of Parliament of both Houses at the House of Commons. He spoke, though without much emphasis, in favour of the Famine Relief Committee's proposals, and was accompanied by the Secretary of the Committee. The Meeting and the **speech** were not reported and no published account has appeared.

2. It follows however that the Archbishop must be reckoned as supporting the actual proposals put forward by the Committee. These recommend despatch of approximately 2,000 tons monthly of powdered milk and vitamin concentrates to Belgium, and similar programme for Greece. Scheme if successful would be extended to other occupied territories. Committee has been pressing these proposals since last Autumn.

3./

3. On Friday, March 19th, the Belgian Prime Minister made a public speech in favour of Committee's plan(see my telegram No. 6983 /November 12th, 1942/ paragraph 3b.)

E 2273

64

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

65

OUT FILE

[CYPHER] DEPARTMENTAL No.1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 2029 D. 3.20 p.m. March 28th, 1943.

March 27th, 1943.

bbbb

My telegram No. 1709 [of March 16th: Attitude of Archbishops to Famine Relief Committee].

I much regret that it was overlooked in replying to your enquiry that on February 17th the Archbishop of Canterbury addressed a meeting of members of Parliament of both Houses at the House of Commons. He spoke, though without much emphasis, in favour of the Famine Relief Committee's proposals, and was accompanied by the Secretary of the Committee. The Meeting and the speech were not reported and no published account has appeared.

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3. On Friday, March 19th, the Belgian Prime Minister made a public speech in favour of Committee's plan (see my telegram No. 6983 [November 12th, 1942] paragraph 3b.)

111

66

GENERAL

W 4790

25 MAR 1943

CO-ORDINATION

Registry Number W 4790/4/49

FROM Mr. Collier (British Embassy to Norway).

37

Dated 19th Mar. 1943

Received in Registry 25th Mar. 1943

W : Co-ordination.

Relief for Norway.

Refers to his despatch No. 30 of 8th March (W 3967/4/49). The Norwegian Prime Minister has again raised the question of relief for Norway, saying that the Norwegian Government were being subjected to strong pressure to make a further appeal to His Majesty's Government and United States Government. The Norwegian Ministry of Social Welfare has been authorised to appoint a committee of these to investigate the whole problem afresh. The report of this committee will be submitted to Ministry of Economic Warfare.

Last Paper.

W 4736 (W 3967)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8 M.E.W. March 25.

(Minutes.)

Copy to E.W.

Naval Dept 29/3

E.W. 29/3

(Action completed.)

pb 30/3/43

(Index.)

M.H. 11/12

Next Paper.

W 5499 220(a)

67

No 37.

W 479

25 MAR 1943

BRITISH EMBASSY TO NORWAY,

c/o Foreign Office, S.W.1.

19th March, 1943.

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No 30 of March 8th regarding the question of relief for Norway, I have the honour to report that the Norwegian Prime Minister mentioned this matter again when I called upon His Excellency yesterday, saying that the Norwegian Government were again being subjected to strong pressure to make a further appeal to H.M. Government and the U.S. Government to take some action in this matter, particularly from Norwegians in the United States, of whom some ten prominent personalities had just submitted a petition to them in this sense. They had accordingly authorised the Norwegian Ministry of Social Welfare to appoint a committee of three to investigate the whole problem afresh; and the report of this committee, when it had been considered by the Cabinet, would probably be submitted to the British Minister of Economic Warfare.

2. In the meantime, while this report was being prepared, M. Nygaardsvold would not ask me to do more than ensure that Lord Selborne was informed of the position and warned that the committee's report would be presented to him in the fairly near future; and I have the honour to suggest that this should now be done.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,
Sir,
Your most obedient, humble Servant,

Laurence Collier

The Right Honourable
Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.

No 37.

BRITISH EMBASSY TO NORWAY,

c/o Foreign Office, S.W.1.

19th March, 1943.

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No 30 of March 8th regarding the question of relief for Norway, I have the honour to report that the Norwegian Prime Minister mentioned this matter again when I called upon His Excellency yesterday, saying that the Norwegian Government were again being subjected to strong pressure to make a further appeal to H.M. Government and the U.S. Government to take some action in this matter, particularly from Norwegians in the United States, of whom some ten prominent personalities had just submitted a petition to them in this sense. They had accordingly authorised the Norwegian Ministry of Social Welfare to appoint a committee of three to investigate the whole problem afresh; and the report of this committee when it had been considered by the Cabinet would probably be submitted to the British Minister of Economic Warfare.

2. In the meantime, while this report was being prepared, M. Nygaardsvold would not ask me to do more than ensure that Lord Selborne was informed of the position and warned that the committee's report would be presented to him in the fairly near future; and I have the honour to suggest that this should now be done.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,
Sir,
Your most obedient, humble Servant,

(SGD) L. COLLIER.

The Right Honourable,
Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.

The Right Honourable

112.

1943

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 4823

26 MAR 1943

69

Registry Number } W 4823/4/49

FROM Mr. Peck (Prime Minister's Dept.) to Mr. Lawford.

No.

Dated 18th March, 1943

Received in Registry } 26th March, 1943

W : Co-ordination.

Belgian relief.

Requests that he may be informed as soon as a further reply may be sent to Monsieur Pierlot about relief.

Last Paper.

W 4790 (W 2551)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Def/ to Mr. Peck (P.M.'s Dept.) from Mr. Lawford March 23

(Minutes.)

See within copy of letter from Mr. Morrison (M.E.W.) to Mr. Peck (P.M.'s Dept.) March 24.

E.L. 29/3

D

(Action completed.)

mb 29/3/43

(Index.)

AEH 24/7

Next Paper.

W 4838

Enclosure 70

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

18th March, 1943.

Dear Lawford,

Will you please let me know as soon as a further reply can be sent to Monsieur Pierlot, about Belgian relief, a letter from whom dated October 30 and another dated February 9 are still awaiting reply.

I am sending a similar letter to Morrison at the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

Yours sincerely,

J.K. Pack

V. G. Lawford, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

W 4823
26 MAR 1943

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W 4823/4/49

Draft.

My Peck
from
Mr Lockhart
4/

Copy to
Mr Thomson
(Moscow)
23/3

71

23 March

~~Mr Peck for Immediate~~
~~23 March (84). Short telegram~~
~~to Moscow Telegram Paraphrase Spiridon~~
We are only too well
aware that a definite reply is
still outstanding to the two
letters of M. Pierlot of
Oct 30th and Feb 9th and
I only wish it were possible
to say when we may be
in a position to send one.
But this as you will remember,
is the result of ~~depends solely on~~ decisions
of general policy taken at
the highest level and so long
~~as matters remain in~~
until we succeed in eliciting
~~their present state of~~
some response from the Americans
~~Belgian approach, I fear~~

~~Here is what we can do about it~~

our hands

We can add nothing to the
military replies which have
already been sent to M. Picilot.

J.F.

N.P.
As I told you today,
however, we hope that it
may be possible to discuss
this problem with Mr
Lehman when he
comes here at the
end of the month.

I am sending a
copy of this letter to
Monsieur de Leusse at the M.E.W.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

27c

73

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

2C

23rd March, 1943.

Thank you for your letter of March 18th. We are only too well aware that a definite reply is still outstanding to the two letters of M. Pierlot of October 30th and February 9th and I only wish it was possible to say when we may be in a position to send one. But this, as you will remember, is the result of decisions of general policy taken at the highest level and until we succeed in eliciting some response from the Americans we can add nothing to the interim replies which have already been sent to M. Pierlot.

As I told you to-day, however, we hope that it may be possible to discuss this problem with Mr. Lehman when he comes here at the end of the month.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Morrison at the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

(Sd.) W. G. LAWFORD

J.H. Peck Esq.,
10 DOWNING STREET.

COPY FOR :- V. G. LAWFORD, ESQ., 74
FOREIGN OFFICE.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

24th March, 1943.

W 4823 / 44 / 49
26 MAR 1943

Dear Peck,

Many thanks for your letter of March 18th regarding a further reply to Monsieur Pierlot about relief.

I have now received a copy of Lawford's letter to you of March 23rd, with which we agree and to which there is nothing that I can add.

I am sending a copy of this to Lawford.

Yours sincerely,

Ronald Morrison

J.H. Peck, Esq.,
10, Downing Street,
S.W.1.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

75

W 4838

26 MAR 1943

Registry Number W } 4838/4/49.

FROM Mr.Quennell, (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr.Crowe.

No. T 550/25.

Dated 24th March,1943.

Received in Registry 26th March,1943

W: Co-Ordination.

Relief for Yugoslavia.

Refers to Foreign Office letter of the 19th March (W 4468/4/49). Encloses for Foreign Office concurrence, draft telegram to Angora replying to Angora telegram No.547 March 17th about relief for Yugoslavia. Encloses copies of telegram from Angora No.21 Encom of 11th February, telegram to Istanbul No.184 Encom of 13th February, telegram from Washington No.799 Arfar of 3rd March No.875 Arfar of 18th March.

Last Paper.

W4823 (W4468)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

draft returned to Mr. Quennell (M.E.W.) March 31

(Minutes.)

Soultys Mrs. Dept WK 29/3

I feel this is all right

? approve draft

E Crowe 29/3

Draft to be returned to Mr Quennell

H.S.W.

See within copy of letter from Mr. Quennell (M.E.W.) to Mr Donovan (U.K.C.C.) April 1. E.C. 5/3/43

See within copy of tel from W/Tan No 1123 Arfar March 29

E.C. 5/4

See within copy of tel to Angora No 198 Arfar April 2.

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
Mle. 31/3/43	Alt 26/7

Next Paper.

W4840 (W5732)

T550/25

Ent soon 76

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

24th March 1943.

My dear Crowe,

As you suggested in our telephone conversation this morning, on the subject of the copies of four telegrams from Angora covered by your official letter no: W4468/4/49 of March 19th, I now enclose for your concurrence the draft telegram to Angora of which we spoke.

To get a picture of the situation up to date, you may find it useful to refer to the following telegrams: no: 18 Encom of January 29th (Angora to U.K.C.C., covered by Donnan's letter to Maclean of February 1st): no.78 Arfar of February 5th (M.E.W. to Angora): no.479 Arfar of February 5th (M.E.W. to Washington): nos.21 & 184 Encom of February 11th and 13th (Angora to U.K.C.C. and U.K.C.C. to Istanbul): no.668 Arfar of February 20th(Washington to M.E.W. covered by copy of Camps' letter to Treasury): no.777 Arfar of February 26th (M.E.W. to Washington): no.799 Arfar of March 2nd (Washington to M.E.W.) no. 875 Arfar of March 8th (Washington to M.E.W.) and no. 995 Arfar of March 12th (M.E.W. to Washington). I enclose duplicates of telegrams of which I believe you have not yet received a copy.

W2013
W2013
attached
W3900
W3900
attached
attached
W2013

Yours ever,

R. H. Quennell

E.E.Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall.
S.W.1.

W 4838
26 MAR 1943

L.F. Copy.

CYPHER/7

ENCOM

FROM ANGORA TO UNITED KINGDOM COMMERCIAL CORPORATION LONDON.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen
No. 21 ENCOM
11th February, 1943.

D. 1.44 p.m. 13th February, 1943.
R.12.25 p.m. 13th February, 1943.

Q Q Q Q Q

General.

My telegram No. 18 and Ministry of Economic Warfare telegram No. 78 Arfar.

Embassy has requested me to answer the latter telegram in Encom series as the matter is in my hands, naturally in consultation with the Embassy.

2. Arfar No. 78 paragraph 1.

List of good proposed to be bought has already been forwarded and is also in the hands of Yugoslav Government but for clarity the following is list of goods:- salt pork, salt and dried fish, olives, oil, soap, figs.

3. Yugoslav Ambassador has been to see me today and expects to receive authority to commence purchasing at any moment and I have told him that we are prepared to co-operate in every way as soon as I receive consent from you.

O.T.P.

78

[CYPHER]

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

ENCOM

FROM U.K.C.C. (LONDON) TO ISTANBUL (CONSTANTINOPLE)

No. 184 ENCOM
13th February, 1943.

D. 7.45 p.m. 14th February, 1943.

JJJ

[YUGOSLAV RELIEF]

Your telegram No. 18 - Yugoslav Relief.

Please see Arfar 78 to Angora. We realise that the Turks may not allow the export of foodstuffs and we await the suggested list of supplies before authorising you to start buying.

OTP.

79

[CYPHER].

ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Viscount Halifax
No. 799 ARFAR.

D. 1.31 a.m. 3rd March, 1943.
R. 9.20 a.m. 3rd March, 1943.

JJJJ

Your telegram No.777 paragraph 4.

American consent does not also cover Yugoslav-Turkish transaction on which we still await a separate reply which we endeavouring to expedite.

(CYPHER) LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION. 80

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Viscount Halifax
No.875 Arfar.

D. 8.20 p.m. March 8th, 1943.
R. 5.30 a.m. March 9th, 1943.

----------oOo----------

My telegram No. 799.

In view of fact that eventual release of dollars is involved State Department at first replied that they could not ask for Treasury views unless they knew what commodities were to be purchased and how much money was involved. We again asked them to seek a decision as to principle and to leave details out of account. This request has produced news that Lehman intends to try to persuade Acheson to modify United States policy on intra-blockade transactions of this nature to bring it into line with our own. If he is successful it will mean that Allied Governments can normally expect to have access to their funds frozen in United States for approved transactions of this type and will consequently be able to plan ahead with greater confidence.

2. As further developments may require a little while any details you can give me about Turkish produce which Yugoslavs propose to buy and amount of money involved would help to expedite a decision on this individual issue.

T.550/25

Copies to:
E.E.Crowe, Esq., - Foreign Office.
W.L.Fraser, Esq., - Treasury.

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MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

1st April, 1943.

4838 | 4 | 49

You will no doubt be relieved to learn that the proposal for Yugoslav relief purchases in Turkey is now in order.

Would you, therefore, be kind enough to ask the appropriate member of the Yugoslav Government to arrange to meet us here to discuss particulars? Our agreement is not valid till this has been done.

H. Donnan, Esq.,
United Kingdom Commercial
Corporation Limited,
Plantation House,
Fenchurch Street,
E.C.3.

2838 4 49.

M1 82

[CYPHER]. LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Viscount Halifax
No: 1123 ARFAR
29th March, 1943.

D. 1. 58 a.m. 30th March, 1943.
R. 10. 5 a.m. 30th March, 1943.

11111

W 2613/4/49

Your telegram No. 995 paragraph 1.

We have approached State Department who in reply say that United States Government offer no objection to His Majesty's Government providing the Turkish pounds for this purpose for Yugoslavs but that specific licence would be necessary to enable Yugoslav Government to transfer the necessary dollars in reimbursement to His Majesty's Government. State Department are prepared to recommend favourably such an application by Yugoslav Government.

2. We were not aware that His Majesty's Government provided Yugoslavs with all the sterling they need for all their various purposes against reimbursement in dollars and we see some danger of trouble with United States Treasury unless Yugoslav Government give full details of the various transactions financed in this way when making application for a licence to reimburse His Majesty's Government in dollars. As you know, all payments out of blocked account require a Treasury licence and fact that they are more lenient in enquiring as to purpose of payment when it is being made to His Majesty's Government would make situation more difficult if they discovered that it was in reimbursement of undisclosed transactions with third parties. If this applies equally to proposed Belgian arrangement referred to in Troutbeck's letter to Fraser at the Treasury (reference T550/ZL) of 12th February Grant is writing independently to Fraser on these questions.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

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Copies sent
W. L. Fraser
H. Donnan.

INDEXED

M.E.W. FILE No. T.550/25
COPY FOR E. E. Crowe Esq
DATE 6.4.43

T 550/25

[CYPHER] LIMITED ARMY DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO ANGORA.

No. 198 ARMY.
2nd April 1943 D. 5.40 p.m. 2nd April 1943

W 4838/4/49

IMPORTANT.

W 4665

Your telegram No. 547 to Foreign Office [March 17th: Yugoslav purchases in Turkey.]

We have now received American agreement over financial aspect of Yugoslav purchases in Turkey. Details still have to be agreed with Yugoslavs here: but we hope to let you have final decision shortly.

2. We notice from your telegram No. 414 that quantity of goods eventually to be purchased might be 3,000 tons. Scheme has so far been discussed with Americans on basis of 1,000 tons and we think it advisable for the moment to adhere to original figure, as increase at this stage may confuse the issue.

3. Meanwhile please ascertain, and inform us urgently of, the arrangements Yugoslav Ambassador proposes to make for transport, as this has important bearing on the question.

O.T.P.

VVK 16/4

114

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION

W 4848
26 MAR 1943
84

Registry Number W 4848/4/49

FROM Sir L. Oliphant (British Embassy to Belgium)

No. 35

Dated 20th Mar. 1943.

Received in Registry 26th Mar. 1943.

W: Coordination +

Food conditions in Belgium

Transmits a copy of a statement made by M. Pierlot, Belgian Prime Minister, at a meeting of "Famine Relief Committee" on 19th March regarding conditions in Belgium.

Last Paper.

W 4838

References.

(Minutes.)

Central Dept
MAR
30/3

E.C.Q. 29/3

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

nb
31/3/43

(Index.)

Alt
24/7

Next Paper.

W 4849

24794 12/42 F.O.P.

No. 35

THE British Ambassador to Belgium presents his compliments to H.M.I.S. of S. for F.A. and has the honour to transmit to him the undermentioned documents.

W 4818

26 MAR 1943

British Embassy to Belgium,
45 Lowndes Square, S.W.1.

20th March, 1943.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Statement by M. Pierlot, Belgian Prime Minister, at meeting of "Famine Relief Committee" at Waldorf Hotel on March 19,1943.	Food conditions in Belgium.

3479A 22474—3 (4)

INBEL.MARCH 19,1943.

M.Hubert Pierlot, Belgian Prime Minister, made the following statement, at a meeting of the "Famine Relief Committee" which was held at the Waldorf Hotel to-day.

The object of the meeting was to discuss the possibility of sending food to Belgian children suffering from famine.

"I came here in answer to the invitation of the Famine Relief Committee, because I wish to seize this opportunity of expressing my gratitude to its members and medical advisers for the efforts they are making on behalf of my compatriots afflicted by famine conditions.

My thanks and those of the Belgian Government are due first to the Bishop of Chichester, President of the Committee, to Dr.Paton, its Vice-President, and to its tireless Secretary, Miss Pye. Under their active leadership the movement they promoted has considerably extended its action during the last months, and everything has been done to arouse interest on the question which they have so much at heart. Neither do I forget the Committee's most influential supporters, His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury and His Eminence Cardinal Hinsley. May I say how deeply grieved I am by his untimely death which I mourn with you all.

This war has caused terrible sufferings. It has caused material destruction which is beyond calculation and has shattered many ideals and illusions, but we may find some comfort in the disinterested devotion stirred by these cruel trials. It is indeed encouraging to see how all Christian Churches in Great Britain have come together and have joined forces in a work of international charity, aiming at safeguarding the life and health of the children of Europe.

As Head of the Belgian Government, I have come here not only to express gratitude to our British friends. I have heard that in certain quarters in this country there has been some astonishment at seeing a purely British movement champion the cause of the starving people of Belgium while, it is contended, the Belgian Government, who must be well informed of the situation in the occupied country, has maintained up to the present an attitude of reserve.

It is easy to understand that the Belgian Government has felt bound to observe a great discretion and not to add in any way to the absorbing concerns of the British Government in the prosecution of the war. We receive hospitality in a friendly country, and the freedom of action and speech which we enjoy prompts us to use them with tact and moderation.

I do not wish, however, for this moderation to be misunderstood. We cannot appear indifferent to the sufferings of our compatriots and to the efforts made by our British friends to alleviate them. Their tragic situation has been explained to you by one of those who has studied it most closely - Dr.Bigwood who, under the auspices of the League of Nations, has devoted his life to the medical and social aspect of nutrition.

The great density of the population of Belgium and its industrial character places it in a particularly vulnerable position. This is the main reason why the ravages caused by starvation are more cruelly felt there than in any other European country, with the exception of Greece. There are in Belgium 725 inhabitants per square mile, a figure reached nowhere else in the world, at least if we consider the country as a whole and not any particular province or district. Belgian agriculture, however developed, cannot possibly satisfy the needs of the whole population. In normal times, it needed a great deal of imported fertilizers and fodder for Belgian agriculture to feed the people during a third of the year. The rest had to be bought abroad,

specially from overseas, and paid for by industrial exports. It goes without saying that the moment such food imports are stopped, the people must after a time perish through hunger, like the citizens of a besieged town.

As early as the end of 1940, the Belgian Government drew the attention of the British and American Governments to this danger. The position they have taken is perfectly clear. They do not wish to take any steps which would jeopardise the efficacy of the blockade. Like the British, they place victory first. The latter will only be obtained if the Allied Powers use all the weapons available, including the blockade of Germany and of the countries under German domination. We can and must nevertheless - within the limits imposed by the blockade - do something to alleviate so much suffering and prevent a catastrophe.

It is in this spirit that we have always limited our requests to what seems strictly necessary for the relief of those categories of people specially threatened, particularly the children of the working classes. We understand, besides, the necessity of placing relief work under a control which ensures its safe distribution.

We are placed before the following alternatives:

Either Germany will agree to give the guarantees required for relief in Belgium and accept an efficient control, ensured by the International Red Cross or by other means; in which case we shall have achieved our purpose, without interfering with the prosecution of the war.

Or Germany will refuse such guarantees, or not comply with the conditions she has accepted. In this case, whatever the cost, we shall no longer press our request for relief. Nevertheless, the attempt made will not have been in vain. It will have released us from our moral responsibilities and fixed them, in an indisputable way, on a political basis. We shall be able to tell our compatriots that the Allies have done all they could to help them, and that this humanitarian endeavour has failed only on account of Germany's attitude.

In fact, we must try to do something!

The Belgian Government has now reduced their request for relief to a limited amount of powdered milk and vitamins which do not correspond with the needs of the whole population but only with the requirements of medical help to those of our compatriots whose lives are threatened, owing to the privations to which they have been subjected for so long. We are thinking specially of the children, because they represent the future of the race - the Belgium of tomorrow. If we do not succeed in saving her, the dawn of victory will rise on a depopulated nation who will not be capable, for the first time in the course of her tragic history, of making the effort necessary to rise up from her ruins.

The realisation of this limited plan does not involve any financial or transport difficulty. The Belgian Government dispose of sufficient funds to make the necessary purchases. They have ceded to the International Red Cross a ship which will sail under the flag of this Institution. This ship, "Caritas," is reserved for the transport of food to be sent to prisoners of war, and for the relief of the occupied country. She is now at Philadelphia, ready to make her first journey. Our orders for supplies are made. One thing only is still required: the navicerts which will allow us to bring the milk and the vitamins for which Belgian children are eagerly waiting.

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20th March, 1943.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Statement by M. Pierlot, Belgian Prime Minister, at meeting of "Famine Relief Committee" at Waldorf Hotel on March 19, 1943.	Food conditions in Belgium.

3479A 22474—3 (4)

INBEL. 19 MARS 1943. N°8.- Répondant à l'invitation du "Famine Relief Committee", qui s'est réuni vendredi au Waldorf Hotel à Londres pour discuter de la possibilité d'envoyer des aliments aux enfants belges éprouvés par la famine, M.Hubert Pierlot, Premier Ministre de Belgique, a prononcé le discours suivant :

En me rendant à l'invitation du "Famine Relief Committee" et en assistant à cette réunion, j'ai voulu saisir l'occasion de remercier les promoteurs et les membres de cette association de l'effort qu'ils ont entrepris en faveur de mes compatriotes éprouvés par la famine.

Mes remerciements et ceux du Gouvernement Belge vont, tout d'abord, à votre Président, l'Evêque de Chichester et à son Vice-Président le Docteur Paton, à qui j'associe, dans une même pensée de reconnaissance, sa dévouée Secrétaire, Miss Pye. Sous leur active impulsion, le "Famine Relief Committee" a étendu, durant ces derniers mois, son action bienfaisante et n'a rien négligé pour atteindre le but qu'il s'est assigné.

Un puissant appui a été prêté à ce mouvement par l'Archevêque de Canterbury et par le Cardinal Hinsley, dont nous déplorons la perte et devant la mémoire duquel je m'incline respectueusement.

Cette guerre a causé de terribles souffrances. Ses destructions matérielles sont sans nombre et, dans l'ordre moral, elle a laissé de grandes déceptions; mais les dévouements que ces épreuves ont suscités sont, malgré tout, une source de réconfort. Il est encourageant, pour l'avenir de l'humanité, de constater comment toutes les Eglises chrétiennes de Grande-Bretagne ont pu s'entendre et s'associer aussi intimement à une oeuvre de charité internationale dont le but suprême est la sauvegarde de l'enfance en Europe.

La présence du chef du Gouvernement Belge à cette réunion a un autre but encore que d'exprimer des sentiments de gratitude. Il m'est revenu que, dans certaines parties de l'opinion publique de ce pays, l'on s'est étonné de voir un mouvement d'initiative exclusivement britannique prendre en main la cause des populations affamées de la Belgique, alors que, faisait-on observer, le Gouvernement Belge, sans doute bien renseigné sur la situation en pays occupé, s'est tenu, jusqu'à présent, dans une grande réserve.

Chacun comprendra la discrétion que s'impose le Gouvernement Belge et son souci de n'être en rien une cause de préoccupation pour le Gouvernement britannique dans sa tâche absorbante de la conduite de la guerre. Nous recevons l'hospitalité dans un pays ami et, plus large est la liberté d'action et de parole dont nous jouissons, plus grand est notre souci d'en user avec modération.

Mais je ne voudrais pas qu'il en résultât une équivoque. Nous ne pouvons paraître indifférents à l'égard des souffrances de nos compatriotes et des efforts faits par nos amis britanniques pour les soulager.

Leur situation tragique vous a été exposée par l'un des hommes qui la connaît le mieux : le Dr Bigwood, qui sous les auspices de la Société des Nations, a consacré sa vie à l'étude des questions d'alimentation populaire. Ce qu'il y a de particulier dans le cas de la Belgique et ce qui fait que la famine y exerce des ravages plus cruels que dans d'autres pays européens, la Grèce exceptée, - c'est l'extrême densité et le caractère principalement industriel de sa population. La Belgique a 725 habitants par mille carré. C'est la plus forte densité du monde entier, du moins si l'on considère non telle province ou tel district mais chaque Etat, pris dans son ensemble. Il va de soi que l'agriculture belge, si développée soit-elle, est impuissante à nourrir tant de monde. C'est déjà par un tour de force qu'en temps habituel, en usant de toutes les ressources que lui procurent les engrais et les fourrages importés, notre agriculture parvient à nourrir la population belge pendant plus du tiers de l'année. Le surplus de sa nourriture, la Belgique l'achetait à l'étranger, spécialement dans les pays d'outre-mer et elle les payait grâce au produit de son travail. Il est évident que, du moment où l'importation de la nourriture étrangère vient à cesser, cette population doit, à la longue, mourir de faim, comme dans une place assiégée.

Le Gouvernement Belge a signalé aux Gouvernements britannique et américain cette situation dès la fin de 1940. La position adoptée par le Gouvernement Belge en cette matière est nette. Nous ne voulons rien entreprendre qui fasse obstacle à l'efficacité du blocus. Comme vous, nous voulons d'abord la victoire. Celle-ci ne sera pas obtenue sans que les Puissances Alliées fassent usage de toutes les armes qui sont entre leurs mains, y compris le blocus de l'Allemagne et des pays qui se trouvent sous la domination ennemie. Mais, dans les limites de ce que permet l'efficacité du blocus, nous pouvons et devons faire quelque chose pour adoucir tant de souffrances et éviter une catastrophe irrémédiable.

Dans ce but, nous avons toujours borné nos demandes de secours à ce qui est strictement nécessaire aux parties les plus éprouvées de la population et, spécialement, les enfants des classes populaires. D'autre part, nous comprenons la nécessité de soumettre le "Relief" à un contrôle destiné à en assurer la destination.

De deux choses l'une :

Ou bien l'Allemagne acceptera de donner les garanties auxquelles sera subordonnée l'introduction des secours en pays occupé; elle acceptera de soumettre l'observation de cet engagement à un contrôle efficace, organisé par la Croix-Rouge Internationale ou de toute autre manière. Dans ce cas, nous serons arrivés à notre but humanitaire sans compromettre les nécessités qu'impose la conduite de la guerre.

Ou bien l'Allemagne refusera les garanties qui lui sont demandées concernant la destination des secours, ou encore, elle acceptera ces conditions mais elle s'abstiendra de les observer. Dans ce cas, quoiqu'il nous en coûte, nous renoncerons à insister pour l'obtention d'un relief quelconque. Cependant, la tentative que nous aurons faite n'aura pas été inutile. Elle aura dégagé notre responsabilité sur le plan moral. Elle l'aura fixée d'une manière indiscutable sur le plan politique. Nous serons en mesure de dire à nos compatriotes du pays occupé que les Alliés ont fait tout ce qu'ils ont pu pour les secourir et que cette entreprise humanitaire n'a échoué que par la faute de l'Allemagne.

En un mot : il faut essayer.

Récemment, vous le savez, le Gouvernement Belge a restreint ses demandes de relief à l'envoi d'une certaine quantité de poudre de lait et de vitamines, correspondant, non aux nécessités alimentaires de la population mais à des besoins d'ordre purement médical, limités à ceux de nos compatriotes dont la santé est compromise et dont la vie se trouve en danger du fait des privations qu'ils ont subies. C'est surtout à l'enfance que nous pensons, parce que l'enfance, c'est l'avenir de la race: c'est la Belgique de demain. Si nous ne la sauvons pas, l'aube de la victoire se lèvera sur un pays dépeuplé et incapable, pour la première fois au cours de sa tragique histoire, de faire l'effort qu'exigera le relèvement de ces ruines.

La réalisation de ce programme restreint ne comporte aucune difficulté d'ordre financier ou de transport. Le Gouvernement Belge possède les fonds nécessaires pour les achats. Il a facilité l'acquisition par la Croix-Rouge Internationale, d'un navire qui battra le pavillon de cette institution. Ce navire, le "CARITAS", est affecté exclusivement au transport des vivres destinés aux prisonniers de guerre et des secours à destination du pays occupé. Il est maintenant en Amérique, à Philadelphie, prêt à faire son premier voyage. Nos commissions d'achat sont prêtes. Il ne nous manque plus qu'une seule chose : les navicerts qui nous permettront d'embarquer et de transporter le lait et les vitamines que les enfants belges attendent pour être sauvés.

115

94

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 4849

26 MAR 1943

Registry Number W 4849/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No. T 550/Z.

Dated 23rd March, 1943

Received in Registry 26th March, 1943.

W : Co-ordination.

Allied relief purchases in neutral European countries.

Transmits copy of letter from Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Fraser (Treasury) of 23rd March stating that what the Allies can buy in neutral European countries is determined by a rule which excludes purchases of goods whose export to enemy territory can be prevented and allows purchases of goods whose export to enemy territory cannot be prevented. Requests some indication of the financial limits of the relief purchases.

Last Paper.

W4884 & (W4157)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Enc 4/3

See within copy of letter from Mr Fraser (Treas) to Mr Camps (M E W) T.1760 March 29

Enc 4/4

See within copy of letter from Mr Camps (M.E.W.) to Mr Fraser (Treas) T550/2 April 30

Enc 4/5

(Action completed.)

30/3 43.

(Index.)

Alt 2/7

Next Paper.

(W7140)

W4920

EL 95

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

W 4879
26 MAR 1943

T.550/Z

23rd March, 1943.

Many thanks for your letter of March 17th about Allied remittances for relief purchases in Neutral European countries.

What the Allies can buy in neutral European countries, as far as we are concerned, is not determined by what we can make available, (His Majesty's Government are, so far as I am aware never in competition with the Allies except in the case of Portuguese sardines), but by a rule which excludes purchases of goods whose export to enemy territories we are able to prevent and allows purchases of goods whose export to enemy territory we cannot prevent under our blockade arrangements with the neutral Governments concerned. It is not possible to predict the volume of such goods which might be obtainable. It can be assumed however that the maximum possible would not have any serious effect on the blockade. The expenditure involved might on the other hand might be large, because of course prices tend to run high. The need for the goods in the occupied countries is not really relevant to the question, which is governed by a practical rule and not by the instincts of our hearts. In any case relief of this sort is extremely inefficient and there is no certainty that it does any good.

This being so, I really must ask you again to give me some indication of the financial limits. I should be less pressing about this, had we not promised the Americans with your concurrence that we would work

on/

W. L. Fraser, Esq.,
Treasury,
S.W.1.

W. 4845
26 MAR 1945

on these lines - which are after all the lines on which we have proceeded in Switzerland.

I am sending a copy of this to Crowe.

(W.A.CAMPS)

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF MR. W. L. FRASER.

97

TREASURY CHAMBERS. MP

F.17602

4849/4/49
11 APR 1943

29th March, 1943.

Dear Camps,

Thanks for your letter of 23rd March about relief purchases in neutral European countries.

It is true that we agreed in draft your telegram No. 552 Arfar to Washington, in which the possibility of working out allocations for the neutrals other than Switzerland was suggested. We will certainly do what we can to help, but for the reasons I have explained, I do not think we are prepared to open the bidding.

The case of Switzerland was quite special. We had more or less concluded an agreement which for our purposes ensured a definite annual ceiling for our transfers to Switzerland. We had some idea of the rate at which our balance of payments was actually running, and it was not difficult to deduce from this that, whatever the merits of the case, we could not afford to agree to transfers beyond a definite limit of £500,000 a year.

None of these considerations apply in Spain. We should feel it quite impossible to fix in advance any upper limit of remittances which we could be certain of making, but on the other hand there is always the possibility of a favourable moment for putting through some quite substantial special arrangement, as for instance we have attempted to do for the Belgians. If on the other hand we had some idea what classes of purchases might be in contemplation, and for what amounts, there might be a possibility of exploring the ground with the Spaniards and getting down to something more definite.

Portugal and Spain have not yet set any limit on the amount of sterling they will accept. But every payment to either country costs us gold (now or later) and you will agree that we cannot tell you that we are prepared to make available any given amount of gold without knowing anything of the possibilities and the merits of the case.

I am afraid, therefore, I must remain of the opinion that the next step lies with you if we are to carry the matter further.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Crowe.

W.A. Camps, Esq.
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

Yours sincerely,
(sgd) W. L. Fraser.

T550/Z.

INDEXED

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

Copy to E.E.Crowe,Esq.,
Foreign Office.

30th April, 1943.

EW 4849/4/49
4 MAY 1943

Would you please refer to your letter F.17602 of March 29th about the financing of Allied relief purchases in neutral European countries.

I am very grateful for your readiness to help, and perfectly willing to start the bidding if you prefer it that way. I am quite sure that it will make it much easier to deal with these questions if we have even provisional limits to work to. Here therefore are our preliminary suggestions. They relate specifically to the use of neutral currencies for purchase of goods in the several neutral European countries for export thence to destinations in enemy or enemy occupied territories, whether for prisoners of war or civilians. They do not include payments made on account of refugees in those neutral countries, even when money is spent on buying goods locally for the support of such refugees, nor do they relate to the purchase of goods for post war use. Nor do they relate to remittances of funds to enemy territories of support payments. Nor do they relate to payments made to the International Red Cross for purely administrative expenses incurred in connection with services rendered to prisoners of war.

1. Sweden. We think you will agree that in view of the high cost to us of Swedish Kroner and the need to conserve such Kroner as we can obtain for essential purposes, no purchases of Kroner should be allowed for relief transactions.

In/.....

W.L.Fraser,Esq.,
Treasury,
Whitehall.
S. W. 1.

99.

In any case, the Norwegians are the only plausible applicants, and we are already considerably embarrassed by the fact that funds locally subscribed in Sweden are promoting applications for exports from Sweden to Norway, to which we cannot on blockade grounds agree.

2. Turkey. We suggest a provisional maximum of the equivalent of £400,000, this to include the purchase, to the value of £100,000, at present being effected on behalf of Yugoslavia. We should however be perfectly ready to reduce this limit, if Davidson considers it excessive. We could also increase it, if he considers that this could be done without compromising pre-emption requirements. But whatever figure is fixed provisionally we ought to discuss it with the Americans, as they are very sensitive on the subject of needs of Turkish currency for pre-emption purchases.

3. Spain. It is clear to us that no pesetas obtained by the British Government can be afforded for relief purchases, in view of the heavy demands of our pre-emption programme. We further consider that we should not invite the Spaniards to make pesetas specially available against sterling for relief purchases, since these must inevitably increase the difficulty of obtaining pesetas for pre-emption. We therefore propose that no pesetas acquired by H.M.G. or otherwise available for use by H.M.G. should be devoted to relief purchases by the Allies, except in such wholly exceptional cases as that in which we were recently able to gratify to the Belgians. You will remember that in that case certain pesetas were offered us by the Spaniards on terms which made it impossible for us to use these particular pesetas ourselves, and that the opportunity occurred in connection with the deal under which we stood at the same time to acquire a valuable slice of pesetas for our own use.

4. Portugal. Since at the moment we have no difficulty in obtaining the escudos needed for pre-emption purposes against sterling from the Portuguese, it is difficult for us to make any bid from here. Presumably you yourself have pre-

occupations/....

occupations about the volume of sterling standing to the credit of the Portuguese and the corresponding post war liability. We think it is very important to fix some provisional limit in the case of Portugal, because the Dutch and other Allies are all too likely to emulate the Belgian example in the near future. As there are six possible applicants in addition to the Belgians, who get £250,000 a month, the potential demand is very considerable and you may think it dangerous to accept further commitments in excess of £40,000 per Ally per month, while hoping of course that even this figure would not be reached. We may possibly be obliged to allow some general increase all round of expenditure on parcel schemes, but this would not be likely to exceed the figure named.

Perhaps you would let us know your views on the above.

W. A. Camps

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

101

W 4920

27 MAR 1943

Registry Number } W 4920/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare

No. (communicated)

Dated

Received in Registry } 27th March, 1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Canned tunny for Belgium.

Transmits copies of telegram from Teneriffe No. 191 Arfar of March 17th and telegram to Teneriffe No 62 Arfar of March 20th regarding purchase of 25 tons of canned tunny for Belgium.

Last Paper.

W 4849

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Contracts Dept

31/3

(Action completed.)

2/4/43

(Index.)

A11

24/7

Next Paper.

W4923 (W 5515).

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

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W 4920

27 MAR 1943

T550/19/4

[CYPHER]

LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO TENERIFFE

No. 62 ARFAR

20th March, 1943. D. 4.30 a.m. 22nd March, 1943.

SSSSS

Your telegram No. 191 [Arfar of March 17th: 25 tons of canned tunny for Belgium].

NVC for 25 tons of canned tunny from Cipriano Escobio, Las Palmas, bought through United Kingdom Commercial Corporation in Madrid and consigned to Belgian Red Cross.

2. This must be refused, as goods may not be sent to Belgium through the blockade.

3. Madrid, please investigate alleged action of United Kingdom Commercial Corporation representative and report urgently. No such purchases should be made without reference here.

OTP

[CODE] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM TENERIFFE TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Mr. Carse.
No.191 ARFAR.
17th March, 1943.

D. 7.40 p.m. 17th March, 1943.
R. 5.45 p.m. 18th March, 1943.

9999999

N.V.C. Cipriano Escobio Las Palmas 25 tons of canned tunny in oil for Belgian Red Cross through Viuda de Fernandez of Pasajes. Purchase made through United Kingdom Commercial Corporation (Spain) Limited, Madrid.

w7

GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

104

W 4923

27 MAR 1943

Registry Number W 4923/4/49.

FROM Lady Davidson to Mr. Eden.

No.

Dated 23rd March, 1943

Received in Registry 27th March, 1943.

W : Co-ordination.

Relief for occupied Europe.

Enquires whether M.P.s may have some statement pointing out the difficulties or explaining the present position as relief for children in occupied Europe.

Last Paper.

W 4920.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

D(fr) Lady Davidson from Mr R. Law Mar 29.

(Minutes.)

See minutes

KEO 31/3

(Action completed.)

Mch 31/3/43

(Index.)

Alt 27/4

Next Paper.

(W 5370).

W 4932.

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ACKNOWLEDGED
25.3.43

1. Interim ackx

2. Mr Law:

Sir J. Simon's
letter to Randall
Davidson, saying
that his speech
is for MEW
not F.O.?

25 March

General Secy. for
disp. if they
agree with the
suggestion.
PG. 25/3

106

Nercott Court,
Berkhamsted.
March 23rd 1943

W 4923
27 MAR 1943

Dear Mr. Eden,

Lately I have been inundated with letters from organisations and individuals on the subject of the starving children of Europe, and I should think most Members have received similar letters.

I have answered them to the best of my ability, pointing out some of the difficulties, but owing to the fact that the Archbishop of Canterbury in his airy way has created the impression that if you really wanted to feed the children of Europe you could do so with no difficulty at all, and it is the Government who are holding back supplies, the majority of the people are not satisfied with one's answers, and I think a great deal of unnecessary damage is being done.

I enclose a letter which appeared in one of my local papers yesterday, which is typical. Is it possible now for the Government or for your Department to let Members of Parliament have some statement pointing out the difficulties or explaining the present position ?

Yours sincerely,

Joan Davidson

OUR READERS VIEWS

STARVATION IN OCCUPIED EUROPE.

To the Editor.

Sir,—In our pamphlet ("One of these Little Ones": price 4d.) Vera Brittain states that an American relief worker told her that again and again he had heard French people say, "We will help the British because we want them to win the war and get rid of Hitler. But we shall hate them for ever for letting our children starve when they could have saved them."

She points out that at the end of 1942 the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster personally asked the Foreign Secretary to give favourable consideration for a limited scheme to save children, mothers and invalids in Belgium and Greece. And she draws attention to a scheme outlined by Dr. Kershner, Director of Relief for the American Friends Service Committee, in January of this year, for providing another year's nourishment for children in France. She quotes Professor Cammaerts, pleading in that same month for Belgium: "the food is there; the ship is there; the money is there—only the navicerts are not there."

She adds: "If these two schemes succeeded without helping the enemy they could be extended. If they failed no great harm would be done. At worst the war would be prolonged only for a few hours. Is it not worth taking this small risk in order to save over 3,000,000 children in Greece, Belgium and France, and thus make these countries our friends . . . when the war is over?"

In my letter to Lady Davidson, asking whether Christian Members of Parliament cannot do something to stir the Government to action, I have felt constrained to say that "from the religious point of view, I think that the refusal of a Government, which openly professes to be fighting on the side of Christ, to even attempt to do this, shows a lack of faith in God and His revelation of His will and power to save, which would merit the accusation of hypocrisy so often applied to us on the Continent, as well as His own just judgment."

May I urge Christian leaders to study this pamphlet and—if they agree with it—to take the action which the writer urges.

Yours faithfully,
CLAUD H. EDMUNDS.

St. Paul's Vicarage,
Hemel Hempstead.
16th.

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St. Paul's Vicarage,
Hemel Hempstead.
16th.

Burns, Wounds. Per tin
It soothes at a touch and ends irritation immediately.

Germoloids The treatment for Haemorrhoids (Piles) based on the Germolene Healing Principle.
Price 1/5 per box from all chemists

WARNING TO STOMACH SUFFERERS

Most cases of Stomach Distress—Indigestion, Gastritis, Flatulence, Heartburn, etc., are associated with Acid. Thus it is thought by many that one has only to stop the acid to stop the trouble. This is not entirely correct, though there is much truth in it. Note these important points:—

(1) Acid is necessary for proper Digestion (2) It is the EXCESS Acid that is dangerous. (3) To kill all acid-action for a prolonged period by taking harsh antacids is unwise.

Some antacid compounds are much better than others. In a new remedy, 'DEX,' the ideal balance has been secured, while a special modern ingredient effectively aids gas-dispersion. 'DEX' stops the *excess* acid at once, banishes the causative conditions, ends the gas, "blots up" the ferment-poisons, and brings restoration and calm to stomach and intestines. Results of taking 'DEX' are amazing, the entire health improving wonderfully, while all such nerve-racking ills as gas-caused sleeplessness just go for good. If 'DEX' is not yet in your Chemists'—ask him to order some for you. Tablets only, two sizes, 1/6½ and 2/7½, inc. Tax. If not near a chemist, post order, (add 3d. postage) to Sun Island Chemicals Ltd., "Bylands" St. George's Hill, Weybridge, Surrey.

DEX Calms Angry Stomachs

BOOKS TO READ

"The Faith of a Jewish Woman" by Lily H. Montagu, 3/6, pubd. by Allen & Unwin, Museum-street

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DEX Calms Angry Stomachs

BOOKS TO READ

"The Faith of a Jewish Woman" by Lily H. Montagu, 3/6, publ. by Allen & Unwin, Museum-street

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W 4923/4/49

OUT FILE

Draft. 1/6

Lady Davidson
from
Mr Law

and you would have to pursue it with them if you wish it to go into details.

Mr Crawford
26 March
Pg 26/3

27a

109

29th March. 1943.

Dear Hini

In the S. of S's absence I am replying to your letter of March 23rd about relief for Europe.

The whole question is really one for the M. E.W. rather than the F.O. But in view of the enfranchisement of the position as we see it may be desirable to let you clearly to the [illegible] I feel you should I hope the following note, should I hope be of some use.

The matter is, of course, far from being as simple as the Archbishop makes out. Neither he nor anyone else has produced any evidence in support of the statement that the supplies required are, or could be made, available. Similarly many statements about the availability of shipping do not correspond with our information. What is more And, of course, there is no (any adequate) central organization in

misfit: assurances received from certain quarters we are by far from convinced that

in existence such as even the most
ardent advocates of relief admit
to be necessary. indispensable

I hope I have made it
clear that quite apart from
the Government's objection to
principle to a ~~this case~~
relaxation of the blockade, the
grant of navicerts - a rather
U.S. States export licences
would be [illegible] from the U.S.
would not solve the problem
at all.

While I do not think that
it would be desirable at this
stage for me to make any
a special statement, I assure
you that the whole matter is
under constant consideration.

Although [illegible] at the moment
the Govt cannot add anything
to the statements on this subject
which have been made in the recent
past I can assure you that they
are very conscious of the desirability
of relieving the suffering of population
of occupied Europe as soon as
circumstances permit and that
the whole question
is under constant
consideration.

Yours sincerely
Ed) Richardson.

2613

to which in practice
it would be difficult
to limit the scope,

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

OUT FILE

1C 111

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(W 4923/4/49). 29th March, 1943.

Dear Nancy

In the Secretary of State's absence I am replying to your letter of the 23rd March about relief for Europe. The whole question is really one for the Ministry of Economic Warfare rather than the Foreign Office and you would have to pursue it with them if you wish to go into details. But the following explanation of the position as we see it may be of some use to you.

The matter is, of course, far from being as simple as the Archbishop makes out. Neither he nor anyone else has produced any evidence in support of the statement that the supplies required are or could be made available. Similarly any statements about the availability of shipping do not correspond with our information. What is more in spite of assurances received from certain quarters we are very far from convinced that there is any adequate control organisation in existence such as even the most ardent advocates of relief admit to be indispensable.

I hope I have made it clear that quite apart from the Government's objections in principle to a relaxation of the blockade of which in practice it would be impossible to limit the scope, the granting of navicerts - or rather United States Export Licences since the supplies would be coming from the United States of America - would not solve the problem at all.

/Although

The Viscountess Davidson, M.P.,
Norcott Court,
Berkhamsted.

11.2

Although at the moment the Government cannot add anything to the statements on this subject which have been made in the recent past I can assure you that they are very conscious of the desirability of relieving the suffering population of occupied Europe as soon as circumstances permit and that the whole question is under constant consideration.

Yours sincerely

(Richard Law)

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

113

W 4932

27 MAR 1943

Registry Number W 4932/4/49

TELEGRAM FROM
Sir R. Campbell
No. Lisbon

Dated 101 Saving (extract)
Received in Registry 23rd Mar. 1943 27th Mar. 1943.

W: Coordination +

Food supplies in Alsace

Gives details of rationing of food and other supplies in Alsace

Last Paper.

W 4923.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Top copy entered C 3320/G.

Entered to record.

French Desk 31/3. May care to see

Lt 30/3

(Action completed.)

W 2/4/43

(Index.)

Ald 27/7

Next Paper.

W 4980

22910 9/41 F.O.P.

Minutes.

W

Top copy enlisted C 3320/G
114

W 4932

[EN CLAIR]

FROM LISBON (MISSION) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R. Campbell
No. 101 SAVING
23rd March, 1943

D. Untimed. 23rd March, 1943
R. 12.30 p.m. 25th March, 1943

Repeated to Madrid No. 28 Saving and to
Tangier No. 6 Saving.

kkkkk

Lisbon telegram No. 84 Saving of 9th March.

SECRET Combined Intelligence Report No. 42.

9. The following information dated March has been received regarding the rationing of food and other supplies in Alsace:

(a) Everything is by ration card. In the country one can get the full amount allowed, which is as follows, with the prices quoted in Marks and Pfennigs.

Butter	Children up to 14 -	750 grammes a month
	Adults	500 grammes " "
		Mk. 1.80 a lb.
Margarine	In addition, 125 grammes of Margarine are allowed.	90 Pfg. per lb.
Oil	There is none available.	
Meat	Children under 14 -	400 grammes a week
	Adults	350 " " "
		Mk. 1.20 a lb.
Cheese	1/8 lb. Munster per month - cost	Mk. 1.50 per lb.
	¼ lb. of other cheese paste once a month.	
Milk	Children up to 14 -	¼ litre a day
	Invalids -	½ " " "
	None whatever for adults.	

The/

27 MAR 1943 F.O. REGISTRY

(7)

The informant, having a large family, was allowed by the authorities to change 720 grammes of butter a month for one litre of milk a day. Milk can also be obtained fraudulently in the country from the peasants.

B.2 Bread People up to 20 years old - 4 lbs. a day
" over " " " - 3 lbs. " "

There is enough bread, but it is of very poor quality. It costs 17 Pfg. a lb.

Pastry Card - calls for "white" flour, 3 lbs. a month, which can be exchanged for 4 lbs. of bread. The flour is not white at all. It costs 49 Pfg. a kilo.

Sugar - 900 grammes a month per person at 45 Pfg. a kilo.

Jam - 700 grammes of jam a month, or in exchange a further 350 grammes of sugar. Jam costs 90 Pfg. to Mk. 1.10 a lb.

Fruit. There is practically none whatever, but the country people collect fruit in the forests in season.

Eggs. Since December 1942 none have been obtainable, except at Christmas, when six were issued.

The card calls for one egg a month, cost 12 Pfg. each.

Macaroni. 250 grammes a month.

Semolina. 250 grammes a month.

Ersatz Coffee. 250 grammes a month.

Sago. - 100 grammes a month.

"Pudding Powders" - 2 small packets a month.

Potatoes - There have been enough up to the present with those one can grow.

200 kilos per person a year, costing Mks. 20.

Soap - One block of very poor quality soap per month, and one packet of powdered soap per month.

Tobacco - For those over 25 years old, including women, 50 grammes every fortnight, cost 60 Pfg.

Those/

Those who do not smoke barter this with the peasants.

Coal - For a household of five, 1750 kilos a year. Cost Mks. 85.75, each sack of 50 kilos costing Mks. 2.45.

Briquettes sometimes replace coal and cost Mks. 2.04 per 50 kilos.

119

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

117

W 4980

29 MAR 1943

Registry Number W 4980/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (Communicated)

No. T 550/20

Dated 26th Mar. 1943.

Received in Registry 29th Mar. 1943.

W: Coordination +

Relief for Netherlands

Transmits copy of letter from Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Baron von Harinxma (London Committee of the Netherlands Red Cross Society) of 26th March stating that the purchase of 4 million pesetas worth of oranges in Spain by Netherlands Red Cross Society for Netherlands cannot be allowed.

Last Paper.

W4932

References.

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

(*Minutes.*)

Central Dept

NOKS

1/4

E.C.O. 31/3

(Action completed.)

vle 2/4/43

(Index.)

Add 27/7

Next Paper.

WSBdk

24794 12/42. F.O.P.

118

Copies to:-
F. E. Harmer, Esq.,
Treasury.

E.E.Browe, Esq.,
F.O.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

4080
29 MAR 1943

T.550/20

26th March, 1943.

You were kind enough to consult me the other day about 4 million pesetas worth of oranges which the Netherland Red Cross Society had hoped to buy in Spain, with the intention of sending them to Holland. I promised that I would investigate the financial question arising from this and let you know how matters stood.

I am very sorry to say that my news is not good. Neither the Treasury nor this Ministry is at the present time in a position to sanction so large a transfer of sterling to Spain for the purpose in question. That is not to say that it would never in any circumstances be possible for us to help you to buy any goods in Spain for despatch to Holland for relief purposes. But I am afraid that the possibilities are always very severely limited, and the present proposal at the present moment simply cannot be fitted in, though we all appreciate the awkwardness of dropping the transaction when it has been carried so far.

(W.A.CAMPS)

Baron van Harinxma,
The London Committee of the
Netherland Red Cross Society,
120, Pall Mall,
S.W.1.

120

GENERAL

19

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 5044

30 MAR 1943

Registry Number W5044/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated).

No.

Dated

Received in Registry 30th March, 1943.

W : Co-ordination.

Relief for Norway.

Transmits copy of letter from Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Brodtkork (Norwegian Government) of 27th March stating that His Majesty's Legation at Berne have been told that they may agree to the purchase of 500 kilos of ascorbic acid from Hoffman la Roche and export to Norwegian Relief Centre in Stockholm for forwarding to Norway. Encloses a copy of the list of consignments received in Stockholm by air from United Kingdom.

Last Paper.

W 4980

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Ecc 1/4

See within Copy of rel to Stockholm No 359 Despatch. May 1st

See within copy of letter from Mr. Camps (M.E.W.) to Dr. John Caspersen (Norwegian Ministry of Social Welfare) Aug. 6.

N. dep.!

Sent 25 Aug.

26/8

(Action completed.)

mb 1/4/43

(Index.)

Alt 24/7

Next Paper.

W5056.

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

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MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

T.550/12

27th March 1943

T.5044
30 MAR 1943

This is to confirm that we have told our Legation at Berne that they may agree the purchase of 500 kilogrammes of ascorbic acid from Hoffman la Roche and export of it from Switzerland to the Norwegian Relief-Central in Stockholm for forwarding to Norway. I understand that your Legation will be approaching them about it in due course, and that you will be in touch with the Treasury about the payment. This, I understand, will be in the order of 180,000 Swiss Francs and will be made through your Legation at Berne to the firm in Switzerland.

I also enclose, as promised, a copy of the list of consignments received in Stockholm by air from England. As I understand Mr. Mitcheson has no instructions allowing him to authorize the re-export from Sweden of these goods, I am enquiring here as to what is to be done about those which have arrived at Stockholm. Meanwhile you were kind enough to say that you would arrange to prevent the difficulty recurring.

Mr. Mitcheson has instructions regarding the consignment of medicines listed in the enclosure to Dr. Caspersen's letter JNR.M.D. 290/43 of January 28th to Dr. Phelps. He will also shortly receive

instructions/

Th. Brodtkorb, Esq.,
Offices of the Royal
Norwegian Government,
Princes House, Kingston Gate,
S.W.7

W. 5044

instructions regarding the Acetyl-salicylic acid mentioned under heading B. of the enclosed list. But my papers are in rather a muddle and I cannot at the moment trace the 4,000 capsules of diphtheria serum and the 50 million units of insulin which are also mentioned in the list. I wonder if you would ask Dr. Caspersen to let me know how things stand about these, so that I can tell Mr. Mitcheson to go ahead.

(W.A.CAMPS)

TRANSLATION.

Summary of aeroplane consignments since the 1st March 1943 from London to Stockholm.

A.	1/2	3 trunks	containing	9 small parcels baby clothing 6 boxes chocolate abt.3 kg. each 3 parcels vitamin AD 17 kg. "
	5/2	3 trunks	"	11 small parcels.baby clothing 6 boxes chocolate abt. 3 kg. each 3 parcels vitamins AD 2 of 17 kg. each 1 of 21 kg.
	15/2	6 trunks	"	24 small parcels baby clothing 12 boxes chocolate abt. 3 kg. each 4 parcels vitamins AD abt. 18 kg. each 2 parcels chocolate abt. 21 kg. each.
	22/2	3 trunks	"	8 small parcels baby clothing 6 boxes chocolate abt. 3 kg. each 3 parcels chocolate abt. 21 kg. each 1 box AD tablettes.
	3/3	7 trunks	"	20 small parcels baby clothing 14 boxes chocolate abt. 3 kg. each 7 parcels chocolate abt. 21 kg. "
	3/3	7 trunks	"	4,000 glass capsules?diphtheria serum of 5,000 units each.
	8/3	3 trunks	"	9 small parcels baby clothing 5 boxes chocolate abt. 3 kg. each 2 boxes chocolate and vitamins AD of abt. 13 kg. each 1 box vitamins AD of abt. 17 kg.

The parcels of baby clothing weight about 400-500 grammes each.

B. The following consignments have not yet arrived:-

Acetyl-salicylic acid 3 tons in small quantities
Insulin 50 million I.E.

Stockholm, 15th March, 1943.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

123

W

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

Copied to Treasury

INDEXED
COPY
DATE 3.5.43

T55012128 with 7749

E. Crowe Esq FO

T 550/12/28

[CYPHER]

W 5044 4 / 49.

M1 ARFAR O.B.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO STOCKHOLM

No. 359 ARFAR

D. 11.10 p.m. 2nd May 1943.

1st May 1943.

T T T T

Norwegians have bought with our approval 500 kilogrammes of Ascorbic Acid from Hoffmann la Roche of Basle, paying firm in Switzerland.

2. Goods in question are now in Sweden. Norwegians have to pay customs charges amounting to 26,000 kronor, later recoverable. We have agreed.

3. Please approve re export on request by Ditleff.

OTP

To: E. E. Crowe, Esq., - Foreign Office.

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With the compliments of Mr. W. A. Camps.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

INDEXED

T.550/12/28.

16th August, 1943.

W5044/4/49.

Thank you for your letter JNR.2918/43 MD of August 13th about your desire to buy a further 50 kilogrammes of ascorbic acid from Hoffmann la Roche for despatch to Norway via Sweden.

I am glad to confirm that there is no objection on our part to this proposal.

Perhaps I should mention that if the goods have been imported into Sweden for Swedish use, the transaction falls in a special category, and I shall have to seek instructions about any further similar arrangements in future. This however does not affect our approval in the present case.

(signed) W. A. Camps.

Dr. Jonn Caspersen,
Norwegian Ministry of Social Welfare,
Kingston House,
Princes Gate,
S.W.7.

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GENERAL

W 5056

30 MAR 1943

CO-ORDINATION

Registry Number W 5056/4/49

FROM Parliamentary Question (Rear Admiral Beamish).

No.

Dated 25th March, 1943.

Received in Registry 30th March, 1943.

W : CO-ORDINATION.

Food supplies for Belgium.

Rear Admiral Beamish asked the Parliamentary Secretary to Ministry of Economic Warfare what His Majesty's Government's attitude was towards a request by Belgian Prime Minister that s.s. "Caritas" be granted a navicert to enable her to carry food to Belgium. Mr. Foot replied that s.s. "Caritas" was engaged in carrying parcels provided by the American Red Cross for transmission to Allied prisoners of war and as the proposal was contrary to His Majesty's Government's and United States Government's policy, the shipment could not be allowed through to Belgium.

Last Paper.

W 5044.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See written letter from Mr. Corbett-Palmer (M.E.W.) to the Foreign Office dated March 23.

Central Dept MEW 1/4

EWE 1/4

(Action completed.)

mb 2.4.43

(Index.)

Aff 24/7

Next Paper.

W 5092.

GENERAL.

126

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION.

W 5056

30 MAR 1943

* 61. Rear-Admiral Beamish,—To ask the Prime Minister, if his attention has been drawn to the request expressed by the Belgian Prime Minister on behalf of his Government that the ss. "Caritas," now at Philadelphia, be granted a navicert to enable her to convey food to Belgium; whether the German Government have been approached for a guarantee; and what is the attitude of His Majesty's Government to the proposal. [*3rd Sitting Day after 21st March.*]

U.

ANSWERED 25 MAR 1943

REPLY ATTACHED.

1789

M.E.W. have been asked to draft on this question & I attach a copy of the reply they are proposing to make. It is true that the name of the U.S. Govt is taken in vain & N.A. Dept may have serious qualms about this, but so far as H.M.G. are concerned we can hardly say less. As the Belgian P.M. has not yet received anything but an inclusive reply to his enquiry (or to a previous like

addressed to the P.M. on the 30th October last) it may be thought advisable to prepare him for this statement which will be made on the 25th March.

If the P.M. is left taking his question himself I should hardly have thought this necessary but that is a matter for Central Dept.

N.A. Dept

Central Dept 23/3

J.M. Le Rougetel.
23/3.

M.E.W. not the P.M. will answer this question. I suggest that the attitude of the U.S.S.R. as in my pencilled amendment and that it makes a better answer. N Butler 23/3.

(tel. with Mr Grey)

(this point is still unsettled)

I have suggested to Mr Strang that Mr Butler's form should be adopted & that refer to the Date of the Belgian P.M.'s request be omitted.

24/3.

BELGIUM (FOOD SUPPLIES)

Rear-Admiral Beamish asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare whether his attention has been drawn to the request expressed by the Belgian Prime Minister on behalf of his Government that the ss. " Caritas," now at Philadelphia, be granted a navicert to enable her to convey food to Belgium; whether the German Government have been approached for a guarantee; and what is the attitude of Majesty's Government to the proposal?

Mr. Foot: The ss. " Caritas " is owned by the International Red Cross, and is engaged in carrying parcels provided by the American Red Cross for transmission to prisoners of war of Belgian and other Allied nationalities. The Belgian Prime Minister recently requested that on her next voyage she should be permitted to carry a consignment of powdered milk for despatch to Belgium. Since the sending of foodstuffs from overseas to countries in enemy occupation is contrary to the policy of His Majesty's Government and of the United States Government, we could not see our way to permit this shipment through our controls. The " Caritas " sailed from Philadelphia on 10th March. The answer to the second part of the Question is in the negative. As regards the third part of the Question, I have nothing to add to the reply which I gave on 16th March to my hon. Friend, the Member for the English Universities (Mr. E. Harvey).

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TEL. NO.:
GROSVENOR 4060.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE,
LONDON, W.1.

23rd March, 1943.

Dear Le Rougetel,

S 056 f 49

Further to your conversation with Troutbeck this morning, I am asked by Mr. Foot to enclose the reply which he had drafted to Rear-Admiral Beamish's Question, together with a copy of the previous answer, to which he refers.

This draft has been sent to 10, Downing Street.

Yours sincerely,

Hugh Corbett-Palmer

(Hugh Corbett-Palmer)
Private Secretary

I. Le Rougetel, Esq., CMG.,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

DRAFT REPLY

Yes, Sir.] The s.s."Caritas" is owned by the International Red Cross, and is engaged in carrying parcels provided by the American Red Cross for transmission to prisoners of war of Belgian and other Allied nationalities. On 9th February the Belgian Prime Minister requested that on her next voyage she should be permitted to carry [200 - 300 tons of] powdered milk for despatch to Belgium. Since [the admission of foodstuffs through the blockade is contrary to the declared policy of His Majesty's Government and of the United States Government, we could not see our way to permit this shipment through the blockade.] The "Caritas" sailed from Philadelphia on 10th March.

The answer to the second part of the Question is in the negative. As regards the third part of the Question, I have nothing to add to the reply which I gave on 16th March to my hon. Friend, the Member for the English Universities (Mr. T.E. Harvey).

* 37. Mr. Harvey, - To ask the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, whether the latest Reports received on the working of the measures of food relief in Greece under the supervision of the International Red Cross and the Swedish Red Cross continue to be satisfactory; whether dried milk and vitamins are now available for Greece; and whether further measures for controlled food relief for children, nursing mothers and expectant mothers are under consideration for any other countries under German occupation, in view of the increasing suffering amongst the civilian population.

16th March, 1943.

My latest information is that the relief foodstuffs imported into Greece through the blockade have been distributed without interference by the occupying authorities. The Neutral Commission has also entered into certain agreements with the occupying authorities for the protection of Greek native produce, though I am not yet able to say how far such agreements are proving effective for their purpose.

The monthly shipments to Greece include condensed milk, and the addition of vitamin tablets has also been approved, though none have yet been shipped.

As regards the third part of the question, this matter is constantly under consideration. But it is necessary to take account not only of the possible benefit to the persons whom it is desired to help, but also of the benefit, direct or indirect, to the enemy.

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GENERAL

CO-ORDINATION.

W 5092

31 MAR 1943

Registry Number W 5092/4/49

FROM Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires

No. P.No. 1786

Dated 27th Mar. 1943.

Received in Registry 31st Mar. 1943.

W: Coordination +

Relief for Yugoslavia

Some time ago the Yugoslav Government acquired 100 tons of foodstuffs and clothing for despatch to Yugoslavia, but the consignment was not forwarded to Yugoslavia as a navicert could not be secured from the competent British authorities. The goods were bought in Cairo and the Yugoslav Legation was instructed to forward them to Turkey for despatch to Yugoslavia but it appeared that a navicert was equally necessary for the consignment to go to Turkey. Requests that the matter may be reconsidered.

Last Paper.

W 5056.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.) Acknd

15 M.E.W. (Mr Campbell) April 2/

Dft/Yugoslav Chg d'aff. Enquiry 11.

& Mr. Campbell (M.E.W.) Enquiry 11.

(Minutes.)

Copies to F.O. (Mr Campbell) for obs

P. Dept aa. very disingenuous. E.C. 2/4

I ~~think~~ MR 5/4

M.E.W. prefer to hold up a reply to this until final sanction to the Turkish deal is given E.C. 7/4

M.E.W. will send us material for a reply E.C. 30/4

U.U. 1st T

See within letter from Mr. Campbell (M.E.W.) to Mr. Crowe T 5550/25 May 3rd.

(Action completed.) 15/5/43.

(Index.) ACH 27/5

Next Paper.

W 5143

133

ROYAL YUGOSLAV EMBASSY
195. QUEEN'S GATE,
LONDON, S.W. 7.
KENSINGTON 4903-6505-6714.

W 5092
31 MAR 1943

P.No. 1786

The Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs to bring the following matter to his notice :

The Royal Yugoslav Government some time ago acquired 100 tons of foodstuffs and clothing, with the object of sending it to Beograd. This consignment, consisting of 10 tons of milk, 10 tons of oil, 40 tons of rice, 10 tons of soap, 20 tons of clothing and underclothing and 10 tons of footwear, could not be forwarded to Yugoslavia as apparently a navicert could not be secured from the competent British authorities.

These goods were bought in Cairo, where they remain in storage. In view of the danger of deterioration while the goods are stored, the Royal Government sent instructions to the Yugoslav Legation in Cairo to despatch them to Turkey, where the Royal Embassy in Ankara would take the necessary measures to forward them to Beograd. The Legation in Cairo, however, replied that this would not appear to be feasible, as a navicert is equally necessary for the consignment of goods to Turkey.

Monsieur Milanovitch would be very grateful if this matter may be reconsidered under this new aspect and an authorisation kindly granted so that at least these goods, which are largely perishable, might be imported into Turkey.

London, 27th March, 1943

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W 1/49

INDEXED

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

T.550/25

3rd May, 1943.

5 - MAY 1943

W5092 / 4 / 49

My dear Crowe,

Would you please refer to your W5092/4/49 of April 2nd covering a note from the Yugoslav Charge d'Affaires, dated March 27th, about 100 tons of food and clothing which the Yugoslavs wish to send from Cairo to Belgrade. You asked me on the telephone the other day for some more material about this.

The consignment referred to is evidently that which was the subject of the Minister of State's telegram No. 48 to you of February 11th 1942. This was answered by our telegram No. 35 Arfar of February 24th. Please see also Maclean's letter to you W.4735/62/49 of April 1st and further correspondence terminating in a note to the Yugoslavs dated April 16th and covered by your reference W.4735/62/49.

I do not think the present Yugoslav request is recommended either by the "danger or deterioration" or by the guileless attempt to forward the goods to Turkey from Egypt for transmission thence to Yugoslavia. On the other hand we should naturally like to help you with the Yugoslavs.

I/

E. E. Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall,
S.W.1.

. . I am afraid however that I cannot think of any convenient means of disposing of the goods, unless they are either forwarded as desired by the Yugoslavs, or used for the benefit of Yugoslav refugees (if any) in the Middle East.

It would be peculiarly difficult to contemplate a special concession for the Yugoslavs at the present moment and I am afraid therefore that I can only suggest that the Yugoslavs should be told with usual regret that the goods cannot be forwarded for reasons which have already been explained. This answer might be sweetened by a reference to our recent helpfulness in the cases which were the subject of my letters T.550/25 of March 13th to Monsieur Protitch and of April 8th to Monsieur Bobitch. The second case, that of the proposed Yugoslav purchase of certain foodstuffs in Turkey, may of course get stuck because of supply or transport difficulties, so it might be as well not to make too much of it.

Yours ever

Anthony Camps

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W5092/4/40

136

11 May, 1943.

J.

Draft.

H.M.

Yugoslav Ch. d'Aff

+1C

H.M.P.S.S.A. presents his compliments to the Royal Yugoslav Ch. d'Affaires and with reference to the latter's N^os. Verbale P No 1786 of March 27th last, has the honour to inform him that the proposal to forward to Yugoslavia certain goods purchased in Canada has received the most careful consideration.

H.M. Minister is doubtless aware that it is contrary to the policy of H.M.G. to permit the despatch of goods through the blockade to enemy occupied Europe; ~~although~~ certain luxury goods may be

Copy to Foreign Office.

S. Dept a.a.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

may be sent from inside the blockade and H.M.G. have recently authorized the purchase for despatch to Yugoslavia of local foodstuffs produce to the value of £100,000.

In the circumstances Mr Eden regrets that he is unable to authorize the shipment of these goods to Turkey for onward transmission to Yugoslavia; but he would be anxious to suggest that they should not prejudice the Royal Yugoslav forces in the M.E.

R.R.C.
6/5

138

No.W 5092/4/49.

His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires and with reference to the latter's note verbale P.No.1786 of the 27th March, has the honour to inform him that the proposal to forward to Yugoslavia certain goods purchased in Cairo has received the most careful consideration.

2. Monsieur Milanovitch is doubtless aware that it is contrary to the policy of His Majesty's Government to permit the despatch of goods through the blockade to enemy occupied Europe; certain goods may however be sent from inside the blockade and His Majesty's Government have recently authorized the purchase for despatch to Yugoslavia local Turkish produce to the value of £100,000.

3. In the circumstances Mr. Eden regrets that he is unable to authorize the shipment of these goods to Turkey for onward transmission to Yugoslavia; but he ventures to suggest that some at least might prove welcome to the Royal Yugoslav forces in the Middle East.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.,

11th May, 1943.

123.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 5143

1 APR 1943

Registry Number W 5143/4/49

FROM Miss G. Brone

No. -

Dated 28th March:1943

Received in Registry 1st April:1943

W: Co-ordination.

Relief for Europe.

Enquires why permission to put a scheme for relief for Belgium into operation, has been refused. Requests that favourable consideration may be given to Mr. Howard Kershner's scheme for relief for France.

Last Paper.

W 5092

References.

(Minutes.)

X

(Print.)

(How disposed of.) ackd

(Action completed.)

2/4/43

(Index.)

April 27

Next Paper.

W 5158

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

12, The Mall, W
Swindon. 140

Webb.

W. 28/3/43.
W. 5143
1 APR 1943

Dear Sir,

At the end of last request was made to you for favourable consideration for a "food relief" scheme to benefit Belgians & Greeks.

Professor Cammaerts has stated that, as regards food relief for Belgium, "the food is there; the ship is there; the money is there; only the navicerts are not there". I should be glad if you will please inform me on what grounds you have, up till now, refused to grant permission for the scheme to be put into operation.

You have no doubt heard of the food relief scheme which has

been outlined by Dr. Howard Kershaw for which permission is required. to send a trial shipment of 3,000 tons of food to Marseilles to enable the work started by the American Friends Service Committee to be continued for another year. I understand that money & food are available in America, neutral ships for transport, & the International Red Cross ready to supervise distribution. I would ask you to give immediate & sympathetic consideration to this scheme, & use your influence to ensure the necessary permits are also granted by the government of the U. S. A.

Yours faithfully,
(Miss) G. Byrne.

1224

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 5158

1 APR 1943

Registry Number } W 5158/4/49

TELEGRAM FROM
Lord Halifax
No. Washington
1507

Dated 30th Mar. 1943.
Received in Registry } 1st Apr. 1943.
W: Coordination +

Anglo-United States relief policy

Refers to Foreign Office telegram No. 1362 of 1st March (W 3118/4/69) It has not been possible to proceed very far in examining detail of schemes for relief through blockade with Governor Lehman because of uncertainty about policy of American side. Mr. Hull is being pressed by Norwegians to agree to 750,000 parcels being sent to Norway and by Belgian Government to send supplies of milk to Belgium.

Mr. Hull considers the plan for transferring Belgian children to Switzerland to be impracticable

Last Paper.

W 5143 (W 4686)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Sir H. Campbell (M.E.W.) April 1st

Sir H. Wallis (M/Food) with W 3118 April 2.

Tel. W'ton No 2284. April 7.

Sir H. Troutbeck (M.E.W.)
Sir H. Mathias (M/Food)
Lord Drogheda (M.E.W.)
April 8.

(Action completed.) mle 23/6/43

(Index.) Hall 26/7

Next Paper.

W 5195 (W 5206)

(Minutes.)

A copy has been sent to the Cabinet. ✓

We have got to answer these questions but it is difficult to do so without taking the initiative in suggesting the possibility of a change in our policy.

I think the best line to take is that we cannot withdraw the framework of our present policy & admit relief supplies through the blockade; and in any case we could not agree to piecemeal schemes for this or that country alone. This may be criticised by the Americans who may be willing to suggest that we should abandon our whole policy; but I do not see that we can say less than this.

E. R. Crowe
14/4

N.A. Hall Caine Santiago / depts

I do not

SECRET
BAN 81A

think we should assume that his attitude as stated by Mr Hull necessarily involves a radical change of policy. It is clear that the U.S. Govt have not given this intricate problem adequate consideration and we must not be rushed into some ill-considered scheme, which would undermine the blockade without appreciably alleviating the situation in occupied Countries. The Prime Ministers minute on Mr Selborne's letter to W 4686/4/49 makes it perfectly clear that he will require a great deal of convincing.

(Hag A)

The most important point about this telegram is that Mr Hull has put it up to the W.C. to reconsider the "parcels scheme for Norway" which was turned down by the P.M. in his reply to the President's telegram in W 7619/6397/6 on the ground that it wd involve a radical change of policy. At that time two alternatives were under consideration — the "child evacuation" & "Secret scheme for Norway". Mr Hull

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

M. Hall

appears to have written off this journey as impracticable and from M. Campbell's letter in W 5206/4/49 it seems that this latter has now been abandoned. We could, I submit, reply to L^d Halifax that we do not like his "parcels scheme" (for reasons which have already been explained) and ask him U.S. to suggest some suitable alternative. This should have the effect of forcing them to give the whole problem serious consideration at an early date. This is precisely what we want, as we are under constant pressure here and, in view of his P.M.'s plan on a change of policy & a complete absence of initiative on the American side we are unable to give any definite reply - positive or negative - to repeated enquiries from various quarters.

(Flag B)

There is to be a meeting at N.E.W. tomorrow morning to consider this telegram & the draft of a reply which N.E.W. are preparing. Subject to Sir D. Scott & N.A. Dept I propose

I take the line indicated in the preceding paragraph.

Central Dept
Northern Dept } (a.a.)
N.A. Dept.
Sir Davis Scott.
Mr Ronald.

M. LeRougetel
2/4.

The pressure on Mr. Hull from mid-western, strongly-Republican Scandinavian elements must indeed be heavy. But this could not justify our committing ourselves to a scheme involving a wide breach of our policy - a joint policy with which the U.S. is identified. Further, it is not clear that Mr. Hull is anxious to agree to the scheme, and might possibly find our refusal not unwelcome as an excuse for rejecting the proposal.

We must however expect rising pressure of American opinion on the question of pre-victory relief for the occupied countries, and anything which will make the St. Dept. to compose its internal differences and get on with formulating policy would be helpful. I therefore agree with Mr. LeRougetel's proposed line of reply.

F. B. Evans 2/4

I agree with Mr. Evans. My own feeling is that from the N.A. point of view we can afford to be quite firm.

2/4/43

WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.
NOTHING TO BE

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Minutes. 146

Mr. Law.

I attach telegram No. 1507 from Washington from which you will see that Mr. Hull has once more put forward the scheme for sending parcels to Norway through the blockade. This scheme was exhaustively discussed in telegrams between the Foreign Office and Washington at the end of last year (Flag D), and also in a direct exchange of telegrams between President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister in December (Flag B).

For the reason stated in my minute on the current paper, I was rather inclined to make use of the revival of this suggestion by Mr. Hull as a means of forcing the U.S. Government to declare themselves in favour of maintaining the blockade or of some considered scheme of relief to be agreed with us. For this purpose I had thought of instructing Lord Halifax to tell Mr. Hull that we do not like the "parcels scheme" any better now than we did last year, and asking him to suggest an alternative. At a meeting with Lord Drogheda at M.E.W. this morning, however, the conclusion was reached that the effect of such action on our part might well be that the U.S.Government would take the bit between the teeth and commit themselves to the "parcels scheme" without more ado. The meeting was therefore in favour of telegraphing to Washington on the lines of the attached draft. From paragraph 5 it will be seen that it is proposed to tell Mr. Hull that we are anxious to embark on a joint examination of the "realities of the situation."

In this way it is hoped that we may be able at long last to induce the State Department to give this matter more adequate consideration than they have in the past, and to confront them with the difficulty of the problem, even if it is not possible to prevent American statesmen from making wild promises about relief. I do not think that this draft is in any way incompatible with the Prime Minister's recent minute on Lord Selborne's letter of the 15th March (Flag A), but if you feel any doubts on the subject you may wish to consult him in the matter and obtain his concurrence.

Hardly necessary. H. McPherson.

3rd April, 1943.

A. 4. 4. Secretary of State

S/S

I think this is right.
Clearly something must be said.
This does not imply any change in policy. On the contrary it is only by taking this line that we can hope to maintain our present policy.

RL 6/3

AZ Gerrard 6

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

W 5158

1 APR 1943

148

[CYPHER] DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Viscount Halifax.
No. 1507.

30th March, 1945.

D. 11.56 a.m. 31st March, 1945.

R. 6.40 p.m. 31st March, 1945.

ZZZ ZZZ ZZZ

IMPORTANT.

Your telegram No. 1362. W 3118/4/49

It has not been possible to proceed very far in examining detail of schemes for relief through blockade with Lehman because of uncertainty about policy on American side.

2. Hull telephoned to me yesterday and said that he was being pressed by Norwegians to agree to 750,000 parcels being sent by American Red Cross to Swedish Red Cross for distribution to women and families in Norway and by Belgian Government to send supplies of milk and similar things to Belgium for distribution to children. He asked for a reply as soon as possible. I am telling him that I am referring matter to you.

3. Meanwhile I am trying to find out whether any real work has been done here on detail which you will no doubt wish to have in front of you before reaching a decision on principle. To best of my present information little serious attention has yet been given to sources of supply and methods of shipping and control and no proper consideration to political difficulties of making these two proposed concessions without being pressed to make parallel concessions to other European Allies.

3.[sic:] Hull also told me that he considers that plan for transferring Belgian children to Switzerland was impractical because of difficulties of journey. He did not appear to have considered political advantages of throwing onus of refusing travelling facilities on to the Germans.

4. Please inform Ministry of Economic Warfare and tell them that I fear that Hull will not be likely to agree that this should be held for consideration until Lehman arrives in London.

APR 1943 F.O. REGISTRY

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. w 5158/4/49

J.H.L.R.

Draft. TELEGRAM.

H.M. Ambassador,
WASHINGTON.

No. 2284

Cypher.

OUT FILE

Important.

April, 1943.

Your telegram No. 1507 of March 30th : Anglo-American policy on relief.

Mr. Hull should surely be aware that the proposals being pressed upon him now were being pressed upon H.M.Government at the beginning of November last (my telegram No.6983 of November 12th). Pressure from the Belgians since then has been continuous, and the Norwegians have now warned us that they too are about to start again.

2. Mr. Hull will also know of the reply which we suggested to these proposals (paragraph 5 of my telegram quoted) and the context in which we made this suggestion (paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 5112 of October 15th). He will further know (my telegram No. 7544 of December 2nd) of our conviction that it would be fatal to take a decision affecting our general policy upon the proposal of any individual Ally, and of our offer to embark jointly with the Americans upon a detailed study of the present position and the consequences which a change of policy would entail. This offer was made at the beginning of December last and no constructive suggestion has so far been received from the U.S.Government. Meanwhile we ourselves have been left in a position of most acute embarrassment, because of our failure either to secure the support of the Americans in the maintenance of existing policy, or to induce them to review the problem with us. Presumably Mr. Hull will not be ignorant of the activities of Mr. Lehman disclosed in your telegrams Nos. 446 Arfar of February 5th

and/

and 541 Arfar [of February 10th], and of our desire that the problem involved should be discussed between him and us on the occasion of his forthcoming visit.

3. You should emphasize most strongly the magnitude of the question raised, and should mention in this connexion that an application for relief of a kind similar to that desired by the Belgian Government has now been submitted to us by the Dutch and by General de Gaulle. The Poles alone have not so far put in any claim for organized relief, but they are constantly pressing us instead to be allowed to send an increased volume of postal parcels from Portugal and to include in them goods imported into Portugal through the blockade. The sufferings of Poland are so much greater than those of the other countries that, if relief were admitted for others, some concession would certainly have to be allowed to the Poles, even if it were of a kind different from that claimed by other Governments.

4. We doubt whether Mr. Hull appreciates the great supply difficulties or the extent of existing and prospective commitments especially towards Russia. These make it essential that no promises should be given in regard to the supply of foodstuffs without the concurrence of the Combined Food Board and other responsible agencies. Milk, meat, fats and vitamins are all in extremely short supply and subject to Combined Food Board allocation. Please consult Food Mission who have full information.

5. You should leave Mr. Hull in no doubt either of our surprise at being pressed for an early decision on proposals which we brought to his attention six months ago without result, or

of/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

of our anxiety to embark at the earliest possible moment on a joint examination of the realities of the situation. Meanwhile we recommend most strongly that the Norwegians and the Belgians alike be told that the position is being kept under constant and careful review by the British and American Governments, but that neither of those Governments considers the moment to have come for a change of the policy hitherto pursued. This ~~need not~~ Communication compromise in any way the discussions which we wish to have with the American authorities, especially since it is plain that the time required for administrative arrangements and negotiations with the Axis would prevent a favourable decision at the present moment taking effect before the Autumn. It would on the other hand dispel the dangerous expectations which the uncertainty of the past six months has produced and restore the atmosphere necessary for a proper examination of the issues at stake.

6. The scheme referred to in your telegram No. 1508 has been abandoned. We are telegraphing separately on this point.

7. We hope that when the suggested joint examination takes place Mr. Hull will not wish to exclude the child evacuation scheme which we favour if only for the reasons stated in your telegram under reply.

CUT FILE

[CYPHER] DEPARTMENTAL No.1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 2284.
7th April, 1943.

D. 3.55 p.m. 7th April, 1943.

999999999

IMPORTANT.

Your telegram No. 1507 [of March 30th: Anglo-American policy on relief.]

Mr. Hull should surely be aware that the proposals being pressed upon him now were being pressed upon His Majesty's Government at the beginning of November last (my telegram No. 6983 of November 12th). Pressure from the Belgians since then has been continuous, and the Norwegians have now warned us that they too are about to start again.

2. Mr. Hull will also know of the reply which we suggested to these proposals (paragraph 5 of my telegram quoted) and the context in which we made this suggestion (paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 5112 of October 15th). He will further know (my telegram No. 7544 of December 2nd) of our conviction that it would be fatal to take a decision affecting our general policy upon the proposal of any individual Ally, and of our offer to embark jointly with the Americans upon a detailed study of the present position and the consequences which a change of policy would entail. This offer was made at the beginning of December last and no constructive suggestion has so far been received from the United States Government. Meanwhile we ourselves have been left in a position of most acute embarrassment, because of our failure either to secure the support of the Americans in the maintenance of existing policy, or to induce them to review the problem with us. Presumably Mr. Hull will not be ignorant of the activities of Mr. Lehman disclosed in your telegrams Nos. 446 ARFAR [of February 5th] and 541 ARFAR [of February 10th], and of our desire that the problem involved should be discussed between him and us on the occasion of his forthcoming visit.

3. You should emphasise most strongly the magnitude of the question raised, and should mention in this connexion that an application for relief of a kind similar to that desired by the Belgian Government has now been submitted to us by the Dutch and by General de Gaulle. The Poles alone have not so far put in any claim for organised relief, but they are constantly pressing us instead to be allowed to send an increased volume of postal parcels from Portugal and to include in them goods imported into Portugal through the blockade. The sufferings of Poland are so much greater than those of the other countries that, if relief were admitted for others, some concession would certainly have to be allowed to the Poles, even if it were of a kind different from that claimed by other Governments.

4./

4. We doubt whether Mr. Hull appreciates the great supply difficulties or the extent of existing and prospective commitments especially towards Russia. These make it essential that no promises should be given in regard to the supply of foodstuffs without the concurrence of the Combined Food Board and other responsible agencies. Milk, meat, fats and vitamins are all in extremely short supply and subject to Combined Food Board allocation. Please consult Food Mission who have full information.

5. You should leave Mr. Hull in no doubt either of our surprise at being pressed for an early decision on proposals which we brought to his attention six months ago without result, or of our anxiety to embark at the earliest possible moment on a joint examination of the realities of the situation. Meanwhile we recommend most strongly that the Norwegians and the Belgians alike be told that the position is being kept under constant and careful review by the British and American Governments, but that neither of these Governments considers the moment to have come for a change of the policy hitherto pursued. This communication need not compromise in any way the discussions which we wish to have with the American authorities, especially since it is plain that the time required for administrative arrangements and negotiations with the Axis would prevent a favourable decision at the present moment taking effect before the Autumn. It would on the other hand dispel the dangerous expectations which the uncertainty of the past six months has produced and restore the atmosphere necessary for a proper examination of the issues at stake.

6. The scheme referred to in your telegram No. 1508 has been abandoned. We are telegraphing separately on this point.

7. We hope that when the suggested joint examination takes place Mr. Hull will not wish to exclude the child evacuation scheme which we favour if only for the reasons stated in your telegram under reply.

125

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 5195

1 APR 1943

Registry Number W 5195/4/49

FROM Mr. Daish (Office of Minister Without Portfolio) to Mr. Grey.

No.

Dated 22nd March, 1943.

Received in Registry 1st April, 1943.

W : Co-ordination.

Relief for the Netherlands.

Dr. Beyen has visited the Minister without Portfolio and drawn his attention to the urgent need for getting vitamins to children in the Netherlands. Enquires what reply should be returned to Dr. Beyen.

Last Paper.

W 5158

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/Mr. Daish (Office of Minister without Portfolio) from Mr. Grey March 24

(Minutes.)

See within letter from Mr. Daish (Office of Minister without Portfolio) to Mr. Grey March 29.

Encl. 1/4

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
6/4/43	ACH 27/7

Next Paper.

W 5196.

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

Gen. Sept. 155

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO,
4/5, RICHMOND TERRACE,
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

22nd March, 1943.

Dear Grey,

Dr. Beyen came to see my Minister today and, amongst other things, he drew attention to the urgent need for getting vitamins to the children in Holland. He appreciates of course that a similar situation arises in relation to the children in other enemy occupied territories.

My Minister said that the matter did not come within his responsibility, but he would enquire as to the position and let Dr. Beyen know. Will you please advise what he should reply to Dr. Beyen?

Yours sincerely,

T. I. Daish

W 5195
1 APR 1943

P. F. Grey, Esq.

Registry
No. w519 14/49

156

OUT FILE

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Draft.

Mr Bailey
from
Mr P. Grey

I am sorry to see from your
letter of March 22nd that
your Minister has been
obviously misled by Dr Beyen about
what he Holland.

Both myself and the U.S.S.R.
Ambassador
[illegible] of course, only too familiar
with this question and it would
not be difficult to put
together material for Sir W. Strang
(as the basis of a reply
to us). We think, however, that
it is better to keep discussion
of the subject was confined to the
Chiefs of Staff directly concerned with
and we therefore suggest that

D 4

Copy to Mr Campbell (U.S.S.R.) who agrees to this

But we cannot help feeling that your Minister's objection based on a great deal of unnecessary labour would be avoided if the

Dr Bergen might be informed that if he wishes to discuss the matter further, he should get into touch with the M. C. W. ~~with the~~ personally

I suggest this because if your Ministers ~~allow~~ himself offers to discuss this question with me & the allies the others will be after him too, hoping to secure his ~~influence~~ interest in their case.

24/3

(Sd.) P. F. GREY

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

158

24th March, 1943.

I am sorry to see from your letter of March 22nd that your Minister has been bothered by M.Beyen about relief for Holland.

Both the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the Foreign Office are, of course, only too familiar with this question and it would not be difficult to put together material for Sir William Jowitt to use as the basis of a reply. But we cannot help feeling that your Minister would be saved a great deal of unnecessary labour if the discussion of the subject were confined to the department most directly concerned, and we therefore suggest that M.Beyen might be informed that if he wishes to discuss the matter further, he should get into touch with the Ministry of Economic Warfare. I suggest this particularly because if your Minister offers to discuss this question with one of the Allies, the

others...

T. Daish Esq., MC.,

others will be after him too, hoping to secure his interest in their case.

(Sd.) P. F. GREY

Gen. Dolph. 160

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO,
4/5, RICHMOND TERRACE,
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

29th March, 1943.

W5195/4/49

My dear Grey,

Many thanks for your letter of the 24th about Mr. Beyen and his request for information about sending food to children in Holland.

In case there should be any misunderstanding I should like to make it clear that My Minister had no intention at all of offering to discuss this question with Beyen. He made it clear to him that the matter did not come within his (my Minister's) responsibility. All he wanted to know was whether the Foreign Office would tell Mr. Beyen about it or whether some other Department would deal with him.

I have asked Morrison (M.E.W.) to communicate with Mr. Beyen.

Yours sincerely,

T. Daish

P.F. Grey, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

126.

161

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 5196

1 APR 1943

Registry Number W 5196/4/49

FROM Monsieur Massigh (French National Committee) to Sir A. Cadogan.

No.

Dated 26th March, 1943.

Received in Registry 1st April, 1943.

W : Co-ordination.

Relief for France.

Transmits a copy of a letter to Lord Selborne of 26th March together with a memorandum regarding provision of vitamins and powdered milk for women and children in France.

Last Paper.

W 5195

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/ Mr. Massigli (French Nat. Ctee) from Sir A. Cadogan. June 30

Dft/ Mr. Massigli (French Nat. Ctee) from Sir A. Cadogan May 17

(Action completed.)

do. 13/4/43

(Index.)

Alt 27.

Next Paper.

W 5205.

(Minutes.)

We are exchanging telegrams with W'hn a Rui question and we cannot add anything useful at present & the bare acknowledgment which has already been sent

French Dept
Mrs. 8/4

E. R. Crowe 5/4

5/4

See within letter from Mr. Massigli (French Nat. Ctee) & Sir A. Cadogan May 13.

Bring up June 1

E. C. 26/5

B. O. July 1st

See within letter from Mr. Quennell (M. & W.) undated

24/6.

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

Enclo 162

COMITE NATIONAL FRANÇAIS — 4 CARLTON GARDENS. S.W.1

WHITEHALL 5444

LE COMMISSAIRE NATIONAL
AUX AFFAIRES ETRANGERES

26 mars 1943.

D.150.

Acknowledgment attached R.L. 29/3

W 5196
1 APR 1943

Mon cher ami,

Vous trouverez ci-joint copie d'une lettre et d'un memorandum annexe, en date de ce jour, que j'ai adressés à titre officieux à Lord Selborne, comme suite à une conversation que nous avions eue ensemble il y a quelques semaines.

Mes collègues du Comité National et moi serions heureux que les propositions qui y sont présentées et qui tendent à autoriser un envoi immédiat en France de lait en poudre et de vitamines puissent obtenir l'approbation du Gouvernement britannique./.

Croyez, je vous prie, à mes sentiments les plus dévoués

Gasquet

The Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.,
Permanent Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office - S.W. 1

- copie -

163

160.

26 mars 1943.

C

Au cours de la conversation que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec vous, il y a quelques semaines, j'avais attiré votre attention sur la situation alimentaire en France et sur la nécessité de prendre des mesures pour atténuer, en ce qui concerne au moins les enfants, les femmes enceintes ou en couches et les malades, les conséquences de plus en plus tragiques d'une détresse qui ne cesse de s'aggraver et j'avais invoqué, à l'appui de cette suggestion, diverses considérations de caractère politique.

Vous avez bien voulu me demander de résumer mes vues à cet égard dans un memorandum de caractère personnel.

J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint ce document où se trouve exposée une opinion que

The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Selborne, P.C.,
Minister of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square - W.1

partagent tous mes collègues du Comité National. J'en communique copie au Foreign Office.

J'ose espérer que cette note retiendra votre attention et qu'avec votre appui le gouvernement britannique acceptera de se prêter à une première expérience, dont le succès présenterait pour la population française une très grande importance./.

- Copie -

165

26 mars 1943.

1C

Au cours de ces derniers mois, et notamment depuis l'extension de la zone d'occupation allemande, la situation alimentaire en France ne cesse d'empirer : augmentation des prélèvements effectués par les services du ravitaillement allemand sur des stocks déjà déficitaires; accroissement des achats individuels des troupes d'occupation; cessation des arrivages en provenance d'Afrique du Nord; contre-coup de la sécheresse de l'été dernier; diminution des disponibilités en viande à la suite des abattages massifs de l'automne, etc. etc..., tout concourt à l'aggravation d'une disette qui se fait déjà très cruellement sentir dans les centres urbains. Les répercussions sur l'état sanitaire des populations, notamment en ce qui concerne les enfants, sont aisées à imaginer; plus la guerre se prolongera, plus ces répercussions seront susceptibles de conséquences catastrophiques.

Pour montrer la gravité qu'elles atteignent déjà, il suffit de constater que l'inspection médicale dans les écoles a pu établir qu'au cours de l'année scolaire 1941-42, 34% des enfants examinés n'ont fait apparaître aucune augmentation de poids (en 1939, la proportion variait suivant les écoles de 0,5% à 2%).

Pour apporter à un tel état de chose un remède pleinement efficace, une modification profonde de la politique du blocus serait sans doute nécessaire; il ne peut en être question. En revanche, un effort

limité tendant à assurer dans les agglomérations urbaines une meilleure alimentation des enfants, des femmes enceintes et des malades, par la distribution de lait en poudre et de vitamines, ne saurait se heurter aux mêmes objections; sans dérogations appréciables aux principes du blocus, il serait possible, en effet, à très peu de frais, d'améliorer sensiblement la situation alimentaire dans le présent et, pour l'avenir, de mettre partiellement la race à l'abri des graves périls qui la menacent.

Un organisme international de contrôle (Comité International de la Croix-Rouge de Genève, Quakers, Comissions suisse ou suédoise) devrait naturellement être créé qui aurait à s'assurer que les envois reçoivent la destination prévue et qu'aucun prélèvement n'est effectué par les autorités d'occupation.

Pour une population urbaine de 20.000.000 d'habitants environ (correspondant aux départements de la France métropolitaine, moins ceux du Haut-Rhin, du Bas-Rhin et de la Moselle pour lesquels on se heurterait, en tous cas, à une fin allemande de non-recevoir) et sur la base d'une ration quotidienne de :

- 25 grammes de lait en poudre pour les enfants de 1 à 14 ans (4.400.000 enfants);

- 50 grammes pour les femmes enceintes et pour les femmes en couches (450.000 femmes) ;

et de

- 25 grammes pour les malades (10% environ de la population urbaine, soit 2.000.000),

et compte tenu de l'emballage, une quantité mensuelle de <u>6.000 tonnes</u> de lait en poudre serait suffisante.

Quant aux vitamines, le tonnage à prévoir est extrêmement faible.

Il est difficile d'admettre que l'attribution de navicerts pour une telle quantité serait susceptible de mettre sérieusement en péril la politique du blocus. Au surplus, rien n'empêcherait de procéder progressivement et de se prêter à une première expérience, avant d'établir une organisation complète.

Facile à réaliser sur le plan technique, l'opération envisagée présente au point de vue de la politique interalliée un incontestable intérêt. Le développement de la guerre aérienne impose à la population française des sacrifices extrêmement lourds et ce sont précisément les régions où la population est unanimement favorable aux Alliés qui se trouvent le plus cruellement frappées. La propagande allemande par radio, qu'elle parte de Berlin, de Paris ou de Vichy, essaye d'exploiter à son avantage les dures épreuves qu'ont ainsi à supporter en particulier les habitants de nos ports. En fait, elle a jusqu'ici échoué et c'est tout au plus si, chez les populations les plus éprouvées, un sentiment d'amertume se manifeste quand elles constatent que les dommages causés aux objectifs militaires ne sont pas en proportion avec ceux qu'ont à supporter les civils. Mais il serait imprudent d'escompter que cet état d'esprit ne se modifiera dans aucune circonstance. Est-il dès lors indifférent que la B.B.C. puisse expliquer qu'obligés de poursuivre leurs opérations aériennes aux dessus des territoires français, les Alliés font du moins ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour atténuer dans un autre domaine les maux de la population?

Au surplus, rien n'assure que le gouvernement allemand, voire celui de Vichy, autoriseraient les distributions envisagées. Serait-il indifférent qu'en une telle éventualité la propagande alliée fût en mesure de faire état de ces refus?

Au moment où l'on annonce aux populations des pays occupés, qui attendent dans l'angoisse leur libération, que la guerre sera encore longue, est-il indifférent que les Alliés aient un geste qui témoigne de leur sollicitude et de leur amitié?/.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W5196/4/49

Draft.

N. Nasigli

Sir A. Cadogan.

169

OUT FILE

Thank you for your letter (S.150) of 26th March, enclosing a copy of the letter and memo. which you have sent to Lord Selborne on the subject of providing vitamins and powdered milk for women and children in France.

PNL 29/3

I am sending into this Disposal and will let you have my considered reply before long.

OUT FILE

W 5196/4/49

170

30th March, 1943.

Thank you for your letter (D.150) of the 26th March, enclosing a copy of the letter and memorandum which you have sent to Lord Selborne on the subject of providing vitamins and powdered milk for women and children in France.

(SGD) ALEXANDER CADOGAN.

Monsieur Massigli.

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COMITE NATIONAL FRANÇAIS

LE COMMISSAIRE NATIONAL
AUX AFFAIRES ETRANGERES

W 5196 | 4 | 49

4 CARLTON GARDENS S.W.1

WHITEHALL 5444

Le 13 mai 1943.

D/127

General D-of-F.
Could you please submit same to Sir A. Cadogan to
show Mr Eden for Mr Massigli?
Tons
15/5.

Mon cher Collègue,

Par ma lettre en date du 26 mars, je vous ai communiqué le texte d'un mémorandum officieux que j'ai adressé à Lord Selborne, au sujet de l'envoi immédiat en France de lait en poudre et de vitamines, en vue d'atténuer, au moins en ce qui concerne les enfants, les femmes enceintes ou en couches et les malades, les conséquences d'une détresse qui ne cesse de s'aggraver.

L'Amiral Stark vient de me faire savoir que la question des secours aux pays occupés avait récemment fait l'objet de discussions entre les services intéressés des Gouvernements britannique et américain. Cette indication me donne une raison

The Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.,
Permanent Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

d'espérer. Puis-je vous demander, à titre personnel et confidentiel, quelques précisions, qui confirmeraient cet espoir, sur l'état actuel des pourparlers en cours ? Connaissant les profondes inquiétudes que m'inspire la situation en France, vous comprendrez, j'en suis sûr, mon désir d'être informé de la suite qui a été réservée aux suggestions que je vous ai soumises./.

Vte. Jean

Georges

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

Draft.

M. Massigli

from

Sir A. Cadogan.

173

1915.

I have received your letter
of the 13th May on the subject
of providing purchased milk &
vitamins for children & sick
persons in France.

I am afraid that I am
not at the moment in a
position to give you any thing
definite on this subject. But I will get
the information and will get
into touch with you again as
soon as I possibly can.

AC.
May 17/15.

FO. 1/6.
1915.

174

17th May, 1943.

CUT FILE

I have received your letter of the 13th May on the subject of providing powdered milk and vitamins for mothers, children and sick persons in France.

I am afraid that I am not at the moment in a position to say anything definite on this subject. But I will get into touch with you again as soon as I possibly can.

(Signed) ALEXANDER CADOGAN.

His Excellency,
Monsieur René Massigli,
French National Committee,
4, Carlton Gardens, S.W.1.

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N5196 Copy for 4 49
INDEXED
W.9150
22 JUN 1943

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF
P. Quennell
RELIEF SECTION

M.E.W.

Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
London,
W.1.

COPY/VLC.

176

COMITE NATIONAL FRANCAIS

Le Commissaire National
Aux Affaires Etrangeres

4 CARLTON GARDENS S.W.1.

Whitehall 5444

26 mars 1943.

PERSONELLE.

Ch. Lord Selborne,

Au cours de la conversation que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec vous, il y a quelques semaines, j'avais attire votre attention sur la situation alimentaire en France et sur la necessite de prendre des mesures pour attenuer, en ce qui concerne au moins les enfants, les femmes enceintes ou en couches et les malades, les consequences de plus en plus tragiques d'une detresse qui ne cesse de s'aggraver et j'avais invoque, a l'appui de cette suggestion, diverses considerations de caractere politique.

Vous avez bien voulu me demander de resumer mes vues a cet egard dans un memorandum de caractere personnel.

J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint ce document ou se trouve exposee une opinion que partagent tous mes collegues du Comite National. J'en communique copie au Foreign Office.

J'ose esperer que cette note retiendra votre attention et qu'avec votre appui le gouvernement britannique acceptera de se preter a une premiere experience, dont le succes presenterait pour la population francaise une tres grande importance./.

Veuillez croire, cher Lord Selborne, a mes sentiments de haute consideration et de devouement.

(Sgd.) MASSIGLI

The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Selborne, P.C.,
Minister of Economic Warfare.

COPY/VLC.

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26 mars 1943.

Au cours de ces derniers mois, et notamment depuis l'extension de la zone d'occupation allemande, la situation alimentaire en France ne cesse d'empirer : augmentation des prelevements effectues par les services du ravitaillement allemand sur des stocks deja deficitaires; accroissement des achats individuels des troupes d'occupation; cessation des arrivages en provenance d'Afrique du Nord; contre-coup de la secheresse de l'ete dernier; diminution des disponibilites en viande a la suite des abattages massifs de l'automne, etc. etc..., tout concourt a l'aggravation d'une disette qui se fait deja tres cruellement sentir dans les centres urbains. Les repercussions sur l'etat sanitaire des populations, notamment en ce qui concerne les enfants, sont aisees a imaginer; plus la guerre se prolongera, plus ces repercussions seront suceptibles de consequences catastrophiques.

Pour montrer la gravite qu'elles atteignent deja, il suffit de constater que l'inspection medicale dans les ecoles a pu etablir qu'au cours de l'annee scolaire 1941-42, 34% des enfants examinee n'ont fait apparaitre aucune augmentation de poids (en 1939, la proportion variait suivant les ecoles de 0,5% a 2%).

Pour apporter a un tel etat de chose un remede pleinement efficace, une modification profonde de la politique du blocus serait sans doute necessaire; il ne peut en etre question. En revanche, un effort limite tendant a assurer dans les agglomerations urbaines une meilleure alimentation des enfants, des femmes enceintes et des malades, par la distribution de lait en poudre et de vitamines, ne saurait se heurter aux memes objections; sans derogations appreciables aux principes du blocus, il serait possible, en effet, a tres peu de frais, d'ameliorer sensiblement la situation alimentaire dans le present et, pour l'avenir, de mettre partiellement la race a l'abri des graves perils qui la menacent.

/Un

Un organisme international de controle (Comite International de la Croix-Rouge de Geneve, Quakers, Comissions suisse ou suedoise) devrait naturellement etre cree qui aurait a s'assurer que les envois recoivent la destination prevue et qu'aucun prelevement n'est effectue par les autorites d'occupation.

Pour une population urbaine de 20.000.000 d'inhabitants environ (correspondant aux departements de la France metropolitaine, moins ceux du Haut-Rhin, du Bas-Rhin et de la Moselle pour lesquels on se heurterait, en tous cas, a une fin allemande de non-recevoir) et sur la base d'une ration quotidienne de :

- 25 grammes de lait en poudre pour les enfants de 1 a 14 ans (4.400.000 enfants);
- 50 grammes pour les femmes enceintes et pour les femmes en couches (450.000 femmes);

et de

- 25 grammes pour les malades (10% environ de la population urbaine, soit 2.000.000,

et compte tenu de l'emballage, une quantite mensuelle de 6.000 tonnes de lait en poudre serait suffisante. Quant aux vitamines, le tonnage a prevoir est extremement faible.

Il est difficile d'admettre que l'attribution de navicerts pour une telle quantite serait susceptible de mettre serieusement en peril la politique du blocus. Au surplus, rien n'empecherait de proceder progressivement et de se preter a une premiere experience, avant d'etablir une organisation complete.

Facile a realiser sur le plan technique, l'operation envisagee presente au point de vue de la politique interalliee un incontestable interet. Le developpement de la guerre serienne impose a la population francaise des sacrifices extremement lourds et ce sont precisement les regions,

/ou

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ou la population est unanimement favorable aux Allies, qui se trouvent le plus cruellement frappees. La propagande allemande par radio, qu'elle parte de Berlin, de Paris ou de Vichy, essaye d'exploiter a son avantage les dures epreuves qu'ont ainsi a supporter en particulier les habitants de nos ports. En fait, elle a jusqu'ici echoue et c'est tout au plus si, chez les populations les plus eprouvees, un sentiment d'amertume se manifeste quand elles constatent que les dommages causes aux objectifs militaires ne sont pas en proportion avec ceux qu'ont a supporter les civils. Mais il serait imprudent d'escompter que cet etat d'esprit ne se modifiera dans aucune circonstance. Est-il des lors indifferent que la B.B.C. puisse expliquer qu'obliges de poursuivre leurs operations aeriennes aux dessus des territoires francais, les Allies font du moins ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour attenuer dans un autre domaine les maux de la population?

Au surplus, rien n'assure que le gouvernement allemand, voire celui de Vichy, autoriseraient les distributions envisagees. Serait-il indifferent qu'en une telle eventualite la propagande alliee fut en mesure de faire etat de ces refus?

Au moment ou l'on annonce aux populations des pays occupes, qui attendent dans l'angoisse leur liberation, que la guerre sera encore longue, est-il indifferent que les Allies aient un geste qui temoigne de leur sollicitude et de leur amitie?/.

COPY/VLC,

180

30th March, 1943.

Dear Monsieur Massigli,

Thank you very much for your letter No. 103 of March 26th in which you were good enough to enclose a memorandum setting out your views on the present food situation in France and your proposals for sending powdered milk and vitamins through the blockade.

I will give your memorandum the most careful consideration and write to you again fully in due course.

Believe me,

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) SELBORNE.

Monsieur Rene Massigli,
4, Carlton Gardens,
S. W. 1.

W 5205/G/181

GENERAL

11 APR 1942

3. 1948

W 5205/~~220~~/a. 49

Ld. Halifax. Washington

No. 1508.

Mar: 30 April. 181.

Rel: to Norway.

Refs. to F.O tel. 721 of 30th (W.1023/220/a).

Re. Hull does not seem to favour secret scheme, which is presumed to be in abeyance owing to interruption in Gothenburg traffic. Asks what is present position.

Last Paper.

W 5158/4/49

W 1023.

References.

(Minutes.)

Northern Dept

? Is their Ru Gothenburg traffic is still held up.

E. Cross. 1/4

It is. But, owing to the abandonment of our operation (and the laying up of our ships) it will soon be possible for the Swedes to negociate with the Germans for its resumption. The Swedes are quite confident that they will secure its resumption. We do not, however, know exactly when they will start negociating but I anticipate it will be a matter of a week or so from now (perhaps less).

(See minutes on W 5158/4/49) Stanning 2/4/42.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.) 8/4/42

(Index.) Myt.

Next Paper.

W 5206.

24794 12/42 F.O.P.

2/4

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W

W5205

[Cypher] DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Viscount Halifax. D. 5.43 a.m. 31st March, 1943.
No.1508. R.11.40 a.m. 31st March, 1943.
30th March, 1943.

c c c

SECRET. W 5158/4/49

My immediately preceding telegram and your telegram No.721 January 30th. W 1023/220/G

1. Hull mentioned your secret scheme for Norway and was not much disposed to favour it; anyway I guess, not as a substitute for what he was now asking.

2. What is the present position? I had supposed that scheme was in abeyance owing to interruption of Gothenburg traffic.

OTP

3A. **1943**

GENERAL

W 5206
2 APR 1943
183

Registry Number W 5206/220/G. 4 49

FROM Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr.Le Rougetel.

No. T 550/12/Z

Dated

Received in Registry 3rd Mar. 1943 2nd Apr. 1943

W: Co-ordination.

Norwegian relief scheme.

Encloses a draft telegram to Washington about the suspension of the Norwegian special relief scheme.

Last Paper.

W 5205/220/G

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel. to Washington 2313. April 8.
c'd. to Mr. Camps. (NEW) '94.

(Minutes.)

See W 5158/4/49 and minutes thereon.
and W 5205/220/G

Norwich 7/4.

Subject to your views this tel. can now be despatched.

7/4.

(Action completed.)

12/4/43

(Index.)

Next Paper.

24994 2'43 F.O.P.

W 5206
2 APR 1943

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

T.550/12/Z

31st March, 1943.

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Enc. Soon

SECRET.

Dear Le Rougetel.

With reference to our telephone conversation the other day, I enclose now a draft telegram to Washington about the suspension of the Norwegian special scheme.

The reference at the beginning is to a telegram reporting the issue of certain licences in the United States. It is actually not on the files of this department.

I understood that you would like to inform No. 10 Downing Street about the telegram. Would you please let me know when it may be despatched.

Yours sincerely,
Anthony Camps

J. H. le Rougetel, Esq., C.M.G., M.C.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

P.S. We should like to get it off soon, to avoid confusion in U.S.

Z.130

W 119.

31.3.43.

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MOST SECRET. Mr Hall No 2284 and

Your telegram No. 652 Arfar of February 19th.

In view of difficulties in Sweden and at your end (see for instance your telegram No. 257 of January 14th to Foreign Office) Norwegians were advised to suspend all action on the scheme until a workable and really secret procedure had been concerted.

2. We now learn further that their intention was to send goods from Sweden into Norway by ordinary channels and distribute them there through the openly established Swedish-Norwegian relief organization; whole operation was thus being transferred to a quite different basis from that indicated in Foreign Office telegram No. 6984 of November 12th. This and evidence of leakage of information in Norwegian circles here make it clear that scheme will have to be abandoned. So far as I can learn at present ~~it is~~ merely in suspense.

3.1

H.M.R.WASHINGTON

NO. 2313 ~~ARFAR~~ ~~O.E.~~ April 8

COPY FOR:
E.E.CROWE, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

Copy to Campo
M.E.W.
April 10th

3.20/A

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3. In view of suspension licences referred to in your telegram should not be renewed when they expire at end of quarter. Can you arrange this?

E.W. 874

Gen 187

W. /G.
[CYPHER]. DEPARTMENTAL No. 1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 2313. D. 3.30 a.m. April 9th, 1943.

April 8th, 1943.

yyyyyy

MOST SECRET.

My telegram No. 2284 paragraph 6 and your telegram No. 652 Arfar [of February 19th].

In view of difficulties in Sweden and at your end (see for instance your telegram No. 257 [of January 14th] to Foreign Office) Norwegians were advised to suspend all action on the scheme until a workable and really secret procedure had been concerted.

2. We now learn further that their intention was to send goods from Sweden into Norway by ordinary channels and distribute them there through the openly established Swedish-Norwegian relief organisation; whole operation was thus being transferred to a quite different basis from that indicated in Foreign Office telegram No. 6984 [of November 12th]. This and evidence of leakage of information in Norwegian circles here make it clear that scheme will have to be abandoned. So far it has merely been in suspense.

3. In view of suspension licences referred to in your telegram should not be renewed when they expire at end of quarter. Can you arrange this?

O.T.P.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

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W 5288

3 APR 1943

Registry Number W 5288/4/49

FROM Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode (British Red Cross) to

No. Mr. Eden

Dated 31st Mar. 1943.

Received in Registry 3rd Apr. 1943.

W: Coordination +

Relief for occupied Europe

Encloses a copy of a Resolution regarding relief for mothers and children in France, Belgium and Greece, which was passed by the Executive Committee at their meeting on 24th March.

Last Paper.

W 5296.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/Field Marshal Sir P. Chetwode (Red Cross) from Re. Langford. April 2.

(Minutes.)

E 1680 574

7

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
mb 5/4/43	ACH 22 7

Next Paper.

W 5353 (W 7052)

(1) Pch
(2) General Dept
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WAR ORGANISATION
OF THE
BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY and ORDER OF ST. JOHN OF JERUSALEM

President: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN.

Grand Prior: H.R.H. THE DUKE OF GLOUCESTER, K.G.

Chairman: THE HON. SIR ARTHUR STANLEY, G.B.E., C.B., M.V.O.

Vice-Chairman: MAJOR-GENERAL SIR PERCIVAL WILKINSON, K.C.M.G., C.B.

Executive Committee:

Chairman: FIELD-MARSHAL SIR PHILIP CHETWODE, BT., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

Vice-Chairman: MAJ.-GENERAL SIR JOHN KENNEDY, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

Deputy Chairmen: SIR ERNEST BURDON, K.C.I.E., C.S.I. THE COUNTESS OF LIMERICK, C.B.E.

Joint Secretaries: F. C. DAVIES, ESQ., O.B.E. BRIGADIER W. B. G. BARNE, C.B.E., D.S.O.

W 5288
3 APR 1943

TELEPHONE: SLOANE 5191
TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS: "ASSISTANCE, KNIGHTS, LONDON"
PLEASE REPLY TO THE JOINT SECRETARIES, AND QUOTE REF.

PC/HA.

14 GROSVENOR CRESCENT,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

31st March 1943.

Dear Eden

We have had constant representations from all over the United Kingdom, especially from our own Red Cross people - notably the Scottish Red Cross - on the subject of relief for people who are suffering from the occupation of their countries by the Germans and Italians, especially mothers and children in France, Belgium and Greece.

Naturally I feel certain that His Majesty's Government are considering the matter and would like to do anything they can to help, but I am requested by my Executive Committee to forward to you the enclosed Resolution on the subject passed at its Meeting on March 24th last.

Yours sincerely,

Philip Chetwode

Field Marshal.
Chairman.

The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, MP.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall. SW.1.

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WAR ORGANISATION
OF THE
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President: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN. | *Grand Prior:* H.R.H. THE DUKE OF GLOUCESTER, K.G.

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TELEPHONE: SLOANE 5191
TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS: "ASSISTANCE, KNIGHTS, LONDON"
PLEASE REPLY TO THE JOINT SECRETARIES, AND QUOTE REF.

14 GROSVENOR CRESCENT,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

Copy of RESOLUTION; passed by the EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE of the WAR ORGANIZATION OF THE BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY & ORDER OF ST.JOHN OF JERUSALEM, at their Meeting held on Wednesday, March 24th, 1943.

The Executive Committee of the War Organization of The British Red Cross Society & Order of St.John at their Meeting held on the 24th February 1943, unanimously agreed that, in view of the representations that have been made to them that starvation, especially among mothers and children in France, Belgium and Greece, is increasing, they would express the hope to His Majesty's Government that they will find it possible to take steps to provide at least vitamins and dried milk to those in need.

Further it was unanimously agreed that the War Organization should offer their services and facilities to be utilized in any possible way in connection with such relief work.

24.3.43.

W5288/4/49

C 191

9C

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

2nd April, 1943.

As Mr. Eden is still away I am writing on his behalf to acknowledge the receipt of your letter to him of March 31st, enclosing a copy of a resolution passed by the Executive Committee of the War organisation of the British Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, and to say that it will be shown to Mr. Eden as soon as he returns.

(Sd.) V. G. LAWFORD

Private Secretary.

Field-Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, Bt., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., K.C.M.G. D.S.O.

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GENERAL

1943

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W 5276

3 APR 1943

ORDINATION.

Registry Number W 5276/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No.

Dated

Received in Registry 3rd Apr. 1943.

W: Coordination +

America Quaker organisation in France

Transmits copy of the telegram from Berne No. 1476 Arfar of 23rd March stating that there is no confirmation that American Quaker organisation in France has been dissolved. Name was recently changed to "Secours Quaker" controlled by French committee. Stocks and funds are insufficient to last beyond summer. American personnel were transferred to Baden Baden at same time as diplomatic corps.

Last Paper.

W5206 (W4311)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See W4087.

A reply to Gen. de Gaulle is outstanding; but in view of our latest telegram to W'Hall (W5158) I think we might wait a little longer.

French Dept N.A. 7.4 8/4 12/4

E.E. Crowe. 5/4

We must wait. 5/4.

(See also W5196/4/49)

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
mdo 13/4/43	Acty 27/4

Next Paper.

W5388

[Cypher].

ARFAR No. B 5276

3 APR 1943

FROM BERNE TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Mr. Kelly
No. 1476 ARFAR.
23rd March, 1943.

D. 8.15 p.m. ~~23rd March, 1943.~~
R. 4.45 a.m. 24th March, 1943.

eeeeeee

Your telegram No. 1142.

Reliable Quaker informant has heard rumour but is unable to confirm that American Quaker organisation in France has been dissolved. Name was recently changed to "Secours Quaker" controlled by French committee. Stocks and funds are in any case insufficient to last beynond the summer. American personnel have been transferred to Baden Baden at the same time as the diplomatic corps.

(OTP)

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GENERAL

1943

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W 5353

5 APR 1943

Registry Number W } 5353/4/49

TELEGRAM FROM Minister of State, Cairo.

No. 814 Medo

Dated 2nd April, 1943

Received in Registry } 5th April, 1943.

W : Co-ordination

Relief for Balkans.

Message for Mr. Matthews, War Cabinet Offices, There is increasing pressure to send relief medical supplies to the Balkans. Agreement now used is that circumstances may be changed and although the importance of blockade is recognised, it is in His Majesty's Government interest to send medical supplies to the Balkans for distribution under International Red Cross Control, since to do so now will relieve problems in the event of re-occupation of the Balkans.

Last Paper.

W 5288.

References.

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

copied & Re. Armstrong by Distr. Room

(*Minutes.*)

Southern Dept

E.R.C. 5/4

(Action completed.)

mle 9/4/43

(Index.)

Alt 27/7

Next Paper.

W 5370.

22910 9/41 F.O.P.

195

[Cypher] DEPARTMENTAL NO.2.

W 5353

5 APR

FROM MINISTER OF STATE, CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

No. 814
2nd April, 1943

D: 2. 55 p.m. 3rd April, 1943
R: 7. 30 p.m. 3rd April, 1943

p p p p

Merra.

Following for Matthews War Cabinet Offices.

Please see telegram No. 91 Merra, telegram No. 103 Arfar Merra, telegram No. 105 Arfar Merra to Ministry of Economic Warfare.

There is increasing pressure here to send relief medical supplies to the Balkans. Argument now used is that circumstances may be changed and although the importance of blockade is recognised, it is in our interest to send medical supplies to the Balkans for distribution under the International Red Cross control, since to do so now will relieve our problems in the event of any re-occupation of the Balkans. Will you consider whether this argument is worth representing to Ministry of Economic Warfare?

[Copies sent to Mr. Armstrong]

O.T.P.

E.O. REGIS

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 5370

5 "R

Registry Number } W 5370/4/49

FROM Lady Davidson
M.P. to Mr.Law.
No. -

Dated 31st March:1943
Received in Registry } 5th April:1943

W:Co-ordination.

Relief for children in occupied Europe.

Refers to Mr. Law's letter of 29th March (W 4923/4/49).

Owing to the repeated statements made by the Archbishop of Canterbury about relief for occupied territory, the public believe that the situation can easily be solved if Government really wish to do so. Considers that a strong statement should be put out by the Government.

Last Paper.

W 5353 (W 4923)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

We cannot make any pronouncement at present

E.L.D. 7/4

(Action completed.)

mle. 8/4/43.

(Index.)

Alfn. 27/7

Next Paper.

W 5392

Mr. Lamb
Gen. Dept.

Norcott Court.
Berkhamsted.

197

March 31st 1943

Earlier correspondence

W 5370
5 APR 1943

My dear Richard,

I have your letter with regard to the question of starving children in Europe.

Your reply is exactly what I expected, and, if I may say so, a sensible attitude to adopt towards this question. My only anxiety is that owing to the repeated statements made by the Archbishop of Canterbury the public are being made to believe that the situation can be easily solved, if the Government really wish to do so. I therefore really feel that some kind of strong statement should be put out by the Government, perhaps in conjunction with the Ministry of Economic Warfare. I know the answers that have been given in the House of Commons and the answers that have been given at meetings, but there is no doubt that these answers have not got across to the public, and it is having such a serious effect and creating so much anti-government propaganda.

I do beg of you to think out some method whereby the true facts may be got across.

Do not bother to answer this letter.

Yours ~~sincerely,~~

Joan Davidson

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 5392

5 APR

Registry Number } W 5392/4/49

FROM Sir J. Jarvis, M.P. to Mr. Eden.

No.

Dated 13th February, 1943

Received in Registry 5th April, 1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for occupied Europe.

Has received many letters dealing with feeding of children and mothers in occupied countries and finding asylum for Continental Jews. Suggests that statement should be made on these points.

Last Paper.

W 5370.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Aft. Sir John Jarvis M.P.
from Mr. Law. Mar 2nd
Aft. Sir John Jarvis M.P.
from Mr. Law. Mar 13
Aft. Mr. Campbell (Min. Sec.)
from Mr. Crowe Apr. 6

D

(Action completed.)

Wle. 8/8/43.

(Index.)

Aff. 22/7

Next Paper.

W 5409.

(Minutes.)

24994 2'43 F.O.P.

ACKNOWLEDGED (1) Int. Acc 199
16.2.43.

From SIR JOHN JARVIS, BT., M.P., HASCOMBE COURT, NR. GODALMING. HASCOMBE 54.

(2) Russia.

W 5392
5 APR 1943

My dear Eden,

Most of us are being inundated with letters on two subjects:-

(a) the feeding of children & mothers in occupied countries

& (b) finding asylum for Continental Jews.

Here is a letter which puts the case very well.

These folk - full of good intentions - do not realize the enormous difficulties in carrying out their wishes & how much the War effort might be hindered if we devoted our time & transport to the fulfilment of their suggestions.

Clearly the best way of helping these unfortunate people is to win the War at the earliest moment. Until then we cannot hope to right a tithe of the wrongs committed by the Hitler regime.

200

There will be a meeting in No. 14 on Wednesday where the Archbishop of Canterbury will preside & my object in writing to you is to suggest that either at this meeting, or in some other way, the real difficulties should be made known.

My own feeling is that whilst a number of our correspondents are well-minded people who want to do a kind act they are, in many cases, instigated by others who wish to embarrass the Government.

The best way of dealing with both classes is, in my opinion, to state the whole position quite frankly & I hope, in some way or another, you will be able to do this soon.

Yours sincerely,

John Garvin.

OUT FILE 201

COPY FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(W 5392/4/49) 2nd March, 1943.

You will remember that I had a word with you the other day about the feeding of occupied countries and the Jewish question, and that our conversation arose out of a letter which you sent to Eden. I am very sorry to say that I have been carrying the letter about in my pocket. As you will no doubt be wanting to reply to your correspondent, I am getting out a reply to you and when it is ready I will return the letter.

(Sd.) Richard Law.

Sir John Jarvis Bt., M.P.

202

Registry
No.

Draft.

Ev. A. Jarvis

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

I promised you, in my letter of March 2nd, notes on the relief and Greek problems.

NP As regards relief, I gave you an outline the other day of some of our main difficulties; but it may be useful if I recapitulate our point of view.

The fundamental principle which underlies our whole policy in this relief question is that both we and the U.S. Government maintain that the responsibility for feeding the civil population of the occupied territories rests solely with the occupying Power. With the exception of Greece, Germany has accepted this responsibility however inadequately she has carried it out.

Food conditions in Greece however have always been far worse than those in other occupied countries with no possible exception (except probably Poland which is of course inaccessible) and recognition of this fact is given by the Greek Relief Scheme. Conditions in other occupied countries are not comparable with those in Greece; moreover we have evidence that in the case of some of the countries concerned there is no widespread demand for relief from the population themselves who appear to appreciate that no real improvement in their lot is possible without also affording relief to the enemy. This last point is however only for your own information since if it were made public it might lead to difficulties with some of

6/3

6) Central Dept for information about prisoners in occupied countries

Lis 6/3

2) Mr Shaw 12/3.

of the Allied Governments in London. But quite apart from this I am sure xxxx you will understand that we could not justify the despatch of supplies, of whatever nature to one country alone. Any relief scheme therefore would have to include France, Belgium and Norway, probably Yugoslavia and possibly Denmark and also Greece if the supplies were to be milk and vitamins since at present only a small amount of milk and no vitamins are being sent to that country. This means that the quantities involved would be considerable. The Famine Relief Committee have estimated that Belgium and Greece would each need 22,000 tons of dried milk and 240 tons of vitamins per annum. If the other countries I have mentioned are to be included the total amount might well be in the neighbourhood of 150,000 -200,000 tons. You will appreciate that this presents quite a nice little shipping problem and though I am prepared to admit that neutral shipping might be made available, I have no evidence and cannot indeed believe that it is actually available at the present time. It is also far from certain that such large quantities of dried milk can be secured and if liquid milk had to be substituted this would require about 3 times the amount of shipping space.

In/...

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

In addition I understand that apart from what has appeared in the press, that the value of concentrated vitamins is by no means unanimously admitted by the medical profession.

Then there is the question of control. Dr. ~~Kergalvorch~~ Kaschnau's organization in unoccupied France (which of course has now ceased to function if only because the American members have almost certainly been interned) consisted of about 140 people - to feed 100,000 children! To set up in all the occupied countries an organization adequate not only to control the distribution of the relief supplies, but also to ensure that that there was no consequential reduction in the existing supplies made available by the Germans would as you will see be no mean task.

These are some of the practical difficulties, but over and above all there is the difficulty of principle. The admission of relief supplies through the blockade immediately gives the enemy the opportunity of shaking off the responsibility which we have laid on him of feeding the civil population and there is a serious risk, which I believe to be very real, that the Germans, once we weakened, would artificially create wholesale famine conditions in the expectation that we would remedy them by further shipments. If the Germans adopted such a ~~possibility~~ policy

~~possibility~~ policy it would be physically impossible for us to cope with the situation even if our determination to fight the war with all our resources allowed us to try.

All this does not mean that we are in any way unsympathetic to the sad plight of these unfortunates. On the contrary we have been considering schemes of relief long before the Famine Relief Committee came into existence: but we are convinced on the evidence before us that the time is not ripe for the major change of policy which all such schemes would involve.

As regards the Jewish question, I enclose a copy of a ~~[illegible]~~ memo which you might be able to refer to your engineers.

Letter with J recently would be a contribution on

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

COPY

206

OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(W 5392/4/49)

13th March, 1943.

I promised you in my letter of 2nd March, notes on the relief and the Jewish problems.

As regards relief, the fundamental principle which underlies our whole policy is that both we and the United States Government maintain that the responsibility for feeding the civil population of the occupied territories rests solely with the occupying power. With the exception of Greece, Germany has accepted this responsibility however inadequately she has carried it out.

Food conditions in Greece however have always been far worse than those in other occupied countries (with the possible exception of Poland which is of course inaccessible) and recognition of this fact is given by the Greek Relief Scheme. Conditions in other occupied countries are not comparable with those in Greece; moreover we have evidence that in the case of some of the countries concerned there is no widespread demand for relief from the population themselves who appear to appreciate that no real improvement in their lot is possible without also affording relief to the enemy. This last point is however over for your own information since if it were made public it might lead to difficulties with some of the Allied Governments in London. But quite apart from this I am sure you will understand that we could not justify the despatch of supplies, of whatever nature to one country alone. Any relief scheme therefore would have to include France, Belgium and Norway, probably Yugoslavia and possibly Denmark and also Greece if the supplies were to be milk and vitamins since at present only a small amount of milk and no vitamins are being sent to that country. This means that the quantities involved would be considerable. The Famine Relief Committee have estimated that Belgium and Greece would each need 22,000 tons of dried milk and 240 tons of vitamins per annum. If the other countries I have mentioned as to be included the total amount might well be in the neighbourhood of 150,000 to 200,000 tons. You will appreciate that this presents quite a nice

little/

Sir John Jarvis, Bt., M.P.

little shipping problem and though I am prepared to admit that neutral shipping might be made available, I have no evidence and cannot indeed believe that it is actually available at the present time. It is also far from certain that such large quantities of dried milk can be secured and if liquid milk had to be substituted this would require about 3 times the amount of shipping space. In addition I understand that, apart from what has appeared in the press, the value of concentrated vitamins is by no means unanimously admitted by the medical profession.

Then there is the question of control. Dr. Kerschner's organisation in unoccupied France (which of course has now ceased to function if only because the American members have almost certainly been interned) consisted of about 140 people - to feed 100,000 children! To set up in all the occupied countries an organisation adequate not only to control the distribution of the relief supplies, but also to ensure that there was no consequential reduction in the existing supplies made available by the Germans would as you will see be no mean task.

These are some of the practical difficulties, but over and above all there is the difficulty of principle. The admission of relief supplies through the blockade immediately gives the enemy the opportunity of shaking off the responsibility which we have laid on him of feeding the civil population and there is a serious risk, which I believe to be very real, that the Germans, once we weakened, would artifically create wholesale famine conditions in the expectation that we would remedy them by further shipments. If the Germans adopted such a policy, it would be physically impossible for us to cope with the situation even if our determination to fight the war with all our resources allowed us to try.

All this does not mean that we are in any way unsympathetic to the sad plight of these unfortunate people. On the contrary, we have been considering schemes of relief long before the Famine Relief Committee came into existence; but we are convinced on the evidence before us, that the time is not ripe for the major change of policy which all such schemes would involve.

As regards the Jewish question, I enclose a copy of a letter which I recently wrote to a constituent and on the lines of which you might be able to reply to your enquirers.

(Sd.) Richard Law

I return your constituent's letter.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W 5392/4/49

Draft.

Mr Campbell

from

Mr Crowe

Put drafts as:-

W 3767

W 4923

& Sir J. Jarvis

& W 2660

b c

208

OUT FILE

6 April, 1943.

[My dear Campbell]

As you suggested on Saturday, I am sending you herewith (a copy of) a few of our replies to enquiries about relief.

Yours ever,

E.E.C. 5/4

Ld) Eric. E. Crowe.

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OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.

6th April, 1943.

(W 5392/4/49)

My dear Camps.

As you suggested on Saturday, I am sending you herewith copies of a few of our replies to enquirers about relief.

(E.E. Crowe)

W.A. Camps, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

134.

210

GENERAL

1943 CO-ORDINATION.

W 5409

8 APR 1943

Registry Number W 5409/4/49

FROM Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Crowe.

No. T 550/12

Dated 3rd April

Received in Registry 6th April 1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for Norway.

Refers to Mr. Crowe's letter of 22nd March (W 4198/4/49). The draft telegram to Stockholm does not achieve the object which Ministry of Economic Warfare had in mind. Would prefer to go to the Swedes when relief policy has been agreed the United States Government.

Last Paper.

W 5392 (W 4198)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

I think we can agree to the
line he - the initiative was
U. S. W's.
Northern Dept
E. E. C.
8/4

(Action completed.)

mb 10/4/43

(Index.)

Ath 24/7

Next Paper.

(W 10044)

W 5499

Evlc

211

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
~~Berkeley Square~~ House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

T.550/12

W.5409
3rd April, 1943.
6 APR 1943

Dear Crowe,

Would you please refer to your letter to Quennell W.4918/4/49 of March 22nd, with which you enclosed a draft telegram to Stockholm about the reception of children.

I think the idea of our own proposal was that the Swedes, by claiming that they were ready to send goods to Norway and blaming us for not allowing them to do so, gave us the right to retort and that they were welcome to exercise their generosity in a manner which we could accept and which would not benefit the enemy. This might be called a locus standi. We also wanted to quell the rather alarmist inclinations of the Legation and to associate the Americans with our action, since they are being attacked as well as us.

On the whole, we fear that an approach on the lines of your draft telegram would not achieve the object which we had in mind. We should prefer to go to the Swedes when we have agreed our line with the Americans, if this ever happens!

Yours ever

Anthony Camps.

E. E. Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
London,
S.W.1.

1943

GENERAL

W5499 /G 212
8 APR 1943

4. H

W5499/~~220~~/G 49

Mr. Collier (British Embassy to Norway)

No. 44.

April 2.

April 8.

Relief for Norway.

Refs. to his desp: No. 37 (W4790/4/49). Records conversation with Norwegian P.M. on April 1st when the latter expressed concern that the Secret Scheme had been abandoned owing to "inadequacy of underground organisations", and stressed urgency of arranging a scheme of some kind.

Last Paper.
(W4790/4/49)
W5205

References.
W3967/4/49.
W17619/6397/G:1942

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)
Dft. Mr. Collier
from Mr. LeRougetel.
April 27
cd. corresp:
Ld-Selborne.
(MEA)
April 28

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
30 April 43	W/T.

Next Paper.

W5662

(Minutes.)

I have spoken to Mr. Campbell about this who tells me that there is no special reason, apart from those given to the Norwegian P.M. (See W5252/G), for this letter having been sent at this time.

As regards para 2/3 of Mr. Collier's despatch, it is clear from the memo: W17619/G/42 that the idea of the scheme was that the goods were to be imported into Norway by the Swedish Red Cross and to be handed over by the latter to the leaders of the Norwegian underground movement for distribution. How the P.M. came to so under this misapprehension I fail to understand, more especially as his idea that distribution was to be by the Swedish

Swedish Red Cross would have it a straight forward - although very limited - relief operation. This, of course, was entirely contrary to our intention which was solely to bolster up the Norwegian underground organisation.

I think it is a great pity that Mr. Collier has allowed himself to be drawn into discussion of this subject and I think we might confine ourselves to quite a brief reply and suggest that the P.M. should take the matter up personally with Lord Selborne who alone is in a position to have views as to the adequacy or otherwise of the Norwegian S.O.E. organisation.

Walter Monckton 13/4.

G. E. Crowe
12/4

J.A.R.
12/4

W5499

BRITISH EMBASSY TO NORWAY,
c/o Foreign Office, S.W.1.

214

2nd April, 1943.

No. 44.

W4790/4/49

Sir,

W5967

With reference to my despatch No. 37 of March 19th last regarding the question of relief for Norway, I have the honour to report that when I called upon the Norwegian Prime Minister yesterday His Excellency showed me a letter to him from the Ministry of Economic Warfare, dated March 30th, in which Lord Selborne stated that it had been decided that the scheme for secret deliveries mentioned in the second paragraph of my despatch No. 30 of March 8th last, could not be proceeded with "owing to "evidence received of the inadequacy of the underground organisations "in Norway for distributing the supplies, as well as to the fact "that knowledge of the scheme had now become too general owing to "leakages of information".

2. His Excellency said that he was at a loss to understand the reference to the inadequacy of the underground organisations in Norway, since as far as he knew it had never been intended that the actual distribution of the supplies should be undertaken by any underground organisations: on the contrary, his understanding had been that the Swedish Red Cross and other Swedish Agencies should distribute the goods as their own property, the secret part of the scheme being, not the distribution in Norway, but the means by which they came into the hands of the Swedish organisations. The goods, in short, would not be smuggled into Norway but merely brought into Sweden by a method of which nothing would be said to the outside world. In any case, he did not know why it had been decided to make this communication now, since the Gothenburg traffic was still suspended and there seemed no immediate likelihood of its resumption.

3. I said that it was news to me, as to M. Nygaardsvold, that underground organisations were to be concerned with the distribution of the supplies in Norway. Possibly what was meant was that the underground organisations were to advise the Swedes on how to get the goods to the right persons; but I did not know enough of this scheme to be able to give him any definite information on the point without further enquiry, which I promised to make. I agreed that, from what I had been told at the Foreign Office, there seemed no immediate prospect of the resumption of the Gothenburg traffic, about which His Majesty's Government were still negotiating with the Swedish Government; but I would not like to say that it would not be resumed sooner or later, and it might be that Lord Selborne had chosen this moment, when the question was for the time being academic, to make a communication about the secret scheme which he

would/

The Right Honourable
Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.

would have had to make in any case sooner or later, and which might have caused more disappointment to the Norwegian Government if it had been made when, owing to the resumption of the Gothenburg traffic, they had felt entitled to hope that the scheme might after all be practicable. The really essential reason for Lord Selborne's letter, I presumed, was the leakage of information, which, if it became at all widespread, would clearly cause the greatest embarrassment to His Majesty's Government owing to its repercussions on their blockade policy in general: of this, I believe, the Norwegian Government had been warned when the scheme was mooted.

4. M. Nygaardsvold then said that in any case an abandonment of this scheme made it all the more urgent to proceed with some alternative, such as the plan for the open storage of supplies in Sweden for use if the situation in Norway became really catastrophic, as he felt only too sure that it would become if the Norwegian people had to go through another winter under the Germans. Evidence of the rapid deterioration of the food situation in Norway was now reaching him from all sides: if people actually began to fall down dead in the streets from starvation, as they had in Greece, something would have to be done regardless of blockade policy, and if that were so it seemed only reasonable to make preparation for it now. He could not say more than this at present, because he was still awaiting the report of the Committee mentioned in my despatch under reference; but he would have to take the matter up vigorously as soon as that report had been received and considered.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect
Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servant

Laurence Collier

216

BRITISH EMBASSY TO NORWAY,

c/o Foreign Office, S.W.1.

2nd April, 1943.

No. 44

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 37 of March 19th last regarding the question of relief for Norway, I have the honour to report that when I called upon the Norwegian Prime Minister yesterday His Excellency showed me a letter to him from the Ministry of Economic Warfare, dated March 30th, in which Lord Selborne stated that it had been decided that the scheme for secret deliveries mentioned in the second paragraph of my despatch No. 30 of March 8th last, could not be proceeded with "owing to "evidence received of the inadequacy of the underground organisations "in Norway for distributing the supplies, as well as to the fact "that knowledge of the scheme had now become too general owing to "leakages of information".

2. His Excellency said that he was at a loss to understand the reference to the inadequacy of the underground organisations in Norway, since as far as he knew it had never been intended that the actual distribution of the supplies should be undertaken by any underground organisations: on the contrary, his understanding had been that the Swedish Red Cross and other Swedish Agencies should distribute the goods as their own property, the secret part of the scheme being, not the distribution in Norway, but the means by which they came into the hands of the Swedish organisations. The goods, in short, would not be smuggled into Norway but merely brought into Sweden by a method of which nothing would be said to the outside world. In any case, he did not know why it had been decided to make this communication now, since the Gothenburg traffic was still suspended and there seemed no immediate likelihood of its resumption.

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would/

The Right Honourable
Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.

would have had to make in any case sooner or later, and which might have caused more disappointment to the Norwegian Government if it had been made when, owing to the resumption of the Gothenburg traffic, they had felt entitled to hope that the scheme might after all be practicable. The really essential reason for Lord Selborne's letter, I presumed, was the leakage of information, which, if it became at all widespread, would clearly cause the greatest embarrassment to His Majesty's Government owing to its repercussions on their blockade policy in general: on this, I believe, the Norwegian Government had been warned when the scheme was mooted.

4. M. Nygaardsvold then said that in any case an abandonment of this scheme made it all the more urgent to proceed with some alternative, such as the plan for the open storage of supplies in Sweden for use if the situation in Norway became really catastrophic, as he felt only too sure that it would become if the Norwegian people had to go through another winter under the Germans. Evidence of the rapid deterioration of the food situation in Norway was now reaching him from all sides: if people actually began to fall down dead in the streets from starvation, as they had in Greece, something would have to be done regardless of blockade policy, and if that were so it seemed only reasonable to make preparation for it now. He could not say more than this at present, because he was still awaiting the report of the Committee mentioned in my despatch under reference; but he would have to take the matter up vigorously as soon as that report had been received and considered.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect
Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servant

(Sgd.) L. COLLIER.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

W5499/2201/a

Dft

M: Collin

from Dalton.

218

27th Apl 43

Most Secret.

Dear Collin,

Please refer to your desp
No. 44 of April 2nd about
the Norwegian "secret scheme".

The purpose of this project
was in fact ~~to~~ to enlarge
the forces of underground
resistance in Norway without
any overt departure from our
established blockade policy.
If the supplies ~~have~~ had been distributed
through the Swedish Red X, as
M. Nygaardsvold appears to
have assumed, neither of these

Copy cover.
Sir C. Wilson
Sir W. Selborne

N. Av. } WB. 24/4
Norway Dept
W.P.C.
Wells

219

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

requirements Law/ bound/ be met.
As the project is now dead
this is a matter of historical
interest, but if R. N. should
return to his charge your
best course would be, I think,
to advise him to communicate
with Lord Selborne personally.
NP. For your own information we have
During the last few
days ~~we have~~ had some
~~further~~ opportunity of discussing the General
~~informally~~ with Governor Lehman, question of immediate
as a result of which I hope relief for the occupied
we shall find it easier in future countries
to deal with approaches of this
kind, although of course our
blockade policy remains
unchanged.

Draft.

Yours ever, (sd) E. E. Crowe

for J. H. Le Rougetel

Registry

220

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(W 5499/220/G) 27th April, 1943.

Most Secret.

Dear Collier,

Please refer to your despatch No.44 of the 2nd April about the Norwegian "secret scheme".

The purpose of this project was in fact to buttress up the forces of underground resistance in Norway without any overt departure from our established blockade policy. If the supplies had been distributed through the Swedish Red Cross, as M. Nygaardsvold appears to have assumed, neither of these requirements would have been met. As the project is now dead this is a matter of historical interest, but if M. Nygaardsvold should return to the charge your best course would be, I think, to advise him to communicate with Lord Selborne personally.

For your own information we have during the past few days had some opportinity of discussing the general question of immediate relief for the occupied countries with Governor Lehman, as a result of which I hope we shall find it easier in future to deal with approaches of this kind, although of course our blockade policy remains unchanged.

Yours ever

(sd) E.E. Crowe

for (J.H. Le Rougetel)

L. Collier, Esq., C.M.G.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W. 5515

8 APR 1943

Registry Number W 5515/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No. T 550/19/4.

Dated 6th April, 1943.

Received in Registry 8th April, 1943

W: Co-Ordination.

Tunny for Belgium.

Transmits copy of telegram from Madrid No.575 Arfar of the 25th March and telegram to Madrid No.818 Arfar of the 31st March regarding purchase of tunny in Canary Islands for Belgium.

Last Paper.

W 5499 (W4920)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

D

(Minutes.)

Central Dept

(Action completed.)

mc 13/4/43

(Index.)

ACH 24/7

Next Paper.

W5563.

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

T 550/19/4

[CYPHER]

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/19/4.
OUTGOING TELEGRAM C.C. Crowe
DATE 6/4/43

Copy sent J. Dolphin

ARFAR O.B.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO MADRID

No. 818 ARFAR.
31st March 1943 D. 1.15 a.m. 2nd April 1943
Repeated to Teneriffe No. 73 Arfar.

W 5515
8 APR 1943

Your telegram No. 575 [Arfar of March 25th: Tunny for Belgium.]

Our agreement to these Belgian relief purchases in Spain is strictly limited to those goods which are bought in Spain itself, are of native Spanish origin and moreover are not goods of a kind which Spain is importing simultaneously through the blockade (see my telegram No. 2910, paragraph 1) [Arfar of November 14th]. Our agreement to this purchase of 80 tons of tunny was accordingly given on the understanding that the goods would be of Spanish origin.

2. We cannot authorise the despatch of tunny to Belgium from the Canary Islands, as this would be a shipment through the blockade, which is not permitted. I fear that navicerts must therefore remain refused, and United Kingdom Commercial Corporation should be instructed that they may purchase Spanish tunny only.

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KGD [CYPHER] ARFAR O. B.

FROM MADRID TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Sir S.Hoare. D. 11.00 p.m. 26th March, 1943.

No. 575 ARFAR. R. 9.50 a.m. 27th March, 1943.

25th March 1943.

Repeated to Teneriffe.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -

Teneriffe telegram No. 62 to you.

Tunny is part of 80 tons for Belgian relief authorised by you (see my telegram No. 2968). United Kingdom Commercial Corporation placed orders with Escobio 25 tons, Alonso Lamberti 42 and Rodriguez Lopez 13 in Canary Islands because more favourable terms offered and because export seemed a good opportunity to relieve to some extent the unfortunate position of local tunny fisheries.

2. Consignees Viuda de Fernandez will take delivery at Pasajes and rail thence to Hendaye where Belgian Red Cross take over.

3. I hope you will authorise navicerts.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 5563

9 APR 1943

Registry Number W 5563/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare

No. (communicated)

Dated T 550/19/28 5th Apr. 1943.

Received in Registry 9th Apr. 1943.

W: Coordination +

Goods for "The Save the Children Union"

Transmits copies of telegrams to Berne No. 630 Arfar of February from Berne No. 1258 Arfar of 11th March, from Washington No. 1035 Arfar of 20th March and to Washington No. 1284 Arfar of 30th March regarding clothing for the Save the Children Union for distribution to refugee children in Switzerland.

Last Paper.

5515.
W 5499

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

14/4

See within copy of tel to Washington No 2072. Arfar of 2nd.

29/5

See within copy of tel to Washington No 904 Arfar Saving of July 28th.

8.

(Action completed.)

15/4/43

(Index.)

All 27/7

Next Paper.

W 5572

24994 2 43 F.O.P.

T550/19/28
E E Crowe, Esq.
8/4/43

225

[CYPHER] ARFAR (O.B.)

W 5563
9 APR 1943

FROM BERNE TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Mr. Norton
No. 1258 Arfar
11th March, 1943

D. 7.51 p.m. 11th March, 1943
R. 11.25 a.m. 12th March, 1943

ddddddd

Your telegram No. 630.

Geneva Union state that the Swiss Legation must have misunderstood the position.

2. Union's import transactions have nothing to do with Swiss Red Cross who are at present accepting no contributions from abroad for welfare work for children.

3. Consignments are despatched direct to the Union Secretariat at Geneva, on the Union's exclusive responsibility and are used in accordance with conditions prescribed by us. Any change in procedure hitherto followed would create complications which might result in a deadlock.

4. Union therefore hope that the Swiss Legation will not persist in its attitude and that you will continue to grant navicerts under the same conditions as in the past.

O.T.P.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

226

T.550/19/28

[CYPHER]

A R F A R (O.B.)

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE

No. 630 ARFAR D. 12.50 a.m. 9th February, 1943.

8th February, 1943.

0 0 0 0

Your telegram No. 509 [Arfar of 30th January: Goods for relief in Switzerland].

We have been informed by Swiss Legation that applications for goods consigned to Save the Children Union should not be granted unless sponsored by Swiss Red Cross. We therefore apply inverted system to such applications. Is Geneva Union aware of this?

O.T.P.

M.E.W. FILE No. T 550/19/28
COPY FOR Miss Saunders F.O.
DATE 10/4/43

227

[CODE] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Viscount Halifax. D. 3. 19 p.m. 21st March, 1943.
No. 1035 Arfar.
20th March, 1943. R. 11. 00 p.m. 21st March, 1943.

W W W W W

The Save the Children Fund Federation have asked us to telegraph that they are anxious for an early decision on an application for a blockade control permit lodged by Swiss branch which they understand has been referred to you from Geneva for twenty five tons children's clothing. They assure us that clothing is intended exclusively for relief of refugee children inside Switzerland and that American Federation as donors will instruct Swiss Federation to observe this condition.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM 228

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

T.550/19/28.

[Cypher] ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON

No.1284. ARFAR.

D. 4.50 a.m. 1st April, 1943.

30th March, 1943.

Repeated to Berne No.1497 Arfar
~~Washington No.1035 Arfar.~~

- - - - -

Your telegram No.1035 [Arfar of March 20th: Goods for Save the Children Union].

Application has not yet been referred to us. Practice here has been for some months for us to refuse applications for navicerts for goods consigned to the Save the Children Union unless sponsored by Swiss authorities under inverted procedure, as we were informed by Swiss Legation here that Union's imports were for Swiss Red Cross and that latter did not now wish to accept any contributions from overseas for their child welfare work in Switzerland.

2. The Union state that the Swiss Legation misunderstand the position and that their import programme has nothing to do with Swiss Red Cross. We are therefore asking the Legation if they agree to our granting Union blockade facilities for small quantities of food and clothing against suitable guarantees.

3. We will inform you as soon as decision is reached.

O.T.P.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

W 229

W5563/4/49

T550/19/28
E. E. Stone, Esq.
24/5/43

(T550/19/28)

[Cypher]

ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No.2072 ARFAR.

20th May,1943. D. 4. 0 p.m. 21st May,1943.

Repeated to Berne No.2418 ARFAR.
Buenos Aires No.499 Arfar.

88888 W5563/4/49

My telegram No. 1284 [Arfar of March 30th - Goods for Save the Children Union].

Swiss authorities state that question of imports by Save the Children Union, Geneva raises a number of delicate questions and further examination of this matter with various Swiss agencies is therefore necessary. In addition Swiss say that final use of goods imported by Union is still uncertain.

2. In circumstances we feel we should continue to refuse blockade facilities as hitherto until Swiss advise us to the contrary.

[To Buenos Aires only]. Buenos Aires, see my telegram No. 390 [Arfar of April 21st] which refers.

OTP

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

W 230

T.550/19/28

[CYPHER]

INDEXED

W5564/4/49

ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No.904 ARFAR SAVING. (en clair) (by M.E.W.) D. 6.40 a.m. 29th July, 1943.
28th July, 1943.

Repeated to Berne No. 3526 ARFAR.

£ £ £

My telegram No. 2027 [Arfar of May 20th: Goods for the Save the Children International Union at Geneva]. Swiss Legation has now replied, distinguishing between children invited into Switzerland and children admitted as refugees. General feeling of Swiss authorities however in both cases is that children should be supported by Swiss people, though later acceptance of outside help is not precluded. As regards refugees in particular Swiss authorities are still considering various problems involved, and feel that further clarification will be necessary before examining request of Save the Children Union for 25 tons of clothing offered by American Federation. Position regarding gifts for current relief in Switzerland thus remains unchanged.

2. Swiss Legation states however that Union plans to build up stock of clothing and foodstuffs in Switzerland for future relief work either in Switzerland, if permitted by Swiss authorities, or in occupied countries. Swiss authorities would probably not object to receipt of gifts for such a stock.

3. We should be glad of views of United States authorities on proposal in paragraph 2 above. Usual disadvantage of stock building in neutral European countries is that pressure may result for premature release of goods into occupied countries. International Red Cross would probably follow Union example. If however privileges could be confined to Save the Childrens Union and goods were admitted for relief work in Switzerland exclusively, this difficulty might not be decisive.

O.T.P.

M.E.W. FILE NO. T550/19/28
COPY FOR Under Secretary of State
DATE 30/7/43

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 5572

9 APR 1943

Registry Number W 5572/4/49

FROM Mr.Robertson, M.P. to Mr.Law.

Dated 3rd April:1943

Received in Registry 9th April:1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for occupied Europe.

Encloses a letter in original stating that ships loaded with vitamins and powdered milk for occupied countries are wiating to sail and the only thing which prevents them doing so is the granting of navicerts. Requests an official denial of this.

Last Paper.

W 5563

References.

(Minutes.)

See minutes E.C. 13/4

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft / Le. Robertson MP
from Sir B Beaumont
April 9
8. Le. Carpo (M.E.W.)
April 10

(Action completed.)

mle. 13/4/43

(Index.)

AdH 22/7

Next Paper.

W 5573

(C 1) Mr Law 2) Dept. - cc NEW. ? 232

W 5572
9 APR 1943

3rd April, 1943

Richard Law, Esq., M.P.
~~House of Commons~~, Foreign Office,
S.W. 1.

Dear Law,

I enclose herewith an original letter dated 25th March, and I will be glad if you will confirm that the ships which my constituent refers to are waiting to sail, and that the only thing that prevents them doing so is the granting of Navicerts by our Government. I feel sure this statement is quite untrue but I would like your official denial of it as soon as you can.

Yours ever,
David Robertson

Copy.
(W 5572/4/49)

25B Rydal Road, 233
Streatham,
S.W.16.

25th March, 1943.

Sir,

We, as members of your constituency learn with increasing alarm of the rising death rate, and spread of disease and famine amongst our Allies in occupied Europe due to famine. The ships with vitamins and powdered milk are waiting to sail, with reasonable guarantees as to distribution. One thing only prevents this aid arriving in time to save thousands more from dying, that is the granting of navicerts by the British Government. We should like to be assured that you are using every effort to get the Government to see that this most vital relief reaches the starving countries without further delay.

Yours faithfully,

(Sgd.) James L. Walker
Grace R. Walker
C. C. Fuelling
Edith E. Hayes

David Robertson Esq.,
House of Commons.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W5572/4/49.

Draft.

Mr D. Robertson M.P.
from
the Lord
Sir B. Beauchamp.

Letter 25th inst. originals

Copy to Foreign Office

for early action
RLC 7/4

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OUT FILE

+IC. 9 April, 1943.

In Lord's absence from writing

to thank you for your letter of April 3rd, the enclosure in which I am glad of the opportunity of dispelling an illusion which appears to be very widespread.

Whether or not supplies for relief in enemy-occupied Europe could be made available in certain circumstances, the fact remains that so far as we know there is no foundation for the statement that powdered milk and vitamins are ready for shipment and that the necessary ships are immediately available. It is also inaccurate to say that there are "reasonable guarantees

guarantees as to distribution"
exist, apart from France
where relief is being distributed
through a joint Swedish-Swiss
Commission, we are not aware of

any organization in existence
in the various countries con-
cerned which could take over
these very important duties.

The whole question of
relief constitutes a major
political problem which is
under constant review and
is far from being as simple
as the public seem to
believe.

Yours sincerely

Ld) Brograve Beauchamp.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

9th April, 1943.

(W 5572/4/49)

Dear Robertson

In Law's absence I am writing to thank you for your letter of 3rd April the enclosure of which I return herewith. I am glad of this opportunity of dispelling an illusion which appears to be very widespread.

Whether or not supplies for relief in enemy-occupied Europe could be made available in certain circumstances, the fact remains that as far as we know there is no foundation for the statement either that powdered milk and vitamins are now ready for shipment or that the necessary ships are immediately available. It is also inaccurate to say that there are "reasonable guarantees as to distribution" since, apart from Greece where relief is being distributed through a joint Swedish and Swiss Commission, we are not aware of any organization in existence in the various countries concerned which could take over these very important duties.

The whole question of relief constitutes a major political problem which is under constant review and is far from being as simple as the public seem to believe.

Ed Bregeave Beauchamp.

D. Robertson, Esq., M.P.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 5573
9 APR 1943

Registry Number W 5573/4/49

FROM Dr. W. Paton (World Council of Churches) to Mr. Law.

No.

Dated 5th April, 1943.

Received in Registry 9th April, 1943.

W : Co-ordination.

Relief of occupied Europe.

Refers to Mr. Law's letter to Sir Cuthbert Headlam (W 2996/4/49). Has been given to understand that vitamins and powdered milk are available and also the money to pay for them. As to the ship, the Belgian Prime Minister announced that a ship has been handed over by the Belgian Government to the International Red Cross.

Last Paper.

W5572 (W2796)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft to Paton (World Council of Churches) from Mr. Law's Sec. April 9.

& to Campo (M.E.W.) April 10.

(Action completed.)

12/4/43

(Index.)

11/12

Next Paper.

W5621 (W5573).

(Minutes.)

See within

12/4

See within letter from Dr. Paton & Miss Jose April 12.

2/6.

24994 2'43 F.O.P.

1) W. Ref. 2) Dept. 238

TELEGRAMS:—"INMISCO. KNIGHTS. LONDON" TELEPHONE:—SLOANE 1425

WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

(In process of formation)

W 5573 4/49
9 APR 1943

PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE

(Constituted by the World Conference on Faith and Order and the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work)

Chairman of Provisional Committee:
THE ARCHBISHOP OF [redacted] CANTERBURY

Chairman of the Administrative Committee:
M. LE PASTEUR MARC BOEGNER, D.D.

General Secretaries:
REV. W. A. VISSER 'T HOOFT, D.D.
REV. WILLIAM PATON, D.D.

Secretary in America:
REV. H. S. LEIPER, D.D.

EDINBURGH HOUSE
2 EATON GATE
LONDON, S.W.1

Personal

WP/SM

April 5th, 1943

Richard Law, Esq., M.P.,
The Foreign Office,
S.W. 1

Dear Mr Law,

Some time ago I was shown, as Vice-Chairman of the Famine Relief Committee, a letter which you wrote to Sir Cuthbert Headlam, who had written to you at the instance of his constituents who had raised certain points about the blockade. I know, of course, that in your letter you were stating the official position and that it would not have been possible, had you wished to do so, to indicate, as you did to me, a certain measure of reconsideration on the part of H.M. Government. There are one or two points in your letter, however, which I should like briefly to take up.

In the first place, you say that you have no information that either food or shipping are available. As to food, the proposal, of course, is not for food in the ordinary sense but for vitamins and powdered milk, and we have certainly been given to understand that these are available and so is the money to pay for them. As to the ship, you will have noticed that the Prime Minister of Belgium publicly announced that a ship had been handed over by the Belgian Government to the International Red Cross. The proposals made by the Famine Relief Committee are for so small amounts - 2000 tons per month for Belgium - as to make a comparatively small shipping provision sufficient.

As to the United States, which you mentioned in your letter to Sir Cuthbert Headlam, our friends in the U.S.A.

I have been in touch both with Mr Sumner Welles and with Governor Lehman and it would certainly not reflect their attitude to say that they are strongly opposed to any such ~~declaration~~ of the blockade as you suggest. Of course we all ~~understand~~ that policy in these matters is now Anglo-American but it is not our impression that opposition proceeds primarily from America.

Yours very sincerely,

William Patten

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Registry
No. W 5573/4/49

OUT FILE

April, 1947.

Confidential

Dear Dr Paton.

Mr Laws will be out of the country for a few weeks (though this has not been made public yet) but before he left he asked me to thank you for your letter of April 5th in which you ask his views for certain points further ~~information~~ on the question of relief.

When writing to Sir C. Headlam the letter to which you refer, he was ~~fully~~ aware that the proposal of the Famine Relief Ctee is/c sending powdered milk & vitamins, but ~~that~~ does not ~~affect what I said~~ ~~said~~ both these commodities are in extremely short supply. Our commitments in regard to them are already very heavy and as far as we know there are only very strictly limited supplies available for other purposes.

As regards the ship mentioned by the Belgian P.M. in his recent public statement, this is the "Canitas" which is now owned

Draft.

Dr Paton
from
Mr Laws's
Secretary

Copy to Camps

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

N.A. MB. 7/4.
Mr Gray Regret, H
M.S. 8/4
E.C.S. 7/4

Registry No. W5573/4/49

OUT FILE

April, 1947.

Draft.

Dr Patton
from
Mr Law's
Secretary

Copy Mr Camps

NB. 7/4.
N. A. Wright, Hy
Mr Gray
M.S.
Mr

Confidential

Dear Dr Patton.

Mr Law will be out of the country for a few weeks (though this has not been made public yet) but before he left he asked me to thank you for your letter of April 5th in which you [wrote] to him for certain [information] further points on the question of relief.

When writing to Sir C. Headlam the letter to which you refer, it was [spoken] suggested that the proposal of the Famine Relief Ctee is/ sending powdered milk & vitamins, but [this does not affect what I said. These cases] both these commodities are in extremely short supply. Our commitments in regard to them are already very heavy and as far as we know there are only very strictly limited supplies available for other purposes.

As regards the ships mentioned by the Belgian P.M. in his recent public statement, this is the "Canitas" which is now owned

owned by the J.R.C. and is fully engaged in carrying food parcels for United Nations including Belgian — prisoners of war.

In regard to the question of the American attitude, I cannot, of course, (it is not possible) to pronounce on the personal views of individual members of the Administration. Our policy however was agreed with the U.S.G. some time ago, when it was also agreed that this policy should not be modified except by common consent; and we have, up to now, not received from the U.S.G. any request for such a modification.

Lt. Col.
Li 8/4

Sd Marjorie Jose

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

OUT FILE

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

9th April, 1943.

(W 5573/4/49)
Confidential.

Dear Dr Paton.

Mr. Law will be out of the country for a few weeks (though this has not been made public yet) but before he left he asked me to thank you for your letter of the 5th April in which you put to him certain points on the question of relief.

When writing to Sir Cuthbert Headlam the letter to which you refer, Mr. Law was aware that the proposal of the Famine Relief Committee is confined to sending powdered milk and vitamins, but both these commodities are in extremely short supply. Our commitments in regard to them are already very heavy and as far as we know there are only very strictly limited supplies available for other purposes.

As regards the ship mentioned by the Belgian Prime Minister in his recent public statement, this is the "Caritas" which is now owned by the International Red Cross and is fully engaged in carrying food parcels for United Nations - including Belgian - prisoners of war.

In regard to the question of the American attitude, it is not possible, of course, to pronounce on the personal views of individual members of the Administration. Our policy however was agreed with the United States Government some time ago, when it was also agreed that this policy should not be modified except by common consent; and we have, up to now, not received

from/

The Reverend
Dr. W. Paton,
Edinburgh House,
2 Eaton Gate,
S.W.1.

from the United States Government any request for such a modification.

(Sd) Marjorie Jose.

Dept. W5573/4/49

with M1 W

TELEGRAMS:—"INMISCO. KNIGHTS. LONDON"

TELEPHONE:—SLOANE 1425

244

WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

(In process of formation)

W 5573/4/49

X Rec 14/4

PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE

(Constituted by the World Conference on Faith and Order and the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work)

Chairman of Provisional Committee:
THE ARCHBISHOP OF [redacted] CANTERBURY

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REV. WILLIAM PATON, D.D.

Secretary in America:
REV. H. S. LEIPER, D.D.

INDEXED

EDINBURGH HOUSE
2 EATON GATE
LONDON, S.W.1

WP/SM

April 12th, 1943

Miss M. Jose,
Foreign Office,
S.W. 1

Dear Miss Jose,

Thank you for your letter on behalf of Mr Law. I knew about his leaving the country but had not realised that it was to be so soon. The point about the scarcity of powdered milk and vitamins has not, so far as I know, been made before in any apologia for the present policy of H.M. Government. It is, of course, an extremely important consideration. I would only say that I believe that if that were the only difficulty there would be enough people in this country willing to go short of a little powdered milk to enable Belgian children and mothers to survive.

About the ship, we know, of course, that it was transferred by the Belgian Government to the International Red Cross, but I cannot conceive that the Belgian Prime Minister would have thought it worth while to mention in public his desire that it might bring powdered milk and vitamins if there were no prospect of its being used for that purpose owing to its being completely commandeered for something else. The International Red Cross are very willing indeed to help with a Belgian plan for women and children.

Thank you for the note about the American Government. We do of course fully understand that it is now a common policy and my friends in America are trying to bring about a new attitude on the part of the Administration there. As they are all people who opposed Hoover two

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END

years ago, they may be listened to.

Yours faithfully,

W Watson

1

GENERAL

1943

[redacted] CO-ORDINATION

F.O.
371

FILE No. 4

Pps. 5621 - 6605

CLOSED
UNTIL
1972

36512

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2

GENERAL

W 5621

10 APR 1943

CO-ORDINATION

1944

Registry Number W 5621/4/49

FROM Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Le Rougetel

Dated 6th Apr. 1943.

Received in Registry 10th Apr. 1943.

W: Coordination +

Governor Lehman's visit to London

Encloses a copy of telegram from Washington No. 1235 Arfar of 5th April stating that Governor Lehman leaves for London on 5th April. He will not be in a position to discuss with any degree of authority the question of relief supplies through blockade for although he and his staff have administrative responsibility in these matters, questions of policy remain with the President, Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles.

Last Paper.

W 5573 (W5206)

References.

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

(*Minutes.*)

The attached telegram from Mr. Hall to Lord Drogheda dashes our hopes so far as effective discussion with Mr. Lehman is concerned.

It would seem as though the only plane on which this question can be discussed with any chance of obtaining the consent of the U.S. Government to a common front vis-à-vis the Allied governments on the subject of immediate relief is by conversations between H.M. Ambassador and Mr. Hull.

Now see W 5638 & 5707

E.R.C. 1/4

36512

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
W.D. 15/4/43	ACH 27/4

Next Paper.

(W 5638)

24994 2 43 F.O.P.

Telephone:
GROSVENOR 4060.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE,
W.1.

3

April 6th 1943.

YOUR REFERENCE_____



Dear Le Rougetel,

Herewith a personal telegram received by Dagbeder today from Hall.

Yours ever

Anthony Eden

[CYPHER] ARFAR (PERSONAL).

4

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Viscount Halifax.
No. 1235. Arfar.
5th April, 1943.

D. 1. 10 a.m., 6th April, 1943.
R. 10. 10 a.m., 6th April, 1943.

W W W W W

SECRET.

Following for Drogheda from H. Hall ~~Catton~~.

Lehman leaves for London to-day.

The Ambassador wishes me to delay departure for a least a week. I have sent a message to Sir F. Leith Ross.

2. Lehman will not (repeat not) be in a position to discuss with any degree of authority the question of relief supplies through blockade. This is reserved by the State Department as a political question. I suppose however that it will be inevitable that these matters will come up while he is in London and in particular Allied Governments are likely to press their views upon him. He will no doubt wish to have some talk on them with Minister and it will be useful if he is given the opportunity to do so. But please remember that while he and his staff have administrative responsibility in these matters, questions of policy remain in other hands, viz. President, Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles.

O.T.P.

1943

5. 4

GENERAL

W 5652 /G 5

1 APR 1943

W 5652 ~~/220~~ /G. 49

M. Camps. (MEW).

Lothian. Crowe. T. 550/12/2. 8/4 16/4.

Relief for Norway.

Encloses copy of letter of 30 March from Ld. Selborne to Norwegian Prime Minister suggesting abandonment of the secret relief plan owing to the inadequacy of underground organisations in Norway

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

W 5499

References.

See W 5499/9

Nat Def 14/4. Dept

Lib 14/4

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
17/4/43	

Next Paper.

W 5834

24794 12/42 F.O.P.

T.550/12/Z

N

6

MOST SECRET

W6632

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

8th April, 1943.

Dear Crowe,

--- Herewith a copy of the letter to the Norwegian Prime Minister about which we spoke on the telephone. I am so sorry that you did not have one before. The original is not actually on the files of this department.

Yours sincerely,
Hubert Camps

E. E. Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall,
S.W.1.

COPY

7

MOST SECRET

F/7362/130/17(b)

30th March, 1943.

My dear Minister,

Will you please refer to my letter to M.Lie of the 6th February about the scheme for conveying certain foodstuffs into Norway for distribution there through clandestine channels?

Since I wrote this letter I have been giving further earnest consideration to the problems which have arisen, and are all too evidently likely to arise in future in connection with this arrangement. In addition, I have now been informed that there is in fact no possibility of the underground organisations in Norway being able to handle with secrecy the volume of goods which it was suggested might be despatched by this means. Moreover, reports reaching me indicate that the scheme itself has become known in outline to far more people than is desirable, not only in the United States and Sweden but in this country also.

In these circumstances, I feel that the only course open to us is to abandon the idea of any operation on the scale formerly envisaged. If, however, we can ascertain how much the underground organisations can effectively deal with, and devise together a workable scheme for putting the goods at their disposal, I shall be glad to co-operate in all ways open to me.

You will no doubt wish to convey this decision to those Norwegian authorities in the United States in whom the details of the scheme were confided.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) SELBORNE.

Monsieur Johan Nygaardsvold,
Kingston House,
PRINCES GATE, S.W.7.

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8

GENERAL

1943

W 5638

10 APR 1943

CO-ORDINATION.

Registry Number } W 5638/4/49

FROMinistry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No.

Dated

Received in Registry } 10th Apr. 1943.

W: Coordination +

Relief for occupied Europe

Transmits a copy of telegram from Washington No. 126 Arfar of 7th April stating that a letter has been received from Mr. Hull suggesting that while Mr. Hall is in London he should discuss with Governor Lehman the question of civilian relief for Norway and Belgium.

Gives a list of points ~~on~~ which United States officials wish to be studied.

Last Paper.

(W 5621)

References.

(Minutes.)

See also W 5707

E. Crow- 12/4

14/4

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

WP 26/5/43

(Index.)

AEH 27/7

Next Paper.

W 5652 (W 5707)

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

With the Compliments of Mr. J.M. Troutbeck.

9

W 5638
10 APR 1943

[Cypher] ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Viscount Halifax,
No. 1260 Arfar
7th April, 1943.

D: 9. 06 p.m. 7th April, 1943
R: 7. 55 a.m. 8th April, 1943

p p p

IMPORTANT

W 1549/5/73

My telegram No. 1602 to Foreign Office and my telegram No. 1235 to you.

I have just received a letter from Hull saying that he understands Noel Hall is shortly leaving for London and suggesting that on arrival there he should take up with Lehman question of civilian relief for Norway and Belgium. The letter by implication restricts the discussions in London to the details of possible schemes and reserves the question of principle.

2. This letter is a most useful step forward and full advantage should be taken of it. It is the result of a growing conviction among some of Lehman's senior officers that relief schemes through the blockade cannot be light-heartedly undertaken at this stage of the war, and who are therefore anxious to see a full and combined scrutiny of the principal points, including the following:

(a) If we give way in the cases of Norway and Belgium as now proposed, can we long continue to give way to the other allies?

(b) If we have to give way to all European allies what is likely to be the minimum quantity of foodstuffs in short supply which will have to be procured and what effect will such procurement have upon the possibility of accumulating reserves for re-occupied territories?

(c) What ships are to carry civil supplies?

(d) By what route are they to be delivered if for example they are to be sent to Belgium across France, will Vichy pursue same tactics as in case of prisoners of war parcels and make some supplies for French civilians an indispenable condition for agreeing to the transit of supplies for civilians of other nationalities?

(e) If we are to avoid the risk under (d) can Gothenburg be used and if so will the Germans provide overland transit and transportation facilities from German Baltic ports or will we have to supply carriers; alternatively will the Germans allow neutral vessels to carry civilian supplies through from Belgian or Dutch ports direct from Gothenburg?

(f) Is there in Belgium any civil agency capable of supervising the distribution of milk and vitamins to women and children? If not is there any possibility of a neutral governmental commission Swiss or Swedish undertaking the task?

(g)/..

W 5636
10 APR 1943

(g) Is it at all possible to ensure that the supplies shipped in will be in addition to and not merely substitutes for supplies that would otherwise have been made available by the occupying power?

3. The above list of questions is not meant to be definitive. It lists some of the points which arose in a conversation with Lehman's staff which conversation is referred to in Hull's letter as a sort of terms of reference for the London discussions with Lehman.

4. I will try to arrange for text of Hull's letter to me to be telegraphed by State Department to Lehman. If Hall's departure is further delayed you will no doubt wish to proceed.

5. There now appears to be little prospect of Hall reaching London before April 16th.

143.

GENERAL

11

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 5707

12 APR 1943

Registry Number W 5707/4/49

TELEGRAM FROM
Lord Halifax
(Washington)
No.
1688 1689

Dated 9th Apr. 1943.

Received in Registry 12th Apr. 1943.

W: Coordination +

Relief for occupied Europe

Refers to Foreign Office telegram No. 2284 7th April (W 5158/4/49) Is writing immediately to Mr. Hull in sense of the telegram under reply. Mr. Hull has athorised the discussions with Mr. Lehman in London as Mr. Osborne has succeeded in convincing him that it is essential to face the realities of situation. Gives relevant paragraph from Mr. Hull's letter. Mr. Hull has also authorised the examination of the practical possibility of devising secretly a plan to meet Allied and political pressure to carry relief through the blockade during the coming winter.

Last Paper.

W 5652 (W 5638)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8. to Lo. Camps (M.E.W.)
Lord Dufferin (M.E.W.)
April 12.

(Minutes.)

Copies sent to Lo Camps (and Dufferin)

See also W 5621 - 5638.

These telegrams mark very considerable progress and will enable us to discuss all the practical aspects fully with Mr Lehman when he arrives. They do not however enable us to reply to the Belgians, Norwegians etc and I think we ought to take the people to W/hall and ask them to inform Mr Hull

a) that we will certainly avoid questions of L.'s visit to discuss the "realities"

and b) that we trust that in the meantime he will agree to our replying to the Belgians etc in the sense of para 5 of our No 2284

N.A. Dept 29/4

J. G. Crowe. Lord 12/4

(Action completed.)

mb 24/6/43

(Index.)

Alt 27/4

Next Paper.

W 5732 (W 6189)

A 5707
[illegible] 1943

it not be better to wait until we have had an exchange of views with Lehman. We may then secure his support for our suggested reply.

J. McCloy.
12/4

Now see subsequent pp.

Hull 24/6.

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W 5707

2 APR 1943

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[Cypher] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Viscount Halifax.
No. 1688.

9th April, 1943.

D. 1.59 a.m. 10th April, 1943.

R. 10.25 a.m. 10th April, 1943.

W 5158/4/49 W5638

Your telegram No.2284 and my telegram No.1260 to Ministry of Economic Warfare.

I am writing immediately to Mr. Hull in sense of your telegram under reply which pulls together considerations that we have pressed persistently but in vain, during past five or six months. I hope that my letter may fall on rather more receptive ears than have my past approaches to him on this subject. I learned just before your telegram under reply reached me that reason why Mr. Hull wrote letter referred to in my telegram No.1260 to Ministry of Economic Warfare authorising discussions with Lehman in London was that Mr. Osborne of Mr. Lehman's staff succeeded in convincing Mr. Hull personally on Tuesday morning that it was essential to face realities of situation. These were such that even if British Government were to agree to Norwegian and Belgian schemes, it would not be possible to get any action started until early autumn. Compare penultimate sentence of your paragraph 5.

APR 12 1943
F.O. REGISTRY

W

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[CYPHER] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Viscount Halifax
No. 1689
9th April, 1943.

D. 3.25 a.m. 10th April, 1943.
R. 11.25 a.m. 10th April, 1943.

0000

SECRET

ly immediately preceding telegram.

1. The following is the wording of relevant paragraph of Mr. Hull's letter to me.

"I understand, however, that Hall is himself proceeding to London in the near future and I would be very glad if upon his arrival he would take up the matter with Lehman along the line of discussion which I understand he had with Lithgow Osborne of Lehman's staff on Monday evening April 5".

[Group undec:] has now cleared with Osborne what Hull means by these words which refers to [group undec: ?our] lengthy evening discussion in which Hall was trying to persuade Osborne to face the realities of the situation. In addition to consideration of points set out by way of illustration to my telegram to M.E.W. No. 1,260, Hull has also authorised, without commitment by either Government on any point of principle, the examination of the practical possibility of devising secretly a plan which our two Governments will have ready to meet what may well be intolerable Allied and political pressure to carry relief through the blockade during the coming winter. The initiative would remain entirely in the hands of the British and American Governments, who would during the coming months examine thoroughly questions of supply, shipping and transport, and agree between themselves to what upper limit, if any, they might be willing and able to make supplies available after consultation with the appropriate food authorities. They would also examine jointly the possibility of using a neutral Governmental commission to administer civilian relief upon some basis of need measured by a common standard to be applied uniformly in all the Allied occupied territory as the opportunity offers. It will be an essential feature of the plan that we would not give a concession to one Allied Government but would give to all.

2. ...

12 APR 1943
F.O. REGISTRY

2. Hull had in mind examination of a scheme along the above lines, as well as the study of immediate practical difficulties in Norwegian and Belgian schemes in using the words quoted above.

3. As seen from here the examination may show that any scheme on the above lines is both impracticable and undesirable. Nevertheless it may be worth while to embark upon the examination seriously as being the best method that we can devise to keep the realities of the situation constantly before Hull and his immediate advisers.

O.T.P.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 5732

12 APR 1943

Registry Number W 5732/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No. T 550/25

Dated 6th April:1943

Received in Registry 12th April: 1943

W: Co-ordination

Yugoslav relief purchases in Turkey.

Transmits copies of letter from Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Donnan (United Kingdom Commercial Corporation) of 8th April enclosing draft telegram to Angora, of a letter from Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) and M. Bobitch (Yugoslav Red Cross Society) of 8th April and of a letter from Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Fraser (Treasury) of 8th April regarding Yugoslav relief purchases in Turkey.

Last Paper.

W 5707 (W 4838)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See within copy of letter from Mr. Fraser (Treas) to Mr. Camps April 10.

Southern Dept

L.H.C. 14/4

See within copy of tel to W/Tm to 1425 Angfair April 9.
" " " " " to Angora to 213 Angfair April 9
" " copy of tel from W/Tm to 1207 Angfair April 12
" " " " tel to W/Tm to 1365 Angfair April 8
" " " " letter from Mr Donnan (U.K.C.C.) to Mr. Camps (M.E.W.) of April 12.
See within copy of tel from Angora no 205 Angfair. May 12th

(Action completed.)

20/4/43

(Index.)

AUH 26/7

Next Paper.

W 5967 (W 11269)

24994 2'43 F.O.P.

17

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

T.550/25

W 5732

12 APR 1943

8th April, 1943.

With reference to our meeting with Monsieur Bobitch on Wednesday morning, I have now spoken to Fraser at the Treasury, who agrees that there is no reason in present circumstances why the Yugoslavs should not proceed to pay you £100,000 in London so that any purchases agreed by us may be proceeded with in Turkey. I am therefore informing Monsieur Bobitch that he can go ahead with the payment.

As I have also now heard from the Yugoslavs what commodities they propose immediately to buy, I have prepared a telegram to the Embassy at Angora, of which I enclose a copy. You could now I think send a parallel telegram to your people, or give them the necessary authority by simple reference to mine. We have to telegraph ourselves because there are various points which concern the Embassy anyway.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Crowe at the Foreign Office and Fraser at the Treasury.

(W.A.CAMPS)

H. Donnan, Esq.,
United Kingdom Commercial
Corporation Limited,
Plantation House,
Fenchurch Street,
E.C.3.

6th April, 1943

18

T.550/25

My telegram No. 198 (Arfar of April 2nd: Yugoslav purchases in Turkey for relief.)

Yugoslavs now inform us that transport will be by rail throughout from Istanbul to Belgrade. They also give list of commodities which it is desired to buy as follows: fish 500 tons; salt meat 100 tons; olives 150 tons; figs 150 tons; soap 300 tons.

H.M.R. ANGORA

NO. ARFAR

2. We have informed U.K.C.C. that they have permission to buy goods in quantities stated on behalf of Yugoslavs, within financial limit of approximately £100,000 (at present available). This figure is to include any transport costs as well.

3. You may agree to export of goods in question. Yugoslavs will pay U.K.C.C. in sterling in London.

4. Please ascertain and inform me for future reference whether Red Cross have secured transport through Axis territory free of cost, or whether payment of Foreign exchange to Axis is involved.

In latter event please say how much. We do not however propose to make difficulties over freight payment question in respect of this present consignment.

5. We note that olive oil is excluded from list of goods to be bought. We welcome this in view of Turkish export prohibition.

20

T.550/25
Copies to:
W. L. Fraser, Esq., - Treasury
E. E. Crowe, Esq., - Foreign Office.
H. Donnan, Esq., - U.K.C.C.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

8th April, 1943.

Since you were kind enough to visit me on Wednesday, I have had the opportunity of speaking to our Treasury and also to Monsieur Demovitch, and have received from Miss Christitch the list of the goods in question.

I am now writing only to confirm that it is in order for you to arrange the payment of the £100,000 to the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation in London. We have sent the necessary instructions to our own people in Angora.

You mentioned your hopes of eventually securing 3,000 tons of goods. While I do not think that this possibility is absolutely excluded, the fulfilment of it would need a fresh investigation into the financial and blockade aspects of the matter, and I am simply not in a position now to give any assurance about it. That is why I am anxious to clear the transaction immediately in question without more ado.

(W.A.CAMPS)

Monsieur M. Bobitch,
Jugoslav Red Cross Society,
3, Shepherd's Place,
Upper Brook Street,
W.1.

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MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

T.550/25

8th April, 1943.

Would you please refer to Quennell's letter T550/25 of March 24th about Yugoslav purchases in Turkey.

You have seen telegram No. 1123 Arfar of March 29th from Washington, which indicates that the State Department agrees to the transaction. We saw the Yugoslavs yesterday, and they produced a list of goods which they want to buy, and which are in order from our point of view. As you told me I might on the telephone yesterday, I have informed the Yugoslavs that they may now proceed to pay the U.K.C.C. in London the £100,000 which is said to be necessary to finance the transaction. I have also told our people in Angora that the scheme can go ahead on this basis. Please see copies of letters to Donnan at the U.K.C.C. and Monsieur Bobitch of the Yugoslav Red Cross which I enclose herewith.

2

There are one or two points outstanding on which I should be very grateful for your help.

1. The Yugoslavs apparently tried to make this payment some while ago but got stopped. I do not know quite how. But the man in charge seems to be pretty woolly about the details, so he may have asked for the transfer to be made to Angora instead of to the U.K.C.C. in London or something of the sort. Anyway the attempt to transfer was of course premature, as the question had not been finally settled. But I hope that we can be sure that, now that it is in order the thing will go through smoothly.

W. L. Fraser, Esq.,
Treasury,
Whitehall

2/

2. I understood you to say that the Yugoslavs were good for £100,000 in any event. But you will see from Washington's telegram No. 1123 Arfar that if they want to buy sterling against dollars to replace this, they are expected to apply for a licence for this specific purpose when they come to ask for the dollars. It all seems to me rather impracticable, but perhaps you would either see that the Yugoslavs set about it in the right way, or alternatively give me an answer to Washington.

3. The Yugoslavs want to spend £100,000 to buy 1,200 tons of goods. They have been told from Angora that the goods in question will cost this amount. But the U.K.C.C. here think it almost certain that such a quantity of the goods in question would cost far more than the sum stated. If so, we here should not object to the extra expenditure, nor should we have to ask Washington again, as we did not mention a figure when putting the question to them in our telegram No. 479 Arfar of February 5th. We have however discussed the matter with you on the basis of £100,000, so I should like to know if you foresee difficulty in providing any extra exchange that may be necessary.

4. The Yugoslavs have also been lead to expect by the people in Angora that they may buy up to 3,000 tons of goods. Unless there are real objections to their doing so, I think that we are committed to allow them, as we allowed the U.K.C.C. to start on this business originally. I am so informing Washington. But meanwhile, I do not see that we are committed to incur the extra expenditure of Turkish pounds, if in fact it would really embarrass us to have to do so. I have therefore reserved a decision

about/

about further position in my letter to Monsieur Bobitch. Would you please consider whether it matters or not from the financial angle?

A great deal of confusion has been caused in all this by the failure of the Yugoslavs to approach us directly until they were made to do so the other day. Among other things you will see from telegram No. 1207 Arfar from Washington of April 2nd that they have gone to the State Department, told them a number of accidental falsehoods and applied for American permission to pay sterling to the U.K.C.C. in Angora. Apparently someone told them that the matter was being discussed with the Americans and they thought that this was the best way to clear it up.

(W.A.CAMPS)

With Mr. W.L. Fraser's compliments

TREASURY CHAMBERS

10th April, 1943.

Dear Camps,

Yugoslav Purchases in Turkey

I will deal separately with the U.S. - Yugoslav part of the story from the dollar point of view; I shall only refer in this letter to the points raised by you in your letter to me of the 8th April regarding the actual purchase in Turkey.

I am not quite clear from your letter whether we have committed ourselves to allow the Yugoslavs to buy up to 3,000 tons of goods. If we have not, I would prefer to let us see whether the purchase of the 1,200

W.A. Camps, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.
Berkeley Square House, Berkeley Square, W.1.

/tons

25

tons goes smoothly. I suspect that export licences will not be easy to come by, and would therefore like to say that 1,200 tons is enough for the present.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Crowe and Donnan.

Yours sincerely,

(SGD.) W.L.FRASER.

[Code: R]. LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION. 26

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Viscount Halifax
No. 1207 ARFAR.
2nd April, 1943.

D. 3.38 a.m. 3rd April, 1943.
R. 10.10 a.m. 3rd April, 1943.

eeeeeee

IMPORTANT.

My telegram No. 1123 paragraph 1.

Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires in a written memorandum to the State Department says that the U.K.C.C. has already purchased for the Yugoslav Government 3,000 tons of foodstuffs in Turkey to be delivered by agreement with Bulgaria, Turkey and the German authorities, in sealed vans. The note then specifically asks for the State Department's approval of a transfer of £100,000 to Angora to pay for the first shipment of 1,200 tons which is to be only a part of the total of 3,000 tons referred to above.

I cannot reconcile either quantities mentioned or the claim that goods have been purchased with the information you have sent to me. Please elucidate.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

W 27

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

W 5729/4/49

T550/25

INDEXED

[Cypher]

LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No.1365. ARFAR. 6th April, 1943.

D. 1.20 a.m. 7th April, 1943.

C C C

Your telegram No.1207 [Arfar of April 3rd: Yugoslav purchases in Turkey]

U.K.C.C. have not yet authorised any purchases. We await discussion of final details with Yugoslavs before authorising deal ourselves. Since my telegram No.479 Arfar of February 5th, figure of 3,000 tons has been mentioned by Angora Embassy, but we have told them that, as we have discussed question with you on a basis of 1,000 tons, the latter figure should stand. We presume United States authorities would not object to further purchases up to 3,000 tons, but should like to clear up present problem before assuming further commitments.

2. Yugoslavs were to re-imburse us here in dollars against purchases made in Turkey on their behalf. By direct transfer which appears to be contemplated they would lose considerable financial advantage of dealing through U.K.C.C. at special rates.

3. We will telegraph you further we have spoken to the Yugoslavs.

Southern Dept

13/4

MEMO FILE No. T550/25

COPY. R R Crowe Esq. F.O.

DATE 11/4/43

copy also for H Donnan U/KCC.
W L Hause. Treas.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

W 5732 / 4 / 49

(T.550/25).
[Cypher].

ARFAR O.B.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 1425 ARFAR.
9th April, 1943. D. 5.0 a.m. 10th April, 1943.

vvvvvvv

My telegram No.1365 [Arfar of April 6th: Yugoslav relief purchases in Turkey].

It appears that Yugoslavs mistook co-operation of U.K.C.C. for final approval of programme by His Majesty's Government. Nothing however can actually have been bought as U.K.C.C. in Turkey were without authority. Yugoslavs had not until yesterday approached His Majesty's Government directly in the matter since our letter T550/Z of September 29th to you was written. Their assumption of our agreement to eventual purchase of 3,000 tons was based on previous assurances mentioned in annexe to that letter and to our letter of October 30th under same reference. The curious terms of their approach to the State Department (which in our earlier reply to your telegram No.1207 [Arfar of April 2nd] we misread as an application for transfer of dollars to Turkey) were due to this position. We had of course no knowledge of this approach. Presumably Yugoslavs had learned that matter was under discussion with American Government.

2. For details of transaction now arranged please see my immediately following telegram. We are examining financial and other implications of eventual purchase of 3,000 tons, and feel committed to allow this unless practical objections emerge. We have not however so informed the Yugoslavs.

O.T.P.

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/25
COPY FOR E E Bowe Esq
DATE 13/4/43.
Copy sent w d/f

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

W 5732/14/49

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and [illegible] Foreign

kept under Lock and Key.]

with MM M 29

INDEXED

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/25
COPY FOR W & Trade Corp
DATE 13/4/43

T.550/25.

[CYPHER]

Copy Sent EE Crowe ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO ANGORA

No. 213 ARFAR.
9th April, 1943.

D. 1.0 a.m. 10th April, 1943.

Repeated to Washington No. 1426 ARFAR.

99999999999

My telegram No. 198 [ARFAR of April 2nd: Yugoslav purchases in Turkey for relief.]

Yugoslavs now inform us that transport will be by rail throughout from Istanbul (Constantinople) to Belgrade. They also give list of commodities which it is desired to buy as follows: fish 500 tons; salt meat 100 tons; olives 150 tons; figs 150 tons; soap 300 tons.

2. We have informed United Kingdom Commercial Corporation that they have permission to buy goods in quantities stated on behalf of Yugoslavs, within financial limit of approximately £100,000 at present available. This figure is to include any transport costs as well.

3. You may agree to export of goods in question. Yugoslavs will pay United Kingdom Commercial Corporation in sterling in London.

4. Please ascertain and inform me for future reference whether Red Cross have secured transport through Axis territory free of cost, or whether payment of Foreign exchange to Axis is involved. In latter event please say how much. We do not however propose to make difficulties over freight payment question in respect of this present consignment.

5. We note that olive oil is excluded from list of goods to be bought. We welcome this in view of Turkish export prohibition.

Southern Dept
Rec'd 13/4

with pp 30

INDEXED

With the Compliments of the
UNITED KINGDOM COMMERCIAL CORPORATION.

Re Yug 14/4/43

12th April, 1943.

Ref. HAD/OMC.

W 5732/4/49 M1

Dear Camps,

Thank you for your letter of the 8th instant in connection with Yugoslav relief. I have sent our Ankara office a parallel telegram to your 215 Arfar and hope that they will be able to buy and secure export licences for at least a substantial part of the goods which the Yugoslavs require.

I have also written to Mr. Bobitch advising him that we have authorised our Ankara office to embark upon purchases up to approximately £100,000, and have suggested to him that we shall be glad to receive his payment for £100,000 at his convenience.

I am sending copies of this letter to Crowe and Fraser.

Yours sincerely,

H. A. DONIA

W. A. Camps, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
LONDON, W.1.

M126/7

31 W

W 5732 4 49

W 5732/4/49

with app

13 MAY 1943

INDEXED

Relief for Yugoslavia

[Cypher] ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM ANGORA TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen,
No.205 ARFAR. D. 8. 52 p.m. 2nd May,1943.
R. 6. 15 a.m. 3rd May,1943.
1st May,1943.

Repeated to Washington.

888888

Your telegram No.213 paragraph 4.

U.K.C.C. have received information that the Germans will provide the necessary waggons for transport of relief supplies to Belgrade. Freight payable by us will be in Turkish lire for section Istanbul(Constantinople) to Bulgarian frontier only.

Copied also to
UKCC
Treasury

T 5501/25
E. Grenside Esq
8.6.43 F.O

145

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 5767

APR 1943

Registry Number } W 5767/4/49

FROM Mrs. Hawkin

No. -

Dated 4th April:1943

Received in Registry } 13th April: 1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for occupied Europe.

The St. Thomas Townswomen's Guild of Exeter is much concerned about the position and regard to relief for occupied Europe.

Requests that it may receive a statement giving reasons why relief cannot be sent to occupied Europe.

Last Paper.

W 5732.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/ Mrs. I. D. Hawkin
April 14.

D

(Action completed.)

15/4/43

(Index.)

ACH 22/7

Next Paper.

W 5781.

(Minutes.)

See cutting
L.E. 15/4

Now see letter from Mrs Hawkin of April 20
L.E.

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

W 5767

13 APR 1943

33

4.iv.43.

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden M.P.
The Foreign Office,
Whitehall.
S.W.1.

Dear Mr Eden,

Though this will not, of course, meet your eye personally, I am going to write as if it would.

The St Thomas Townswomens' Guild in this City has been much concerned over the facts given by the Belgian Ambassador, the Archbishops, and many others, as to the starvation now going on in many countries of Europe. It has seen responsible statements which seem to show that a moderate amount of relief, if only for children, could be sent by us successfully, -(as successfully as the Red Cross parcels for

prisoners of war, It has written to the Member, Mr A.C.Reed, but only received a vague and unsatisfactory reply for him, after delay, and a second request.

It would allay much local anxiety if a reason for our course of conduct could be given; and would credit one given with your imprimatur.

I hope very much that you will be able to send us a brief reply.

Yours faithfully,

Dorothy Hawkin.

Registry
No. W 5767/4/49

J.H.Le R.

Draft.

Mrs. T.D. Hawkin.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Z

Pol Dep. Secy R/4

13a

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OUT FILE

14th April 1943.

(Dear) Madam,

Mr. Eden has asked me to reply to your letter of April 4th about food conditions in occupied Europe.

Both H.M.Government and the United States Government have always maintained that the responsibility for feeding the civil population of the occupied countries rests solely with the occupying Power. Germany has accepted this responsibility, except in the case of Greece.

Food conditions in Greece, however, have always been far worse than those of other accessible occupied countries, and recognition of this fact is given by the Greek Relief Scheme, which has been working in one form or another since the second half of 1941.

As regards other accessible countries under German occupation, ~~it would not be justifiable for~~ present circumstances would not justify H.M. Government in sending supplies to any one to the exclusion of the others, even if the supplies themselves, the necessary shipping, and adequate means of supervising distribution were available. According to the information at our disposal, none of these conditions can be met at the present time.

Yours etc.

(Sd.) J. H. LE ROUGETEL

R/C 17/4

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FOREIGN OFFICE, SW.1.,

OUT FILE 14th April, 1943.

(W 5767/4/49)

Madam,

Mr. Eden has asked me to reply to your letter of the 4th April about food conditions in occupied Europe.

Both His Majesty's Government and the United States Government have always maintained that the responsibility for feeding the civil population of the occupied countries rests solely with the occupying Power. Germany has accepted this responsibility, except in the case of Greece.

Food conditions in Greece, however, have always been far worse than those of other accessible occupied countries, and recognition of this fact is given by the Greek Relief Scheme, which has been working in one form or another since the second half of 1941.

As regards the other accessible countries under German occupation, present circumstances would not justify His Majesty's Government in sending supplies to any one to the exclusion of the others, even if the supplies themselves, the necessary shipping, and adequate means of supervising distribution were available. According to the information at our disposal, none of these conditions can be met at the present time.

I am,
Madam,
Your obedient Servant,

(Sd.) J. H. LE ROUGETEL

Mrs. T.D. Hawkin.
Rougemont Cottage,
Old Tiverton Road,
Exeter.

(W 5767/4/49)

Rougemont Cottage,
Old Tiverton Rd.
E X E T E R.

W 5767 4 49.

20th April
1949.

Mrs Hawkin and the Exeter voters she wrote for, are grateful to the Foreign Office for the reply of 14th April to their inquiry regarding the possibility of relieving starvation among allied nations.

They do not expect to prolong the correspondence, knowing the pressure under which the Foreign Office must be working. But they are still concerned over the matter, as neither this reply, nor those received from their M.P. have disposed of certain facts best presented with the authority of Mr Herbert Hoover, and reported in the New York "Herald-Tribune" of Feb. 21st last. Mr Hoover spoke at a meeting of some 2,500 in the Carnegie Hall, and among other statements made these: that the Swedes have idle ships that they will not risk in belligerent service, but which they are ready to charter for use in humanitarian service. Thus, the question of depleting Allied shipping does not arise.

There is ample food in S. America which cannot be transported by the Allies, and therefore there need be no deprival of food to the Allies.

They also feel that the fact that parcels to prisoners of war are distributed without interference, warrants a belief that the larger work could be carried through, if the Government wished it to be done.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 5781

17 APR 1943

Registry Number W 5781/4/49

FROM Sir C. Headlam, M.P. to Mr.Law.

No.

Dated 9th April, 1943.

Received in Registry 13th April, 1943.

W : Co-ordination.

Relief for occupied Europe.

Encloses a letter from some of his constituents regarding despatch of relief to occupied Europe. Enquires what reply should be sent to these people.

Last Paper.

W 5767 (W 5573)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Sir C. Headlam M.P. from Sir B. Beauchamp April 19

M.E.W. April 19.

D

(Minutes.)

Dyas 14/4

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
20/4/43	A.C.H. 27/7

Next Paper.

W 5834

Gen. Dept.

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TELEPHONE: 266111
TELEGRAMS: "NOCO"

NORTHERN COUNTIES CLUB
NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE

W 5781
Holywell
1943

9/11/43

as from

CC.

+ put up Durham with

Cabinet Letter & Dr Salter

My dear Law —

I hate to bother you again, but if you could supply me with a rejoinder to these tiresome people I should be greatly obliged. They represent our University intelligentsia in this area — an annoying and futile community

Sincerely yours
Cuthbert Headlam

16a

41

Registry
No. W5781/4/49.

19 April, 1943.

My dear Headlam.

Despatched

I am replying to your letter to M. Law who is away. I am sorry that you are still having trouble with your constituents about the relief question and I will try to provide answers to the points raised in the letter which you sent me - and which I return herewith.

In the first place the fact that the Belgian P.M. states that supplies have been "ordered" does not mean that they are available. (I imagine everyone these days must be only too well aware of this distinction from their own personal experiences) The fact the commodities which both M. Pirlot and the Famine Relief Office have specially in mind for Belgium - namely powdered milk and vitamins - are in extremely short supply. Our commitments

Draft. Sir C. Headlam
from
Sir B. Beauchamp

Telegram.

M.J. 15/4

Copy to Mr Camps

Stream as soon as we know such supplies have been paid for.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

commitments i regard t them ~~[illegible]~~ are already very heavy and als our information goes t show that there are only very strictly limited supplies available for other purposes.

As regards the "Caritas" this ship is owned by the I.R.C. and is fully engaged in carrying food parcels for United Nations - including Belgian - prisoners of war. In this connection I might remind you of ~~[illegible]~~ the reply given by Mr Foot Dingle in the House on March 26th to a question by ~~[illegible]~~ Beamish

The question of an adequate control organization is, I concur, a difficult one. I do not dispute the fact that the I.R.C may be willing to try t exercise the necessary supervision; but that is not the same as saying that either that the organization exists or that it would be adequate if it were brought into existence.

I

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

I may mention that Dr Hauschner's Quaker organization which fed 100,000 children in France — and which of course no longer exists — consisted of no less than 400 persons! While therefore I do not mean to imply that it would be impossible to organize proper supervision + control, it would obviously be a big task and would entail a great deal of preparatory work + discussion.

As regards British Naval entry U.S.E.L.'s the statement that the Latter would be required was not an attempt to shuffle out of responsibility at the expense of the Americans but on the contrary to emphasize the necessity of acting in close collaboration with them in accordance with our agreed policy. Everything that you

Could I could stress once again that we could not allow relief for our country and not for others.

your constituents say a thing point simply brass him out. The point is that our blockade policy is a point one and cannot be modified by either party alone.

I hope that the foregoing will enable you to pacify your zealous Communitarian at least for some time.

Yours sincerely
1914

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

45

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

19th April, 1943.

(W 5781/4/49)

My dear Headlam.

I am replying to your letter to Law who is away. I am sorry that you are still having trouble with your constituents about the relief question and I will try to provide answers to the points raised in the letter which you sent me - and which I return herewith.

In the first place the fact that the Belgian Prime Minister states that supplies have been "ordered" does not mean that they are available. (I imagine everyone these days must be only too well aware of this distinction from their own personal experiences). Moreover as far as we know no such supplies have been paid for. In fact the commodities which both M. Pierlot and the Famine Relief Committee have specially in mind for Belgium - namely powdered milk and vitamins - are in extremely short supply. Our commitments in regard to them are already very heavy and all our information goes to show that there are only very strictly limited supplies available for other purposes.

As regards the "Caritas" this ship is owned by the International Red Cross and is fully engaged in carrying food parcels for United Nations - including Belgian - prisoners of war. In this connexion I might remind you of the reply given by Dingle Foot in the House on the 25th March to a question by Bennish.

The question of an adequate control organisation

is/

Lieutenant-Colonel
Sir Cuthbert Headlam, Bt., D.S.O., O.B.E., M.P.

is of course, a difficult one. I do not dispute the fact that the International Red Cross may be <u>willing</u> to try to exercise the necessary supervision; but that is not the same as saying either that the organization exists or that it would be adequate if it were brought into existence. I may mention that Dr. Kerschner's Quaker organization which fed 100,000 children in France - and which of course no longer exists - consisted of no less than 400 persons! And I would stress once again that we could not allow relief for one country and not for others. While therefore I do not necessarily mean to imply that it would be impossible to organize proper supervision and control, it would obviously be a big task and would entail a great deal of preparatory work and discussion.

As regards British Navicerts versus United States Export Licences the statement that the latter would be required was not an attempt to shuffle out of responsibility at the expense of the Americans; but on the contrary to emphasize the necessity of acting in close collaboration with them in accordance with our agreed policy. Everything that your constituents say on this point simply bears this out. The point is that our blockade policy is a <u>joint</u> one and cannot be modified by either party alone.

I hope that the foregoing will enable you to pacify your zealous humanitarians at least for some time.

Yours sincerely

(B.Beauchamp)

6. 1943 4

GENERAL

W5834 /G/47

14 APR 1943

W 5834 /220/ Gen. 49

M. E. W.

(Comm.d).

—

April 14.

Norwegian Relief Scheme.

Copy of tel: No. 1431 Repeated to Washington, asking authorities to assist Swedes in their desire to sell to U.S. Govt. purchasers in Buenos Aires, 550 tons of land purchased for the Norwegians before the Scheme was cancelled

Last Paper.

W5650.

(Minutes.)

Northern Dept

Stores. 17/4.

E.R.O. 16/4

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
18/4/43.	W/T.

Next Paper.

W6500.

24794 12/42 F.O.P.

13/4 Hon. Crowe

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

48

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

Entry

W

W5834
14 APR 1943
G

(Z.130)
[Cypher].

ARFAR O.B.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No.1431 ARFAR.
9th April, 1943.

D. 3.40 a.m. 10th April, 1943.

vvvvvv

MOST SECRET.

Foreign Office telegram No.2313 [of the 8th April: secret arrangement for Norwegian relief].

Before scheme was cancelled the Swedes had, with our approval, purchased for Norwegians 100 tons of lard from Armour and 450 tons of lard from Swift, both of Buenos Aires, for gradual shipment to Sweden. (See paragraph 5 of my telegram No.192 [Arfar of the 16th January]).

2. They have now offered this lard to United States Government purchasers in Buenos Aires at price which would show neither profit nor loss to them on whole transaction.

3. Norwegians have asked us to support this deal with the United States authorities. It is difficult to see how you can assist in Washington and Buenos Aires have no knowledge of scheme. If however goods cannot be sold without loss Norwegians are likely to apply to United States Treasury for release of their own dollars to pay the Swedes and we shall be morally bound to support their application. As this may well prove very embarrassing please do what you can to sponsor the sale.

O.T.P.

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49

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 5870

15 APR 1943

Registry Number W 5870/4/49

FROM Consul-General Shepherd (Leopoldville)

No. No. 56 (C.6.c)

Dated 25th Mar. 1943

Received in Registry 15th Apl. 1943

W : Co-ordination

Relief for Belgium.

Encloses copies of two cuttings from the Leopoldville paper "Avenir Coloniale Belge" regarding food for the population of Belgium. The cuttings record a telegraphic request made on 6th March by the Committee of the "Confédération d'Associations des Anciens Combattants" to the Minister for the Colonies for his intervention in this matter.

Last Paper.

W 5834

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

& hr. Camps (M.E.W.) (with enclosures for P.R.) April 20.

(Minutes.)

Copy (with orig. encl. for pers. + return) to Mr Camps M.E.W.

EKS 1874

(Action completed.)

mb 22/4/43

(Index.)

M.H. 11/12

Next Paper.

(W10167) W 5884

24994 2'43 F.O.P.

W

19~
50

No.56.
C.6.c.

British Consulate General,
Leopoldville,
15th March, 1943.

5870
15 APR 1943

1C

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of two newspaper cuttings regarding food for the population of Belgium. The cuttings record a telegraphic request made on March 6th by the Committee of the "Confédération d'Associations des Anciens Combattants" to the Minister for the Colonies for his intervention in the matter, and a reminder sent on March 20th.

2. These cuttings are from the Leopoldville paper "Avenir Coloniale Belge," which is anti-Government. It is of course true that the privations of their compatriots in Belgium is a cause of constant worry to Belgians in the Congo, and that disturbing news often arrives of particularly unhappy cases. There is a strong and universal feeling that something should be done for women (especially mothers and expectant mothers) and children, on the lines of the resolution passed at Oxford during the last few days at a meeting presided over by the Bishop of Oxford.

3. It is a little surprising that more has not been heard here of relief for Belgium in recent months, during which a considerable number of persons have reached the Colony from Belgium. There seems to be a general feeling that conditions, though hard, are nevertheless bearable for the majority of people, but that the lack of proper nourishment for children and mothers is a most serious problem, which, in the interests of the coming generation should be dealt with urgently.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servant,

R. Hillsley Shepherd

H.M. Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs.
FOREIGN OFFICE.
LONDON S.W.1.

P.S. A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Resident Minister at Accra.

NOTHING

Avenir Colonial Belge
20-3-43.

ONIAL BELGE

Confédération des Anciens Combattants

N'ayant pas reçu réponse à notre télégramme du 5 mars 1943 envoyé à notre ministre des Colonies au sujet des envois des vivres à nos compatriotes en pays envahi, nous lui adressons le télégramme de rappel ci-dessous :

" DEVLEESCHAUWER
Ministre des Colonies Belgique
LONDRES.

CONFIRMONS TÉLÉGRAMME 5 COURANT STOP COLONIAUX ANXIEUX VOS INTERVENTIONS ET RESULTATS ACQUIS.

BELPAIRE
Président Confédéral

N. de la R. — *Bravo les Anciens ! Poursuivez votre offensive, vous arriverez peut-être à les remuer... Vous n'en ferez jamais assez lorsqu'il s'agit de soulager les misères de nos malheureux compatriotes écrasés sous la botte boche.*

Courrier d'Afrique 25-3-43.

Un plaidoyer en faveur du ravitaillement de la Belgique

Un meeting présidé par l'évêque d'Oxford a eu lieu dans la grande salle du Nouveau Collège d'Oxford.

Près de cinq cents professeurs et étudiants y écoutèrent un plaidoyer en faveur de l'envoi de vivres à la Belgique et aux autres pays occupés.

La résolution suivante fut prise à l'unanimité :

« La présente réunion, organisée par «The Oxford University Church Union» (l'Union de l'Eglise de l'Université d'Oxford), « The Student Missionary Union (l'Union des Etudiants Missionnaires), « The Student Christian Movement » (Le Mouvement des Etudiants Chrétiens), avec le concours des cercles politiques, tenue à Oxford, le 9 février 1943, sous la présidence de l'Evêque d'Oxford, souhaite voir le Gouvernement britannique autoriser l'envoi de vivres en Grèce en vue d'y enrayer les ravages de la famine, exprime l'espoir le plus formel de voir — moyennant garantie suffisante — étendre le bénéfice d'une telle assistance à d'autres pays de l'Europe menacés par la famine, et plus particulièrement à la Belgique et à certaines parties de la France; admet qu'en considération des difficultés que l'expédition de quantités considérables présenterait dans la pratique, les envois devraient être strictement limités à des produits pharmaceutiques et à une certaine quantité d'aliments concentrés, [illegible] l'effet de protéger autant que possible les femmes et les enfants contre les [illegible] de la tuberculose et d'[illegible] résultant de deux ans [illegible] alimentation, insiste pour [illegible] soit prise d'urgence avant que les mauvaises conditions sanitaires aient eu le temps de miner la résistance morale et physique du peuple et de compromettre tout espoir d'une reconstruction future. »

6-3-43

L'AVENIR COLONIAL BELGE

La question du ravitaillement de nos compatriotes affamés

Une belle initiative des Anciens Combattants

Le Comité de la Confédération d'Associations des Anciens Combattants au cours de sa réunion d'hier a décidé d'envoyer à M. A. De Vleeschauwer, ministre des Colonies, le télégramme ci-dessous :

DEVLEESCHAUWER
MINISTRE COLONIES BELGIQUE
LONDRES

« AU NOM TOUTES ASSOCIATIONS ANCIENS COMBATTANTS COMITÉ CONFÉDÉRAL RAPPELLE VŒUX REMIS LE 9 AOUT 1942 REPRIS DANS MÉMOIRE DU 31 AOUT REMIS 7 SEPTEMBRE ET SPÉCIALEMENT QUESTION RAVITAILLEMENT POPULATION BELGIQUE OCCUPÉE POUR LAQUELLE AVIEZ PROMIS INTERVENTION EFFECTIVE STOP COMITÉ INSISTE POUR CONNAITRE RÉSULTAT VOS NÉGOCIATIONS ET MESURES PRISES STOP NOTRE DÉMARCHE DICTÉE PAR PROFONDE ÉMOTION PARMI POPULATION CONGOLAISE SUITE DÉSASTREUSES NOUVELLES REÇUES BELGIQUE. »

BELPAIRE
PRÉSIDENT CONFÉDÉRAL

Ce que nous en dit une personnalité belge venue récemment de Londres

Une personnalité belge, ancien combattant de 14-18, récemment arrivée de Londres, mais qui désire garder l'anonymat, a bien voulu nous faire part des démarches qu'elle a faites en Grande-Bretagne dans le but de venir en aide à nos compatriotes du pays occupé.

Ayant vécu sous l'occupation allemande cette personnalité pouvait en connaissance de cause parler de la tragique situation de nos compatriotes.

Devant les maigres résultats qui avaient été atteints dans ce domaine, notre informateur prit sur lui d'intervenir auprès de hautes personnalités pour les intéresser aux souffrances de la Belgique martyre. C'est ainsi qu'il plaida la cause de nos compatriotes, tout d'abord auprès de Mgr Amigo, archevêque de Southmark avec lequel il eut une entrevue le 26 juin 1942, puis avec le cardinal Hinsley, archevêque de Westminster, le 1er juillet.

Le cardinal Hinsley le mit en rapport, le 9 juillet avec Mgr Myers, évêque catholique chargé des intérêts spirituels des Belges de Grande-Bretagne.

Il eut par la suite l'occasion de rencontrer à ce sujet Mgr Godfrey, Nonce Apostolique en Grande-Bretagne et de nombreuses personnalités influentes de l'Eglise anglicane entre autre le Révérend William Achman, chanoine de la Cathédrale St Paul et aumonier de la Cour.

Chaque fois, notre ami leur demanda d'intervenir auprès des autorités britanniques pour obtenir d'elles les navycerts nécessaires. Finalement, il fut décidé que Mgr Myers, accompagné d'un évêque anglican et d'un évêque écossais se rendrait auprès du ministre du Blocus pour obtenir un navycert qui permettrait l'envoi en Belgique, via Genève, du chargement d'un bateau déjà freté à partir des Etats-Unis d'Amérique Ce chargement se composait de médicaments indispensables et de vitamines.

Cette délégation fut reçue par le ministre anglais du Blocus qui promit formellement d'étudier rapidement la question devant l'urgence du problème.

Notre ami, qui a actuellement rejoint le Congo Belge, ne peut nous dire si l'autorisation a été accordée, mais quoiqu'il en soit, nous ferons remarquer que si des *personnalités privées* parviennent à mettre en branle *pareilles influences*, à plus forte raison notre Gouvernement et nos ministres de Londres devraient pouvoir faire mieux encore.

Alors, que conclure ?

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Enclosed with a copy of a despatch dated March 25th from Leopoldville to Foreign Office and forwarded to M.E.W. under reference W 5870/4/49.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF

Mr. W. A. Camps.

Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
London,
W.1.

General Division
Foreign Office

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 5884
15 APR 1943

Registry Number W 5884/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No. T 550/19/5

Dated 11th Apr.1943

Received in Registry 15th Apr.1943

W: Co-ordination

Belgian purchases of Portuguese fish.

Transmits copies of telegrams from Lisbon No.155 Arfar Saving of 20th March and to Lisbon No. 693 Arfar of 7th April regarding Belgian purchases of Portuguese fish.

Last Paper.

W 5870

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Central Dept [illegible] 1674
MEA 3 ...
19/4

See within copy of rel to Lisbon tel 135 si Arfar.
July 23.

[illegible] 19.29/7.

Central dept. [illegible] 30/VII

(Action completed.)

W.B. 29/4/43

(Index.)

AEH 24/7

Next Paper.

W 5907

55

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

(T 550/19/5)

[Cypher]

LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

W 5884

15 APR 1943

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO LISBON

No. 693 ARFAR
7th April, 1943.

D. 12.25 a.m. 8th April, 1943.

:-:-:-:-:-:-:

Your Savingram No. 155 [Arfar of 20th March:. Belgian purchases of Portuguese fish].

Please inform Belgians that provided (a) they buy no sardines until the summer catch begins and (b) then use the 600 tons of tin plate they have already acquired for packing their new purchases, they may now proceed to buy fish other than sardines, using their own tinplate or not as they prefer. You will understand, of course, that they must not buy fish of a type imported through the blockade.

O.T.P.

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/19/5
COPY FOR Crowe Esq. F.O.
DATE 11/4/43

(3) (20) ARFAR (O.B.)

S A V I N G R A M

From : H.M.AMBASSADOR - LISBON
To : Ministry of Economic Warfare
No : 155 ARFAR SAVING
Dated : 20th March, 1943
Received : 25th March, 1943

Belgian Relief Organisation inform us that they have obtained no Sardines on the contract which they made last year as they did not deliver their tinplate in time to the Fish Institute. In consultation with us and the U.K.C.C. they are discussing with the Institute the possibility of making a contract for delivery of Sardines in the forthcoming season and of utilising some of their tinplate now for packing fish other than sardines.

2. In the meanwhile they are receiving offers of fish other than sardines already packed which they are anxious to accept. Please inform me whether such purchases may be authorised or whether their purchases should be limited to the quantities to be packed in their own tinplate.

3. Please reply by telegram -

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

ful w/f 57

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

(7550/19/5).

[Cypher].

ARFAR DISTRIBUTION INDEXED

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO LISBON.

No. 1355 ARFAR:
23rd July, 1943.

D. 4.30 a.m. 24th July, 1943.

eeeeeeeee

W5884/4/49

Following for Nicholls.

Ministry of Food say that independent Belgian purchases of sardines are spoiling prices for them, and suggested that Belgians might keep off the market if guaranteed an allocation from Ministry's own contract. Figure in mind was 10,000 cases. Belgians were sounded accordingly, without mention of figure, but are plainly shy.

2. Belgians have 600 tons of tinplate and 25 million escudos monthly. Price considerations for them are secondary. We doubt therefore if the above would be sufficient inducement to refrain from independent action.

3. Are you able from local knowledge and contact with Belgian representatives to make any suggestions?

4. Please note that we do not appear to be committed to allow the Belgians either (a) to buy sardines packed in tinplate other than their own, or (b) to obtain more tinplate by sending tin to Belgium when their present stock is exhausted. See my telegram No. 693 [Arfar of April 7th] and my savingram No. 314 [Arfar of July 18th].

(OTP)

W5884/

T550/1945

W. mfg Hoggett Esq

25.7.43 F.O

Copied Treasury.
M/Food

150

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 5907

16 APR 1943

Registry Number W 5907/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated).

No. T 550/12.

Dated 6th April, 1943.

Received in Registry 16th April, 1943.

W : Co-ordination.

Relief for Norway.

Transmits copy of despatch from Commercial Counsellor, Stockholm No. CC.442 of 23rd March and copy of telegram to Stockholm No.281 Arfar of 6th April regarding desire of Norwegian Relief Centre in Sweden and Swedish Help to Norway Organisation to export five tons of Danish meat extract and two tons of children's clothing to Norway.

Last Paper.

W 5584/

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Northern Dept 20/4

E.C. 16/4

See within Copy of tel to Stockholm no 348 Arfar. Apl 27.

(Action completed.)

Mle. 22/4/43.

(Index.)

Add 27/7

Next Paper.

W 6936.

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

with ???

T.550/12.

[CYPHER]

W 5907

ARFAR (C.B.)

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO STOCKHOLM

16 APR 1943

No. 281 ARFAR.
6th April, 1943.

D. 2.40 p.m. 7th April, 1943.

99999999

copy attached

Your C.C.442 of March 23rd.

Since both items consist of List A goods (see our letter T550/12 of February 23rd) I fear that export cannot be approved.

O.T.P.

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/12.
COPY FOR E. E. Brown, Esq.
DATE 6.4.43.

Walter Dept E.C. 13/4

T550/12/13.
E. E. Crowe, Esq.
1/5/43.

T550/12/13

O.B. Despatched 12 noon
27/4/43

INDEXED

W5907/4/49

PRODROME
STOCKHOLM

ARFAR 348 Your 230 Arfar [of April 18th: relief export of oatmeal etc. to Norway from Sweden]

For answer to paragraph 1 see my 281 Arfar [of April 6th]

T Prev. recd. 1/4

CONFIRMATION COPY.

T 550/12.139/2a/43

LB/MS

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Memorandum
From the Commercial Counsellor, H.M. Legation, Stockholm.
To the Ministry of Economic Warfare, London.

No. C.C.442. Stockholm, 23rd March 1943.

The Norwegian Relief Centre in Sweden and the Swedish Help-to-Norway Organisation wish to export five tons of Danish meat extract now lying in the free port of Malmö and two tons of used children's clothing to be sent in two equal lots. The goods will be forwarded in the usual way through the Donor's Committee.

I shall be grateful to receive your instructionsby telegram as to whether we shall consent to the necessary export licences being given by the Swedish authorities.

J. Mitcheson.

RECEIVED
3 APR 1943

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 5936

16 APR 1943

Registry Number W 5936/4/49

FROM Parliamentary Question (Mr. Sorensen)

No.

Dated 14th Apr. 1943.

Received in Registry 16th Apr. 1943.

W: Coordination +

Food supplies for enemy occupied Europe

Mr. Sorensen asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he discussed with United States Government the question of war time food relief to certain European areas, and whether he would state attitude of the United States Government in this matter. Mr. Eden replied that he had nothing to add to the account of his visit to United States and that he could not speak of Governments other than His Majesty's Government. Mr. Sorensen asked supplementary question

Last Paper.

W 5907

References.

(Minutes.)

Copy for E.W.

Eric 18/4

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8 M.E.W. April 19.

D

(Action completed.)

20/4/43

(Index.)

AEH 22/7

Next Paper.

W 5940

24994 2'43 F.O.P.

LAB.

Parliamentary Question

* Mr. Sorensen,—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether he discussed with the Government of the United States of America the question of wartime food relief to certain European areas; and if he will state the attitude of the United States Government on this matter. [*3rd Sitting Day after 11th April.*]

W. 5936
14 APR 1943

ANSWERED 14 APR 1943
REPLY ATTACHED.

1187/8

P.P. to Dept 13 APR 1943

P.S.'s dept file and that the S/S writes to reply as the Cmns that as regards the first part of the question he has nothing to add to his recent statement in the House; and as regards the second that he can only refer H. of C.

D/H reply herewith

E.E. Cook 13/4

J 13/4.

ENEMY-OCCUPIED EUROPE (FOOD SUPPLIES)

8. **Mr. Sorensen** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he discussed with the Government of the United States of America the question of war-time food relief to certain European areas; and whether he will state the attitude of the United States Government on this matter.

Mr. Eden: I have nothing to add to the account of my visit to the United States of America which I gave to the House on 8th April. As regards the second part of the Question, I cannot of course speak for Governments other than His Majesty's Government.

Mr. Sorensen: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether at any time he is likely to make any statement regarding this matter, particularly in relation to the United States of America? Is it quite impossible to expect any kind of statement?

Mr. Eden: I could not give a promise. I should like to consider that.

APR 13 1943
F.O. REGISTRY

14 APR 1943

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

Draft.

64

I have nothing to add to the account of my visit to the U.S.A. which I gave to the House on April 8th.

As regards the second part of the question, I cannot ~~it is not for~~ course speak ~~discuss~~ for ~~other~~ other Ports / than H.M.G.

A.C.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 5940

16 APR 1943

Registry Number W 5940/4/49

FROM Mr. Gardner (War Office) to Mr. Crowe.

No. 0103/5002(F.4.P.W)

Dated 14th April, 1943

Received in Registry 16th April, 1943

W : Co-ordination

Drugs for French Red Cross in Indo-China.

Refers to Mr. Crowe's letter of 8th April (W 3180/4/49) Does not wish to agree to this proposal unless it is absolutely necessary. Suggests that the International Red Cross should be told that there is little prospect of space in diplomatic exchange ships being anything like sufficient to carry the minimum quantities of supplies essential to preserve the health of the prisoners in the Far East from the United Nations.

Last Paper.

W 5936. (W 3180)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Def/ Mr. Gardner (W.O.) from Mr. Crowe April 16

& Mr Campbell (M.E.W.) April 16.

(Action completed.) W.O. 7/5/43

(Index.) All'd 27/7

Next Paper.

W 5976.

(Minutes.)

See written [illegible] letter [illegible] 18/4

French Dept

See written copy of letter from Mr Gardner (W.O.) to Mr. Crowe No 0103/5002 (F & P.W.) April 27.

French Dept WA 5/5.

Was all this correspondence really necessary.

[illegible] 3/5

See within copy of letter from M.E.W. to Mr. Buckhardt (I.R.C.C.) T 550/80 April 29

[illegible] 6/5

See within copy of tel to Berne No 3582 Aftan. July 29.

W 7/8.

See within copy of tel to Berne No 4278 Afternoon

[illegible] 3/5

Tel.No. WHItehall 9400.
Ext.518.

66

The War Office,
W 5940
LONDON, S.W.1.
16 APR 1943

0103/5002 (P.4.P.W).

Dear Crowe,

Many thanks for your letter of the 8th April, 1943 No.W.3180/4/49 regarding the proposal to allow the International Red Cross to ship a small quantity of drugs to the French Red Cross in Indo-China on any future diplomatic exchange ships. I am sorry if the War Office seems pernickety, but we have a fear of thin ends of wedges the other ends of which may become very thick; and it is not unknown for the International Red Cross to try and get a closed door open a very little bit before pushing hard to open it wide.

Surely we can say, in truth, to the International Red Cross that we cannot see any prospect of space on diplomatic exchange ships being anything like sufficient to carry the minimum quantities of supplies we would regard as essential to preserve the health of the prisoners in the Far East from the United Nations; and we feel, therefore, that it would be unreasonable for the International Red Cross to press us to give up some of the limited space available to provide for those who have, by assisting our enemies, helped to create the very serious prisoner situation with which we are trying to cope.

Further, I should have thought that one could have urged on the International Red Cross that the French in Indo-China have proved themselves good friends to the Japanese and that they ought, therefore, look to Japanese resources to provide what they may need.

If this particular shipment was a "once and for all" matter, I should feel moved by your arguments; but the hard fact, which we find it difficult to escape, is that if any further exchange opportunity occurs these particular supplies could only be included by excluding something we regard as essential for the prisoners from the United

/Nations

E.E. Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street,
S.W.1.

Reply Leonard

Send Dept ack. E.C. 1574

[illegible] 1945

Nations. . When to this very unpleasant fact is added the fear of the thin end of a wedge, you will perhaps understand our reluctance to agree to what you are urging.

Will you consider again whether the advantages of the course you propose really do out-weigh the arguments against it. I do not suppose we should hold out against the considered Foreign Office view if you are positively convinced that this thing ought to be; but I wanted you to know that our opposition to it is not casual or arbitrary, and before we modify our attitude we should like to ask: is your gesture really necessary?"

I am sending a copy of this letter to Camps.

Yours sincerely,

W. Hardinge

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W5940/4/49.

Draft.

Mr Gardner
W.O.

Copy Mr Campos ref

16c

68

April 16, 1943.

Dear Gardner,

Your letter 0703/5002 (7.4. P.W.) of April 14th.

The arguments which we set forth against allowing this very small consignment of drugs to Indo-China would, I venture, carry more weight with me, if I could share your fears of the Machiavellian designs of the T.R.C.F. We would, I think, be perfectly easy to make it ~~clear~~ clear to the T.R.C. that we were treating their application as exceptional

exceptional and that we would not regard it as a precedent. This should surely be an adequate safeguard against the spate of further demands which you anticipate.

I admit further that I find it hard to accept your contention that to ask you to sacrifice ½ to a space out of the ~~[illegible]~~ hundreds if not thousands of tons at your disposal if a ship can sail is "unreasonable." On the contrary I fear that I find this word much more applicable to the refusal of this request on space grounds; and

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No. -

Draft.

and that is why I am so reluctant to return a negative reply to the I.R.C. when good-will is surely a matter of considerable importance to us.

I am not prepared to make this a real issue between us; if you still cannot see your way to making this very small hypothetical sacrifice of shipping space, I think the furthest we can go is to tell the I.R.C. that there is no prospect at present of any exchange shipping

going to the Fair Court and
that ~~Receiver Rees is~~ we cannot Receive
commit ourselves.

Yours sincerely

Sd) E. E Crowe

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

71

OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

16th April, 1943.

(W 5940/4/49)

Dear Gardner,

Your letter 0163/5002 (F.4.P.W.) of 14th April.

The arguments which you set forth against allowing this very small consignment of drugs to Indo-China would, I confess, carry more weight with me, if I could share your fears of the Machiavellian designs of the International Red Cross. It would, I think be perfectly easy to make it clear to the International Red Cross that we were treating this application as exceptional and that we would not regard it as a precedent. This should surely be an adequate safeguard against the spate of further demands which you anticipate.

I admit further that I find it hard to accept your contention that to ask you to sacrifice ½ ton of space out of the hundreds, if not thousands, of tons at your disposal if a ship ever sails is "unreasonable". On the contrary I fear that I find this word much more applicable to the refusal of this request on space grounds; and that is why I am so reluctant to return a negative reply to the International Red Cross where good-will is surely a matter of considerable importance to us.

I am not however prepared to make this a real issue between us. If you still cannot see your way to making this very small hypothetical sacrifice of shipping space, I think the furthest we can go is to tell the International Red Cross that there is no prospect at present of any exchange ship going to the Far East and that we cannot therefore commit ourselves.

Yours sincerely,

W.H. Gardner, Esq.,
War Office.

(E.M. Crowe)

Tel.No. WHItehall 9400.
Ext.518.

W with ppr 73

The War Office,

INDEXED LONDON, S.W.1.

0103/5002(P.4.P.W.)

Your reference W5949/4/49 27 April, 1943.

22 APR 1943

Dear Crowe,

Thanks for your letter of the 16th April, 1943 No. W.5940/4/49.

As you attach some importance to letting the International Red Cross include drugs for Vichy subjects in Indo-China on any future exchange ships proceeding to the Far East (you will no doubt have seen the telegram in which the Japanese propose such an exchange for the end of June) we will not press our objection further, so long as it is clear that the amount involved is only half a ton and does not constitute a precedent for any further consignments to non-United Nations subjects.

I gather that you are satisfied that this concession can be made as an entirely exceptional case and that it will not lead to further and expanding requests from the International Red Cross.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Camps.

Yours sincerely,

W. Goldwell

E.E.Crowe,Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street, S.W.1.

Copy for E.E. Crowe Esq, Foreign Office,

T 550/80

MP 74

INDEXED

W 5940/4, 49

4 - MAY 1943

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

29th April, 1943.

W

I am extremely sorry that there should have been so much delay in replying to your enquiries on the subject of sending 20 kilograms of Emetine and 340 kilograms of Premaline by one of the exchange ships sailing between Europe and Japan.

After a somewhat prolonged discussion, it has been decided that there will be no objection, provided that the amount involved does not exceed half a ton, and it is understood that this does not constitute a precedent for any further shipments. I am very glad that the affair should now have reached this satisfactory conclusion.

Monsieur N. Burckhardt,
Comite International de la Croix-Rouge,
London Delegation,
55 Pall Mall.
S.W.1.

W 5944 4/45

75

W 44

OUTWARD TELEGRAM.

(T.550/80.)

[Cypher.]

INDEXED

ARFAR (O.B.).

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE.

No. 3532 ARFAR.
29th July, 1943.

D. 11.30 p.m., 29th July, 1943.

::::::::::::::::::

International Red Cross have applied to send the following goods from the French Red Cross at Vichy to the French Red Cross at Saigon in Indo China, using if possible diplomatic exchange ships: Emetine 20 kilogrammes, premaline 340 kilogrammes.

2. We agree to this without prejudice to decision on future similar applications.

3. Please invite the International Red Cross to apply for Export Pass, and issue document on application. They should of course appear as consignors and assume responsibility.

O.T.P.
copies sent to
W. H. Gardner W.O.

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/80.
COPY FOR E. Crowe Esq.
DATE 1.8.43

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

(W) 76

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W 5949 / 4 / 49

M.E.W. FILE No. 1550/80.
COPY FOR E.E. Crowe. Esq. F.O.
DATE 16.9.43.

INDEXED

(T 550/80)

[CYPHER]

ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE

No: 4278 ARFAR
14th September, 1943.

D. 1. 15 a.m. 15th September, 1943.

11111

My telegram No. 3532 [Arfar of July 29th: shipment of drugs on exchange ship to Saigon].

Have you received any application from International Red Cross with regard to this shipment? If so, what action has so far been taken? Exchange ship expected to sail from Goa during December or early next year. We wish to give instructions to His Majesty's Representative Goa.

O.T.P.

copy also sent to—
W.H. Gardner. Esq. W.O

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 5976

17 APR 1943

Registry Number } W 5976/4/49

FROM Foreign Office Minute (Mr. Crowe).

No.

Dated 14th April,

Received in Registry } 17th April, 1943

W: Co-ordination

Transfer on members of American relief organisations to Germany from France.

The German Government have stated in their note passed to the United States Government by the Swiss Minister on 28th February that United States Red Cross representatives, Quakers and members of the "Secours Mennonites aux Enfants" have been transferred to Germany.

Last Paper.

W 5940

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See within.

E 2074

D

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
21/4/43	ACH 28/7

Next Paper.

W 5996

24794. 12 42 F.O.P.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Minutes. Enclosure. 78

Registry

W 5976
17 APR 1943

Will you please put a
record in some suitable way the
fact that the German Govt have
stated in their note passed to
the U.S.G. & the Swiss Minister on
Feb 23rd, that U.S. "Red X rep".
Quakers & members of the Secours
MENNONITES
Mennonites and Friends & have
been transferred to Germany.

Eis 14/4

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 5996

17. APR 1943

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Registry Number W} 5996/4/49

FROM Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Walker.

No. T 550/19/28.

Dated 16th April, 1943

Received in Registry 17th April, 1943

W: Co-ordination

Child evacuation scheme.

As the question of the evacuation of children from occupied territories to neutral countries is not on the agenda of the Bermuda Conference, requests that Mr. Randall may be asked to raise this point. Gives brief summary of position reached in this scheme. Encloses copy of telegram to Washington No.690 Arfar of 20th February regarding inclusion of Jewish children in the scheme.

Last Paper.

W 5996/4/49 (W 1972)

References.

W 5158

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

18. M.E.W. (Mr. Camps) April 21

Del W'Tau to 2723. April 24.

Del U.K. Delegation to Refugee Conference Bermuda No 23. April 25

Mr. Camps (M.E.W.) June 24.

(Action completed.)

(nt 29/4/43

(Index.)

M. W. 13/5/43

Next Paper.

W 6102 (W 6658)

(Minutes.)

As this scheme has been put to the Americans I do not think we can ask Mr Randall to raise it at Bermuda without consulting W'Tau first.

I submit draft

E. E. Grove. 18/4

This subject was discussed at this meeting with Gov: Lehman this morning. If as anticipated we have a further meeting tomorrow or the day after we could discuss these draft instructions with him before despatch. Meanwhile they should be agreed with Mr Camps.

Refugee Centre Draft (a.a.) 19/4

24994 2 43 F.O.P.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W 5996/4/49.

Draft.
His Majesty's
Ambassador
Washington.

Telegram.

No.....

Cypher.

80

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

April, 1943.

IMPORTANT

Your telegram No. 1507 paragraph 5.

Question of immediate relief is being discussed with Lehman (your telegram No.1689). Child evacuation scheme was mentioned but Lehman was averse from putting it forward as an alternative to direct relief. He was however in favour of giving the scheme serious consideration, and I would like to see it discussed at the Bermuda refugee conference. Telegram No. 690 ARFAR to you referred to the possibility of including a proportion of children in the scheme. Please transmit to Mr. Law copies of the relevant correspondence including my telegram No. 4465 of 1942, telegrams 241 Arfa to Berne and 690 Arfar to you.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. 5996/4/49.

Draft.

Mr. Law,
Bermuda.

Telegram.

No.....

81

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

April, 1943.

My immediately preceding telegram.

As you will see from the correspondence, scheme referred to is as follows:-

2. Children from the occupied countries should be sent to Sweden and Switzerland where they would be properly cared for. In order to ensure this additional quotas of foodstuffs and clothing would be allowed to these two countries through the blockade. It is hoped that in this way up to perhaps 100,000 children altogether could be looked after, of which 20-25% might be Jewish. While such a scheme could not be regarded as even a partial solution of the Jewish problem it would at least be an earnest of our good intention.

enclosure 82

W 5996
17 APR 1943

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1

T.550/19/28

16th April, 1943.

Dear Walker,

You will remember that we spoke on the telephone the other day about the schemes for evacuating children during the War from occupied territories to neutral European countries, which have been under discussion with the Americans for some time without result. You said that these questions were not on the agenda of the Bermuda Conference, but that if we wished you would write to Randall and ask him to see that they were not forgotten.

After consideration, we feel that it would be very helpful if you would do this. I am subjoining a very brief summary of the position reached, for your convenience.

(W 10003/947/49

The idea was first put forward in your telegram No. 4465 of July 24th, 1942 to Washington. The emphasis has always been upon evacuation of Belgian and other children to Switzerland, but the evacuation of Norwegian children to Sweden has been considered throughout as an additional possibility. The American Government have never shown any enthusiasm for the idea. At one time they agreed that we should proceed to discuss the Belgian-Swiss plan with the Swiss Government, and the matter has in fact

been/

A. Walker, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

been put up informally to the latter. Though the Swiss reaction was favourable, and a detailed project was submitted to Washington in our telegram No. 405 Arfar of February 1st 1943, no progress has been made, since the State Department withdrew their preliminary approval at the end of last year pending an agreement by both Governments on the general policy to be pursued on the question of relief through the blockade. We now hope to examine the question of relief through the blockade with the American Government. But the last communication received from Washington on the subject of child evacuation (paragraph 3 of Washington telegram No. 1507 of March 30th to you) indicated that Mr. Hull was unsympathetic towards the idea.

Our own position is that we consider that the notion of evacuating children is not dead, and we should like it to be kept in mind that the Swiss Minister recently suggested to Foot that a proportion of Jewish children might be received in Switzerland in connection with such a scheme if it materializes. Washington was informed of this, and of our attitude towards the proposition, by our telegram No. 690 Arfar of February 20th, of which I enclose a copy for convenience of reference.

Yours sincerely,
W. A. Campbell.

P.S. Since writing this we have had a warning some task with Le Rougetel hearing on the subject. Wab

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

T.550/19/28.

[CYPHER] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 690 ARFAR.
20th February, 1943.

D. 1. 0 p.m. 20th February, 1943.

JJJJ

W 3134/4/49

IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 672 [Arfar of February 18th], paragraph 2(b).

Swiss Minister has again referred to the proposed child evacuation scheme in which his Government is now evidently keenly interested. He suggested that a proportion of Jewish children might with advantage be included.

2. Please mention this to United States authorities, as they may share our view that this is a valuable opportunity of bringing some relief to the suffering Jewish population of Europe, for whom much sympathy is felt both here and in United States.

3. You might also point out that in our view the inclusion of Jewish children who are in particular distress deserves to be considered, whether they are in Germany or in the occupied territories.

4. Swiss Minister is anxious for early progress to be made with the scheme. He was told of course that no definite decision had yet been taken.

OTP.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No. W5996/4/49

E.E.C.

Draft.

H.M. Ambassador,
Washington.

Telegram.

No.....

Cypher

Repeat
Mr. Law,
Bermuda.

Refugee Dept. first.

To M.E.W. for concurrence.

91a
85

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
Despatched *M.*

April 1943.

IMPORTANT

Your telegram No. 1507 paragraph 5.

Question of immediate relief is being discussed with Lehman (your telegram No. 1689). Child evacuation scheme was mentioned but Lehman was averse from putting it forward as an alternative to direct relief. He was however in favour of giving the scheme serious consideration, and I would like to see it discussed at the Bermuda refugee conference. Telegram No. 690 ARFAR to you referred to the possibility of including a proportion of children in the scheme. Please transmit to Mr. Law copies of the relevant correspondence including ~~telegrams~~ my tel No 4465 of 1942, telegrams 241 Cipher to Berne + 690 Cipher to you.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W5996/4/49

E.E.C.

Draft.

Mr. Law,
Bermuda.

Telegram.

No.... (13

Refugee Dept. first.

To M.E.W. for concurrence.

86

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

Despatched *M.*

April 1943.

My immediately preceding telegram.

As you will see from the correspondence, scheme referred to is as follows:-

2. Children from the occupied countries should be sent to Sweden and Switzerland where they would be properly cared for. In order to ensure this additional quotas of foodstuffs and clothing would be allowed to these two countries through the blockade. It is hoped that in this way up to perhaps 100,000 children altogether could be looked after, of which 20-25% might be Jewish. While such a scheme could not be regarded as even a partial solution of the Jewish problem it would at least be an earnest of our good intention.

W 5996/4/49. FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

OUT FILE 10.45 24/4

April, 1943. 87

IMPORTANT

His Majesty's
Ambassador
Washington.

Telegram.

No. 2723.
April 24.

Cypher.

~~Repeat to~~

T.

K/077

Your telegram No. 1507 paragraph 5.

Question of immediate relief is being discussed with Lehman (your telegram No.1689). Child evacuation scheme was mentioned but Lehman was averse from putting it forward as an alternative to direct relief. He was however in favour of giving the scheme serious consideration, and I would like to see it discussed at the Bermuda refugee conference. Telegram No. 690 ARFAR to you referred to the possibility of including a proportion of children in the scheme. Please transmit to Mr. Law copies of the relevant correspondence including my telegram No. 4465 of 1942, telegrams 241 Arfar to Berne and 690 Arfar to you.

Jewish

M.E.W. Law Concurred.

Please repeat to Bermuda

6 pm

OUT FILE 88

W.5996/4/49.

[CYPHER] DEPARTMENTAL No.1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 2723 D. 10.45 p.m. 24th April, 1943.
24th April, 1943.

999999999

IMPORTANT.

Your telegram No. 1507 paragraph 5.

Question of immediate relief is being discussed with Lehman (your telegram No. 1689). Child evacuation scheme was mentioned but Lehman was averse from putting it forward as an alternative to direct relief. He was however in favour of giving the scheme serious consideration, and I would like to see it discussed at the Bermuda refugee conference. Telegram No. 690 ARFAR to you referred to the possibility of including a proportion of Jewish children in the scheme. Please transmit to Mr. Law copies of the relevant correspondence including my telegram No. 4465 of 1942, telegrams 241 ARFAR to Berne and 690 ARFAR to you.

Please repeat to Bermuda.

O.T.P.

89

Cypher Telegram
(O.T.P.)

OUT FILE

TO U.K. DELEGATION TO THE REFUGEE CONFERENCE IN BERMUDA

~~FROM S. OF S. COLONIES~~

Sent 25th April, 1943. 15.45 hrs.

No.23.

Following from S. of S. for Foreign Affairs.

My telegram No.2723 to Washington. W 5996/4/49

As you will see from the correspondence scheme referred to is as follows:-

2. Children from the occupied countries should be sent to Sweden and Switzerland where they would be properly cared for. In order to ensure this additional quotas of foodstuffs and clothing would be allowed to these two countries through the blockade. It is hoped that in this way up to perhaps 100,000 children altogether could be looked after, of which 20-25% might be Jewish. While such a scheme could not be regarded as even a partial solution of the Jewish problem it would at least be an earnest of our good intention.

Copies sent to:-

Foreign Office - Refugee Dept.
- Cypher Dept. R.181.

11am April 27.

90

OUT FILE

[CYPHER] DEPARTMENTAL NO..2.

FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE REFUGEE CONFERENCE IN BERMUDA.

No. 23.
25th April, 1943.

D. 11.00 a.m. 27th April, 1943.
(Via C.O.)

q q q

Following from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

My telegram No. 2723 to Washington.

As you will see from the correspondence scheme referred to is as follows:-

2. Children from the occupied countries should be sent to Sweden and Switzerland where they would be properly cared for. In order to ensure this additional quotas of foodstuffs and clothing would be allowed to these two countries through the blockade. It is hoped that in this way up to perhaps 100,000 children altogether could be looked after, of which 20-25% might be Jewish. While such a scheme could not be regarded as even a partial solution of the Jewish problem it would at least be an earnest of our good intention.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 6102
20 APR 1943

91

Registry Number W 6102/4/49

FROM Miss A.W. Taylor

No.

Dated 5th April, 1943

Received in Registry 20th April, 1943

W : Co-ordination.

Relief for occupied Europe.

Considers that as the ships, the food and the means of distribution are available, relief should be sent to children in France and Belgium.

Last Paper.

W 5996

References.

(Minutes.)

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft / Miss Taylor from Mr. Hallgarth May 8.

D

(Action completed.)

W.O. 11/5/43

(Index.)

ACH 27/7

Next Paper.

W 6154

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

Coventry Evacuated Schools

92

5. 4. 43.

Rev. Jephcott

Long St.
Astley Abbotts
W. 6102
20 APR 1943

Dear Sir

I recently attended a meeting to protest in connection with famine Relief in Europe. I was definitely opposed to the idea and regarded its originators as unpractical cranks. Mr. Martin Case, however, by his clear explanation convinced me that it is not only practicable to attempt to give relief to the children of Greece & Belgium, but also advisable in our own interests.

He thought that possibly the Government's refusal to sanction the plan was due to a belief that the country as a whole was not in favour of such action. This may be so, but the reason for that attitude in most cases is probably, as in mine, ignorance of the facts. It seems to me that it would not be difficult for the Govt. to justify such a

step, in fact win universal approval by it, as few people could possibly fail to be convinced by the following arguments & statements of fact put forward by the Famine Relief Cttee

93

We ought to do all we can to help our unfortunate allies, if it is possible to do so without assisting the enemy.

We are already far from popular on the Continent and, even having won the war, we shall be hated if we allow the children to starve without attempting to save them.

The quantity of dried milk & vitamins needed for a month's consignment is so small that even if it were seized by the enemy it would be of no very great importance.

There have been no complaints from the Red Cross in this war — nor were there in the last — that prisoners' parcels have been tampered with, so why should there be interference in this case?

If this did happen once, supplies would

immediately be stopped & we could not be blamed for discontinuing them. On the other hand we should have shown our allies that we are not indifferent to their sufferings

The ships, the food & the means of distribution are all ready to hand. Will the Government not use them?

Yours faithfully

(Miss) A. W. Taylor

Registry
No. W6102/4/49.

95

OUT FILE

Draft.

8th May, 1943.

Miss Taylor

from

Mr. Eden.

Mrs. Colson.

See o/a.

Dear Madam

I am sorry it has been ~~impossible~~ to reply before on Mr. Eden's behalf to your letter of April 5th about relief for occupied Europe.

~~If the arguments which~~ you quote represented the whole picture, the problem would not be half as difficult as it is. I can assure you that the Govt are fully aware of the importance of doing everything possible to help the unfortunate people, and especially the children, of the countries occupied by the Axis.

Cecil. In considering the problem however they have to take into account the benefit which would accrue not only to the recipients of the relief but to the enemy who are responsible for the present tragic state of affairs. For this and for other reasons they have been unable to agree to any of the schemes which have been put forward. Some of the difficulties are explained in the answers to questions in the H. of C. of which I enclose copies.

Yours Truly,
(Sd) J. E. Millard. (Private Secretary).

(among other things)

Copies
to Miss
Mr Spearman
& Mr Harvey.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

97

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.

(W 6102/4/49) 8th May, 1943.

Dear Madam,

I am sorry not to have been able to reply before on Mr. Eden's behalf to your letter of the 5th April about relief for occupied Europe.

I can assure you that the Government are fully aware of the importance of doing everything possible to help the unfortunate people, and especially the children, of the countries occupied by the Axis. In considering the problem, however, they have to take into account, among other things, the benefit which would accrue not only to the recipients of the relief but to the enemy who are responsible for the present tragic state of affairs. For this and for other reasons they have been

unable/

Miss A.W. Taylor,
Coventry Evacuated Schools,
Long Street,
Atherstone,
Warwickshire.

98

unable to agree to any of the schemes which have been put forward. Some of the difficulties are explained in the answers to questions in the House of Commons of which I enclose copies.

Yours truly

(G.E. Millard).

Private Secretary.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 6154

21 APR 1943

Registry Number } W 6154/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No.

Dated

Received in Registry } 21st April 1943

W: Co-ordination

Clothing for Children in Serbia.

Transmits copy of telegram from Minister of State, Cairo No.105 Arfar of 2nd April stating that Belgrade has urgently requested Yugoslav Red Cross, Middle East to send clothing for 100,000 children now in Serbia where they have sought refuge from other occupied Yugoslav territories. International Red Cross will arrange control transport. The Yugoslav Red Cross asks permission to send 100,000 sets of underwear. Goods can be purchased locally.

Last Paper.

W 6102.

References.

(Minutes.)

See within copy of tel to M/State Cairo No 85 Afar April 6
" " copy of tel to M/State Cairo No 99 Afar April 15

Southern Dept 30

See within copy of tel to M/State Cairo No 139 Afar of June 3rd.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

3/5/43

(Index.)

28/7

Next Paper.

W 6189

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

Enter

W.6154

100

[Cypher] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTER OF STATE CAIRO TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

No. 105 ARFAR
2nd April, 1943.

D. 12.10 a.m. 3rd April, 1943.
R. 4.10 a.m. 3rd April, 1943.

:-:-:-:-:-:-:

MERRA.

Commissariat for refugees. Belgrade has urgently requested Yugoslav Red Cross in Middle East to send clothing for 100,000 children now in Serbia where they have sought refuge from other occupied Yugoslav territories. International Red Cross has assured Yugoslav Red Cross that it will arrange and control transport. The Yugoslav Red Cross asks permission to send 100,000 sets of underwear (chemises, calecons and tricots). Only cotton goods will be sent. It is probable in view of comparatively small quantities involved, that goods can be purchased locally.

[Copies sent to Mr. Armstrong].

O.T.P.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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INDEXED

(T550/25) W 6154/4/49

FILE No. T550/25.
COPY FOR E.E. Bowe, Esq.
DATE 9/4/43.

[Cypher] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO MINISTER OF STATE CAIRO.

No.85 ARFAR.

6th April,1943. D. 9.25 p.m. 6th April,1943.

88888

Your telegram No.105[Arfar of April 2nd].

Proposal to send these goods through the blockade runs counter to blockade policy as now established. We cannot in fairness to other Allies entertain Yugoslav request. Similar Allied requests have already been turned down.

[Copies sent to Mr.Armstrong].

OTP

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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W 102

W 6154/4/49

T550/25.

[CYPHER] ARFAR (O.B.)

21 APR 1943

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO MINISTER OF STATE CAIRO.

No. 99 ARFAR. D. 7.05 p.m. 16th April, 1943.
15th April, 1943.

£ W £ £

My telegram No. 85 [Arfar of April 6th: clothing may not be sent from Cairo to Belgrade].

Yugoslavs wish to send 200 kilogrammes of Atebrin from here to Belgrade. We could admit this amount through the blockade under the heading of "strictly medical" supplies.

2. Please inform me, preferably without disclosing the above to local Yugoslavs, whether this Atebrin could be sent from Egypt instead without supply objection. If so, it might be possible to arrange transport with consignments of foodstuffs expected shortly to be sent to Yugoslavia from Turkey. This would have several advantages over despatch from here.

[Copies sent to Mr. Armstrong].

O.T.P.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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W6154/4/49

M.E.W. FILE No. T550 125
COPY
DATE 7.6.43 F.O.

T.550/25.

[CYPHER] ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO MINISTER OF STATE, CAIRO.

No.139 ARFAR.
3rd June, 1943.

D. 5.55 a.m. 4th June, 1943.

[ ] [ ] [ ]

Your letter of May 10th [despatch of children's clothes to Yugoslavia].

Please refer to my telegram No.85 [Arfar of April 6th] dealing with similar request. We regret decision must remain unaltered.

O.T.P.

157.

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

104

W 6189

21 APR 1943

Registry Number W 6189/4/49

FROM Lord Selborne (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Secretary of State

No.

Dated 13th Apr. 1943.

Received in Registry 21st Apr. 1943.

N: Coordination +

Relief for occupied Europe

Considers that policy with regard to food relief in enemy-occupied countries should be reviewed once more. Outlines a scheme which could be followed if His Majesty's Government have to allow relief to occupied countries.

Last Paper.

W 6154 (W 5707)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See within

See within

E.H.C. 21/4

(Action completed.)

mle 26/5/43

(Index.)

ACH 27/7

Next Paper.

(W 6190)

24994 2'43 F.O.P.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

This long letter is in the main recapitulatory. Its general sense is that there is nothing which can really be done to alleviate the food situation in occupied Europe at the present time. As indicated in our recent telegram to Washington (Flag D), the supply position, largely as a result of increasing demands from the U.S.S.R., is exceedingly tight, and even if Swedish tonnage can be made available from the Baltic there is in addition the great, if not insuperable, difficulty of ensuring the administration of relief over a wide area without great benefit accruing to the enemy. In a word, our wisest course would be to maintain the blockade as at present.

Lord Selborne, however, suggests (paragraph 10) that "if some concession, or apparent concession, appears to be unavoidable" we might, should the supply position permit, announce publicly our willingness to feed children and nursing and expectant mothers in certain selected cities of occupied Europe. He puts forward this plan as a pis aller designed to forestall an inept initiative on the part of the U.S. if we had reason to believe that it was imminent. It makes no pretense to immunity from the various objections already enumerated in this minute, and indeed one of the main arguments adduced in support of it is that the Germans might be expected to turn it down. In other words, such value as it had would be tactical vis-à-vis both the U.S. and the occupied countries.

Finally, Lord Selborne raises a point which is of immediate practical interest, i.e. on the assumption that our joint policy remains unchanged, agreement should be reached with the U.S. Government regarding the form of reply to be given to enquiries on the subject of immediate relief, whether from the Allied governments or from the public. In view of the increasing interest which Parliament appears to be taking in this question, and of the difficulty of making a full explanatory statement under present conditions, I submit that every effort should be made to cover this point at least in discussion with Governor Lehman while he is in London.

Lord Drogheda has just informed me that the meeting with Governor Lehman on relief through the blockade is to take place at the M.E.W. at 11 a.m. on Monday April 19th. Lord Drogheda has suggested that I should have a preliminary meeting with him on April 16th to discuss the exact line we are to take. For this purpose, I submit, Lord Selborne's letter gives us a very good lead. If this view is approved, we should make it our aim (a) to convince Governor Lehman of the impossibility of modifying our present policy without serious detriment to ourselves and our Allies and substantial benefit to the enemy; and (b) work out with him a suitable formula for the use of both our Governments for dealing

I agree DR

/with

with enquiries under present conditions.

J.H.L. Ronald.

April 14th 1943.

North American Dept.

Sir D. Scott.

I agree. The U.S.G. is not under much pressure to change its policy. American public opinion is pretty callous as regards Europe and will, I think, continue so until American liberating armies can show America in an Uncle Bountiful role.

With Governor Lehmann in charge I do not think that Americans will spring surprises on us, but clearly his visit gives us our chance to concert a line and a second line.

N.M. Butler
14/4.

I agree. I believe indeed that from a purely American point of view there is no necessity for us to offer any concession.

O. Sargent
15/4/43

I agree; so proceed.

A. Eden 15/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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TEL. No.:
GROSVENOR 4060.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE,
LONDON, W.1.

SECRET

13th April 1943

W 6189

21 APR 1943

My dear Anthony,

I feel that the time has come when we ought once again to review our policy with regard to food relief in enemy-occupied countries. Our present position is one of growing embarrassment. As you know, pressure from the refugee governments has increased considerably in recent months, and is likely to increase still further, both in London and in Washington. M. Pierlot's declaration a few days ago has naturally enough been seized on by German propaganda, and may well be the cause of trouble in the Belgian Congo. The Norwegian threat to withdraw shipping from our service may be renewed at any time. The Norwegian Government and General de Gaulle have now joined the ranks of applicants for relief, and a few days ago the Yugoslav Government received a strongly-worded communication on this subject from General Mihailovic. Although it appears from Washington telegram of 9th April (No.1689) that the Americans are now less inclined than formerly to precipitate action, we cannot rule out the danger that Norwegian or Belgian importunity will suddenly prevail in Washington,

W 5707 W

and/

and that we shall be faced without warning with some capricious decision, based on imperfect information, which it will be too late to reverse.

2. Personally, I am not greatly concerned about public agitation as such, either in the United States or this country. Mr. Hoover's recent campaign does not appear to have met with any remarkable success, while pressure from our own public does not seem to me to be very formidable. It appears to come from a small, though vocal section, and the arguments used are generally such that we have no difficulty in meeting them. But we cannot wholly ignore the propaganda on this subject, since it is apparently becoming a matter of concern to a growing number of Members of Parliament. Foot tells me that during the last two or three weeks he has been approached by many more M.Ps. than ever before. Several of them are hostile to the agitation but these are the most difficult to answer, since they are beginning to demand that the Government should make a full-dress statement of policy, comparable to the Prime Minister's original statement in August 1940. So far he has managed to prevent these demands being publicly expressed, but he doubts whether he can go on doing so for much longer. At any moment, therefore, we may be faced

with/

with a Parliamentary Debate. If this were to happen we could hardly avoid setting out all the arguments for our present policy, and these could be used against us if, within a few weeks, fresh concessions had to be made. It would then be apparent to everyone that the Government had been compelled to give way to pressure.

3. There are two other unfortunate consequences which may follow if the present state of uncertainty continues for much longer. A report from Sweden recently stated that there was a general expectation "in Europe" that the blockade would shortly be relaxed. Such an expectation may have serious consequences since, if these hopes are allowed to grow, there may be bitter disappointment when they are not fulfilled. Then, for the first time, German propaganda on this subject may become really effective. Secondly, the present agitation in this country and the United States is creating in the minds of those interested a number of wholly false impressions. These could be fairly easily corrected. But, for the reasons given in the foregoing paragraphs, it is not easy to do so when, for all we know, we may have to accept at any moment a considerable modification of our present policy.

4. Although I gather that Governor Lehman is not empowered to commit his Government to any major change of policy, we have been authorised to discuss the subject with him while he is in London.

But/

But, apart altogether from his visit, we may at any moment be involved in a further exchange of views with the United States Government. If, as is envisaged in telegram 1689, the Americans begin to study this subject in detail, they will presumably consult us, possibly at an early stage. For all these reasons it seems to me a matter of some urgency that we should make up our minds as to the course which we wish to pursue. I am not at this moment suggesting a fresh approach to the Cabinet. But the first step is to clarify our own intentions as to the measures which we would favour if it were found that our present policy could not be maintained.

W5707

5. The situation has changed since 1940. Even if we wished to feed all the children in Occupied Europe, we should be quite unable to do so. For example, as long ago as October 1941, Mr. Richard Allen, of the American Red Cross, wrote to the Parliamentary Secretary, pointing out that if one pint of milk each day for a period of one year were to be given to all children under fourteen in Belgium, France Greece, Yugoslavia, Holland and Norway, we should require a quantity of milk concentrates not then available in any country in the world. He calculated that the total number of children in these countries was, in round figures, 19,600,00, and

that /

that the annual supply needed would be 320,000 tons of powdered milk. He estimated the cost at the then prevailing prices at £208,000,000 and further pointed out that fifty-four ships of six thousand tons capacity would have been needed for transport, in addition to railroad cars, trucks, petrol, and other facilities for handling such a large scheme. He made no mention either of Poland or of Occupied Russia, and the addition of Poland alone would account for another 10,500,000 children, making a total of 30,000,000. Even if we halve the figure, to make a very rough allowance for rural children in no need of relief, the result would be 240,000 tons of powdered milk. To take another example, the Famine Relief Committee's scheme allows only one-third of a pint of milk daily. The requirements for 15,000,000 children on this basis would be about 80,000 tons per annum. But we found that it was not an easy matter even to purchase cargoes of 100 tons of dried milk for the Greek relief scheme, and we now have to face increased demands for foodstuffs from Russia and North Africa. I gather that the Ministry of Food are extremely reluctant to contemplate any allocation of milk products for this purpose, and are very doubtful whether any substantial quantities could be obtained over and above what is now being shipped to the combatant countries.

6./

6. If, therefore, we were to put forward a scheme for feeding hungry children throughout Europe, we should be assuming an obligation we could not possibly carry out. It seems to be taken for granted by the advocates of food relief that any concession we might make would raise the morale and evoke the gratitude of the occupied countries. But this is by no means certain. At present the peoples concerned are at any rate accustomed to the idea that nothing can pass through the blockade, and whatever the Allied Governments may say, we have remarkably little evidence that they resent our attitude. Indeed some of those who have most recently arrived from the areas in question appear fully to approve. If, however, the populations concerned were allowed to think that the blockade had been relaxed, and that we had no particular objection to the import of foodstuffs from overseas, and if thereafter the foodstuffs failed to arrive, we might well incur far greater odium than at present. The situation might be still worse if we commenced to feed any considerable area, and then were compelled to discontinue.

7. The main objection to the proposals of the Famine Relief Committee, Mr. Howard Kershner, et hoc genus omne, is that relief could not be limited in the way that they suggest. We could not

feed/

feed children in Belgium and Southern France, and refuse the others. Yet it would not be entirely easy to rely on this argument in public controversy. We should be accused of refusing to save any children at all, because we could not save the lot.

8. In view of all these considerations, any scheme which we put forward ought, in my opinion to be designed -

(a) to make it as difficult as possible for the enemy to accept;

(b) to avoid discrimination between one European Ally and another;

(c) to give each refugee government something that looks like a concession, which it can use for propaganda purposes;

(d) to keep our commitments down to the smallest possible amount if the enemy accept;

(e) to avoid raising throughout Occupied Europe hopes which we cannot satisfy.

9. The Greek scheme is certainly not a precedent to be followed. By disguising it as a Swedish proposal we deprived ourselves of the credit we should otherwise have obtained. Moreover, it is now fairly certain that the enemy has obtained appreciable benefit.

There/

There is no certainty that the Neutral Commission has succeeded in establishing anything like complete control over Greek domestic produce. Reports do not reach us nearly as frequently as they should, with the result that it might be three or four months before any glaring abuse came to our notice. By feeding a large number of Greek adults we have provided the enemy with a considerable number of fit workers, whom he is now employing on the defences of Greece. In other words it is working in very much the same way as the Hoover scheme in the last war. It was clear then that it was helping the enemy, but the Government was naturally reluctant to admit this, and it was held to be quite impossible to reimpose a complete embargo.

10. At this Ministry we have come to the conclusion that if some concession, or apparent concession, appears to be unavoidable, the following proposal offers the fewest objections. Always assuming that the supply position enables us to contemplate anything of the kind, we should announce publicly our willingness to feed children and nursing and expectant mothers in certain selected cities (e.g. Marseilles, Paris, Brussels, Rotterdam, Oslo, Warsaw, Cracow, Belgrade, Smolensk). It would, of course, be necessary before doing so to consult the Allies as to the areas to be chosen, making it plain to them that it was this or nothing, and that it was for

A

them/

them to choose. We should declare bluntly that we have no intention of relieving the enemy of the greater part of his obligation to feed the occupied territories, that in any case we could not, without detracting from our own war effort, assume the whole burden, and that we consider that water-tight neutral control cannot be achieved over wide areas. We should then announce our willingness to initiate experimental schemes in the selected cities or districts upon the following conditions:-

(i) All imports from overseas to be carried on Swedish coal-burning ships released from the Baltic;

(ii) An adequately-staffed neutral commission to be installed in each city, with complete freedom of movement and facilities for reporting back to us at frequent intervals;

(iii) The present rations to be fully maintained;

(iv) The Germans to supply half of the milk, fats, vitamins, medical supplies, etc., which the commissions will handle;

(v) The Germans to supply all necessary overland transport such as rolling-stock, motor vehicles, rubber tyres and petrol.

11. Unlike the Greek scheme, this would not be made to emanate from a neutral government. No doubt it would be necessary to secure

Swiss/

Swiss and Swedish concurrence in advance. But we should then proclaim the scheme without warning, making it clear that the enemy must take it or leave it as a whole, and that we are not prepared to accept amendments.

12. If they have not been published before, I should like at the same time to propose the Swiss and Swedish child evacuation schemes.

13. You will see that if the enemy accepted we should run little risk of conferring any substantial economic advantage upon him. If, on the other hand, he refused, which I am advised is the most likely result, we should then be in a very strong position, since there is no one of the proposed conditions which is in itself unreasonable. We should also avoid the charge of inconsistency, since we could well argue that adequate neutral control is much more feasible within single cities than it could possibly be over wide areas. Our refusal to do more than this could well be justified by referring to the growing needs of our Russian Allies. Whatever happened the position of the refugee Governments would be made considerably easier.

14./

14. It is, of course, possible that even these proposals may prove to be quite impracticable for reasons of supply, and, as far as we can judge at the moment, the supply position is likely to prove the most serious of all obstacles to any relief scheme. But this should not prevent us from formulating the principles on which we are prepared to act if the foodstuffs prove to be available.

15. Will you let me know whether you are in general agreement with this letter ? If so, we might try to steer Governor Lehman towards the same conclusions in any conversations we may have with him. It is quite impossible, of course, that we should do anything of this kind before the harvest, and therefore, we should be thinking in terms of next winter. In the meantime, however, public agitation and pressure from the Allied Governments will presumably continue to grow. If possible, I should like to agree with the

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Americans a form of reply to be given to enquiries either from Allied Governments or from the public, indicating that while the position remains constantly under review by H.M.G. and the U.S. Government, neither considers that the time has yet come come for a change of policy. (This would not preclude some increase of Allied purchases inside the blockade area). I regard this as

important/

important, since otherwise it is difficult for us to give a clear answer to our various interrogators.

Yours ever,

Sellonc.

The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street,
S.W.1.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

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W 6190

21 APR 1943

Registry Number W 6190/4/49

FROM Foreign Office minute (Mr. Harvey)

No.

Dated 13th Apr. 1943.

Received in Registry 21st Apr. 1943.

W: Coordination +

Governor Lehman's visit to United Kingdom

While Governor Lehman is in United Kingdom, he is proposing to discuss the questions of relief through the blockade for occupied Allied countries and post-war relief administration. He has been authorised by Mr. Hull to explore the possibilities of the first question. Mr. Lehman is anxious to get in direct touch with Ministers of Food, Supply and Production to take stock for future relief work

Last Paper.

(w 6189)

References.

(Minutes.)

See minutes

E.R. Dew

E.R. Collins. 21/4

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

mb 11/5/43

(Index.)

Allied 30/7

Next Paper.

(w 6193)

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

W 6190
21 APR 1943

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Secretary of State.

You asked me about the position of Governor Lehman and his conversations here.

Mr. Lehman while here is proposing to deal with two sets of questions: (a) the question of relief through the blockade to occupied Allied countries and (b) post-war relief administration.

As regards (a) he has been authorised by Mr. Hull to explore possibilities with us and for this purpose he will be meeting Lord Drogheda of M.E.W. whilst the Foreign Office will be represented by Mr. Le Rougetel of the General Department (a note on this subject is below).

As regards (b) Governor Lehman has not yet received the appointment of Head Administrator of the United Nations Relief Administration which it is expected that he will be given. In the meanwhile he is Head of the American Section of the Relief Administration and in this capacity he will be taking soundings in London for the future. Up till now United Nations questions have been dealt with by Sir F. Leith-Ross who represents not only H.M.G. but also the Allied Governments in London on the subject. Mr. Lehman is understood to be anxious to get in direct touch with the Ministers of Food, Supply and Production, in order to take stock for future relief work. Sir F. Leith-Ross is now on the official staff of Mr. Dalton and would have to be detached if relief is to be separated from the Board of Trade and placed under a new Minister.

13th April, 1943.

This will have to be further considered

April 13

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Mr. Harvey.

On the Secretary of State's return from Washington the relief file was submitted to him with a minute of mine for Mr. Law on paper W.5158, summarising the position reached on April 3rd. I attach these papers for convenience of reference.

We have now heard from Lord Halifax that as the result of a conversation between Mr. Noel Hall and Mr. Osborne, a member of Governor Lehman's organisation in Washington, on April 5th, Mr. Hull has ~~now~~ authorised Mr. Lehman during his stay in London to discuss with H.M. Government the question of relief through the blockade "without commitment by either Government on any point of principle". In particular Mr. Hull is anxious that we should examine the practical possibility of devising secretly a plan which our two Governments will have ready to meet relief through the blockade during the coming winter (Washington telegram No. 1689, Flag D.). As Lord Halifax points out at the end of this telegram, the merits of the scheme which Mr. Hull desires us to consider are of less immediate importance than the opportunity it should afford us of examining all aspects of the problem of immediate relief while Governor Lehman is in London.

Lord Drogheda is making arrangements for a meeting with Governor Lehman, if possible this week, at which I am to be present, and I am keeping in close touch with him meanwhile.

W

H. M. Rowan.
April 13th 1943.

S. 15.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 6193
21 APR 1943

Registry Number W 6193/4/49

FROM Lord Drogheda (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. le Rougetel

No.

Secret.

Dated 21st April, 1943

Received in Registry 21st April, 1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for occupied Europe

Transmits three copies of record of meeting with Mr. Lehman held at Ministry of Economic Warfare on 19th April together with three copies of some notes on the suggested approach to the examination of the relief problem. Record of meeting has been sent to Mr. Lehman.

A further meeting will be held on 22nd April.

Last Paper.

(W6190)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

It will be great help if Treasury's meeting can reach agreement on the terms of the reply to be returned to enquiries, including the Belgian, Norwegian Govts and Gen. de Gaulle.

Examination of the other points will clearly take some time and will presumably be begun by Mr Lehman, after his return to Washington, with the Embassy and the various Food Boards etc.

W. A.
Central
Northern
Southern
depts

E. E. Crowe 21/4

This is now superseded by the record in W6322/4/49.

(Action completed.) wb 26/5/43

(Index.) All 30/5

Next Paper.

W6222
(W6322)

24994 2'43 F.O.P.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Mr. Harvey.

I attach a record of a meeting with Governor Lehman at M.E.W. on April 19th, which I have just received from Lord Drogheda. At this meeting, which I attended on behalf of the Foreign Office, Lord Selborne took the chair.

As you will see, the discussion was fairly comprehensive and quite inconclusive, but Governor Lehman appeared to be genuinely anxious to keep in step with us so far as relief through the blockade is concerned. At the same time, it was clear that Governor Lehman, although not authorised to discuss matters of high policy, is himself convinced of the desirability of some kind of token shipment through the blockade, which could not be made without a definite change of policy. It is no doubt with a view to keeping Governor Lehman in play that in Conclusion (a) of this record it is admitted that an experimental relief scheme on a small scale may prove to be desirable next autumn.

The notes attached to this record have been prepared with a view to a further meeting with Governor Lehman which is to be held at M.E.W. tomorrow afternoon, April 22nd. M.E.W. are also preparing a "basis of reply" to enquiries, for discussion with Governor Lehman at this meeting.

H. LeRougetel

April 21st 1943.

W.M. Mack 21/4

S/S has seen.

His comments. Would of course leave us no modification of blockade without the agreement of Cabinet.

22 April

Ext - Urgent 124

Tel. No.
GROSVENOR 4060.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE.

BERKELEY SQUARE,
W 6 1193
21 APR 1943

SECRET.

21st April, 1943.

Dear Le Rougetel,

I enclose herein three copies of our record of Monday's meeting with Mr. Lehman, together with three copies of some notes on the suggested approach to the examination of the relief problem. We sent the record of the meeting to Mr. Lehman in draft so that he might have a chance to amend or add to it, if he wishes to do so.

I confirm that we are to have a further meeting with him tomorrow, Thursday, at 3.p.m.

Yours ever,

Dreghers.

J.H.Le Rougetel, Esq., C.M.G., M.C.,
Foreign Office.

SECRET
DRAFT

RECORD OF MEETING

The question of the admission of relief foodstuffs (and or vitamins) through the blockade to occupied territories other than Greece was discussed at a meeting with Mr. Lehman at the Ministry of Economic Warfare on Monday, 19th April, 1943.

2. In the course of the discussion, which covered a wide range, Mr. Lehman indicated that his Government desired, if possible, to work out a scheme for the initiation of relief on a limited and experimental scale to be brought into operation as soon as possible. Such a scheme would, of course, have to be designed to fit into the framework of the existing supply situation, and would have to incorporate the conditions necessary to ensure its success and to prevent the enemy from drawing advantage from it. Mr. Lehman considered that the operation of a scheme on these lines would avert psychological dangers which otherwise might result from the maintenance of a purely negative attitude on our part, both among the Allied nationals of the occupied countries serving the cause of the United Nations away from their homes, and in the occupied territories themselves. He mentioned that the supply of food packages to Norway and of powdered milk and vitamins to Belgium had been considered, and that in his view the necessary goods for restricted schemes of this kind for those two countries could be found; he appreciated, however, that pressure for increasing the scale of such action in the countries mentioned, and also for extending it to other

countries/

countries, would be extremely strong, and he thought therefore that the supply situation would first have to.be very carefully examined.

3. On the British side attention was drawn to the fundamental consideration that the obligation of feeding any population lay with the occupying Power - an obligation that had been scrupulously honoured by the United Nations in the cases of North Africa, Iceland, Persia and the Middle East. Any move on the part of the Allies to assume an obligation which was Germany's might not only obscure to the oppressed peoples the source responsible for their misery, but might also tempt the Germans to intensify that misery in order to increase the benevolence of the Allies. It should not be forgotten that by refusing to allow any food to pass through our controls since August 1940, we had in fact compelled the enemy to send into Norway and Belgium substantial quantities of food which otherwise would have been available for his own consumption. It could not be denied that even the Greek Scheme had been of some assistance to the enemy.

4. We recognised, however, that conditions in the occupied countries might, as in the case of Greece, become so bad that the abovementioned disadvantages and risks would have to be accepted. This might occur next winter, and therefore it was necessary now to explore the position carefully.

5. We agreed that the necessary tonnage for a limited relief scheme could probably be obtained from Swedish

shipping/

shipping in the Baltic, if the Swedish Government and the German Government consented to its use. On the other hand, attention was drawn to the possible hostile reactions of the Russian Government to any scheme involving the diversion of supplies which might otherwise have been available to them. It was also pointed out that assistance on a substantial scale would be needed by the occupied territories after their liberation, and that there were dangers in assuming commitments elsewhere in respect of commodities which were especially suitable for the initial phases of relief in liberated countries. Mention was also made of the danger possibly inherent in a limited relief action, of raising expectations of assistance on a scale greater than that which in practice could be provided. It was suggested that the first stage of any examination of the problem should be to determine the limits within which supplies could be made available, so that the best use of these could then be considered and the merits and demerits of the resulting proposition discussed. With regard to any initial experiments which might be made, it was strongly recommended that action should be confined to particular cities in each occupied country, rather than to a limited number of countries out of the total of possible claimants; it seemed to us most undesirable to give one or two Allies preference over the rest.

6. These considerations were advanced, however, rather as points to be taken into account at a later stage than as

objections to the approach to the problem proposed by Mr. Lehman. General agreement was recorded in the following terms:-

(a) It might prove desirable to initiate in the coming autumn a relief scheme on a small and experimental scale in the occupied territories.

(b) The responsible departments of the British and American Governments should examine the possibility of such a scheme, with a view to its submission, if it proved practicable, for the approval of their respective Governments.

(c) Meanwhile it was desirable that the general line of replies to be given to enquiries and applications concerning a change of blockade policy in this matter should be agreed, in order that the British and American Governments should speak with a single voice.

(d) The possibility of promoting the evacuation of children from occupied countries to Switzerland and Sweden should be further explored; not as an alternative to any relief scheme which it might be decided to propose to the United States and British Governments, but as a supplementary measure possessing advantages of its own.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

20th April, 1943.

SECRET.

NOTES ON THE SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THE EXAMINATION OF THE RELIEF PROBLEM.

It is assumed that any relief action contemplated will be confined to children, since these have the strongest claim on humanitarian grounds; and moreover assistance successfully administered to them would be of less advantage to the enemy than a relief scheme for adults.

2. The nature of the supplies to be employed has to be determined. For this purpose consideration will have to be given to the particular needs of the intended recipients, to portability and to facility of control.

3. Since most foodstuffs other than cereals are in short supply, it is evident that the supply situation must be a decisive factor. The first step should therefore be to ascertain the maximum amount of the selected commodities which would be made available for relief purposes in the winter of 1943 and during 1944 without compromising such essential needs as supplies to combatant Allies and liberated territories.

4. Since any supplies available for the occupied territories are likely to be severely limited, it is necessary to decide on what principle they should be allocated. In so doing regard ought to be had to the need for equitable treatment as between the various Allies. Moreover, since it will probably be found that supplies available to any one territory are inadequate to render more than a fraction of the assistance which is desirable, some principle will have to be discovered according to which the recipients are to be selected. A decision on this point will again be influenced by the view taken of what degree of assistance is worth rendering and what is not; e.g., whether it is better to give four children a quarter of a pint of milk each, or a whole pint to one child only.

5. It is important that any scheme adopted shall bring about a material improvement of the conditions of those whom it is designed to benefit. This means first, that a careful control

must/

must be exercised over the transport and distribution of the imported supplies themselves. It means, secondly, in order but not in importance, that a method must be found of ensuring that these supplies are supplementary to what the intended recipients have at present, and that their effect is not nullified by a deterioration in local conditions which might be brought about by German action. The control necessary in these two respects will involve the acceptance by the Germans of strictly drafted terms, and the institution of a system of neutral supervision which, to be effective, must include facilities for free movement and rapid communication with the blockade authorities.

6. Various technical details concerned with transport and the financial costs of supervision in the occupied countries would have to be considered in their turn.

7. Finally, any scheme evolved should be considered in the light of probable German reactions, and of the psychological consequences likely to be produced in the occupied territories themselves. With regard to the latter we should weigh the possibility that,while the first arrival of foodstuffs may produce an excellent effect, assistance continued at a low level, and prevented by supply considerations from increasing, may provoke considerable discontent. At present the inhabitants of the occupied territories know that they will receive nothing through the blockade, and there is evidence that the reasons for existing policy are generally understood. If, however, it appears to them that some food can be sent, and that we have found a method of minimizing the damage to the blockade, there may be bitter disappointment that so little is forthcoming.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 6222

22 APR 1943

Registry Number W} 6222/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare, Communicated

No. T 550/20

Dated

Received in Registry 22nd April, 1943.

W : Co-ordination

Food situation in the Netherlands.

Transmits a copy of a letter from Netherlands Ambassador and Lord Drogheda (Ministry of Economic Warfare) of 12th March enclosing a copy of a memorandum by Mr. Kastens on food situation in Holland. Transmits copies of Lord Drogheda's reply of 13th March and of a minute on the Dutch survey.

Last Paper.

w6193/04589/

References.

(*Minutes.*)

Central Dept

28/4

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

(Action completed.)

nil
29/4/43

(Index.)

ACH 22/7

Next Paper.

(w7832)

w6252

24994 2'43 F.O.P.

DMC

Copy for E Ebourne. Esq F.O. T.550/20 132

NETHERLANDS EMBASSY

21A, Portman Square,
London, W.1.

No.759

12th March, 1943.

W 6222
22 MAR 1943

Dear Drogheda,

I enclose the survey of Mr.Kerstens on the food situation in Holland, especially with regard to the underfeeding of different categories of children. It is a report based on official and other reliable information, and I can guarantee that it has in no way been embellished. You might find in the conclusion a discrepancy with the request made in the conversation of Monday with Lord Selborne and yourself. I asked for an immediate relief of 1,000 to 1,500 tons of milkpowder a month. The report comes to the conclusion that monthly, 2,000 tons of milkpowder and a 1,000 tons of dehydrated eggs are wanted. The last figures illustrate the present deficiency compared with normal requirements.

Personally, I would be delighted if that amount could be sent; as we were not unaware of the great difficulties, we have limited our request to the bare minimum of 1,500 tons, which already would be a considerable improvement on the present situation.

Yours very truly
(Sgd) E.Michiels van Verduynen,

To the Earl of Drogheda, C.M.G., C.B.E.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House, W.1.

NOTE ON THE FOOD SITUATION IN THE NETHERLANDS.

(February 1943)

1. Food deficiencies.

In the following survey it is assumed that in the Netherlands official rations give a fairly accurate picture of the food situation. As a rule rations are obtainable but, unlike in other occupied Western European countries, outside the rations additional sources of supply, which could be of any substantial value to the average diet are unknown.

Edible products can only be bought on ration cards, except, fish fruits and vegetables, which however are available, if at all, in such minute quantities, that they can hardly be counted as a contribution to the diet. As to fish 80% of pre-war consumption was dependent on fishing at sea; since the occupation the sea going fishing fleet has been utilised for other purposes. To a lesser extent home production of vegetables has fallen, but export - before the war some 35% of domestic production - rose since 1940 to 80%. Still worse is the situation as regards fruits. For fruits the Netherlands were normally a net importer to the extent of over 60% of home consumption. At present domestic consumption has been reduced to that which is unsuitable for export or for canning. In 1940 and also in 1942 citrus fruits were imported from Italy and Spain; according to information from a Dutch fruit importer in 1943, these imports did not exceed 2% of normal requirements.

The black market must be regarded as a local feature. There are several circumstances in the Netherlands, which have impeded illicit trade in foodstuffs with the result that only a few privileged benefit by it. These circumstances are long experience in matters of "crisis"-control over production and marketing of foodstuffs, specialised cultivation according to regions and dense concentration of the consumer's population in urban districts. This has been more fully explained in a note on "Food conditions in occupied Holland", handed to Lord Selborne on March 1st by Mr.Kerstens.

Until now there was little mention in the press of the food-situation in countries like the Netherlands and it seems logical to assume that the general public is more impressed by spectacularly low starvation rations how limited the areas concerned might be, than by conditions which reveal planned poverty for all, which is the case in the Netherlands.

With the aid of official ration lists - as appearing regularly in the newspapers - the following figures have been calculated, showing in energy values allocations to normal consumers:

...

Rations.

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Rations for normal consumers in the Netherlands.

(including allowances for non-rationed foodstuffs)

August	1940	2450	calories
January	1941	2110	"
May	"	1960	"
January	1942	1670	"
May	"	1590	"
February	1943	1520	"

The figures indicate a constant and rapid decline since 1940. To regard them as an indication of really available food seems, however, too optimistic. According to information from medical sources based on actual information amont the urban population - by no means restricted to local situations but spread all over the country - the level of 1500 was already reached in January 1942, so that in view of the further decline, as shown by the above figures an average calory intake of 1350 in February 1943 seems nearer to the truth.

Especially among the town-population the rations are not always available in time. If serious shortages occur, announcements are published in the local press, that the ration cards are extended over a longer period. Actually this means a reduction in rations. Repeatedly this has been the case with fat and potatoes. Since spring 1942 when compulsory slaughter of cattle started on a large scale, increasing difficulties have arisen with the milk supply as well.

Annexes I - V give details about the allocation of foodstuffs to the various consumers and age groups.

These data are summarized in the following table, showing deficiencies for the age groups concerned in comparison with League of Nations standards (weighed averages):

Rations for various consumers' groups in the Netherlands during February 1943.

	Energy value in calories	Proteins in grammes		Fat in grammes	Ca in milligrammes
		total	(an.)		
Children 0-4 years					
Standard L.o.N.	1000	45	(38)	...	1000
rations Febr.'43	1420	54	(32)	32	1075
deficiency(-),surplus(+)	+	+	-	...	+

Children/...

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	Energy value in calories	Proteins in grammes total	(an.)	Fat in grammes	Ca in milli-grammes
Children 4-14 years					
standard L.o.N.	2400	67	(45)	...	1000
rations Febr.'43	1720	58	(21)	32	670
deficiency in %	- 30%	- 17%	- 54%	...	- 33%
Adolescents.					
standard L.o.N.	3300	97	(56)	...	1000
rations Febr.'43	1850	61	(14)	23	475
deficiency in %	- 45%	- 40%	- 75%	...	- 50%
Expect. and nursing mothers.					
(during 26 weeks)	3300	110	(68)	125	1500
standard L.o.N.	2100	78	(30)	37	1050
rations Febr.'43	- 40%	- 30%	- 56%	- 70%	- 50%
deficiency in %					
Other adults +)					
Standard L.o.N.	3000	70	(35)	90++)	750
rations Febr.'43	1520	51	(14)	20	440
deficiency in %	- 50%	- 30%	-60%	- 75%	- 40%

+) extra rations for heavy workers are not taken into account
++) pre-war figure.

The table shows, that adolescents, children and expecting and nursing mothers are, notwithstanding extra allowances, on the whole worse off than the other groups of the population. The comparatively favourable figures for the very small children are misleading. It should be noted in this connection, that nursing mothers receive their additional rations only during a period of six weeks, which is far shorter than what is considered necessary. The list moreover shows, that the greatest deficiency in the diet for women and children consist of proteins, especially animal protein. As regards fats shortage, already last year medical authorities were concerned especially for the growing youth; at that time fat rations were still higher than they are now. The unreliable milk position is the more serious as mothers and children depend for their fat - and protein-intake - as the figures in Annexes II - V show - at present already from 30-50% on milk.

Exact figures cannot be given with regards to vitamins. The diets however are seriously deficient which can be understood from the great shortage of leafy vegetables, the absence of fruit and fish-oil and the fact that milk for women and children is not whole milk, but milk adjusted to 2½% buttermilk.

...

According/...

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According to private information, the charge for a vitamin injection was in November 1942 f.7,50 for 50 tablets A, B, C, and D f.25. In some schools vitamin tablets have been distributed free of charge, but it is admitted even in the press, that this is done on far too small a scale to be of any practical effect.

2. Health Statistics.

Official figures are scarce and now partly out of date. They generally cover 1941 when food conditions, although serious, were not as alarming as at present.

Mortality rate. Excluding direct victims of the war the general death rate has increased since 1939, according to "Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek". (Central Bureau of Statistics), in 1941 as follows:

for children	0-4	years	of	age	by 31%
"	5-14	"	"	"	" 27%
" adolescents					" 43%
" adults					" 14%

Causes of death. From the same source are the following figures indicating the increases of death rates for various diseases in 1941 in comparison with 1939:

1. influenza	by 124%
2. tuberculosis.	" 47%
3. bronchitis	" 36%
4. pneumonia	" 20%
5. contagious diseases (other than 1 and 2)	" 98%
6. diseases of the respiratory tract (other than 4)	" 36%
7. diarrhoea and enteritis	" 54%
8. all other diseases.	" 4%

Contagious diseases. Concerning the spread of contagious diseases some figures are also revealed for 1942. Dysenteria, Dyphtheria, and typhoid fever come into the foreground, typical diseases caused by undernourishment.

Cases of contagious diseases.
(in index figures)

	1939	1941	1942 (4 months)
scarlet fever	100	70	83
diphtheria	100	430	1170
dysentaria	100	480	653
typhoid fever) paratyphoid)	100	94	225
poliomegelitis	100	101	330
cerebrospinal meningitis	100	222	82

Other/...

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Other diseases. As to the other diseases it is known from statements by doctors and others that medical circles in Holland are more and more concerned about the increase of the following diseases:
Rachitis: Lack of fish oil and absence of calcium are responsible for the rapid spread of rachitis. In the summer of 1942 examination of Rotterdam schoolchildren by the Medical Health Service has shown that only 36% received sufficient vitamins to prevent rickets.
Tuberculosis: The yearly report of "Nederlandsche Vereeninging tot bestrijding der Tuberculose" (Netherlands Tuberculosis Society) mentioned an increase of mortality by tuberculosis in 1941 in comparison with 1940 by 34%. The increase affects especially tuberculosis of the respiratory tracts and of the bronchial glands.

The "Nederlandsche Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde" (Netherlands Review of Medicine and Surgery), of June 6th 1942, draws attention to the increase of tuberculosis in the Northern provinces. The council of Emmen - a town of ± 50.000 inhabitants - in view of the increase of cases of tuberculosis during the first quarter of 1942 - voted for f.30.000 on the budget, nearly double the amount which was expended for tuberculosis during 1941.

The Director General of Public Health - member of the Nazi party - "ascribes", according to items in the "Maandblad van het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek" (Monthly Review of the Central Bureau of Statistics), of Aug./Sept.1942 - "the alarming increase in the incidence of tuberculosis in the Netherlands mainly to the fact, that now more people than before apply for examination, so that a greater number of cases are revealed". He "regrets the growing shortage of sanatorium accomodation".
Scabies, hitherto virtually unknown, is now rampant owing to the shortage of soap.

A tide of ill health is sweeping the country, while the falling rations and the ever decreasing power of resistance to disease is aggravating the situation alarmingly.

3. First objectives with relief.

The necessity to raise the protein level in the diet for children in the Netherlands cannot be stressed too much and calls for immediate relief.

Whole milk powder as well as dehydrated eggs are the most suitable foodstuffs for this purpose. Both these products moreover are an important supplement to the shortage of fats, minerals and the vitamins A and the B-group of the rations.

H.M.Government is concerned in the first place with the children in big cities and for industrial townships proper.

According to the latest census the urban population in the Netherlands can be estimated as follows:

in/...

in towns over 100.000 inhabitants	2.500.000
in suburbs and residential towns proper	800.000
in industrial agglomerations	1.100.000
total "urban" population	4.400.000

of which the following categories of children and expectant and nursing mothers require relief:

	Relief population	Protein-deficiencies in grammes per day.
children 0 - 4 years	450.000	-
" 4-14 "	890.000	10
adolescents 14-21 years	570.000	36
nursing and expectant mothers	90.000	32
	2.000.000	17 (weighed average)

This requires a monthly supply of:

4.000 m.tons of whole milkpowder
or
2.000 m.tons whole milkpowder and 1.000 m.tons dehydrated eggs.

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13th March, 1943.

My dear Ambassador,

Thank you for sending me Mr.Kerstens' survey on the food situation in Holland. We will read it with great interest and will consider the whole situation most carefully.

Yours very sincerely,
Drogheda.

His Excellency Jonkheer E.Michiels van Verduynen,
Netherlands Embassy.

MINUTE SHEET.

I summarize below Miss Dennehy's comments on the Dutch survey:-

(a) The survey exaggerates the difficulties of the present food position in the Netherlands.

(b) The figures do not include any allowance for non-rationed foodstuffs. We believe that the Average Dutchman does get some 150 calories a day from unrationed foods. The Netherlands Government would, however, dispute this and we should not be able to produce any statistical proof of our contention.

(c) The report tends to under-estimate the black market, which is patronized to some extent by the middle classes. But the poor would not be able to buy on it; and the very poor probably find it hard to afford their full rations.

(d) The statement that only minute quantities of vegetables are available, if at all, is an exaggeration. We do, however, receive reports of shortages of vegetables in the larger towns where distribution is probably difficult.

(e) The Dutch note is misleading in that it uses a new (and lower) calorie factor in calculating the value of the rations for the various consumer groups, and compares this with the old (and higher) standard of calorie requirements.

(f) Vitamin distribution in the Netherlands since the war has been on a larger scale than the report suggests. A Dutch press report of January last stated that at the last distribution of vitamin D the majority did not come to fetch their share.

The last thing we want to do is to get involved in arguments about rations, or calories, or vitamins, with the exiled Governments. And, therefore, even if the Dutch case is a great deal less strong than appears from Mr.Kersten's statement, we shall no doubt have to allow some relief into the Netherlands, if a concession is made to our other Allies.

At the moment, however, we are precluded from making any reply to representation from the Dutch or anyone else in regard to relief. We can only hope that they will not press us too often for the answer we cannot give!

We should send the Foreign Office a copy of M.Michiels' letter and its enclosure, and perhaps we might, in doing so, add the gist of this minute.

The Minister. Yes certainly. S. 6.4
The Parliamentary Secretary.

(In'lld) D.
1st April, 1943.

D.M.F.
12.4.43.

FOOD CONDITIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS
(February 1943)

ANNEX I

Rations for normal consumers per week.

	Quantity in grammes	Energy value in calories	Proteins in grammes total	(animal)	Fat in grammes	Ca in milligrammes.
bread and cakes	1800	4554	162	(-)	3	275
butter, margarine etc.	146	1085	-	(-)	120	21
meat (incl.bones)	200	245	27	(27)	7	14
potatoes	4000	1960	60	(-)	-	390
sugar	250	950	-	(-)	-	--
jams, syrup etc.	125	321	-	(-)	-	14
cheese	75	146	25	(25)	4	698
flour	70	251	7	(-)	-	13
farinaceous products	150	513	18	(-)	3	30
pulses	63	173	13	(-)	1	82
		10.198	312	(52)	138	1537
skimmed milk	1300	468	46	(46)	--	1560
total per week		10.666	358	(98)	138	3097
total per day		1.520	51	(14)	20	440

FOOD CONDITIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS
(February 1943)

ANNEX II.

Rations for nursing and expectant mothers (during 26 weeks)

	Quantity in grammes	Energy value in calories	Proteins in grammes total	Proteins in grammes animal	Fat in grammes	Ca in milli-grammes
Standard ration		10.666	358	(98)	138	3.097
extra:						
milk (2½% fat)	3.500	1.925	122	(122)	87	4.200
bread or	700	1.771	63	(-)	1	110
farinaceous products or	700	2.398	84	(-)	7	140
bread and	500	1.265	45	(-)	1	75
butter	125	928	-	(-)	103	-
recapitulation.		1.771	63	(-)	1	110
		2.398	84	(-)	7	140
		2.193	45	(-)	104	75
		6.362	192	(-)	112	325
average		2.121	64	(-)	37	108
Standard ration		10.666	358	(98)	138	3.097
extra milk		1.925	122	(122)	87	4.200
extra other food		2.121	64	(-)	37	108
Total per week		14.712	544	(220)	262	7.405
Total per day		2.100	78	(31)	37	1.050

FOOD CONDITIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS
(February 1943)

ANNEX III

Rations for children (0 - 4 yrs.)

	Quantity in grammes	Energy value in calories	Proteins in grammes Total	(Animal)	Fat in grammes	Ca in milli-grammes.
Bread and cakes	900	2.277	81	(-)	1	138
butter, margarine etc.	100	740	-	(-)	80	14
meat (incl.bones)	100	122	13	(13)	3	7
potatoes	2.000	980	30	(-)	-	195
sugar	250	950	-	(-)	-	-
jams, syrup etc.	125	321	-	(-)	-	14
cheese	75	146	25	(25)	4	698
flour	70	251	7	(-)	-	13
farinaceous products	150	513	18	(-)	3	30
pulses	63	173	13	(-)	1	82
rice	125	445	9	(-)	-	10
cacao powder (fatless		163	2	(-)	-	11
2/3 sugar)	38	7.081	198	(38)	92	1.212
milk (2½% fat)	5.250	2.887	183	(183)	130	6.300
skimmed milk	-	-	-	(-)	-	-
Total per week		9.968	381	(221)	222	7.512
Total per day		1.420	54	(32)	32	1.075

FOOD CONDITIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS
(February 1943)

ANNEX IV

Rations for children (4 - 14 years)

	Quantity in grammes	Energy value in calories	Proteins in grammes Total	(Animal)	Fat in grammes	Ca in milligrammes
Bread and cakes	1.800	4.554	162	(2)	3	275
butter, margarine etc.	200	1.486	-	(-)	144	25
meat (incl.bones)	200	245	27	(27)	7	14
potatoes	4.000	1.960	60	(-)	-	390
sugar	250	950	-	(-)	-	-
jams, syrup etc.	125	321	-	(-)	-	14
cheese	75	146	25	(25)	4	698
flour	70	251	7	(-)	-	13
farinaceous products	150	513	18	(-)	3	30
pulses	63	173	13	(-)	1	82
		10.599	312	(52)	162	1.541
milk (2½% fat)	2.625	1.444	92	(92)	65	3.150
skimmed milk	-	-	-	--	-	-
Total per week		12.043	404	(144)	227	4.691
Total per day		1.720	58	(21)	32	670

FOOD CONDITIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS.
(February 1943)

ANNEX V

Rations for adolescents (14 - 21 years).

	Quantity in grammes	Energy value in calories	Proteins in grammes total	(animal)	Fat in grammes	Ca. in milligrammes
bread and cakes	2.200	5.566	198	(-)	4	337
butter, margarine etc.	200	1.486	-	(-)	144	25
meat (incl. bones)	200	245	27	(27)	7	14
potatoes	6.000	2.940	90	(-)	-	585
sugar	250	950	-	(-)	-	-
jams, syrup, etc.	125	321	-	(-)	-	14
cheese	75	146	25	(25)	4	698
flour	70	251	7	(-)	-	13
farinaceous products	150	513	18	(-)	3	30
pulses	63	173	13	(-)	1	82
		12.591	378	(52)	163	1.798
skimmed milk	1.300	468	46	(46)	-	1.560
total per week		13.059	424	(98)	163	3.358
total per day		1.866	61	(14)	23	479

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 6252

22 APR 1943

Registry Number W 6252/4/49

FROM Parliamentary Question (Mr.Spearman)

No.

Dated 20th Apl. 1943

Received in Registry 22nd Apl. 1943

W : Co-ordination.

Relief for occupied Europe.

Mr. Spearman. asked the Parliamentary Secretary to Ministry of Economic Warfare whether he would give an assurance that he would permit navicerts for a small supply of vitamins to a particular country, if that could be done without materially interfering with the blockade and if the representatives of that country were of the opinion that the amount in question would assist their children.

Mr. Dingle Foot replied that he could not give the assurance.

Mr. Spearman asked supplementary questions.

Last Paper.

W 6222.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/ Miss Emery (P.O.)
from Mr. Hilland
May 6.

(Minutes.)

A.-g. Pol. Dept
Central Dept

Ltr 4/4

(1)

(Action completed.)

W.O. 30/4/43

(Index.)

Aff 28/7

Next Paper.

W 6277.

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

GENERAL.

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION.

W 6252

22 APR 1943

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* 51. Mr. Spearman,—To ask the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, if he will give an assurance that the impossibility of supplying all parts of occupied Europe with adequate food will not deter him from permitting navicerts for a small supply of vitamins to a particular country, if that can be done without materially interfering with the blockade and our shipping arrangements, and if the representatives of that country are of the opinion that the amount in question will be of material assistance to their children. [*1st Sitting Day after* 18*th April.*]

U.

ANSWERED 20 APR 1943
REPLY ATTACHED.

1520

F.O. ARE NOT ASKED TO ADVISE.

Mc Grose

Please attach reply

19/4

2 0 APR 1943

ECONOMIC WARFARE

Enemy-Occupied Europe (Vitamins)

23. **Mr. Spearman** asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare whether he will give an assurance that the impossibility of supplying all parts of occupied Europe with adequate food will not deter him from permitting navicerts for a small supply of vitamins to a particular country, if that can be done without materially interfering with the blockade and our shipping arrangements, and if the representatives of that country are of the opinion that the amount in question will be of material assistance to their children?

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare (Mr. Dingle Foot): While I sympathise with the purpose which my hon. Friend has in mind, I am afraid I cannot give the assurance for which he asks. The hypothetical circumstances envisaged by the Question would have to be considered by His Majesty's Government on their merits when they arose.

Mr. Spearman: Is my hon. Friend aware that responsible people consider that the shipment of only 2,000 tons of vitamins and powdered milk would save children in Belgium? If it is so, would it not be worth while allowing it for only one month?

Mr. Foot: I doubt whether that arises out of the Question; but if that scheme is carefully examined, it will be seen that the whole benefit that might be conferred on Belgian children could be wiped out by some small reduction in the present ration.

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

6th May, 1943.

OUT FILE

You asked me on the telephone what reply Mr. Attlee should send to an M.P. who had enquired about relief for occupied Europe.

For your own information the question of a stock reply to enquirers on this subject is at present under consideration with the United States Government, but it has unfortunately not yet been possible to agree a draft. The stock reply which we used to send is now out of date in view of the discussions which Lord Selborne had with Governor Lehman during his visit here. You may care to turn up Lord Selborne's Cabinet Paper on this subject and the Cabinet Conclusions of last Monday.

All we can suggest, therefore, is that Mr. Attlee's correspondent should be referred to two Parliamentary Questions and their replies, the first by Mr. Harvey on March 16th and the second by Mr. Spearman on April 20th. I enclose copies of these questions and answers for convenience of reference.

(Sd.) G. E. MILLARD.

Miss E.J. Emery,
DOMINIONS OFFICE.

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GENERAL

1943 CO-ORDINATION.

W 6277

23 APR 1943

Registry Number W 6277/4/49

FROM Professor Carl Burckhardt (International Red Cross Committee)

TO Mr. Roberts.

Dated

Received in Registry 22nd Mar. 1943 / 23rd Apr. 1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for Belgium.

The supplying through Portugal of foodstuffs for the needy Belgian civilian population will in future be ensured by the delegations of the International Committee of Red Cross in Lisbon and Brussels and the Belgian relief organisations and the relief will be carried out in the name of the Joint Relief Commission of the International Red Cross.

Last Paper.

W 6252

References.

(Minutes.)

Copy to Camps (M.E.W.)

Central Dept

E.C. 26/4

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

& to Camps (M.E.W.)

April 28.

(1)

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
WE 30/4/43	All 24/7

Next Paper.

W 6322.

24994 2'43 F.O.P.

W 6277
23 APR 1943
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COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE

AGENCE CENTRALE DES PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE

Rappeler dans la réponse :

GENÈVE, le 22 March 1943

W. Roberts, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
London.

Dear Mr. Roberts,

The International Committee of the Red Cross have the honour to inform the Foreign Office that at the request of the parties concerned, and after having come to an agreement with them, the supplying through Portugal of foodstuffs for the needy Belgian civilian population will in future be ensured, in collaboration, by the delegations of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Lisbon and Brussels, and the Belgian relief organizations, and that this relief action will be carried out in the name of the Joint Relief Commission of the International Red Cross.

Yours very truly,

Carl J. Burckhardt

Carl J. Burckhardt
Member of the International
Committee of the Red Cross

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 6322

23 APR 1943

Registry Number W 6322/4/49.

FROM Lord Drogheda (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. le Rougetel.
No.

Secret.

Dated 23rd April, 1943.

Received in Registry 23rd April, 1943

W: Co-Ordination.

Blockade relief policy.

Encloses copies of a record of meetings held on the 19th and 22nd April with Mr. Lehman on the question of relief through the blockade; notes on the suggested approach to the examination of the relief problem and a draft statement to form the basis of replies to appeals for relief through the blockade.

Last Paper.

w 6272 (w 6193)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

The purposes of these discussions with Govt. Lehman were (a) to keep the U.S. Govt. in play and to allay any suspicion there might be that we were about to steal a march on them and (b) to agree upon a line to be taken by both Govts in dealing with enquiries from [allied Govts] public, Parliament & Congress.

It has long been clear that a purely negative attitude on the part of H.M.G. would be no more effective in securing for them these limited desiderata than it would be in resisting public pressure. In order to secure Govt. Lehman's cooperation he agreed to discuss the problem of relief through the blockade in all its aspects, on the explicit understanding that he were in no way authorized to suggest

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
24/6/43	Alt 27/5

Next Paper.

w 6393 (w 6471)

any departure from our accepted
policy, which is to maintain the blockade.
In the event, he agreed to (recommend) the setting
up of a small committee in Washington
to examine the possibility of initiating a
relief scheme "on a small and experimental
scale" in the autumn. It may be
argued that this is, in effect, a change
of policy - I would prefer to say
that it is the only means we have
of preventing a reversal of our
policy (accompanied by much bad
feeling in Washington) being forced
upon us during the next few weeks.

The record of the meetings
concludes with a series of decisions
which should be useful points of departure
in our attempt to create some kind
of joint machinery for dealing with
this painful subject. To it are
attached notes on the suggested
approach of the joint committee to its
task and a draft statement which
is intended to form the basis of
replies to enquiries, official and

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

[W 6500/220/6]

Otherwise —

on both sides of the Atlantic. Gov. Lehman could not agree to this Light on his own authority but feel confident that it wd be acceptable to the Stati Dept.

I understand that L^d Selborne is preparing a paper on the subject of his conversations with Gov. Lehman for Cabinet. Meanwhile I think we should lose no time in sending L^d Halifax a copy of his record with its annexes under cover of a short explanatory despatch.

N.A. Dept. MB. 26/4.
Sir D. Steel 26/4/15
~~M. Ronald~~.

M. L^d Rosebery
24/4.

The action suggested above is being taken by F.E.W. who are sending us copies of their despatches. In the meantime the telegrams in a have been despatched in the Arfan series. I do not think there is anything we can usefully add.

M. L^d R.
28/4.

3/VI

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Tel. No.
GROSVENOR 4060.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE,
W.1.

W 6322

23rd April, 1943.

23 APR 1943

Secret.

Dear Le Rougetel,

I enclose herein three copies of each of the following papers :-

(a) Record of our meetings on the question of relief through the blockade

(b) Notes on the suggested approach to the examination of the relief problem

(c) Draft statement to form the basis of replies to appeals for relief through the blockade.

My Minister is, I understand, drafting a memorandum on the whole subject, and will probably send it to the Cabinet.

Yours ever,

Douglas

J.H.Le Rougetel, Esq., C.M.G., M.C.,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

SECRET

RECORD OF MEETINGS ON THE QUESTION OF RELIEF THROUGH THE BLOCKADE

The question of the admission of relief foodstuffs (and or vitamins) through the blockade to occupied territories other than Greece was discussed at two meetings with Mr. Lehman at the Ministry of Economic Warfare on the 19th and 22nd April, 1943.

2. In the course of the discussion, which covered a wide range, Mr. Lehman indicated that his Government desired, if possible, to work out a scheme for the initiation of relief on a limited and experimental scale to be brought into operation as soon as possible. Such a scheme would, of course, have to be designed to fit into the framework of the existing supply situation, and would have to incorporate the conditions necessary to ensure its success and to prevent the enemy from drawing advantage from it. Mr. Lehman considered that the operation of a scheme on these lines would avert psychological dangers which otherwise might result from the maintenance of a purely negative attitude on our part, both among the Allied nationals of the occupied countries serving the cause of the United Nations away from their homes, and in the occupied territories themselves. He mentioned that the supply of food packages to Norway and of powdered milk and vitamins to Belgium had been considered, and that in his view the necessary goods for restricted schemes of this kind for those two

countries /

countries could be found; he appreciated, however, that pressure for increasing the scale of such action in the countries mentioned, and also for extending it to other countries, would be extremely strong, and he thought therefore that the supply situation would first have to be very carefully examined.

3. On the British side attention was drawn to the fundamental consideration that the obligation of feeding any population lay with the occupying Power - an obligation that had been scrupulously honoured by the United Nations in the cases of North Africa, Iceland, Persia and the Middle East. Any move on the part of the Allies to assume an obligation which was Germany's might not only obscure to the oppressed peoples the source responsible for their misery, but might also tempt the Germans to intensify that misery in order to increase the benevolence of the Allies. It should not be forgotten that by refusing to allow any food to pass through our controls since August, 1940, we had in fact compelled the enemy to send into Norway and Belgium substantial quantities of food which otherwise would have been available for his own consumption. It could not be denied that even the Greek scheme had been of some assistance to the enemy.

4. We recognised, however, that conditions in the occupied countries might, as in the case of Greece, become so bad that the abovementioned disadvantages and risks would have to be accepted. This might occur next winter, and therefore it was necessary now to explore the position carefully.

5./

5. We agreed that the necessary tonnage for a limited relief scheme could probably be obtained from Swedish shipping in the Baltic, if the Swedish Government and the German Government consented to its use. On the other hand, attention was drawn to the possible hostile reactions of the Russian Government to any scheme involving the diversion of supplies which might otherwise have been available to them. It was also pointed out that assistance on a substantial scale would be needed by the occupied territories after their liberation, and that there were dangers in assuming commitments elsewhere in respect of commodities which were especially suitable for the initial phases of relief in liberated countries. Mention was also made of the danger possibly inherent in a limited relief action, of raising expectations of assistance on a scale greater than that which in practice could be provided. The possibility would also have to be weighed that, while the first arrival of foodstuffs might produce an excellent effect, assistance continued at a low level, and prevented by supply considerations from increasing, might provoke considerable discontent. At present the inhabitants of the occupied territories knew that they would receive nothing through the blockade, and there was evidence that the reasons for existing policy were generally understood. If, however, it appeared to them that some food could be sent, and that we had found a method of minimizing the damage to the blockade, there might be bitter disappointment that so little was forthcoming.

6./

6. It was suggested that the first stage of any examination of the problem should be to determine the limits within which supplies could be made available, so that the best use of these could then be considered and the merits and demerits of the resulting proposition discussed. With regard to any initial experiments which might be made, it was strongly recommended that action should be confined to particular cities in each occupied country, rather than to a limited number of countries out of the total of possible claimants; it seemed to us most undesirable to give one or two Allies preference over the rest.

7. These considerations were advanced, however, rather as points to be taken into account at a later stage than as objections to the approach to the problem proposed by Mr. Lehman. General agreement was recorded in the following terms:-

(a) It might prove desirable to initiate in the coming autumn a relief scheme on a small and experimental scale in the occupied territories.

(b) A small Committee consisting of representatives of the State Department, the British Embassy and the United States Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation should examine the possibility of such a scheme and submit their recommendations to the two Governments.

(c) Meanwhile it was desirable that the general line of replies to be given to enquiries and

applications/

applications concerning a change of blockade policy in this matter should be agreed, in order that the British and American Governments should speak with a single voice.

(d) The possibility of promoting the evacuation of children from occupied countries to Switzerland and Sweden should be further explored; not as an alternative to any relief scheme which it might be decided to propose to the United States and British Governments, but as a supplementary measure possessing advantages of its own.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

23rd April, 1943.

SECRET.

NOTES ON THE SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THE EXAMINATION OF THE RELIEF PROBLEM.

It is assumed that the examination of any relief action will be confined to children and expectant and nursing mothers, since these have the strongest claim on humanitarian grounds, and moreover assistance successfully administered to them would be of less advantage to the enemy than a relief scheme for adults generally.

2. The nature of the supplies to be employed has to be determined. For this purpose consideration will have to be given to the particular needs of the intended recipients, to portability and to facility of control.

3. Since most foodstuffs other than cereals are in short supply, it is evident that the supply situation must be a decisive factor. The first step should therefore be to ascertain the maximum amount of the selected commodities which could be made available for relief purposes in the autumn and winter of 1943 and during 1944 without compromising such essential needs as supplies to combatant Allies and liberated territories.

4. Since any supplies available for the occupied territories are likely to be severely limited, it is necessary to decide on what principle they should be allocated. In so doing regard ought to be had to the need for equitable treatment as between the various Allies. Moreover, since it will probably be found that supplies available to any one territory are inadequate to render more than a fraction of the assistance which is desirable, some principle will have to be discovered according to which the recipients are to be selected. A decision on this point will again be influenced by the view taken of what degree of assistance is worth rendering, and what is not; e.g., whether it is better to give four children a quarter of a pint of milk each, or a whole pint to one child only.

5, It is important that any scheme adopted shall bring

about /

about a material improvement of the conditions of those whom it is designed to benefit. This means first, that a careful control must be exercised over the transport and distribution of the imported supplies themselves. It means, second in order but not in importance, that a method must be found of ensuring that these supplies are supplementary to what the intended recipients have at present, and that their effect is not nullified by a deterioration in local conditions brought about by Axis action. The control necessary in these two respects will involve the acceptance by the Germans of strictly drafted terms, and the institution of a system of neutral supervision which, to be effective, must include facilities for free movement of personnel and supplies and rapid and secure communication with the blockade authorities.

6. Various technical details concerned with transport and the financial costs of supervision in the occupied countries would have to be considered in their turn.

SECRET

DRAFT STATEMENT TO FORM THE BASIS
OF REPLIES TO APPEALS FOR RELIEF
THROUGH THE BLOCKADE.

The British and American Governments are aware of the grave sufferings of the Allied peoples in the territories occupied by the enemy. They deeply sympathise with these sufferings and wish to relieve them.

2. It is unfortunately clear that the conditions necessary for effective relief on any significant scale can only exist when the Axis domination in the several countries of Europe has been broken. Nevertheless, the British and American Governments have examined the possibility of bringing more immediate assistance to these countries, while they remain under enemy occupation, by means of imports of suitable commodities through the blockade. Various plans of this nature have received the fullest attention of both Governments jointly, and the problem raised by such plans remains under constant examination.

3. However, in considering this question the two Governments are obliged to take into consideration all the relevant strategic and military factors, and they cannot assume a responsibility in this matter until they are satisfied that whatever steps are taken will not be neutralized by the enemy, who controls the economy of the peoples concerned, and will not imperil the all important object of securing their early liberation.

4. Neither Government considers that it is advisable at this stage to change existing policy. But the whole problem is the subject of continuous consultation between the two Governments, and the assurance can be given that they would initiate action of the kind described if at any time it appeared to them practicable to do so.

Mary Hanks 164
NMSR
24/IV

SECRET

RECORD OF MEETINGS ON THE QUESTION
OF RELIEF THROUGH THE BLOCKADE

The question of the admission of relief foodstuffs (and or vitamins) through the blockade to occupied territories other than Greece was discussed at two meetings with Mr. Lehman at the Ministry of Economic Warfare on the 19th and 22nd April, 1943.

2. In the course of the discussion, which covered a wide range, Mr. Lehman indicated that his Government desired, if possible, to work out a scheme for the initiation of relief on a limited and experimental scale to be brought into operation as soon as possible. Such a scheme would, of course, have to be designed to fit into the framework of the existing supply situation, and would have to incorporate the conditions necessary to ensure its success and to prevent the enemy from drawing advantage from it. Mr. Lehman considered that the operation of a scheme on these lines would avert psychological dangers which otherwise might result from the maintenance of a purely negative attitude on our part, both among the Allied nationals of the occupied countries serving the cause of the United Nations away from their homes, and in the occupied territories themselves. He mentioned that the supply of food packages to Norway and of powdered milk and vitamins to Belgium had been considered, and that in his view the necessary goods for restricted schemes of this kind for those two

countries /

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GENERAL

W 6393

27 APR 1943

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

Registry Number W 6393/4/49

FROM Parliamentary Question (Mr. Roberts

No. -

Dated 22nd April:1943

Received in Registry 27th April: 1943

W: Co-ordination

Food rations in enemy and enemy occupied countries

Mr. W. Robets asked the Parliamentary Secretary to Ministry of Economic Warfare what were the official rations in Germany, Italy and occupied and satellite countries and how for such rations were actually available.

Mr. Foot replied that the information was contained in the attached table.

Last Paper.

w 6322.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

E.H.C. 28/4

(Action completed.)

W 29/4/43

(Index.)

ACH 28/7

Next Paper.

W 6490

24994 2'43 F.O.P.

GENERAL. 166

PARLIAMENTARY

QUESTION.

L.

* 29. Mr. Wilfrid Roberts,—To ask the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, what are the official rations in Germany, Italy and occupied and satellite countries; and how far such rations are actually available. [*3rd Sitting Day after 18th April.*]

F.O. ARE NOT ASKED TO ADVISE.

ANSWERED 22 APR 1943

REPLY ATTACHED.

1844/9

Liberia Please attach reply

R.C.C. 2/4

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W. 6393
27 APR 1943

EXTRACT FROM
HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES

22 APR 1943

ENEMY AND ENEMY-OCCUPIED COUNTRIES (FOOD RATIONS)

Mr. W. Roberts asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare what are the official rations in Germany, Italy and occupied and satellite countries; and how far such rations are actually available?

Mr. Foot: The information for which my hon. Friend asks is contained in the attached table.

AVERAGE WEEKLY RATIONS OF PRINCIPAL FOODSTUFFS IN ENEMY AND ENEMY OCCUPIED COUNTRIES. (In ounces.)

N.C. = Normal Consumer. L.W. = Light Worker. N.W. = Night Worker. H.W. = Heavy Worker. V.H.W. = Very Heavy Worker. Ch. = Children. Ad. = Adolescents.

Country	Bread	Meat	Fats	Sugar	Potatoes	Whole Milk (pints)	Remarks
Germany ...	N.C. ... 80 N.W. ... 100 H.W. ... 129 V.H.W. 164 Ch. under 3 39 Ch. 3–6 ... 42 Ch. 6–10 60 Ad. 10–20 92	12½ 19½ 25 33½ 7 7 14 14	7 8 10½ 20 4½ 6½ 9½ 9½	8	140 Miners 175	~~Nil~~ Nil Nil Nil 9 6 3 Nil	Rations always obtainable.
Protectorate	N.C. ... 80 N.W. ... 100 H.W. ... 129 V.H.W. 164 Ch. under 3 39 Ch. 3–6 ... 42 Ch. 6–10 60 Ad. 10–20 92	12½ 19½ 25 33½ 7 7 14 14	6 7 10½ 20 4½ 6½ 6½ 6	9	122	Nil Nil Nil Nil 6 6 6 Nil	Rations generally obtainable.
Italy ...	N.C. ... 37 L.W. ... 62 H.W. ... 86 V.H.W. 110	Northern 6 to 7 Southern 5	3½	N.C. ... 4½ Ch. under 3 9 Ch. and Ad. 3–18 5½	17½	Locally rationed. Priority to children, sick, nursing mothers.	Rations not always obtainable in some districts. Local supply conditions vary considerably.
Netherlands	N.C. ... 63 H.W. ... 95 V.H.W. 126 Ch. under 4 32 Ad. 14–20 77	4½ 10½ 17½ 4½ 4½	5 7½ 15½ 3 6	9	140 210 280 70 140	Nil Nil Nil 9 Ch. 4–14 4½	Rations generally obtainable.
Norway	N.C. ... 64 H.W. ... 87 V.H.W.cat.1 104 ,, ,, 2 119 Ch. under 2 32 Ch. 2–5 40 Ad. 12–20 72	Locally rationed. H.W. 10½	7½ 8½ 10 11 7½ 7½ 7½	7	105 131 158 184 105 105 105	Nil Nil Nil Nil 9 9 Ch. 5–15 6 Ad. 16–18 3 +3 pts. skimmed	Sugar *or* particularly fats not always available. Milk sometimes in short supply in certain towns.

Country	Bread	Meat	Fats	Sugar	Potatoes	Whole Milk (pints)	Remarks
Belgium ...	N.C. ... 55 L.W. ... 71 H.W. ... 86 V.H.W. 103 Miners ... 134	7½ 10½ 12½ 15 17½	3 5 7½ 10 24	8	122	Ch. under 3 9 Ch. 3–6 ... 6 Ch. 6–14 ... 3	Formerly meat, fats and potatoes not regularly available. Rations now generally obtainable, except milk for older children in large towns.
Denmark ...	N.C. ... 82 H.W. ... 106 V.H.W. 130 Ch. under 6 41	Unrationed	N.C. ... 10½ Fishermen 16	N.C. ... 13 Fishermen 17½	Unrationed		Rations always obtainable.
France ...	N.C. ... 68 H.W. ... 87 Engine drivers 122 Miners 147 Ch. under 3 25 Ch. 3–6 ... 49 Ch. 6–13 68 Ad. 13–21 87	N.C. ... 4½ H.W. 8 V.H.W. 11½ Engine drivers 14 Miners 18½ Ad. 13–21 7½	*Urban* *Rural* N.C. 2½ 2 H.W. 5 4½ V.H.W. 8 7	N.C. ... 4½ Ch. under 3 9 Ad. 13–21 6½	Locally rationed	Ch. under 6 9 Ch. 6–14 3	The recently reduced rations of meat and fats now generally obtainable, formerly very irregular. Milk scarce in certain departments.
Finland ...	N.C. ... 61 H.W.cat. 1 74 H.W.cat. 2 98 V.H.W. ... 122 Ch. under 3 37 Ch. 4–12 49	By value F. Marks N.C. ... 4.80 H.W. 7.20 V.H.W. 9.60	N.C. ... 4½ H.W. ... 5½ V.H.W. ... 6½ Ch. under 7 6½	2 Non-workers 4	N.C. ... 87 H.W. and V.H.W. 122	N.C. ... 3½ Ch. under 3 12 Ch. 3–14 7	Except bread and potatoes, rations frequently unobtainable.
Slovakia ...	*Bread* *Flour* N.C. 37 12½ H.W. 47 12½ V.H.W. 73 25	N.C. ... 14 H.W. and V.H.W. 21	N.C. ... 2 H.W. and V.H.W. 4½ (margarine) Ch. ... 4½ Sick ... 2 (butter)	*Urban* *Rural* N.C. 8 6 Ch. under 10 12½ 10½	105	N.C. ... 1¼ Ch. under 1 9 Ch. 1–14 6 Sick ... 2½	Rations obtainable.

Country	Bread	Meat	Fats	Sugar	Potatoes	Whole Milk (pints)	Remarks
Hungary ...	N.C. ... 39 H.W. ... 68 V.H.W. 108	17½	5 8 8	*Urban* *Rural* N.C. ... 9 3–4½	35	Ch. under 3 9 Ch. 3–14 6	Rations obtainable.
Bulgaria ...	N.C. ... 62 H.W. ... 124 V.H.W. 153 Ch. under 1 31 Ch. 1–5 ... 43	17½	9 (lard and oil) Ch. under 5 3½ (butter)	9	Unrationed	Ch. under 1 9 Ch. 1–5 ... 6	Rations probably obtainable.

Rumania.—Rationing in Bucharest only. Bread N.C. 79, H.W. 158, Meat 9, Sugar 5½, Fats 4½. Rations believed to be obtainable.

Yugoslavia—Croatia.—Bread 37, Meat 5½, Sugar 2½, Fats 3, Potatoes 74, Milk Ch. under 2 9, Ch. 2–5 6. *Serbia*—Bread 78, Meat 4½, Sugar 5½, Fats 3. Rations for the most part believed to be unobtainable.

Poland.—No uniform rationing. In Incorporated Territories, Germans and so-called "loyal" Poles get same rations as in Reich: Jews and Poles get about half as much. In General Government, rations for Germans same as in Reich. Poles get less. Jews in ghettos get starvation rations.

Greece.—Bread is rationed at 44 ounces—since relief shipments, rations usually available.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 6470

28 APR 1943

Registry Number W 6470/4/49

FROM Censorship (communicated)

No. LON/21394/43

Dated 23rd April, 1943.

Received in Registry 28th April, 1943.

W. : Co-ordination.

Relief for occupied Europe.

Transmits an extract from a lettter from the Swedish Travel Bureau, London to Kungl Jarnvagsstryrelsen Stockholm of 4th April stating that material received from the Swedish Foreign Office, concerning relief for Norway, Belgium, and Greece was not suitable for window display and so it was placed in a prominent position inside the building.

Last Paper.

w 6393

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

An earlier Censorship intercept showed that it was intended that propaganda material for relief was to be sent to the Swedish Travel Bureau; and I got Censorship to watch out for it. Now came through the post, it is therefore clear that this material has come in the Swedish bag.

This seems to me to be a serious abuse of the bag and I should be glad if the views of Northern Dept as to whether, and if so how but, this could be taken up with the Swedes.

N. Dept please

29/4

I think the Swedish Emb. should have

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
KW 1/5.	Action 28/7

Next Paper.

w 6471

can put what they like into their own bag,
and I do not see how we can protest about
this.

Yours
30/4.

Ren x

E.C.
30/4

POSTAL & TELEGRAPH CENSORSHIP.

P.C. 72.

GR.
21.4.43.

TERMINAL MAIL

SUBMISSION No. LON/21394/43.

Air ~~Surface~~

Date

From SWEDISH TRAVEL BUREAU,	To KUNGL. [illegible]RNVÄGSSTYRELSEN, PERSONTAXEBYRAN, REKLAMAVDELNINGEN, STOCKHOLM.
Address ~~or postmark~~ 21, COVENTRY STREET, LONDON, W.1.	W 6470 28 APR 1943
Date of letter 12.4.43.	Language SWEDISH.
ORIGINAL LETTER (State whether Submitted, Photographed, Retained, Released or Returned to Sender). Released.	SUBMITTED TO: Comment to F/O. W. Crowe AD. 24/4

Seen by: Naval Adviser | Air Adviser | M.I.12.

Operating Unit	Section	Examiner	D.A.C.	Date
HOL/TRA.	6/V11	1755.	H.C.H.	18.4.43.

SUBJECT. (Include necessary references to Watch Lists, with Authority requiring the Watch.)

Norwegian, Belgian and Greek Relief - Swedish Campaign for:-

Letter deals mainly with propaganda for travel in Sweden but the following paragraph occurs here given in translation:

"The material received from the (Swedish) Foreign Office, concerning relief for Norway, Belgium and Greece was not suitable for window display and for this reason we placed it instead in a prominent position inside the building."

AD

POSTAL & TELEGRAPH CENSORSHIP.

P.C. 72.

174

GR. 21.4.43.

TERMINAL MAIL

SUBMISSION No. LON/21394/43.

Air ~~Surface~~ Date

From	To
SWEDISH TRAVEL BUREAU,	KUNGL. JARNVAGSSTYRELSEN,
Address ~~or Postmark~~ 21, COVENTRY STREET, LONDON, W.1.	PERSONTAXEBYRAN, REKLAMAVDELNINGEN, STOCKHOLM.
Date of letter ~~or postmark~~ 12.4.43.	Language SWEDISH.

ORIGINAL LETTER (State whether Submitted, Photographed, Retained, Released or Returned to Sender).	SUBMITTED TO:
Released.	Comment to F/O.

Seen by: Naval Adviser Air Adviser M.I.12.

Operating Unit	Section	Examiner	D.A.C.	Date
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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 6471

28 APR 1943

Registry Number W 6471/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No. T 550/9/Z

Dated 26th April

Received in Registry 28th April 1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for occupied Europe.

Transmits a copy of telegram to Washington No. 1654~~and~~ Arfar of 23rd April stating that record of discussions with Mr. Lehman on current relief problems are being sent by fast bag. It has been agreed that the question should be further examined in Washington by a committee representing State Department, British Embassy and office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation.

Last Paper.

W6470. (W6322)

References.

(Minutes.)

to Washington April 24.

See also Cypher 1673, either.

N. A. Dept

Lem 29/4

E. L. Cunn. 29/4

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

W.O. 3/6/43.

(Index.)

AGH 28/7

Next Paper.

(W6605)

W 6472

24994 2 43 F.O.P.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

W 6471

(T 550/9/Z)

28 APR 1943

[CYPHER]. SPECIAL ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO

WASHINGTON

No: 1654 ARFAR D. 5. 40 p.m. 24th April, 1943.
23rd April, 1943.

11111

Record of discussions with Lehman on current relief problems goes to you by fast bag. It has been agreed subject to reference to the two Governments that question should be further examined in Washington by a committee representing State Department, British Embassy and office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation. You should keep in closest touch on supply aspect with representatives of Ministry of Food who will be receiving instructions from Ministry of Food.

2. Whole question should be treated as one of utmost secrecy.

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/G/Z
COPY FOR Mr LeRougetel, Foreign Office (only)
DATE 26.4.43

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

W6471/4/49 M1

[CYPHER] - ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON

No. 1673 ARFAR
24th April, 1943

D. 5.45 a.m. 26th April, 1943

kkkkk

SECRET

Following for Hon. R. H. Brand Food Mission from Noel Hall.

Please refer to my recent letter to you about relief supplies through the Blockade. Pressure for immediate relief is strong both from the Allied Governments in London and from some quarters of the American Administration. It has, as you know, been difficult to persuade the latter to face the realities of the situation, particularly on the supply side. Discussions with Lehman which had been specifically authorised by Hull have resulted in a joint suggestion now being considered that all the facts shall be critically examined in Washington by State Department, OFFRO and Embassy. The foremost fact would appear to be possibility of making supplies of milk products and other scarce foods available during the last quarter of this year and during 1944. We shall need all the help that you can give us in getting this properly considered and I understand the Ministry of Food will be communicating with you direct about it.

2. It has taken months to persuade the State Department to allow an examination of the real facts and I understand that they are still very anxious to prevent any idea that we are to examine the situation seriously getting to the ears of Allied Governments or Board of Economic Warfare or the pressure groups in Washington.

3. There is still a danger that we may be faced with a unilateral decision that will be really embarrassing to us both on supply and other grounds. The most promising way of dealing with this danger would appear to be the secret examination now suggested. I hope that we shall be authorised to proceed with it. It is the only way that I can see of persuading the protagonists of immediate relief to face squarely the supply difficulties and dangers. Hull on the American side and the Minister of Economic Warfare on ours have made it absolutely clear that the examination, if it is carried out, implies absolutely no commitment by either Government.

OTP.

167.

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 6472

28 APR 1943

178

Registry Number W 6472/4/49

FROM Ministry of Warfare.

No. t 550/19/28A

Dated 25th April

Received in Registry 28th April 1943

W: Co-ordination

Last Paper.

W 6471 (W 3807).

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

W.E. 3/5/43

(Index.)

M.N. 13/12

Next Paper.

W 6500 (W 12026)

Allied relief purchases in Switzerland.

Transmits copies of telegrams from Berne No. 1772 Arfar of 5th April and to Berne No. 1768 Arfar of 15th April regarding Allied relief purchases in Switzerland.

(Minutes.)

Central Dept MEB 30/4
Lib W Dept 4/V

E.E. 29/4

See within
Copy of tel from Berne No 2851 Arfar May 28
Copy of tel to Berne No 2750 Arfar June 8
Copy of tel from Berne No 3424 Arfar June 29
Copy of tel to Berne No 3241 Arfar July 9

Central Dept MEB 21/7

E.E. 21/7

See within
Copy of tel to Berne No 3394. July 21.
" " " " " 3395. " "
" " " Berne No 3655 Aug 6

W.E. 11/8

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

BW

T.550/19/28a

[Cypher]

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/19/28a
COPY FOR E. E. Crowe, Esq.
DATE ARFAR (O.B.) 23/4/43.

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FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE

Copy sent to Washington

No. 1768 ARFAR
15th April, 1943.

D. 6.35 a.m. 17th April, 1943.

W 6472

28 APR 1943

Repeated to Washington No.565 Arfar Saving.

Attached.

Your telegram No.1772 [Arfar of April 5th: Allied relief purchases in Switzerland].

Reason for allowing these remittances is that we have for two years now in principle allowed allied governments to organise export from neutral European countries to occupied countries of goods which were (a) neither imported nor of a kind imported through our blockade by these neutrals (b) permissible anyway for export to enemy-controlled destinations under our War Trade Agreements with these neutrals. Financial aspect of such transactions is further governed by the need (a) to avoid financial benefit to the enemy (b) to conserve the very limited supplies of neutral exchange at our disposal.

2. At the present moment there is no advantage in extending the terms of this concession. On the contrary, the more that is obtainable in Switzerland, the sooner will the small amount of Swiss francs which can be made available for this purpose to Allied Governments be exhausted. Demands highly embarrassing from the Financial point of view might then follow.

3. The United States Government have shown great dislike for the concession mentioned in paragraph 1 above, and while they now seem likely to adopt a policy corresponding to our own, we should clearly not widen the implications of this policy without first consulting them.

4. With reference to your paragraph 6, our overriding interest is of course to cut down Swiss exports to Axis Europe. We certainly ought not to sacrifice this in order to promote exports to occupied territories. Nor can we encourage the Swiss to export for relief purposes.

goods /

goods of which they are themselves short, as we should then expose ourselves to demands for compensation.

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5. If the possibilities of export are restricted by the circumstances described in paragraphs 1 and 4 above, you will see from paragraph 2 that we cannot really regret this. This may sound hard-hearted but the fact is that relief of the kind in question is much more expensive than it is efficient, and is not from a humanitarian point of view, likely to make any appreciable difference to the well being of the occupied countries. We can see later if there is a case for modifying our rule exceptionally in Switzerland, but must first know the result of applying it strictly.

6.. We can therefore agree in this connexion only to the purchase in Switzerland of goods of Swiss origin which (a) are assured of export licence by the Swiss authorities (b) do not contain anything of a kind imported into Switzerland through the blockade (c) fulfil the four conditions set out in paragraph 4 of my telegram No.1858 [Arfar] of April 25th 1942. With regard to (c) it must be clearly understood that, for the purpose of the War Trade Agreement, Red Cross exports are in no way distinguishable from other Swiss exports. Since the War Trade Agreement is the dominant factor, we might consider waiving (a) above in particular cases referred to us in which (c) was fulfilled but (a) technically was not.

W 4174/62/49

7. With particular reference to paragraph 3 of your telegram No.1704 [Arfar of April 1st], you should note that we cannot now agree to purchases of tinned or dried meat, since the Swiss have asked to import meat extract and we have stipulated as a condition that there should be no exports of meat or meat extract. All "medical supplies" should be subject initially to reference here, as the term is susceptible of differing interpretations and moreover we do not want scarce currency wasted on buying goods which could be better obtained from overseas. As regards the remaining items, including the three products specifically named in your 3(b), you will probably find that paragraph 6 above enables you to proceed without reference here. We cannot answer more precisely without knowing the Swiss tariff items under which the commodities fall.

8. We should welcome an arrangement such as that proposed in paragraph 3 of your telegram No.1772 [Arfar of April 5th],

provided /

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provided that requirements of paragraphs 6 and 7 above are carried out. You should of course telegraph the monthly returns of purchases made.

9. Allied Governments other than the Belgian are so far satisfied with a system of individual remittances for individual purchases approved here. While this may lead to a certain amount of cross-telegraphing, we do not now wish deliberately to encourage them to make block remittances in advance on the Belgian pattern.

O.T.P.

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[CYPHER]. LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM BERNE TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Mr. Norton
No. 1772 ARFAR.
5th April, 1943.

D. 11.55 p.m. 5th April, 1943.
R. 10.45 a.m. 6th April, 1943.

rrrrrrrr

Your telegram No. 14 [grp. undec. ?98].

w3807 w3807

(1) 1. I assume that reasons for the procedure outlined in your telegrams Nos. 1025, 1195 and 1450 are those stated in your telegram No. 1092 of 1942 paragraphs 3 and 4.

w4174.

2. As however political rather than blockade considerations would appear to affect our policy in allowing these remittances, I suggest that there would be advantage in dealing with the matter of purchases in a liberal and elastic way with the minimum of red tape, i.e. concentrating on conditions (a) and (c) in paragraph 4 of telegram No. 1092 of 1942, but allowing some purchases of goods of like kind to these to be imported through our blockade provided that no compensatory imports be asked for (see also my telegram No. 1704).

3. I would also suggest that the Swiss Control Board of Imports and Exports be invited to control purchases on the same lines as it handles distribution lists, i.e. checking that suppliers are unobjectionable to us, that proposals comply with our conditions as to origin and that they effectually export. A monthly return of purchases made should be supplied to me and to you, and Control Board could consult me on doubtful cases. The head of the Board is sure the Swiss wish to continue friendly to our cause. I have reason to believe that such an arrangement would be welcome to him and would strengthen his position. If you agree in principle C.S. would approach him informally to work out a detailed scheme.

4. Purchases by Allied Legations would, and in case of Belgians and Yugoslavs [?grp. omtd.] be made by Red Cross mixed commission which would deal direct with the Control Board. If there were particular goods (especially in pharmaceutical line) to the export of which you take objection on either qualitative or quantitative grounds, these could be notified to Swiss Control Board, the Mixed Commission and Legations concerned.

5. I should prefer to avoid too elaborate a machinery of control by this legation over allied colleagues where blockade considerations are few and not of major importance.

6. Purchase scheme already promises to become complicated and give rise to difficulties. For instance, although the Swiss

are/

are willing to supply milk and cheese products the Germans are refusing enemy transit permits because exports of these products to Germany have been radically cut down. In other cases where Germany might be willing to give permits, the Swiss may be reluctant to allow exports in order to preserve their stock position. Indeed as the war is prolonged, "genuinely surplus" produce is likely to become a very restricted category.

W 3807

7. In view of your telegram No. 1525 (to which I am replying separately) I have now discussed the matter with my United States colleague who concurs in the above.

8. I should be grateful for your observations.

OTP.

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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W6972/4/49

INDEXED

T550/20

[CYPHER] ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE

No. 3241 ARFAR
9th July, 1943. D. 7.00 p.m. 10th July, 1943.

Repeated to Washington No. 845 Arfar Saving

SSSSS

My telegrams No. 1025 [Arfar of March 4th: Allied relief purchases in Switzerland] paragraph 3 and No. 1768 [Arfar of April 15th] paragraph 9.

Early in June we agreed to Dutch Government remitting 273,000 Swiss francs to representative of their Red Cross c/o Dutch Legation at Berne for purchase of 3,400 cases of condensed milk and 10 tons of powdered milk through Mixed Commission of International Red Cross.

2. We asked that Dutch Legation should seek your agreement before sanctioning expenditure of funds under these arrangements. I much regret that you were not earlier informed.

OTP

copy also sent to:-
W.H. Fraser.

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/20.
COPY FOR Hon. W. Hogg.
DATE 15/4/43.

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[Cypher]. ARFAR O.B.

FROM BERNE TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Mr. Norton.
No. 3424 ARFAR.
29th June, 1943.

D. 4.33 p.m. 29th June, 1943.
R. 7.53 p.m. 29th June; 1943.

vvvvvvv

IMPORTANT.

W6472/4/49

Your telegram No.2750.

Keller has informed the Commercial Secretary that the Swiss authorities would object on principle to certifying that in appropriate cases exports will count against agreed quota. They object to the conditions in paragraph 6 b of your telegram No.1768 and in paragraphs 4 c and d of your telegram No.1858 of 1942. As regards the first they point out that it would preclude sending sweetened condensed milk because sugar was imported through blockade. The last two are unacceptable as the Swiss maintain that Red Cross exports should be treated entirely distinctly from Swiss exports and that this point was made clear when the question of drawing up a quota of Red Cross exports was discussed in London. Moreover conditions do not correspond to realities of the situation. If the Swiss agree with us to stop all exports of dairy produce to the Azores our conditions would preclude all exports of condensed milk by the Red Cross.

2. Omissions of the words "and that in" to "agreed quota" in paragraph 3 v of my telegram No.2851 would probably enable the Swiss to agree to the issue of the proposed letter.

3. Keller pointed out that if there was any objection most cases were to be referred to you for decision [?grp.omtd: ?and that] these conditions were superfluous as you would judge in each case to what extent any of your conditions might be waived.

4. Keller also pointed out that these transactions were being facilitated by the release of Swiss francs against blocked gold under Finance Agreement which was still unsigned and implementation of which depended on your acceptance of the proposals referred to in my telegram No.3325. I should be grateful for early instructions.

O.T.P.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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W6472/4/49 Left with

T 550/19/28/A

[CYPHER] ARFAR O.B.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE.

No. 2750 ARFAR.

8th June 1943 D. 3.00 p.m. 9th June 1943

Your telegram No. 2851 [Arfar of May 28th: method of dealing with Allied relief operations in Switzerland.]

We agree with your proposals.

2. For purposes of reference here we should find it useful if you could let us have a list of relief consignments authorised since the beginning of current year, to ensure that quotas allowed under War Trade Agreement have not been exceeded. If this is too detailed to telegraph perhaps Swiss could arrange to transmit it.

O.T.P.

copies also sent to.

~~W.K. Fraser~~

Hon. W. Hogg.

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/19/28/A.
COPY FOR Hon. W. Hogg
DATE 15/7/43.

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[Cypher] ARFAR (O.B.)

Code 7.29.

FROM BERNE TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

. Norton
. 2851 Arfar
28th May, 1943

D: 7. 56 p.m. 28th May, 1943
R: 5. 15 a.m. 29th May, 1943.

W6472/4/49

p p p

Your telegram No. 1768.

I have discussed the matter further with my United States colleague. He has no instructions and he concurs in the following, without prejudice and merely by way of assisting me in working out a plan. We find your explanation of your reasons for wishing to limit the scope of these operations most helpful and we agree therewith.

2. If these intra blockade transactions are to be controlled from Berne it seems to us most desirable to avoid an elaborate technique which would throw additional work on local staff out of proportion to the importance of the subject.

3. We suggest therefore the following procedure:

(a) Where remittances from United Kingdom are concerned, matter will be dealt with exclusively by this Legation.

(b) Allied Legations apply in the first instance stating (1) nature of goods
(2) quantity
(3) value
(4) name of seller, insurers, and other intermediaries.
(5) will produce a letter from Swiss authorities certifying goods are of Swiss origin, that export licence will be granted, and that in appropriate cases exports will count against agreed quota.

(c) all cases will be referred to you for decision (except milk and milk products authorised in your telegram No. 1025) unless closing of deal is of real urgency when approval will be given without reference in the light of your telegram No. 1768, paragraph 6.

(d) Transactions to which approval have been given without reference will be reported to you at the time the approval is given.

(4) It is not proposed to go beyond the Swiss assurance referred to in paragraph (b) by insisting on production of certificate of origin of Swiss Chamber of Commerce or making meticulous enquiries into enemy content e.g. of sugar in sweetened condensed milk.

(5) It is felt that a procedure along these broad lines should secure control on essential points mentioned in your telegram No. 1768 with reasonable economy of effort.

(6) I should be grateful for your early observations and I hope approval as it will be necessary to give more definite guidance to the Allied Legations than has been possible hitherto and to notify the Swiss authorities of our wishes in order to bring paragraph 3 (d) into effect.

OTP.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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W

W 6472/4/49

T 550/19/28a
[CYPHER]

INDEXED

ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE

No. 3395 ARFAR
21st July, 1943

D. 3.00 p.m. 21st July, 1943

kkkkk

Your telegram No. 3424 [Arfar of June 29th: Allied relief purchases in Switzerland], paragraph 1 and my immediately preceding telegram.

Keller's contention that Red Cross exports are distinct from Swiss exports was indeed discussed in London and clearly stated to be unacceptable to ourselves. We stand by paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 1025 [Arfar of March 4th]. It is quite correct that a prohibition of exports of dairy produce from Switzerland would preclude exports by the Red Cross unless these were specially agreed.

2. As regards the point about sweetened condensed milk, you will know from paragraph 6 of my telegram No.1768 [Arfar of April 15th] that we might consider waiving condition (b) of that paragraph in cases which otherwise complied with the terms of the War Trade Agreement.

3. Please make it clear to Swiss that we shall work on above basis.

OTP.

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/19/28A
COPY FOR W. McGregor Esq
23.7.43 F.O

copied also to Treasury

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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W6472/4/49.

(T 550/19/28a)

[Cypher]

ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE

INDEXED

No. 3394 ARFAR
21st July, 1943.

D. 3.15 p.m. 21st July, 1943.

:-:-:-:-:-:

Your telegram No. 3424 [Arfar of 29th June: Allied relief purchases in Switzerland].

The only one of the Swiss "objections" which seems to affect practically the procedure suggested in your telegram No. 2851 [Arfar of 28th May] is their refusal to certify in appropriate cases that an export will count against the agreed quota.

2. Let us therefore amend the form of the certificate required from the Swiss as proposed in paragraph 2 of your telegram under reply.

3. Since however we cannot accept the Swiss contention about Red Cross exports, you will not (repeat not) under the amended procedure be able to approve without reference Red Cross exports of any goods whose export is prohibited or restricted by quota under the War Trade Agreement (except milk and cheese) and those only until such time as Swiss obtain fodder quotas from us in return for prohibition of exports etc. Nor will approval generaly be forthcoming on reference here.

4. Please let me have your comments before taking further action.

5. See also my immediately following telegram.

O.T.P.

W

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for 1 week.

W6472/4/49

T550/19/28A ARFAR DISTRIBUTION Despatched 12 Noon 6th. Aug. 1943

INDEXED

PRODROME
BERNE

ARFAR 3555 YOUR 3909 ARFAR [of July 27th: relief exports from Switzerland]

PLEASE PROCEED ACCORDINGLY

copy also sent to—
W.H. Fraser.

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/19/28A.
COPY FOR Hon. W Hogg.
DATE 7-8-43

1943 GENERAL

W6500 /G 191

28 APR 1943

7. 4

W 6500 | ~~220~~ | e. 49

Lord Drogheda.

(NEW)

to Mr. Le Rougetel. 27. April. 28. April

Relief through the blockade for occupied Europe.

Suggests War Cabinet should be informed of position regarding conversations with Mr Lehman on relief policy. Encloses memo. by Mr Winster of E.W. discussing proposed action in view of danger of U.S. authorities acting on their own.

Last Paper.

W5834

References.

(Minutes.)

(See minutes W.(43)186.)

(Print.)

The letter ~~within~~ from Lord Drogheda encloses the paper foreshadowed in W.6322/4/49.

This memorandum, under cover of which Lord Selborne has communicated the records of his recent meetings with Governor Lehman to the War Cabinet, expresses the view that the decisions reached during the recent discussions do not commit H.M. Government to anything beyond a joint examination of the facts in Washington.

Lord Selborne asks the Cabinet to approve these decisions, and attaches a draft reply to Parliamentary Questions, the terms of which he would like to agree with the U.S. Government, if they are approved by the Cabinet.

(How disposed of.)

April 28th 1943.

See written final version of Lord Selborne's paper and further minutes

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
28/4/43	Yes.

Next Paper.

W6643

25119 3 43 F.O.P

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RELIEF THROUGH THE BLOCKADE.

Lord Selborne presided at two meetings with Governor Lehman on the question of relief through the blockade, held on April 19th and 22nd last.

The main purposes of these discussions were:

(a) to keep the U.S. Government in play, and if possible to obviate any premature initiative on their part, and

(b) to reach agreement upon the line to be taken by both Governments in dealing with pressure as long as we adhere to our present blockade policy.

It has become increasingly clear that neither of these requirements can be met by maintaining a purely negative attitude, and in order to secure U.S. co-operation we agreed to discuss the problem with Governor Lehman in all its aspects, on the explicit understanding that we were in no way authorised to initiate any change of policy. As a result of the discussions last week it was agreed to recommend the formation of a small Committee in Washington to examine the possibility of a relief scheme on a small and experimental scale in the Autumn. It may conceivably be argued that this recommendation opens the way for a change of policy, but it was, I submit, the only means we had of preventing a reversal of our policy being forced upon us during the next few weeks. This would almost certainly have proved extremely embarrassing, and might have been accompanied by considerable hard feeling in Washington, where the various foreign "pressure groups" lose no opportunity of depicting H.M. Government as the chief obstructors of immediate relief.

Lord Selborne has now prepared the attached draft paper asking the War Cabinet to approve the line agreed with Governor Lehman.

In his covering note Lord Selborne asks the Cabinet to approve the suggested joint examination in Washington, the general line of approach proposed /Annex B/, and the draft basis for replies to appeals /Annex C/. He also attaches a draft reply for use in dealing with Parliamentary Questions /Annex D/.

Lord Selborne's statement is succinct, comprehensive and self-explanatory, and his recommendations should, I submit, receive a full measure of support from us. It will be particularly useful if we can secure the agreement of the U.S. Government to the proposed basis for replies to enquiries, and although Governor Lehman could not himself approve the text submitted, he felt confident that it would be acceptable to the State Department. It was generally agreed that if the proposed Committee is set up in Washington the strictest secrecy should be observed with regard to all its activities.

I agree with Mr Lyttelton
MacDonald 29.4.43

J.M. McRoughton.

April 30

AL. April 29.1943.

April 29th 1943.

Tel. No.
GROSVENOR 4060.

W

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MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE,
W.1.

Immediate
Secret.

27th April, 1943.

W6500/G
APR 1943

Dear Le Rougetel,

As I told you in my last letter, my Minister feels that we should inform the War Cabinet of the position resulting from our conversations with Mr. Lehman on relief through the blockade. He wishes, however, to make sure that our two departments see eye to eye in the matter, and he has accordingly asked me to send you a draft of the paper which he is thinking of laying before the Cabinet.

Of the Annexes referred to in this paper I have already sent you copies of (A), (B) and (C). I enclose herein a copy of (D), the draft parliamentary reply.

Will you let me know as soon as you can whether you have any comments to make on the paper itself, or on the draft reply, as the question should be taken at the earliest possible Cabinet, as Mr. Lehman left for Washington last Sunday, and will want to start the proposed examination without delay.

yours ever,

Dugdale.

J.H.Le Rougetel Esq., C.M.G., M.C.,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

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D R A F T.

RELIEF FOR OCCUPIED EUROPE.

Memorandum by the Minister of Economic Warfare.

In May 1942, the War Cabinet rejected a proposal that a supply of limited quantities of milk, for the relief of children only, should be allowed to enter occupied Europe. Since then many appeals have been received from the exiled Governments and from philanthropic bodies here and in the United States. No concession has, however, been made beyond the regular shipments to Greece which were authorised in February 1942.

2. In face of the increased pressure and the distressing conditions that undeniably exist, there is now a real danger that the Americans may act on their own. The President seems to have given some kind of promise to the Norwegians, and Mr.Hull recently informed Lord Halifax that he was being pressed to agree to a parcels scheme for Norway, and to milk for children being sent to Belgium. There is little doubt that if we had not offered to take part in a joint examination of the realities of the situation, the U.S.Government would have pledged themselves to allow shipments to both countries. The danger of this happening, although it has lessened for the time being, has by no means disappeared. Nothing could be more unfortunate than any ill-considered concession to some Allies to the exclusion of others. The Blockade would be treated in a manner calculated to produce the maximum of discord among our Allies with disastrous psychological consequences.

3. /

3. I have had two discussions on relief with Governor Lehman. We had a clear understanding that our conversations were purely exploratory, and that our conclusions would have to be approved by our Governments. I annex :-

(A) A record of our discussions.

(B) Some notes on the suggested approach to the examination of the subject.

(C) A draft basis for replies, while the question is being examined, to relief appeals from our Allies and from humanitarian bodies.

4. It will be seen that we are committed to nothing beyond, (subject to Cabinet approval and that of the United States Government), a

joint /

joint examination in Washington of the practical possibilities of sending relief if the existing policy were changed; though it no doubt follows that we should have further consultations with the Americans after the Washington enquiry, and in the light of the general situation then existing on the Continent. I should give explicit instructions to our representative on the Committee of enquiry that its recommendations should be confined to advice as to the possibilities of supply, shipping and control of distribution, if any change in existing policy were decided upon.

5. I ask my colleagues to approve:-

(i) the suggested joint examination in Washington.

(ii) the general line of approach proposed in Annex (B).

(iii) the draft basis for replies to relief appeals.

6. I also ask my colleagues to consider what line should be taken in replying to Parliamentary questions, or if a debate on this subject is forced upon us in either House. One reason for my request is that Parliamentary interest in the matter is being stimulated by humanitarian "pressure groups", another is that Parliamentary opponents of relief increasingly demand a reasoned reaffirmation of our existing policy in order to counter the relief agitation. I annex (D) a draft reply covering the main points that have been raised. The substance of this reply would presumably have to be agreed with the U.S. Government before it could be given in Parliament.

7. If the blockade were relaxed by our agreeing to send some milk and vitamins to occupied Europe, it should be possible to

obtain/

obtain Swedish ships from the Baltic for the purpose. The supply difficulty, which has not, I think, yet been fully appreciated by the Americans, is, however, great and increasing.

8. I believe that the only practicable relief scheme would be one confined to children, and possibly expectant and nursing mothers, in certain specified big cities in Europe. Such a scheme would give those most in need of it whatever amount of dried milk, etc. might be available, and would have the great advantage that all occupied countries would receive equal treatment at our hands. It is, however, possible that the result of a thorough examination of the question may be to establish that the supplies which could be spared are so limited that the psychological effect of sending so little would merely tend to discourage the peoples of the occupied territories, while providing excellent propaganda for the enemy.

9. Experience in the case of Greece has shown that after a relief scheme has been sanctioned in principle, the negotiations to ensure control of distribution, and to obtain a supply of vessels for regular shipments, take several months. Any scheme which might be approved after the proposed Washington enquiry could, therefore, hardly come into operation much before next winter.

10. My colleagues may wish to have an appreciation of the present food conditions on the Continent. I am advised that, while the position is nowhere so acute as in Greece during the

autumn/

autumn and winter of 1941, it is bad in occupied Russia and Poland, and in some parts of Yugoslavia and Belgium. In descending order of "scarcity conditions" the list would be approximately:-

Occupied Russia
Poland
Yugoslavia
Belgium
France
Norway
Greece (after allowing for present relief shipments)
Holland
Czechoslovakia
Denmark

11. Conditions are bad in occupied Russia and Yugoslavia because of their proximity to the front and the savagery of the warfare. In Poland they are bad because of the particular animosity of the Germans against the Poles, and the active spirit of resistance of the Polish people. Except for these three countries the situation maybe described as bad in most of the big towns but not in the country districts.

12. Babies and young children are, generally speaking, much better off for milk than the other children. The most undernourished are those above seven years old.

April, 1943.

Annex A 199

SECRET

RECORD OF MEETINGS ON THE QUESTION
OF RELIEF THROUGH THE BLOCKADE

The question of the admission of relief foodstuffs (and or vitamins) through the blockade to occupied territories other than Greece was discussed at two meetings with Mr. Lehman at the Ministry of Economic Warfare on the 19th and 22nd April, 1943.

2. In the course of the discussion, which covered a wide range, Mr. Lehman indicated that his Government desired, if possible, to work out a scheme for the initiation of relief on a limited and experimental scale to be brought into operation as soon as possible. Such a scheme would, of course, have to be designed to fit into the framework of the existing supply situation, and would have to incorporate the conditions necessary to ensure its success and to prevent the enemy from drawing advantage from it. Mr. Lehman considered that the operation of a scheme on these lines would avert psychological dangers which otherwise might result from the maintenance of a purely negative attitude on our part, both among the Allied nationals of the occupied countries serving the cause of the United Nations away from their homes, and in the occupied territories themselves. He mentioned that the supply of food packages to Norway and of powdered milk and vitamins to Belgium had been considered, and that in his view the necessary goods for restricted schemes of this kind for those two

countries /

countries could be found; he appreciated, however, that pressure for increasing the scale of such action in the countries mentioned, and also for extending it to other countries, would be extremely strong, and he thought therefore that the supply situation would first have to be very carefully examined.

3. On the British side attention was drawn to the fundamental consideration that the obligation of feeding any population lay with the occupying Power - an obligation that had been scrupulously honoured by the United Nations in the cases of North Africa, Iceland, Persia and the Middle East. Any move on the part of the Allies to assume an obligation which was Germany's might not only obscure to the oppressed peoples the source responsible for their misery, but might also tempt the Germans to intensify that misery in order to increase the benevolence of the Allies. It should not be forgotten that by refusing to allow any food to pass through our controls since August, 1940, we had in fact compelled the enemy to send into Norway and Belgium substantial quantities of food which otherwise would have been available for his own consumption. It could not be denied that even the Greek scheme had been of some assistance to the enemy.

4. We recognised, however, that conditions in the occupied countries might, as in the case of Greece, become so bad that the abovementioned disadvantages and risks would have to be accepted. This might occur next winter, and therefore it was necessary now to explore the position carefully.

5./

5. We agreed that the necessary tonnage for a limited relief scheme could probably be obtained from Swedish shipping in the Baltic, if the Swedish Government and the German Government consented to its use. On the other hand, attention was drawn to the possible hostile reactions of the Russian Government to any scheme involving the diversion of supplies which might otherwise have been available to them. It was also pointed out that assistance on a substantial scale would be needed by the occupied territories after their liberation, and that there were dangers in assuming commitments elsewhere in respect of commodities which were especially suitable for the initial phases of relief in liberated countries. Mention was also made of the danger possibly inherent in a limited relief action, of raising expectations of assistance on a scale greater than that which in practice could be provided. The possibility would also have to be weighed that, while the first arrival of foodstuffs might produce an excellent effect, assistance continued at a low level, and prevented by supply considerations from increasing, might provoke considerable discontent. At present the inhabitants of the occupied territories knew that they would receive nothing through the blockade, and there was evidence that the reasons for existing policy were generally understood. If, however, it appeared to them that some food could be sent, and that we had found a method of minimizing the damage to the blockade, there might be bitter disappointment that so little was forthcoming.

6./

6. It was suggested that the first stage of any examination of the problem should be to determine the limits within which supplies could be made available, so that the best use of these could then be considered and the merits and demerits of the resulting proposition discussed. With regard to any initial experiments which might be made, it was strongly recommended that action should be confined to particular cities in each occupied country, rather than to a limited number of countries out of the total of possible claimants; it seemed to us most undesirable to give one or two Allies preference over the rest.

7. These considerations were advanced, however, rather as points to be taken into account at a later stage than as objections to the approach to the problem proposed by Mr. Lehman. General agreement was recorded in the following terms:-

(a) It might prove desirable to initiate in the coming autumn a relief scheme on a small and experimental scale in the occupied territories.

(b) A small Committee consisting of representatives of the State Department, the British Embassy and the United States Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation should examine the possibility of such a scheme and submit their recommendations to the two Governments.

(c) Meanwhile it was desirable that the general line of replies to be given to enquiries and

applications concerning a change of blockade policy in this matter should be agreed, in order that the British and American Governments should speak with a single voice.

(d) The possibility of promoting the evacuation of children from occupied countries to Switzerland and Sweden should be further explored; not as an alternative to any relief scheme which it might be decided to propose to the United States and British Governments, but as a supplementary measure possessing advantages of its own.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

23rd April, 1943.

Annex B 204

SECRET.

NOTES ON THE SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THE EXAMINATION OF THE RELIEF PROBLEM.

It is assumed that the examination of any relief action will be confined to children and expectant and nursing mothers, since these have the strongest claim on humanitarian grounds, and moreover assistance successfully administered to them would be of less advantage to the enemy than a relief scheme for adults generally.

2. The nature of the supplies to be employed has to be determined. For this purpose consideration will have to be given to the particular needs of the intended recipients, to portability and to facility of control.

3. Since most foodstuffs other than cereals are in short supply, it is evident that the supply situation must be a decisive factor. The first step should therefore be to ascertain the maximum amount of the selected commodities which could be made available for relief purposes in the autumn and winter of 1943 and during 1944 without compromising such essential needs as supplies to combatant Allies and liberated territories.

4. Since any supplies available for the occupied territories are likely to be severely limited, it is necessary to decide on what principle they should be allocated. In so doing regard ought to be had to the need for equitable treatment as between the various Allies. Moreover, since it will probably be found that supplies available to any one territory are inadequate to render more than a fraction of the assistance which is desirable, some principle will have to be discovered according to which the recipients are to be selected. A decision on this point will again be influenced by the view taken of what degree of assistance is worth rendering, and what is not; e.g., whether it is better to give four children a quarter of a pint of milk each, or a whole pint to one child only.

5. It is important that any scheme adopted shall bring

about /

about a material improvement of the conditions of those whom it is designed to benefit. This means first, that a careful control must be exercised over the transport and distribution of the imported supplies themselves. It means, second in order but not in importance, that a method must be found of ensuring that these supplies are supplementary to what the intended recipients have at present, and that their effect is not nullified by a deterioration in local conditions brought about by Axis action. The control necessary in these two respects will involve the acceptance by the Germans of strictly drafted terms, and the institution of a system of neutral supervision which, to be effective, must include facilities for free movement of personnel and supplies and rapid and secure communication with the blockade authorities.

6. Various technical details concerned with transport and the financial costs of supervision in the occupied countries would have to be considered in their turn.

Annex C 206

SECRET

DRAFT STATEMENT TO FORM THE BASIS
OF REPLIES TO APPEALS FOR RELIEF
THROUGH THE BLOCKADE.

The British and American Governments are aware of the grave sufferings of the Allied peoples in the territories occupied by the enemy. They deeply sympathise with these sufferings and wish to relieve them.

2. It is unfortunately clear that the conditions necessary for effective relief on any significant scale can only exist when the Axis domination in the several countries of Europe has been broken. Nevertheless, the British and American Governments have examined the possibility of bringing more immediate assistance to these countries, while they remain under enemy occupation, by means of imports of suitable commodities through the blockade. Various plans of this nature have received the fullest attention of both Governments jointly, and the problem raised by such plans remains under constant examination.

3. However, in considering this question the two Governments are obliged to take into consideration all the relevant strategic and military factors, and they cannot assume a responsibility in this matter until they are satisfied that whatever steps are taken will not be neutralized by the enemy, who controls the economy of the peoples concerned, and will not imperil the all important object of securing their early liberation.

4. Neither Government considers that it is advisable at this stage to change existing policy. But the whole problem is the subject of continuous consultation between the two Governments, and the assurance can be given that they would initiate action of the kind described if at any time it appeared to them practicable to do so.

Annex D.
207

Draft reply to a Parliamentary Question.

The policy of H.M.Government with regard to the admission of foodstuffs into occupied territories through the blockade has, except in the case of Greece, remained unchanged since the announcement by the Prime Minister on the 20th August 1940. The responsibility for feeding the territories that he has overrun, lies on the enemy, and we are under no obligation to relieve him of that responsibility. Experience has shown that insistence on this fact has had due effect upon the Axis economy. While the enemy has continued to plunder ruthlessly the food producing areas under his control, he has been compelled, for military and economic reasons, himself to supply foodstuffs to countries normally dependent upon overseas imports. It is clear that, if the United Nations had at any time assumed the burden in whole or in part of feeding such countries, the effect of the blockade would have been considerably weakened.

2. Nevertheless, the British and American Governments are aware that there is much suffering on the continent, and they have under continual examination the possibility of relieving the Allied peoples by sending them some immediate assistance by means of imports of suitable commodities through the blockade. Unfortunately, however, it is apparent that the conditions necessary for effective relief on any significant scale can only exist when the Axis domination over the several countries

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of Europe has been broken. It is also clear that any relief scheme would be of some advantage to the enemy. The resources of the occupied territories have been thoroughly harnessed to the Axis war machine and any steps taken to strengthen their economy would inevitably strengthen the enemy as well.

3. The difficulties of supervision by some international or neutral body are frequently underrated. While it might be possible to ensure that there was no interference with the imported foodstuffs, it would obviously be far more difficult to ensure that the enemy did not indirectly benefit by withdrawing or consuming larger quantities of domestic produce. This problem would be almost impossible of solution in any area where there were large numbers of occupying troops.

4. The two Governments made a special exception to this general rule when they agreed to the Swedish Scheme for relief in Greece. Conditions in the Greek cities and islands were unique, while, since Greece can make no great contribution to the Axis war effort, the enemy had done nothing to discharge his responsibility towards the Greek people. The two Governments fully acknowledge the invaluable services rendered by the Swedish-Swiss Commission, under the auspices of the International Red Cross. Even in Greece, however, it is clear that the enemy has obtained some benefit from our sending foodstuffs to people whose labour he has afterwards decided to use.

5. /

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5. For the reasons already given we are not prepared to repeat the Greek scheme in other occupied territories. We have, however, sympathetically examined various schemes for some limited forms of relief in other areas. We have regretfully reached the conclusion that these schemes would be of very doubtful benefit to the peoples concerned, and that it would be neither wise nor humane to change our policy at this stage. Nevertheless, arrangements have been made to keep the whole problem under continuous review, and to secure the prompt consideration of new situations as they arise. The two Governments will initiate such action as may be possible if at any time it appears that this can be done with a reasonable certainty of appreciable benefit to the peoples in the occupied territories and without substantial benefit to the enemy and consequent prolongation of the war. I should add, that, if any change of policy were made, we do not think that it would be possible to differentiate in principle between one occupied country and another.

S/s for Foreign Affairs

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

Printed for the War Cabinet. April 1943.

W6509 G

19 MAY 1943

Ended

SECRET.

Copy No. 56

W.P. (43) 186.

April 30, 1943.

WAR CABINET.

RELIEF FOR OCCUPIED EUROPE.

MEMORANDUM BY THE MINISTER OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

IN May 1942 the War Cabinet rejected a proposal that a supply of limited quantities of milk, for the relief of children only, should be allowed to enter occupied Europe. Since then many appeals have been received from the exiled Governments and from philanthropic bodies here and in the United States. No concession has, however, been made beyond the regular shipments to Greece, which were authorised in February 1942.

2. In face of the increased pressure and the distressing conditions that undeniably exist, there is now a real danger that the Americans may act on their own. The President seems to have given some kind of promise to the Norwegians, and Mr. Hull recently informed Lord Halifax that he was being pressed to agree to a parcels scheme for Norway, and to milk for children being sent to Belgium. There is little doubt that if we had not offered to take part in a joint examination of the realities of the situation, the United States Government would have pledged themselves to allow shipments to both countries. The danger of this happening, although it has lessened for the time being, has by no means disappeared. Nothing could be more unfortunate than any ill-considered concession to some Allies to the exclusion of others. The blockade would be treated in a manner calculated to produce the maximum of discord among our Allies with disastrous psychological consequences.

3. I have had two discussions on relief with Governor Lehman. We had a clear understanding that our conversations were purely exploratory, and that our conclusions would have to be approved by our Governments. I annex :—

(A) A record of our discussions.
(B) Some notes on the suggested approach to the examination of the subject.
(C) A draft basis for replies, while the question is being examined, to relief appeals from our Allies and from humanitarian bodies.

4. It will be seen that we are committed to nothing beyond (subject to Cabinet approval and that of the United States Government) a joint examination in Washington of the practical possibilities of sending relief if the existing policy were changed; though it no doubt follows that we should have further consultations with the Americans after the Washington enquiry, and in the light of the general situation then existing on the Continent. I should give explicit instructions to our representative on the Committee of Enquiry that its recommendations should be confined to advice as to the possibilities of supply, shipping and control of distribution, if any change in existing policy were decided upon.

5. I ask my colleagues to approve :—

(i) The suggested joint examination in Washington.
(ii) The general line of approach proposed in Annex (B).
(iii) The draft basis for replies to relief appeals.

S/S for Foreign Affairs

210

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

Printed for the War Cabinet. April 1943

W6509 G

Enclosure

19 MAY 1943

SECRET.

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(B) Some notes on the suggested approach to the examination of the subject.
(C) A draft basis for replies, while the question is being examined, to relief appeals from our Allies and from humanitarian bodies.

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5. I ask my colleagues to approve :—

(i) The suggested joint examination in Washington.
(ii) The general line of approach proposed in Annex (B).
(iii) The draft basis for replies to relief appeals.

6. I also ask my colleagues to consider what line should be taken in replying to Parliamentary questions, or if a debate on this subject is forced upon us in either House. One reason for my request is that Parliamentary interest in the matter is being stimulated by humanitarian "pressure groups," another is that Parliamentary opponents of relief increasingly demand a reasoned reaffirmation of our existing policy in order to counter the relief agitation. I annex (D) a draft reply covering the main points that have been raised. The substance of this reply would presumably have to be agreed with the United States Government before it could be given in Parliament.

7. If the blockade were relaxed by our agreeing to send some milk and vitamins to occupied Europe, it should be possible to obtain Swedish ships from the Baltic for the purpose. The supply difficulty, which has not, I think, yet been fully appreciated by the Americans, is, however, great and increasing.

8. I believe that the only practicable relief scheme would be one confined to children, and possibly expectant and nursing mothers, in certain specified big cities in Europe. Such a scheme would give those most in need of it whatever amount of dried milk, &c., might be available, and would have the great advantage that all occupied countries would receive equal treatment at our hands. It is, however, possible that the result of a thorough examination of the question may be to establish that the supplies which could be spared are so limited that the psychological effect of sending so little would merely tend to discourage the peoples of the occupied territories, while providing excellent propaganda for the enemy.

9. Experience in the case of Greece has shown that after a relief scheme has been sanctioned in principle, the negotiations to ensure control of distribution, and to obtain a supply of vessels for regular shipments, take several months. Any scheme which might be approved after the proposed Washington enquiry could, therefore, hardly come into operation much before next winter.

10. My colleagues may wish to have an appreciation of the present food conditions on the Continent. I am advised that, while the position is nowhere so acute as in Greece during the autumn and winter of 1941, it is bad in occupied Russia and Poland, and in some parts of Yugoslavia and Belgium. In descending order of "scarcity conditions" the list would be—

Occupied Russia.
Poland.
Yugoslavia.
Belgium.
France.
Norway.
Greece (after allowing for present relief shipments).
Holland.
Czechoslovakia.
Denmark.

11. Conditions are bad in occupied Russia and Yugoslavia because of their proximity to the front and the savagery of the warfare. In Poland they are bad because of the particular animosity of the Germans against the Poles, and the active spirit of resistance of the Polish people. Except for these three countries the situation may be described as bad in most of the big towns but not in the country districts.

12. Babies and young children are, generally speaking, much better off for milk than the other children. The most undernourished are those above seven years old.

S.

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
April 30, 1943.

(A)

RECORD OF MEETINGS ON THE QUESTION OF RELIEF THROUGH THE BLOCKADE.

The question of the admission of relief food-stuffs (and/or vitamins) through the blockade to occupied territories other than Greece was discussed at two meetings with Mr. Lehman at the Ministry of Economic Warfare on the 19th and 22nd April, 1943.

2. In the course of the discussion, which covered a wide range, Mr. Lehman indicated that his Government desired, if possible, to work out a scheme for the initiation of relief on a limited and experimental scale to be brought into operation as soon as possible. Such a scheme would, of course, have to be designed to fit into the framework of the existing supply situation, and would have to incorporate the conditions necessary to ensure its success and to prevent the enemy from drawing advantage from it. Mr. Lehman considered that the operation of a scheme on these lines would avert psychological dangers which otherwise might result from the maintenance of a purely negative attitude on our part, both among the Allied nationals of the occupied countries serving the cause of the United Nations away from their homes, and in the occupied territories themselves. He mentioned that the supply of food packages to Norway and of powdered milk and vitamins to Belgium had been considered, and that in his view the necessary goods for restricted schemes of this kind for those two countries could be found; he appreciated, however, that pressure for increasing the scale of such action in the countries mentioned, and also for extending it to other countries, would be extremely strong, and he thought, therefore, that the supply situation would first have to be very carefully examined.

3. On the British side attention was drawn to the fundamental consideration that the obligation of feeding any population lay with the occupying Power—an obligation that had been scrupulously honoured by the United Nations in the cases of North Africa, Iceland, Persia and the Middle East. Any move on the part of the Allies to assume an obligation which was Germany's might not only obscure to the oppressed peoples the source responsible for their misery, but might also tempt the Germans to intensify that misery in order to increase the benevolence of the Allies. It should not be forgotten that by refusing to allow any food to pass through our controls since August 1940 we had, in fact, compelled the enemy to send into Norway and Belgium substantial quantities of food which otherwise would have been available for his own consumption. It could not be denied that even the Greek scheme had been of some assistance to the enemy.

4. We recognised, however, that conditions in the occupied countries might, as in the case of Greece, become so bad that the above-mentioned disadvantages and risks would have to be accepted. This might occur next winter, and therefore it was necessary now to explore the position carefully.

5. We agreed that the necessary tonnage for a limited relief scheme could probably be obtained from Swedish shipping in the Baltic, if the Swedish Government and the German Government consented to its use. On the other hand, attention was drawn to the possible hostile reactions of the Russian Government to any scheme involving the diversion of supplies which might otherwise have been available to them. It was also pointed out that assistance on a substantial scale would be needed by the occupied territories after their liberation, and that there were dangers in assuming commitments elsewhere in respect of commodities which were especially suitable for the initial phases of relief in liberated countries. Mention was also made of the danger possibly inherent in a limited relief action, of raising expectations of assistance on a scale greater than that which in practice could be provided. The possibility would also have to be weighed that, while the first arrival of food-stuffs might produce an excellent effect, assistance continued at a low level, and prevented by supply considerations from increasing, might provoke considerable discontent. At present the inhabitants of the occupied territories knew that they would receive nothing through the blockade, and there was evidence that the reasons for existing policy were generally understood. If, however, it appeared to them that some food could be sent, and that we had found a method of minimising the danger to the blockade, there might be bitter disappointment that so little was forthcoming.

6. It was suggested that the first stage of any examination of the problem should be to determine the limits within which supplies could be made available, so that the best use of these could then be considered and the merits and demerits of the resulting proposition discussed. With regard to any initial experiments which might be made, it was strongly recommended that action should be confined to particular cities in each occupied country, rather than to a limited number of countries out of the total of possible claimants; it seemed to us most undesirable to give one or two Allies preference over the rest.

7. These considerations were advanced, however, rather as points to be taken into account at a later stage than as objections to the approach to the problem proposed by Mr. Lehman. General agreement was recorded in the following terms :—

(*a*) It might prove desirable to initiate in the coming autumn a relief scheme on a small and experimental scale in the occupied territories.

(*b*) A small Committee consisting of representatives of the State Department, the British Embassy and the United States Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation should examine the possibility of such a scheme and submit their recommendations to the two Governments.

(*c*) Meanwhile, it was desirable that the general line of replies to be given to enquiries and applications concerning a change of blockade policy in this matter should be agreed, in order that the British and American Governments should speak with a single voice.

(*d*) The possibility of promoting the evacuation of children from occupied countries to Switzerland and Sweden should be further explored; not as an alternative to any relief scheme which it might be decided to propose to the United States and British Governments, but as a supplementary measure possessing advantages of its own.

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
April 23, 1943.

(B)

NOTES ON THE SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THE EXAMINATION OF THE RELIEF PROBLEM.

It is assumed that the examination of any relief action will be confined to children and expectant and nursing mothers, since these have the strongest claim on humanitarian grounds, and, moreover, assistance successfully administered to them would be of less advantage to the enemy than a relief scheme for adults generally.

2. The nature of the supplies to be employed has to be determined. For this purpose consideration will have to be given to the particular needs of the intended recipients, to portability and to facility of control.

3. Since most food-stuffs other than cereals are in short supply, it is evident that the supply situation must be a decisive factor. The first step should therefore be to ascertain the maximum amount of the selected commodities which could be made available for relief purposes in the autumn and winter of 1943 and during 1944 without compromising such essential needs as supplies to combatant Allies and liberated territories.

4. Since any supplies available for the occupied territories are likely to be severely limited, it is necessary to decide on what principle they should be allocated. In so doing regard ought to be had to the need for equitable treatment as between the various Allies. Moreover, since it will probably be found that supplies available to any one teritory are inadequate to render more than a fraction of the assistance which is desirable, some principle will have to be discovered according to which the recipients are to be selected. A decision on this point will again be influenced by the view taken of what degree of assistance is worth rendering, and what is not, *e.g.*, whether it is better to give four children a quarter of a pint of milk each, or a whole pint to one child only.

5. It is important that any scheme adopted shall bring about a material improvement of the conditions of those whom it is designed to benefit. This means, first, that a careful control must be exercised over the transport and distribution of the imported supplies themselves. It means, second in order but not in importance, that a method must be found of ensuring that these supplies are supplementary to what the intended recipients have at present, and that their effect is not nullified by a deterioration in local conditions brought about by Axis action. The control necessary in these two respects will involve the acceptance by the Germans of strictly drafted terms, and the institution of a system of neutral supervision which, to be effective, must include facilities for free movement of personnel and supplies and rapid and secure communication with the blockade authorities.

6. Various technical details concerned with transport and the financial costs of supervision in the occupied countries would have to be considered in their turn.

(C)

DRAFT STATEMENT TO FORM THE BASIS OF REPLIES TO APPEALS FOR RELIEF THROUGH THE BLOCKADE.

The British and American Governments are aware of the grave sufferings of the Allied peoples in the territories occupied by the enemy. They deeply sympathise with these sufferings and wish to relieve them.

2. It is, unfortunately, clear that the conditions necessary for effective relief on any significant scale can only exist when the Axis domination in the several countries of Europe has been broken. Nevertheless, the British and American Governments have examined the possibility of bringing more immediate assistance to these countries, while they remain under enemy occupation, by means of imports of suitable commodities through the blockade. Various plans of this nature have received the fullest attention of both Governments jointly, and the problem raised by such plans remains under constant examination.

3. However, in considering this question the two Governments are obliged to take into consideration all the relevant strategic and military factors, and they cannot assume a responsibility in this matter until they are satisfied that whatever steps are taken will not be neutralised by the enemy, who controls the economy of the peoples concerned, and will not imperil the all-important object of securing their early liberation.

4. Neither Government considers that it is advisable at this stage to change existing policy. But the whole problem is the subject of continuous consultation between the two Governments, and the assurance can be given that they would initiate action of the kind described if at any time it appeared to them practicable to do so.

(D)

DRAFT REPLY TO A PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION.

The policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to the admission of food-stuffs into occupied territories through the blockade has, except in the case of Greece, remained unchanged since the announcement by the Prime Minister on the 20th August, 1940. The responsibility for feeding the territories that he has overrun lies on the enemy, and we are under no obligation to relieve him of that responsibility. Experience has shown that insistence on this fact has had due effect upon the Axis economy. While the enemy has continued to plunder ruthlessly the food-producing areas under his control, he has been compelled, for military and economic reasons, himself to supply food-stuffs to countries normally dependent upon overseas imports. It is clear that, if the United Nations had at any time assumed the burden in whole or in part of feeding such countries, the effect of the blockade would have been considerably weakened.

2. Nevertheless, the British and American Governments are aware that there is much suffering on the continent, and they have under continual examination the possibility of relieving the Allied peoples by sending them some immediate assistance by means of imports of suitable commodities through the blockade. Unfortunately, however, it is apparent that the conditions necessary for effective relief on any significant scale can only exist when the Axis domination over the several countries of Europe has been broken. It is also clear that any relief scheme would be of some advantage to the enemy. The resources of the occupied territories have been thoroughly harnessed to the Axis war machine, and any steps taken to strengthen their economy would inevitably strengthen the enemy as well.

3. The difficulties of supervision by some international or neutral body are frequently underrated. While it might be possible to ensure that there was no interference with the imported food-stuffs, it would obviously be far more difficult to ensure that the enemy did not indirectly benefit by withdrawing or consuming larger quantities of domestic produce. This problem would be almost impossible of solution in any area where there were large numbers of occupying troops.

4. The two Governments made a special exception to this general rule when they agreed to the Swedish scheme for relief in Greece. Conditions in the Greek cities and islands were unique, while, since Greece can make no great contribution to the Axis war effort, the enemy had done nothing to discharge his responsibility towards the Greek people. The two Governments fully acknowledge the invaluable services rendered by the Swedish-Swiss Commission, under the auspices of the International Red Cross. Even in Greece, however, it is clear that the enemy has obtained some benefit from our sending food-stuffs to people whose labour he has afterwards decided to use.

5. For the reasons already given we are not prepared to repeat the Greek scheme in other occupied territories. We have, however, sympathetically examined various schemes for some limited forms of relief in other areas. We have regretfully reached the conclusion that these schemes would be of very doubtful benefit to the peoples concerned, and that it would be neither wise nor humane to change our policy at this stage. Nevertheless, arrangements have been made to keep the whole problem under continuous review, and to secure the prompt consideration of new situations as they arise. The two Governments will initiate such action as may be possible if at any time it appears that this can be done with a reasonable certainty of appreciable benefit to the peoples in the occupied territories and without substantial benefit to the enemy and consequent prolongation of the war. I should add, that, if any change of policy were made, we do not think that it would be possible to differentiate in principle between one occupied country and another.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 6590

30 APR 1943

216

Registry Number W 6590/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No. T 550/20

Dated 26th Apr. 1943

Received in Registry 30th Apr. 1943.

W: Coordination +

Fish liver oil from South Africa for Dutch children

Transmits copy of letter from Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Gray (Dominions Office) of 26th April regarding request by Netherlands Minister in Union of South Africa for permission to send 13,200 gallons of fish liver oil from Union to Netherlands for distribution by the Red Cross among Dutch children.

Last Paper.

w 6500

References.

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

(*Minutes.*)

Mins. 5/5
Mr Courtauld Dept
D V S 3/5

L.E.C. 3/5

(Action completed.)

wb 8/5/43

(Index.)

All 27/7

Next Paper.

w 6605

24994 2 43 F.O.P.

T550/20.

Copy to:- E.E.Crewe,Esq.,

W / / W 6590

29 APR 1943

30 APR 1943

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

26th April,1943.

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re track

Would you please refer to Fourie's letter to you, No. 106/52, of April 14th, about a request made by the Netherlands Minister in the Union of South Africa for permission to send 13,200 gallons of fish liver oil from the Union to Holland for distribution by the Red Cross among Dutch children.

As Fourie says, present policy is opposed to the despatch of food stuffs (which are held to include fish liver oil, as a Vitamin A.preparation) through the blockade. The Chairman of the Netherlands Red Cross recently wrote to my Minister and mentioned his hopes of obtaining some vitamin A preparations for Holland. He was told that the question would be examined, but that it presented great difficulties of principle.

In the circumstances, we should be grateful if the Union Government would reply to the Netherlands Minister on the lines which they have contemplated. They might wish to say that they could not accede to the request since it was contrary to the present principles of blockade policy. Or, if they prefer, we can cover this application ourselves in a further reply to the Netherlands Red Cross here.

W. A. Camps.

S.O.Gray,Esq.,
The Dominions Office,
Dover House,
Whitehall,
S.W.1.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 6605

30 APR 1943

Registry Number W 6605/4/49

FROM Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Crowe.

No. T 5503/G/Z

Dated 28th April, 1943.

Received in Registry 30th April, 1943.

W : Co-ordination.

Blockade Relief Policy.

Encloses copies of letter from Mr. Troutbeck (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Thorold (Washington) of 24th April and of a letter to Mr. Hollins (Ministry of Food) of 24th April regarding discussions with Mr. Lehman about current relief schemes.

Last Paper.

w6590 (w6471)

References.

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

(*Minutes.*)

E.P. 1075

(Action completed.)

mb 11/5/43

(Index.)

Aeh 27/7

Next Paper.

w6631 (w6821.)

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

T.550/G/Z

W 6605
30 APR 1943

219

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

28th April, 1943.

My dear Crowe, E. Nir H.

With reference to our telephone conversation about the talks with Lehman, I am sending you herewith copies of letters written by Troutbeck to Thorold at Washington and to Hollins at the Ministry of Food here.

Yours ever
Tom Campbell

E. E. Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall,
S.W.1.

COPY.

220

BY FAST AIR MAIL.

T.550/G/Z

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.
24th April, 1943.

SECRET.

I enclose three copies of a record of the discussions held with Lehman on the subject of current relief schemes, three copies of a paper setting out suggestions for the best approach to the problem, and three copies of a draft statement to form the basis of replies to appeals for relief through the blockade. This has been given to Lehman ad referendum.

I also enclose a copy of correspondence with the Ministry of Food, which is self-explanatory. You will not doubt get in touch with your representatives in Washington and be guided by their advice on the supply side. I think we can only leave it to you people on the spot to arrange whether they should actually sit in at the meetings of the Committee.

Will you please note the importance attached to secrecy regarding this whole question?

(signed) J.M.Troutbeck.

G. Thorold, Esq.,
British Embassy,
Washington.

COPY.

SECRET.
T.550/G/Z

221

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

24th April, 1943.

With reference to my letter of the 22nd April I now enclose copy of the final record of the discussions which my Minister held with Mr. Lehman on the subject of current relief schemes. The record covers a second discussion held on the 22nd April. It was fully understood on both sides that the agreements reached at the meeting were ad referndum to the two governments.

Subject to that, it was agreed, as you will see, that the question should be further examined in Washington by a small committee consisting of representatives of the State Department, the British Embassy and the U.S. Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation. Clearly the representatives of our Embassy will need expert advice on the supply side, and will hope to obtain it from the representatives in Washington of the Ministry of Food, with whom they have been discussing these matters for some months past. I think we must leave it to those on the spot to decide whether Ministry of Food representatives are actually to be present at some of the meetings of the Committee or confine themselves to briefing the representatives of the Embassy. Mr. Lehman appeared to attach great importance to keeping the Committee as small as possible and may therefore prefer that neither side should bring experts to the meetings. But in any case you will no doubt wish to send instructions to your people in Washington, and we shall tell ours to keep in the closest touchwith your representatives, and to keep them fully informed throughout.

There is one other point. Would you be good enough/

P. Hollins, Esq.,
Ministry of Food,
Import Plans Division,
Portman Square, W.1.

222
END

enough to treat this whole question as one of great secrecy and to impress this upon your people in Washington? The Americans are particularly anxious that the fact of this Committee being set up should not become public property, and we fully share their view on the point.

Finally I enclose a revised copy of our notes on the suggested approach to the examination of the problem.

(signed) J.M.Troutbeck.

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

F.O.
371

FILE No. 4

Pps. 6631 - 8333

CLOSED
UNTIL
1972

36513

171

2

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 6631

1 MAY 1943

Registry Number } W 6631/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated).

No.

Dated

Received in Registry } 1st May, 1943

W : Co-ordination.

Relief for Finnish children.

Transmits copies of telegram from Stockholm No.212 Arfar of 13th April and telegram to Stockholm No.328 Arfar of 20th April regarding export of Swedish apple pulp to Finland as relief shipment for children.

Last Paper.

w 6605.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Walther Dept

36513

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
6/5/43	Acks 28/5

Next Paper.

w 6643

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

[illegible] ARPAR O.B.

FROM STOCKHOLM TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

Mr. Mallet.
No. 212 ARPAR.

D. 7.05 p.m. 13th April 1943.
R. 11.25 p.m. 13th April 1943.

W 6631
1 MAY 1943

13th April 1943.

Please telegraph whether we may approve export of 10 tons Swedish apple pulp to Finland without sugar as relief shipment for children.

OTP

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

T550/15

[CYPHER]

ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO STOCKHOLM

No. 328. Arfar D. 4.55 a.m. April 21st, 1943.

April 20th, 1943.

bbbb

Your telegram No. 212 [Arfar of April 13th: Goods for children in Finland].

As apples fall within List A export must be refused. We do not in any case favour despatch of relief goods to a country with which we are at war.

O.T.P.

GENERAL

W6643 /G 5

1 MAY 1943

8 1943 4

W 6643 /~~220~~ 49

Mr. Collier.

to Mr. Crowe.

April 22.

May 1.

Relief for Norway

Refers to his despatch No: 44 (W5499). Comments on unfavorable impression created among Norwegian circles in America by U.S. stories that it is U.K. who are preventing U.S. Govt. from acting in these matters.

Last Paper.

W6580

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of:)

c/d. Mr. Campbell (N.E.D.)

May 4.

(Minutes.)

I fear this was bound to happen sooner or later.

N.A. 5/5.

N.A. / depts

Copy to Campbell (N.E.D.) ref

E.C.C. 3/5

It is a point that Northern Dept. might care to mention to Mr Hugh Cumming for off the record before he goes back if relations with Norway come under official or unofficial discussion.

Noted. E.O.C. 8/5

N.B. Butler 7/v.

E.C.C. 10/5

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
Rec'd 1/5/43	Indexed.

Next Paper.

W6813

W

1C

W6643

BRITISH EMBASSY TO NORWAY,

c/o FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.,

April 22nd, 1943.

Dear Crowe,

Although it is hardly worth writing a despatch on the point, you may like to know, with ~~regard~~ reference to my despatch No. 44 of April 2nd about the relief question, that when I saw the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs last Monday on his return from America he told me that he had found all the Norwegians over there inclined to be anti-British over the two questions of relief and the Stockholm air service, mainly because the Americans had been putting it out that it was we who prevented the United States Government from doing anything for them in these matters. In the case of the Air Service he had found out and had told his countrymen that the Americans were being disingenuous, since they were only willing to supply aircraft out of the exiguous British quota of transport machines; but in the matter of relief it was being openly said that President Roosevelt would have done something but for the objections of Mr. Churchill, and from what the President had told him himself this appeared to be true.

As you have told me, this is in fact the truth, and I suppose there is nothing to be done about it; but I think the Foreign Office ought to know that the Americans have let the cat out of the bag and that the effect on Anglo-Norwegian relations is naturally bad. That, of course, is only one factor in the question; but it is a factor which, I hope, will not be ignored.

Eric Crowe, Esq.,
General Department.

Yours ever
Laurence Collier

173

7

GENERAL

W 6658

1943

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

Registry Number W 6658/4/49

TELEGRAM FROM Lord Halifax, (Washington)

No. 2024

Dated 30th April

Received in Registry 2nd May 1943

W: Co-ordination

Child evacuation scheme.

Refers to Foreign Office telegram No. 2723 April 24th (W 5996/4/49). The telegram under reference did not arrive in time to make it possible to get papers to Bermuda before close of conference.

Last Paper.

W6605 (W5996)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

A W&R.

Ref. 6/V

Letter 14.5 Copies

N. 3/5

(Action completed.)

mk 19/5/43

(Index.)

M. H. 13/12

Next Paper.

W 6774 (W9792)

22910 9/41 F.O.P.

[CYPHER] FILES

W 6658

2 MAY 1943

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Viscount Halifax
No.2024
30th April, 1943

D. 3.48 a.m. 30th April, 1943
R. 9.45 a.m. 1st May, 1943

X X X X

Your telegram No.2723.

Unfortunately telegram under reference did not arrive here in time to make it possible to get papers to Bermuda before close of conference.

MAY
F.O. REGISTRY

174

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 6774

5 MAY 1943

9

Registry Number W 6774/5/49

FROM Mr. Sterndale-Bennett (Angora) to Sir O. Sargent.

No. (644/2/43)

Dated 16th April,

Received in Registry 5th May, 1943.

W : Co-ordination

Relief for Belgium.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has read to Mr. Sterndale-Bennett some extracts from a report by the Turkish Minister in Bucharest on the situation in Belgium as recounted by a Belgian ex-Cabinet Minister. The Belgian referred to supplies which were being sent via Portugal and Spain to Belgium and requested that the Turkish Minister would get a message sent to the Belgian Government in London begging that they might be augmented. The Minister for Foreign Affairs did not wish to take this up with the Belgians.

Last Paper.

W 6658

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

18/ Mr. E.W. (Mr. Campo) (with marked letter) May 11.

(Mr) Mr Sterndale-Bennett (Angora) - from Sir O. Sargent. May 13.

8/ Mr. Campo (M.E.W.) May 14

(Minutes.)

Mr Sterndale-Bennett is quite right & his P.S. & saying that there is nothing secret about the arrangement for buying supplies in Portugal etc. Similar concessions have been made to other allied govts.

The Belgians are frequently pressing for increased allotments of essentials but supplies are limited and have to be divided among many applicants.

Copy to Campo (M.E.W.) and draft reply to Mr Sterndale Bennett.

E.E.C. 7/5

C.W.D. Central Dept

(Action completed.) W.E. 14/5/43

(Index.) All 24/7

Next Paper.

W 6805

10

British Embassy,

ANGORA.

16th April, 1943.

Central / General } Desks.

W.S. 3/5

(644/2/43)

1C

W 3/5 8774
5 MAY 1943

My dear Sargent,

The Minister for Foreign Affairs read me the other day some extracts from a report by the Turkish Minister in Bucharest on the situation in Belgium as recounted to him by a Belgian ex-Cabinet Minister, and the Secretary General has since given me a few more details about the same report. The name of the ex-Cabinet Minister was unfortunately not given by the Turkish Minister, who merely said that he had recently been in Roumania making purchases for Belgium.

2. There was nothing very new in the report and the only thing which was (to me at all events) unexpected was that he stressed the increasing unity of the people in Belgium round the King. Otherwise it was an unrelieved picture of distress and misery and was mainly concerned with the constant menace, which hung over all families, of being suddenly separated, without regard for age or sex, and sent to forced labour. The internal situation was described as "lamentable" and special mention was made of the fact that the iron and cotton industries were not working. The food situation was becoming worse and worse, and it was here that lay the real point of the report. The Belgian had referred to supplies which were being sent via Portugal and Spain, ostensibly by the International Red Cross but really and secretly by the Belgian government in London. (I do not know whether it is a secret or not, but the Turkish representative had been asked specially to regard it as such on the ground that if the truth leaked out the Germans would put obstacles in the way of the supplies).

The.....

Sir Orme Sargent, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

The Belgian had urged the importance of these supplies, and had asked the Turkish Minister to get a message sent to the Belgian government in London begging that they might be augmented.

3. When Numan spoke to me he said he particularly did not wish to take up this question with the Belgian Minister here. He knew it was a thorny question, and he preferred, therefore, to pass on the information to us so that we could decide what to do about it, or alternatively to ignore it. Beyond thanking him for the information I contented myself with agreeing that the whole question of permitting supplies to countries in German occupation was a difficult one.

Yours ever,

J.C. Sterndale Bennett.

P.S. Since writing the above I have seen in the print a "Note on Blockade Policy respecting Relief" prepared by the Ministry of Economic Warfare, (War (General) February 24th, 1943, Section I). I presume that the supplies referred to in paragraph 2 of the above letter are those purchased in Portugal and Spain under the arrangements described in paragraph 7 of the memorandum. Prima facie there appears to be nothing particularly secret about these arrangements.

5013.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. w6774/4/49.

12

Draft.

Mr Stirdale
Bernalds
Angora
Turkey.

Sir O. Sargent

Central Dept

Copy to Cairo for Info.

Thank you for your letter No 644/2/43 of April 26th about relief supplies for Belgium.

You are quite right in thinking that there is nothing secret about the Belgian purchases in Portugal and other neutral countries; and similar concessions have been made to several other Allied Govts.

The Belgians are constantly asking for an increased allotment of exports: but of course the supply is limited and what

is

is available has to be
divided between the various
claimants. There is therefore
no apparent reason why
your Belgian colleague
should have taken this up
with the Turks and there
is certainly nothing that
the latter can do about it

Yours sincerely
[illegible]

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

14

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

WAR (GENERAL). February 24, 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL. SECTION 1.

(16326)

[W 3225/4/49] Copy No. 13

Note on Blockade Policy respecting Relief.—(*Received in Foreign Office, February* 24.)

IN the autumn of 1940 the Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons that it was the intention of the British Government to maintain rigorously the blockade of all territories occupied and controlled by the enemy, and to lay squarely upon the shoulders of the enemy the responsibility for providing for the needs of the inhabitants. This policy was reaffirmed in the spring of 1941 in a public statement issued through the British Embassy at Washington at the time of Mr. Hoover's appeal for an official experiment in food relief in Belgium. In the autumn of 1941 the United States Government affirmed a similar attitude. Their declaration referred, however, to territory occupied by the enemy and did not specifically include areas such as the unoccupied zone of France, which, though controlled by the enemy, was not then under formal occupation. This pronouncement of the American Government was founded upon a very definite assertion of the enemy's responsibility for the maintenance of the populations whose countries he had occupied, but it did not, of course, positively assert the intention of the American Government to maintain a blockade of these territories inasmuch as the American Government was not at that time at war. In the autumn of 1942 the two Governments resolved formally upon a joint policy in these matters, and it was agreed that no changes of the practice at that time established should be made unless by common consent.

2. At the end of the winter of 1941 a condition of desperate famine developed in Greece, and the two Governments, not without considerable anxiety, decided in January 1942 that it was necessary to make an exception to the policy which they had so far universally applied. Accordingly a shipment of 8,000 tons of wheat was permitted to pass the blockade to Greece. In announcing this decision, which was taken upon the joint responsibility of the British and American Governments, the determination of both these Governments was reaffirmed in the clearest terms that the general policy of blockade should remain, with this single exception of Greece, unimpaired. Since then the case of Greece has been treated as wholly exceptional; the first 8,000 tons were followed by further occasional cargoes during the spring and summer, and since the end of August 1942 regular shipments of 15,000 tons of wheat monthly have been permitted to pass the blockade under a scheme sponsored by the Swedish Government and governed by conditions agreed by the enemy Powers. These conditions provide not only for neutral supervision and the immunity of food-stuffs imported through the blockade from Axis interference, but also that the native produce of Greece shall be reserved (except where exchanges are approved by the neutral supervisors) exclusively for the use of the Greek population. It has been possible to defend this exception, so far, on the double ground that the need of Greece was incomparably more acute than that of rival claimants, and that whereas in the greater part of Europe the enemy Powers have found it necessary to permit commercial exchanges which have ensured a minimum subsistence to the population, in the case of Greece they have not found it to their interest to take any such measures to avoid the development of a major calamity. It is, therefore, argued on the one hand that since a general importation of food-stuffs into occupied Europe is manifestly impossible, the claims of Greece to be the sole exception are paramount on obvious grounds of need; and on the other hand, that by taking action which they have taken in respect of Greece, the British and American Governments have not relieved the enemy of a burden which he would otherwise have carried himself. The scheme originally provided for the shipment of 15,000 tons monthly of wheat only, and such medical supplies as are ordinarily admissible under navicert to any occupied territory. In December of 1942, however, it was agreed to add up to 3,000 tons of pulse monthly, to this amount, and also 100 tons monthly of powdered milk or the equivalent.

3. The British Government has been approached on many occasions with requests to admit supplies of food and clothing through the blockade for relief in countries other than Greece. The following are the principal instances which have occurred since the campaign of Mr. Hoover in the United States in the winter of 1940 and early part of 1941 :—

(*a*) In the summer of 1941 the Belgian Government presented a scheme for relief from soup kitchens, similar in its essentials to that recommended by Mr. Hoover. As an appendix to it or as an alternative, they requested the despatch of a small monthly amount of milk and vitamins for children. In the early months of 1942 they reverted to the latter proposition, and on receiving the customary negative they repeated their request in July. After this was refused they again asked, towards the end of 1942, that the British Government should allow a single consignment of 200 or 300 tons of dried milk for children to be shipped from the United States on the ex-Belgian ship, *Caritas I*, which has been assigned to the carriage from America to Europe of parcels for prisoners of war. This request was followed by a strong letter rejecting the grounds on which previous applications were refused, and threatening that the Belgian Government might publicly disassociate itself from the British Government's policy on these questions.

(*b*) In October 1941 the Norwegian Government approached the British Government with a suggestion for sending one parcel to every family in Norway from the United States as a gift of the Norwegian merchant seamen. This request was repeated in October of 1942. It was said to have been laid before the United States Government also, and was presented on this occasion as an experiment which might, if successful, be repeated so as to provide a regular flow of relief. Another plan which was put forward simultaneously proposed the importation of food and clothing into Sweden to be stored there against the admission of relief to Norway at some unspecified later date. These proposals were strongly pressed, and the Norwegian Government threatened to connect them with questions affecting the use of Norwegian ships in the Allied war service.

(*c*) The Yugoslav Government have on several occasions requested permission to send comparatively small consignments of food and clothing to the town of Belgrade or to the area inhabited by the supporters of General Michailovic.

(*d*) Apart from these particular applications by the Allied Governments there have also been agitations by private persons or societies for relief for the Channel Islands and for Jewish sufferers in Eastern Europe. With regard to the latter, the suggestion has been made that Jews in Polish ghettoes should be treated as the equivalent of prisoners of war in camps of internment and receive similar privileges in respect of the blockade.

(*e*) On various occasions requests have been made for the admission of very small quantities of specified food-stuffs through the blockade to be despatched in postal parcels from Portugal to occupied territories. These requests have been frequent and insistent. It is to be noted that there is a very powerful demand in the Belgian Congo for facilities of such a kind.

(*f*) There has also been agitation in this country by British subjects for a modification of the policy of the British Government. In the winter of 1941–42 a movement was started, largely by persons of pacifist tendencies, which resulted in numerous meetings all over the country and, though without any marked general influence, had some effect upon the conscience of the members of some religious denominations. Such general public sympathy as was roused was almost entirely concentrated upon the single case of Greece.

In the spring of 1942 the centre of gravity shifted to a new organisation called the Famine Relief Committee. This body commands a certain volume of support from responsible persons and has been very careful to keep itself apparently free from pacifist associations. The committee's members include representative bishops of the Anglican and Roman Churches and leaders of the Free Churches, as well as certain personalities from the academic and journalistic

world. The committee presented to the Minister of Economic Warfare during the summer of 1942 a memorandum recommending a detailed project for child relief in Belgium and Greece, to be extended later, if successful, to other occupied countries. It brought forward this project once again towards the end of the year and the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Archbishop of Westminster were induced by the committee to approach the Prime Minister in the matter in their behalf. The committee claims that Dr. Van Dusen and a group associated with him are working on parallel lines in the United States. It will be observed that the sympathy of this organisation is very largely focussed upon Belgium and that its proposals are similar in kind to those put forward by the Belgian Government since the abandonment of their major plan in the summer of 1941. The strength of this movement lies in the fact that it commands responsible and intelligent support and that it recognises that relief action can take place only upon a limited scale and in a form least calculated to confer material benefit upon the enemy. In fact, its main thesis is not readily open to criticism on simple grounds of economic warfare, though the committee is plainly unaware of the practical difficulties of securing an adequate control or limiting a concession once made. The British Government are, however, still convinced that the time is not ripe for any action which would begin a process tending to shift the responsibility for providing for the occupied territories from the shoulders of the enemy Powers on to those of the United Nations, and they believe that there are grave psychological dangers in accepting any commitment in this respect, however small.

4. While the above describes the position of the British Government in respect of food relief (or relief in the form of clothing and so on) for the civilian populations of occupied territories as a whole, there have from the beginning been certain acknowledged exceptions to the principle of total blockade. Thus, the British Government informed the International Red Cross in the autumn of 1940 that "medical supplies in the strict sense of the term" would receive facilities enabling them to pass the blockade to enemy occupied territories. They since more precisely defined the term "medical supplies" as referring to drugs of strictly and solely medical and humanitarian application, and excluding products convertible to other uses, or whose use in medical practice could not be defined as humanitarian in effect. The rule at present applied permits the despatch to occupied territories, under navicert or corresponding authority, of medical products which it is believed can be of no material assistance to the enemy if diverted by them from the intended recipients. The British Government has not granted navicerts under this heading for bandages or cotton wool, blankets, hospital bedding or other textile materials. Nor has it normally granted navicerts for oily and fatty substances, such as castor oil or paraffin, which are utilisable for other than medical purposes. Nor has it commonly granted navicerts for drugs of a strategic application, such as quinine, which is required by the enemy for maintenance in certain circumstances of armies in the field. Moreover, in admitting certain commodities the practice has been to maintain a statistical check in order to ensure that the facilities accorded did not become subject to exploitation. It has also been the practice to require in general that consignments of this nature should be sent through certain accepted channels and not in the way of ordinary commerce.

It should be noted that the above rule has been applied with some flexibility, and that small amounts of normally excluded items have sometimes been admitted.

A large number of navicerts and licences for small consignments have been granted on various occasions; some of the more important instances have been the despatch of a large consignment of medical stores from the United States to Poland in the autumn of 1941, a further substantial consignment from the United States to Belgium in the spring of 1942, and a consignment to Yugoslavia from this country. The Belgian Government recently received a licence for the export from the United States to Belgium of a quantity of certain products considered to be sufficient for the needs of Belgium for a whole year.

5. Facilities have also regularly been granted for food and clothing and other appropriate articles sent to prisoners of war. This derives from the fact that the Geneva Convention provides a machinery offering the prospect of control of distribution and receipt of such gifts, as well as imposing on the detaining Power certain obligations regarding the maintenance of prisoners and the way in which they may be employed.

(*a*) Postal parcels addressed to individual prisoners of war have been regularly permitted to pass the blockade from all parts of the world.

An attempt was at one time made to require that such parcels should be sent in care of the I.R.C. at Geneva, but this was found impracticable on technical grounds as well as unprofitable, in view of the later discovery that parcels so addressed did not, in fact, pass through the hands of the International Committee at all. The British and Imperial Governments have restricted the despatch of postal parcels to individual prisoners from their own territory in accordance with a general policy which aims at supplying British and Imperial prisoners out of a common pool on equitable principles. A similar, but not exactly identical, restriction has lately been adopted in the United States.

(*b*) At an early stage the British Government agreed to grant navicerts for goods of suitable kinds sent as freight, as well as by post, to the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva for general distribution to prisoners of this or that nationality. This arrangement applied, in the first instance, to the despatch of Red Cross standard parcels, crated in large boxes and shipped as freight, instead of being transmitted through ordinary postal channels. It was later extended to allow the despatch of suitable commodities in bulk (for instance, cases of tinned meat or cartons of sugar and so forth, instead of actual parcels of assorted content) in order to save shipping space and help the generosity of donors who had not the facility for packing large numbers of parcels. The British and American Governments have recently agreed, however, that it is important, if abuse of this concession is to be avoided, to require that goods despatched in this manner should be of such a kind and so packed as to be suitable for individual distribution to the prisoners and for direct consumption by them, since otherwise it is plain that such relief would shortly become a substitute for, instead of supplementary to, the rations provided by the detaining authorities. A statistical check is maintained upon all such despatches.

(*c*) The British Government for long found difficulty in permitting the French Government to organise without limit the supply from overseas on a large scale and with official funds of food and clothing for the very numerous French prisoners held in German hands under somewhat ill-defined conditions. Their practice has been to give facilities more or less automatically for gifts from private societies and individuals for French prisoners, but to draw a distinction between these and supplies officially organised as described above.

In the autumn of 1942 it was proposed to exact conditions of stricter control over the disposal of goods sent to French prisoners through the International Red Cross, and thus remove the misgivings felt about the efforts of the Vichy Government to organise despatches for them on a substantial scale. Progress was delayed, however, by the occupation of the Vichy zone by the Germans, and, owing to the uncertainty of the situation which resulted from this event, the British and American Governments agreed to suspend action on a navicert application for about 1,200 tons of food-stuffs bought in Argentina by the Vichy authorities. The latter then threatened to withdraw facilities for the transport of goods for British prisoners through Marseilles and across France. The International Red Cross have since been informed that the navicert applied for in Buenos Aires will be granted subject to special conditions of control of the kind envisaged before the Vichy zone was occupied by the enemy. A reply is awaited.

(*d*) The British Government has felt considerable concern about the ultimate disposal of goods sent to prisoners of war of certain nationalities and has been seeking to learn from the I.R.C. Committee the extent of the control which the committee is really able to exercise over such goods. It has not so far been possible to obtain fully satisfactory information about this. A further difficulty has arisen in that the exact numbers of prisoners of various nationalities whom the I.R.C. is in a position to service are not at present in all cases known, and considerable discrepancies have been noted in figures emanating from different sources. As regards British and American prisoners, much fuller information on all points is available from the reports directly communicated to the Governments concerned by the agents of the protecting Power and the I.R.C. Committee.

(*e*) Navicerts have not been granted for the despatch of goods to societies or persons in Europe other than the I.R.C. Committee for forwarding to prisoners of war, since it is apparent that any other practice would result in numerous demands by bodies whose activity would not be readily controllable, and who would not themselves have any facilities for verifying the safe arrival of these goods in the hands of the persons for whom they were nominally intended.

(*f*) A problem has recently arisen in connexion with the supply of shipping for carrying goods to prisoners of all Allied nationals from overseas to Europe. The I.R.C. Committee has constituted a shipping company of its own in Switzerland, through which it hopes to acquire for use under its own control ships which are for various reasons not at present employed. There appear to be certain objections to the development of this idea by the I.R.C. Committee, and this matter has also been under discussion between the British and United States Governments. On the other hand, the problem of providing shipping for the prisoners-of-war traffic remains, and it seems desirable to establish a co-ordinated policy in respect of this.

The shipping company of the International Red Cross has, so far, acquired one ship. This is the former Belgian steamship *Frederick*, now called the *Caritas I*. It was formerly at Casablanca, whence it was released by the Armistice Commission on its transfer to the ownership of the I.R.C.C.'s company and to Swiss flag. The British Government agreed to the transfer of ownership and flag on condition—

(*a*) That financial benefit to the enemy should not result.

(*b*) That the ship should be used for transport of cargoes covered by documents issued by the blockade authorities and destined for prisoners of war, with the exception that strictly medical supplies for the civilian population of occupied territories might also be carried. It was further understood that the vessel would run between a United States port and Europe.

The former owners were a Belgian company in Belgium who sold the ship to the I.R.C.C.'s shipping company on the terms that payment should fall due in five years' time or three months after the end of the war, they having an option to take the ship back instead of receiving payment at that date. Extensive repairs proved necessary after the ship arrived at Lisbon from Casablanca, and the cost of these was to be borne as to half by the former owners and as to half by the I.R.C.C.; the latter, however, had to call upon the Belgian Government to pay for their share. The whole transaction was extremely unsatisfactory and confused, partly owing to the unbusinesslike methods of some of the people concerned, and partly to the ambiguous position of the Belgian Government in the deal. Theoretically, they had no part in it, and the transaction was supposed to be between the Belgian owners and the Red Cross only.

The I.R.C.C. later proposed to take over another ship, the Danish *Nancy*, now at Lisbon. They invited the British Red Cross to bear the cost in the general interest of prisoners of war. The British Government was prepared to agree to this provided that—

(*a*) Any payment required by the Danish owners in Denmark was made into an effectively blocked account in Switzerland, the owners at the end of the war having the option of receiving their money or taking back the ship.

(*b*) The ship was used on the Lisbon–Mediterranean route for transport exclusively of parcels for prisoners of war and civilian internees.

The United States Government gave its concurrence to this proposal, albeit without enthusiasm.

The above financial terms were understood to be those proposed by the I.R.C.C., but further enquiry showed that this was not the case. The owners were, in fact, asking not only for the guaranteed return of the ship to them after the war, but also for a substantial hire which was to accumulate meanwhile to their credit in a blocked account. It was also found that the cost of running the ship would be unduly onerous. Negotiations were therefore broken off.

The general attitude of the British Government to this Red Cross shipping company is as follows :—

No encouragement in general terms can be given, since the company may work to the advantage or disadvantage of the United Nations according as it is directed. On the other hand, it is always possible to consider a particular proposal for the company to acquire a particular ship for a particular purpose under particular conditions, and, indeed, it may be that in some cases the company may be able to help the supply of shipping for prisoners of war while at the same time not conflicting with the interests of our war effort. The British Government is particularly concerned to ensure—

(*a*) That financial benefit to the enemy shall not result from these transactions.
(*b*) That shipping is not acquired by the Red Cross company which might be or become of service to the United Nations in other ways.
(*c*) That shipping controlled by the I.R.C. do not become a factor in promoting demands for relief shipments which would be of a kind unwelcome to the blockade authorities.

6. Civilian internees in enemy and occupied territories have been regarded as eligible for the same privileges as prisoners of war, where appropriate, in respect of the blockade, if they were detained in identical conditions and if the cause of their detention was the simple fact of their being (from the point of view of the Axis) "enemy aliens." The purpose of this limitation has been to keep within the framework of the Geneva Convention as at present applied by the various belligerents, and also to avoid an indefinite extension of blockade privileges to the very numerous categories of prisoners who are detained in various parts of Europe for a wide variety of reasons. It is understood that the principle in question is agreed between the British and United States Governments. The general question of assistance to persons interned under conditions not at present qualifying them for relief requires joint consideration by the British and United States Governments.

It should be noted that in one or two cases the British Government departed from the policy described in allowing relief to be extended experimentally to a class of internees outside the above definition. One such case was that of the refugees and destitute persons of various nationalities detained in a group of camps in the south-west corner of the formerly unoccupied zone of France. In response to a request by the International Red Cross the British Government agreed in the spring of 1941 to permit collective consignments of food and clothing to pass the blockade for distribution in these camps, provided that a resident supervisory staff was installed in the camps by the International Red Cross, the American Red Cross, or the American Friends, and that regular reports were furnished on the working of the arrangement. In December 1941 the International Red Cross secured the agreement of the French authorities to a modified version of these terms, which provided for the collaboration of the International Red Cross and the American Friends in distributing goods in the camps and verifying by subsequent visits that all was well, but did not accept resident supervisors appointed by either of these bodies. This was accepted provisionally, and the American Friends sent an initial shipment of clothing from United States in the first half of 1942; further shipments were to be conditional on the report of this first experiment proving satisfactory. It appears, however, that though the goods reached Marseilles, no distribution in the camps had been effected at the time when the Germans occupied the Vichy zone. The International Red Cross reported about that time that distribution was not advisable since the situation in the camps in question had been transformed by wholesale deportations of their inmates, who were stripped of clothing on crossing the frontier. The future treatment of this class of internees will now require review. Another irregular arrangement was sanctioned by the British Government in the autumn of 1941, when they agreed, at the request of the International Red Cross Committee, to allow food parcels to be sent through the committee to 5,000 maimed or otherwise disabled Greek soldiers in hospitals, as though these men were prisoners of war (which they are not). This decision has caused no embarrassing repercussions in the sense of demands for similar facilities on behalf of wounded soldiers of other nationalities. It could have been defended on the ground that genuine Greek prisoners of war are extremely few and that the conditions in Greece justify this exceptional measure. The decision had, however, caused endless trouble with the Greeks themselves. The

International Red Cross is taking steps to secure the hospitalisation of a number of the men in question, who had been turned out of hospital, and permission has been given for them to forward parcels meanwhile to these cases also. The nature of this concession is now obscured by the fact that relief on a substantial scale is being allowed to the civilian population of Greece.

7. Apart from these specific exceptions to the general principle described in paragraph 1, there has been also an interpretation of that principle by the British Government which appears to have caused some misunderstandings. In April 1941, at a time when pressure for a general breach of the blockade was very strong, various Allied Governments, notably the Belgian and Norwegian Governments, put forward proposals for the purchase in neutral European countries of goods which had already passed the blockade for despatch for purposes of relief. It was proposed by the Norwegian Government to buy such goods in Sweden, payment being made with dollars hitherto blocked in the United States. The United States Embassy in London enquired the views of the British Government on this proposal and after reflection the British Government replied that they were agreeable in principle to the purchase by Allied Governments or organisations in neutral European countries of goods originating in those countries, and not of a kind which those countries were simultaneously being permitted to import through the blockade controls. The British Government added that they had no objection to the release of dollars for such purchases provided that financial benefit to the enemy did not result, and they explained this phrase to mean that enemy banks or intermediaries or firms should not be employed in the transactions. Thereafter it became the practice of the British Government to encourage purchases of goods for relief within the limits indicated, and frequent reference was made to this concession when negative answers were returned to requests for formal breaches of the blockade. For various reasons very few such transactions materialised except in Portugal, where the Belgian Government gradually developed a purchasing organisation which worked in agreement with the British representatives in Portugal, and was financed from time to time by transfers of funds to Portugal through the Bank of England. These transfers ran at the rate of about £50,000 a month during the last four months of 1941. In February 1942 the Belgian Government requested that funds should be made available up to a quarter of a million pounds a month. It was then explained that this could only be done if the Portuguese Government would agree to permit the Bank of England to convert this amount of sterling into escudos without reducing the amount of escudos which the British Government desired to obtain against sterling for its own purposes. The Portuguese Government agreed to this as a gesture of sympathy towards the Belgians and since then the purchases in Portugal have run at the rate of approximately £200,000 a month or 20 million escudos.

During the autumn of 1941 similar purchases in Turkey were encouraged in the hope that the necessity for a major breach of the blockade in favour of Greece might be avoided. In this case the goods were bought with Turkish pounds available to the British Government from a considerable balance then at their disposal, and the expenditure of Turkish pounds was reimbursed partly by dollar contributions from a relief association in the United States and latterly by the Greek Government in London. The possibility of purchases in Turkey has, however, greatly diminished, and the need for it has become less urgent in view of the adoption of the relief scheme described in paragraph 2 above.

Meanwhile, in the autumn of 1941, the United States Government adopted a new and stricter policy towards the licensing of transfers of dollars to buy neutral European currencies. This policy of the United States Government was in general most welcome and helpful to the blockade policy of the British Government, but in particular cases occasional embarrassment resulted as a result of the latent discrepancy between it and the principle previously adopted by the British Government regarding the legitimacy of buying goods in neutral European countries for relief purposes. The United States Government must have found itself in the position of appearing less sympathetic than the British Government to the requests of certain Allies. On the other hand, the British Government, which had (as explained above) frequently assured the Allies of its readiness to approve such relief transactions, was open to suspicion of having deliberately tried to escape from its own concessions by persauding a friendly neutral to take measures which would make their fulfilment impossible. From this point the British Government ceased to encourage or support proposals for relief purchases in neutral European countries, which would require the licensing of a transfer of dollars by the United States Treasury, except where consent of

the latter had already been obtained. It was, however, obliged by the assurances already given to continue to allow such purchases to be financed by transfer of sterling, in so far as its exchange requirements in the neutral countries in question allowed; this in general precluded purchases in countries whose currency could only be obtained by the Bank of England in immediate exchange for gold.

The resulting position was, of course, unsatisfactory, since (*a*) the discrepancy between United States and British practice remained, with consequent embarrassment to both parties; (*b*) some Allied Governments were placed at a disadvantage compared with others, if their only resources were in dollars, or if the currency of the neutral country from which they desired to buy supplies was only obtainable against dollars or gold. Furthermore, it is believed that the United States Government view with distaste the whole system of intra-blockade relief purchases, for a complex of reasons, of which the chief are: (*a*) a fear that the resulting acquisition of foreign exchange by European neutrals will ultimately be prejudicial to the interests of the "financial" blockade; (*b*) the growing shortage of funds in neutral European currencies required by the United Nations for essential war purposes. The British Government are, of course, substantially in agreement with the United States Government on these points; on the other hand, they are to a certain degree morally committed to the line of policy which they have followed so far, and are also convinced that in certain circumstances the permission to make relief purchases of the kind in question is of great assistance politically to Allied Governments and has in the past contributed largely to the successful maintenance of the blockade. It does not appear that it should be difficult to arrive at a common policy which will be in accordance with the wishes of both Governments. Meanwhile, it is agreed that new commitments should be the subject of joint consultation.

The Belgian Government has asked for funds to spend in Spain, Switzerland and Sweden, as well as in Portugal. It has been agreed that they may have Spanish currency from time to time, provided (*a*) that any allocations of this are deducted from the £250,000 equivalent monthly allowed to them at present for purchases in Portugal; (*b*) that they will be content with such amounts of pesetas as can be obtained across the Anglo-Spanish special account after other requirements have been met.

No Swedish crowns have been made available to the Belgian Government for relief purchases.

They were allowed about a million Swiss francs exceptionally in February of 1942, and at the same time put in a request for a regular monthly allocation of the same amount. They were subsequently informed that a decision on this would depend on the outcome of the financial discussions with the Swiss Government which were in progress. They have reverted to the subject several times, and the matter is now under discussion with the United States Government, together with requests for smaller single sums of Swiss francs which have been received from the Dutch and Yugoslav Governments.

The Yugoslav Government several times during 1941 and 1942 expressed a wish to buy food-stuffs in Turkey for despatch to Yugoslavia. The quantities and cost involved were small, and in accordance with the principle already explained His Majesty's Government consented to these proposals. Nothing materialised, however, until August of 1942, when the Yugoslav Government were preparing a specific plan for purchases of 3,000 tons of food-stuffs in this way. Unfortunately it was overlooked that, while necessary small sums in Turkish £ should be furnished by His Majesty's Government, the only assets with which the Yugoslav Government can reimburse His Majesty's Government are in dollars. Consequently it appears that His Majesty's Government has unwittingly consented for its part, and without consultation of United States Government, to a transaction which would involve a transfer of dollars. No purchase has yet been made, but it seems that the Yugoslav proposal is still active.

In their commodity aspect, those transactions encouraging the despatch of "surplus" produce from neutral European countries to occupied territories are recommended by the fact that they offer at least a prospect of doing some good without the danger of doing much harm, besides being politically helpful to the Allied Governments. The goods are generally accessible, anyway, to the enemy, so that nothing is added to the total of the resources within their reach. The principle applied leaves the blockade ring intact, and affords a clearly defined natural limit which would not exist if imports through the blockade were allowed.

The practical efficiency of such arrangements in relieving distress is admittedly hard to judge, and probably varies according to circumstances. There

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is no doubt that the supplies sent from Turkey to Greece in the winter of 1941–42 saved many people in Athens and Piræus from starvation. On the other hand, it cannot be said whether, for instance, the supplies sent to Belgium from Portugal by the Belgian Government really improved the lot of people in Belgium; since this depends on whether they are supplementary to the total of food-stuffs which the Germans allow Belgium to obtain commercially from inside Europe, or merely replace food-stuffs which would otherwise have been imported under other arrangements.

8. Certain minor points arise in connexion with the principle explained at the beginning of the preceding paragraph :—

(*a*) In the case of Switzerland and Sweden the liberty of these countries to export to enemy and occupied territories is not governed primarily by the question whether the goods proposed are of a type simultaneously imported by them through the blockade, but the terms of agreements concluded with the blockading Governments cover the whole range of their trade and prohibit or limit exports of certain commodities even where these are in themselves produced in surplus by the country in question and not imported through the blockade at all. It is desired to establish in principle that goods may be bought in Switzerland for export as relief to enemy-occupied countries only within the limits within which they might be exported in the course of ordinary trade, unless a special agreement otherwise provides.

(*b*) It was recently discovered that the Swiss Government had been under the impression that exports made from Switzerland by the Joint Commission of the International Red Cross and League of Red Cross Societies of goods bought on the Swiss market were exempt from any restrictions imposed on ordinary exports by War Trade Agreement. It has been explained that such exports are regarded by the British Government as indistinguishable in principle from Swiss commercial exports and therefore subject to the same restrictions and regulations. On the other hand, the British Government thinks it desirable to accord some privileges to the International Red Cross in this respect, and would be prepared to allow it to make extraordinary exports under conditions and within limits fixed in advance. It is understood that the International Red Cross could accept such a procedure as far as food-stuffs are concerned, but wishes to be free to export "medical supplies" obtained in Switzerland without any restriction.

(*c*) It sometimes occurs that charitable societies in neutral European countries wish to send to occupied territories goods bought in their own country with their own funds, but export of which to such destinations is prohibited by War Trade Agreements or cannot ordinarily be approved by the British Government because the goods are of a kind imported by the supplying country through the blockade. In general such transactions have hitherto been obstructed, but consent is occasionally given.

(*d*) The question sometimes arises of the attitude of the British Government to charitable organisations in neutral European countries (chiefly the Joint Commission of the Red Cross) when they wish to spend money in enemy territories to buy goods for relief work in Allied occupied territories. The practice of the British Government has been (i) to refuse their consent where this was necessary to the fulfilment of the transaction; (ii) otherwise to maintain an attitude of disapproval, but not actively to intervene; (iii) not to regard as offenders firms who undertook such transactions on behalf of the International Red Cross, since action, if at all, should be taken against the latter. It is for consideration whether any action is necessary or possible or desirable to prevent the International Red Cross engaging in such transactions, or acquiring by contributions from sources not directly controlled by the United Nations funds which might thus be spent in enemy territories.

9. Finally, there are the so-called "Parcel schemes," of which the history is briefly as follows: The Portuguese postal regulations have so far permitted the despatch to enemy and most occupied territories of small parcels of food-stuffs, commonly sample packets weighing 1 lb. apiece. From the beginning of 1941 onwards firms in Portugal did a brisk trade in these parcels with people overseas who wished to send something to their friends in the enemy-controlled area. The British Government did its best to repress the traffic, chiefly on the two grounds (*a*) that enemy-controlled firms were acquiring valuable foreign exchange from it; and (*b*) that the Portuguese allowed export in these parcels of goods imported through the blockade, whose re-export by other ways could be prevented. The

latter objection has largely disappeared owing to restrictions imposed by the Portuguese Government on the contents of the parcels. But the traffic by private firms, which still continues, is still viewed with disfavour.

In the summer of 1941 the Belgian Government, as explained under paragraph 3 above, brought strong pressure to bear on the British Government to make a formal breach of the blockade in favour of Belgium. Simultaneously, but separately, they asked that Belgians in Great Britain might be allowed to have parcels sent on their behalf from Lisbon to their families in Belgium. The total amount requested was 4 tons weight monthly, and the transfer of funds involved was a monthly maximum of £3,000. In the circumstances, and having regard to the fact that Allied nationals (and indeed Axis nationals) in most countries in the world were freely able to make such arrangements, the British Government thought it proper to agree to the latter request. They have since continued to combat the parcels traffic, except where specifically authorised as in the above case. But facilities similar to those extended to the Belgians have, of course, been granted to other Allied Governments who have applied for them, and will have to be granted to the remainder if and when these apply.

The essential features of the authorised schemes are—

(*a*) Parcels may be sent, with one or two exceptions, on behalf of persons or organisations in the United Kingdom only.

(*b*) The orders for parcels are handled by offices established for the purpose at London and Lisbon, the former being engaged to follow a procedure laid down by the Trading with the Enemy Department, and the latter to consult the British Embassy about the firms with whom they deal. The use of private correspondence to promote or advertise these schemes is not allowed.

(*c*) The volume of goods authorised to be sent each month is not more than 4 tons, and the maximum special transfer of funds allowed to finance the operation is £3,000 monthly.

The schemes operating are: Belgian (£3,000 monthly); Fighting French (at present less than £3,000 monthly); Norwegian (about £600 monthly. Run secretly); Dutch (operated with embassy funds. There is no special allocation at present); Polish Ministry of Social Welfare on behalf of Jews in Poland (at present less than £3,000 monthly); Polish Red Cross (discovered recently and not formally authorised. Funds available locally at Lisbon are used, and despatches appear to be at the rate of about 4 tons a month). Of the above the Norwegian scheme and that conducted by the Polish Ministry of Social Welfare differ from the remainder in that orders for parcels are not taken from individuals, the recipients being designated by the organisers and paid for at their end out of general funds.

It will be appreciated that a certain number of parcels are almost certainly sent by Allied representatives in Lisbon from funds theoretically allotted for other purposes, and that the organisations in Lisbon also receive remittances and orders from persons living in neutral countries overseas. There is a large unauthorised flow of direct remittances from the Belgian Congo to Lisbon with which it has not seemed necessary or desirable to interfere.

It is understood that the American Government, which has not hitherto permitted the remittance of funds from the United States for purposes such as the above nor allowed persons living in the United States to send orders for parcels to Lisbon, has recently been considering the adoption of a practice generally similar to that outlined. It also appears that new regulations governing the export of parcels from Portugal are now contemplated by the Portuguese Government, but the scope of these is not yet known.

It is not considered here that these schemes, which have certain advantages from the point of view of Allied morale, have any real relation to the question of blockade and relief policy. It is, however, important to keep them within bounds on account of the relative shortage of escudo currency and the administrative complications likely to result if they were unduly extended.

10. In view of the difficulties of admitting food-stuffs through the blockade, the British Government has for some time considered whether a means could be found of helping the Allies by promoting the evacuation of a certain number of children from distressed countries into sympathetic neutral countries such as Switzerland and Sweden.

It is known that both the latter have been prepared in the past to receive Belgian children, though the plans were frustrated by German obstructions.

Switzerland actually did receive a small number of Belgian children, and a much larger number from France. In the event of the neutrals looking with favour on the idea of further action on these lines, it might be possible to envisage the supply to them of extra quantities of suitable food and clothing to provide for the children.

With the agreement of the American Government this idea has been put informally to the Swiss Government, who have indicated their sympathy. Specific proposals are now under discussion between London and Washington.

It should be added that a plan for the evacuation of children from Greece was actively promoted at the beginning of 1942. Accommodation for several thousand children was prepared in Egypt, and further accommodation promised in various parts of the British Empire. Unfortunately the Italian Government, having consented in principle to the plan, raised objection to the children being received in British territory. Despite this set-back, and despite the somewhat non-co-operative attitude of the Greek Red Cross in Greece, arrangements proceeded for the evacuation of such children as could be accommodated in Egypt and appeared on the point of producing a result when the German advance into Egypt in the middle of the summer made it necessary to abandon the project for the time being. A revival of it is now thought practicable, and the I.R.C.C. have been asked to secure Italian consent to the removal of 2,000 children to a camp which is ready for them in Egypt.

Ministry of Economic Warfare, London,
January **1943**.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No.

W 6774/4/49

OUT FILE

FC

12a

25

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

13th May, 1943.

Draft. 5/4

Mr. Sterndale Bennett
Angora.
from

Sir O. Sargent

Dear Bennett:

Thank you for your letter No. 644/2/43 of 26th April about relief supplies for Belgium.

You are quite right in thinking that there is nothing secret about the Belgian purchases in Portugal and other neutral countries; and similar concessions have been made to several other Allied Governments.

The Belgians are constantly asking for an increased allotment of escudos; but of course the supply is limited and what is available has to be divided between the various claimants. There is therefore no apparent reason why your Belgian colleague should have taken this up with the Turks and there is certainly nothing that the latter can do about it.

Yrs. Ed) O. S. Sargent.

Ltr. 1145

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

13th May, 1943.

(W 6774/4/49) OUT FILE 26

Dear Bennett.

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Yours

Sd/O.G. Sargent.

J.C. Sterndale Bennett, Esq., C.M.G., M.C.,
Angora.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 6805

5 MAY 1943

Registry Number W 6805/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No. T 550/19/69

Dated 3rd May, 1943.

Received in Registry 5th May, 1943.

W: Coordination +

Relief for Belgium

Transmits copies of despatches from Leopoldville No. 10 (C 6 C) of 4th March and No. 11 (C. 6. C) of 6th March and copy of telegram to Leopoldville No. 3 Arfar Saving of 30th April regarding despatch of vitamins from Belgian Congo to occupied Belgium.

Last Paper.

W 6774

References.

(Minutes.)

Central Dept

M.E.W. 8/5

E. to E. 6/5

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
10/5/43	Act'd 26/7

Next Paper.

W 6810

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

M.E.W. FILE No. T.550/19/69
COPY FOR E. Crowe & Co
DATE 3:5:43 F O BY BAQ

C 628

T.550/19/69

S A V I N O R A M

W 6805
5 MAY 1943

From: Ministry of Economic Warfare.
To: H.B.M. Consulate-General LEOPOLDVILLE.

ARFAR SAVING NO: 3 (En clair) 30th April, 1943.

Your despatch No. 10 (C.6.C.) of March 4th about policy in respect of proposals to send vitamins through the blockade to occupied territories.

The following are the answers to the questions asked in paragraph 2 of your despatch.

(a) Vitaminized foodstuffs and vitamin concentrates are regarded from the blockade point of view as identical with any other foodstuffs.

(b) Accordingly, no shipments of vitamins through the blockade to Belgium have been authorized.

(c) Despatch of foodstuffs, including vitamins, from neutral countries inside the blockade area is allowed in principle, provided that the goods in question, or their constituents, are not of a kind of which the supplying country imports any part of its requirements through the blockade, or which the supplying country has undertaken under War Trade Agreement not to export to enemy controlled destinations. The Belgian Government in fact remits certain sums of money with the assistance of His Majesty's Government to Portugal and to Switzerland periodically for the purchase of approved goods for export in this manner. The possibilities are however severely restricted by the conditions explained above, and by the financial necessities of the present time. Independant remittances from the Congo for such purposes would not be desirable, and indeed the maximum possible financial concession has already been made to the Belgian Government in this respect. It should perhaps be added that transactions of the kind are only approved if the firms employed are acceptable and if the goods are sent under charitable rather than commercial arrangements.

(d) It will be seen from paragraph (b) above that the importation of raw materials into neutral European countries to be used for the manufacture of vitamin products for re-export to Belgium would not be allowed.

(e) The goods at present sent to Belgium under the arrangements described in paragraph (b) above are sent under the auspices of the Mixed Commission of the International Red Cross Committee. It is believed that they are addressed to the German Red Cross Society for handing over to the Belgian Relief Organizations. No information is available regarding the efficacy of the control exercised over these consignments. Experience elsewhere suggests that such control must be hampered by the International Red Cross Committee's lack of facilities for rapid and secret communication. Probably the Committee is able to verify that receipts are given by the local relief societies for goods addressed to them. The accurate distribution thereafter of these goods in such a manner as to benefit exclusively the most deserving sections of the Belgian population must depend on the degree to which the local societies are immune from or subject to German pressure.

2/.

2. You will see from this that the proposal to send rice from the Congo to Switzerland for the manufacture there of vitamin C preparations would unfortunately not be admissible. For the same reason the application of a Navicert for 500 kilogrammes of yeast referred to in your despatch No. 11 (C.6.C.) of March 6th must unfortunately also be refused. You will no doubt appreciate that the obstacle in such cases is one of general principle. It is not anticipated that 500 kilogrammes of yeast would materially benefit the enemy if they fell into enemy hands, but the despatch of vitamin preparations through the blockade into the occupied area of Europe generally would.

3. Strictly for your own information, the possibility is at present being considered of revising the blockade rule so as to permit the despatch of vitamin D to enemy occupied territories through the blockade. This vitamin differs from the others in that it can be used for virtually no other purpose than the treatment of certain children's complaints. It seems improbable however that vitamin D preperations are manufactured in the Congo.

4. A copy of your despatch under reply has been transmitted to the Foreign Office.

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No. 11 (C 60)

6th March, 1943.

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 10 (C 60) of the 4th March, I have the honour to report that I have received a request for navicerts for the export of yeast made from beer.

2. The Chief Health Officer of the Congo wishes to send about 500 Kgs of yeast (about one million tablets) to Mr. Reisdorff, a senior Congo Government Official at present at Lisbon, who would forward them to the Belgian Red Cross in tins of 2½ Kgs. to be used in hospitals and maternities in Belgium under Red Cross supervision. The yeast is manufactured by the local brewery and I believe contains a high proportion of Vitamin B or B1.

3. I should be grateful for instructions in due course.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant

H. M. Consul-General.

The Minister for Economic Warfare,

London.

T550/19/69. 31

BRITISH CONSULATE GENERAL.

LEOPOLDVILLE.

4th March, 1943.

NO.10 (C 6C)

Sir:

I have the honour to refer to paragraph 4 of my Despatch No.5 (C 6D), of 26.1.43 and its enclosure, Congo Red Cross letter No.8778.

2. I should be glad to have an early expression of your views on the sending of pure vitamin extract or vitaminised foods to occupied Belgium. For instance:

(a) Are vitamins regarded exactly as any other foodstuffs, from the blockade point of view, when sent to civilians in enemy-occupied territory.
(b) Has pure vitamin extract been purchased in the U.K. or U.S.A. or elsewhere outside the blockade area, and then been sent to Belgium ?
(c) Does the M.E.W.attempt to prevent the sending of vitamins to Belgium from countries inside the blockade area (e.g. by blacklisting firms in such countries).
(d) Would the M.E.W. permit the sending from countries outside the blockade, to neutral countries within the blockade area, of raw materials used for the pure vitamin extract, destined to occupied Belgium.
(e) Any information about the effectiveness or otherwise of measures to ensure that, if such vitamins were sent to Belgium, they would not be converted to enemy use.

3. With reference to point 2(d) above, I have recently received a letter from the Chief Health Officer of the Belgian Congo, who enquires about the possibility of sending to Switzerland Congo Rice to be used for the manufacture of Vitamin C. The rice would be consigned in the first place to M.Biart, Director of the Belgian Red Cross at Geneva. Hoffman La Roche of Basel were suggested as possible manufacturers. The Vitamin C would go principally to Belgium.

The Minister for Economic Warfare,
LONDON.

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4. I have informed the Chief Health Officer that it would be best if Monsieur Biart would get into touch with the competent British representatives in Switzerland who would submit the question to you. In due course you would inform me whether the necessary navicerts could or could not be granted. I have suggested that M.Biart would do well to name as manufacturer some firm other than Hoffman La Roche.

5. From the local political point of view it is worth noting that a very large part of all charitable subscriptions raised in the Congo are devoted to the purchase of "vitaminised products", and that the new Director of the Congo Red Cross, a former Belgian Senator named W.Van Remoortel, is doing all he can to keep the issue before the public by frequent wireless talks and newspaper articles. It is felt locally that some distinction should be made by the British blockade authorities between food for the Belgian civilian population as a whole, and vitamins for children and invalids.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,

Your obedient Servant,
(Sgd)

H.M.Consul-General

176.

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 6810

5 MAY 1943

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Registry Number W 6810/4/49

FROM Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Crowe

No. T 550/19/11

Dated 4th May, 1943.

Received in Registry 5th May, 1943.

W:Coordination +

Relief for Belgium

Turkey

M. Borel de Bitche has suggested that as the Smyrna Water Company in ~~Italy~~ owes dividends to Belgian shareholders to the value of £ Turkish 80,000, this might be used to buy hazel-nuts and tobacco in ~~Italy~~ to be sent to Belgium. The goods would be distributed by the Belgian Red Cross. Considers that this proposition should be turned down.

Turkey

Last Paper.

W6805.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Desp/ Mr. Camps (M.E.W.) from Mr. Crowe ✓ May 10.

(Minutes.)

I agree that this should be turned down

Comml Dept

E.W.C. 6/5

(Action completed.)

11/5/43

(Index.)

Ref 26/7.

Next Paper.

W6812.

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

Enc 34

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

T.550/19/11

4th May, 1943.

W 6810
5 MAY 1943

Dear Crowe,

I had a visit the other day from Borel de Bitche who is the Belgian who usually deals with us over relief questions when details rather than major principles are involved.

It seems that the Smyrna Water Company in ~~Italy~~ Turkey owes dividends to Belgian shareholders to ~~the~~ value of £ Turkish 80,000. A proposal has been made that this might be used to buy hazel-nuts and tobacco in ~~Italy~~ Turkey to be sent to Belgium. This proposal was adversely criticised by H.M. Ambassador at Ankara, and was in fact turned down by this department some months ago. It was at that time presented as a commercial proposition, and it was felt that the goods would probably be diverted by the Germans to their own purposes. But above and apart from this, it is known that the Belgian shareholders in Belgium have other substantial assets in Turkey, which the Germans have been conspiring to use for their own good.

Borel de Bitche's new contribution was to suggest that we might agree on condition that the hazel-nuts and tobacco might be handed over for distribution to the Belgian Red Cross instead of being sold in Belgium in the ordinary way of

commerce/

E. E. Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall,
S.W.1.

commerce. We are not much impressed by this idea, since we have always thought it advisable to keep relief purchases sharply distinct from trade arrangements between neutrals and occupied countries. We feel this all the more in the present case because of the manifest German interest in Belgian interests in Turkey to which I have already referred. Lastly, we do not think that tobacco and hazel-nuts are particularly suitable for relief purchases, and even if the Belgian Red Cross were able to handle them and able to distribute them accurately to the Belgians alone, it seems probable that the effect would only be to replace in this manner imports which the Germans would otherwise have to let the Belgians secure by other means.

We should therefore propose, unless you see objection, to turn down Borel's proposition.

Yours ever

Hugh Gibson.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No. W6810/4/49

OUT FILE

36

Draft. ✓

Mr Campbell (M.E.O.)

from

Mr Crowe

Central Dept

10 May, 1943.

My dear Campbell

Your letter No T530/19/11 of May 4th about hazel-nuts + tobacco from Turkey to Belgium.

I agree that Bowker de Bitche's latest scheme does not materially alter the situation and that we cannot agree to this scheme.

Yours ever,

Sd) Eric E. Crowe.

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OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.
10th May, 1943.

(W 6810/4/49)

My dear Camps.

Your letter No. T 550/19/11 of the 4th May about hazel-nuts and tobacco from Turkey for Belgium.

I agree that Borel de Bitche's latest scheme does not materially alter the situation and that we cannot agree to this scheme.

(E.E. Crowe)

W.A. Camps, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

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38.

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 6812

5 MAY 1943

Registry Number W 6812/4/49

FROM Lord Drogheda (Ministry of Economic Warfare) communicated

Dated

Received in Registry 5th May, 1943

W : Co-ordination

Blockade Relief Policy.

Transmits record of a conversation between Lord Drogheda and Mr. Steyne of United States Embassy of 4th May during which the draft statement to form the basis of replies to appeals for relief through the Blockade was discussed.

Last Paper.

W 6810 (W 6605)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel Washington No 3220 May 12th

(Minutes.)

See minute on W6813/9

E.C. 575

Has seen further minute

Lord Drogheda

E.C. 1075

See with letter from Lord Drogheda (MEW) to the Private Secretary May 4th.

(Action completed.)

21/5/43

(Index.)

Alt 27/7

Next Paper.

(W8029/220(a)) W6813.

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

In view of the Cabinet Conclusion 63(43) of May 3rd we can no longer maintain, as in the past, that relief through the blockade is "the subject of continuous consultation" between the U.S. Government and ourselves. We are confined to asking the U.S. Government to consult us if and when any suggestion for relief in the occupied countries comes up for consideration. This change of attitude on our part will certainly not be palatable to the U.S. Government, and I do not think we should emphasise it unduly in our telegram to Washington. We shall gain nothing by gilding the pill, and the point should, I submit, be clearly stated.

We need not, however, abandon all hopé of persuading the Americans to maintain with us a common front against attempts to secure a modification of the blockade. We may fail in this, and if we do there is admittedly a danger that sooner or later our hands may be forced by American action. I cannot help feeling that this would be less detrimental to Anglo-American relations than a continuation of the existing state of affairs, in which neither Government feels able to take a definite stand because it suspects the other of stealing a march.

If on the other hand we could obtain from the U.S. Government a definite assurance that they would adopt a similar line to ourselves in dealing with appeals, most of our more immediate troubles would be at an end.

As directed by the Secretary of State in W.6813/220/G, I submit a draft telegram to Washington which has been prepared by me in consultation with M.E.W. and has been approved by Lord Selborne.

M. L. Rouquin.

N. American Dept.
Sir D. ~~Scott~~ (away)

May 11th 1943.

/This

This, of course, will be a disappointment to Governor Lehman and possibly to President Roosevelt personally, but it is much better to tell Washington now frankly what our position is than to wrap it up more ambiguously.

N.W. Butler

May 12th 1943.

Lt: Drapers in morning rang me up about his aft. tel. He thought (and rightly) that it wd: come as a shock to Mr: Hull and possibly also to the President.

He wondered whether, now that the P.M. was in Washington, there might not be a frank discussion of the whole position.

I might have added to my minute of May 6 that I suggested to Mr: Winant that the opportunity shd: be taken for such a discussion and he agreed and said he wd: suggest it.

I am sure that the only thing is a heart-to-heart talk between P.M. & Pres.

I have made some changes and an addition to the aft. accordingly.

A.D. May 12/43.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Sir A. Cadogan.

In his minute of the 5th May the Secretary of State says he does not understand how Mr. Winant came to know of the terms of the suggested "Draft Statement": I think it is clear that Governor Lehman showed it to him.

After he had spoken to you Lord Drogheda was informed by Mr. Winant that Mr. Steyne had not correctly interpreted his views. The object of Mr. Winant's call on you is no doubt to let you know what he really does think. It seems that his view is that the "Draft Statement" is too long and would be more satisfactory if it confined itself to saying that the whole question was under review.

I submit that it will probably be best if you merely listen to what he has to say and promise to pass it on. When we know what line he is advocating we can judge whether or not to make any allusion to it in the telegram which we are to send to Washington in accordance with the War Cabinet's conclusion of the 3rd May.

N.B. Ronald

6th May, 1943.

Mr: Winant explained that Mr: Steyne had not expressed his thought very clearly.

What he (Mr: W.) thought was that a statement, if it could not say more than this statement did, should be very short - only 4 or 5 lines.

I took an opportunity of saying that we

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we quite understood that the U.S. Govt., like ourselves, were under some considerable pressure, but that we were very anxious that they should take no commitment before consulting us.

A.C. May 6. 1943.

Good & we will telegraph to Winn -

A.E. May 7

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

A.

I don't understand why Mr: Winant should have left Washington without seeing the Prime Minister. Mr: Winant left the Prime Minister's house to go to the Palace to see the King, and left London to fly to Washington without seeing the Prime Minister again. Lord Dunglass rang me up this morning to tell me of this.

I said that the Cabinet's decision stood, and that there was no hope of changing it now.

The Prime Minister had urged his case but had failed to win it, in spite of support from the Secretary of State.

Mr: Winant seems to go ahead even of Governor Lehman. I don't know whether Secretary of State Mr: Hull is prepared to talk to Mr: Winant, with the object of toning him down.

A.B.

May 4. 1943.

SECRET.

W Mr. Crowe. 44.

Cem'd by Lord Brocket 6812 Ent

5 MAY 1943

Mr.Steyne of the U.S.Embassy called this morning on Mr.Winant's instructions to speak about the draft statement to form the basis of replies to appeals for relief through the blockade (Annex (B) to the memorandum dated April 30,1943, submitted to the War Cabinet by the Minister)

Mr.Winant's criticism of the draft statement is that it is much too wishy-washy, does not convey a sense of urgency in examining the situation, and does not hold out sufficient hope of relief to the Governments and peoples of the occupied territories. He wondered whether we could redraft the statement accordingly.

I said that the matter was a very complicated one; that the difficulties of supply were very great; that until we knew what supply possibilities were, it would be wrong to hold out any prospect of relief; that the result of any examination of the supply position might well show that so little could be provided that sending it might have a worse effect than sending nothing at all; and that though we heard a lot from those who were in favour of sending relief through the

blockade, many people were strongly opposed to our doing so. I reminded Mr.Steyne of the Prime Minister's statement of August 1940 and said that, unless and until our two Governments decided that the policy then enunciated should be changed, it would be wrong to hold out any hope of such a change. I added that while I would report Mr.Winant's views, I could not promise to redraft the statement in the sense desired, as in its present form it went quite as far as we were authorized to go.

The Parliamentary Secretary. (Intd) D.

The Minister. 4th May, 1943.

Copies sent to :- Foreign Office.
Mr.Camps.
Mr.N.Hall.
Colonel Vickers.
Mr.Troutbeck.

WITH LORD DROGHEDA'S COMPLIMENTS.

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When the U.S.Ambassador saw the Minister this afternoon in connexion with the forthcoming Swedish negotiations, he also mentioned the question of relief for occupied Europe. He said that Mr.Steyne had given him a record of the conversation with me yesterday in regard to the draft statement which forms Annex B to the memorandum of April 30th 1943. From this record it was clear that Mr.Steyne had not quite got the point that Mr.Winant had wished to convey to us. What the Ambassador had meant Mr.Steyne to say was that, in his opinion, it would be better if every reply given on this subject were to be as short as possible, and if it could be confined to the statement that the matter was under constant examination, and that the two Governments were working together on it. Mr.Winant referred to a statement of Mr.Elihu Root that "every added sentence means a new law suit".

The Minister said that he would inform the Foreign Office of what the Ambassador had said.

(Sgd) DROGHEDA.

5th May, 1943.

Copies sent to :-

Mr. Foot.
Mr.Troutbeck.
Mr. Camps.
Foreign Office (Mr.Crowe).

INDEXED 47

M.E.W.,
4.V.43.

W 6812 / 4 / 69.

Dear Private Secretary,

Herewith two copies of a minute recording a conversation with Mr. Stayne of the U.S. Embassy re relief. I spoke to Sir A. Cadogan on the telephone about it just before lunch.

Will you please give

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Cairgan a copy.
Send me to Crane in
your General Dept. as
soon as possible.

Yours

Dreghorn.

SECRET.

Mr.Steyne of the U.S.Embassy called this morning on Mr.Winant's instructions to speak about the draft statement to form the basis of replies to appeals for relief through the blockade (Annex (B) to the memorandum dated April 30,1943, submitted to the War Cabinet by the Minister)

Mr.Winant's criticism of the draft statement is that it is much too wishy-washy, does not convey a sense of urgency in examining the situation, and does not hold out sufficient hope of relief to the Governments and peoples of the occupied territories. He wondered whether we could redraft the statement accordingly.

I said that the matter was a very complicated one; that the difficulties of supply were very great; that until we knew what supply possibilities were, it would be wrong to hold out any prospect of relief; that the result of any examination of the supply position might well show that so little could be provided that sending it might have a worse effect than sending nothing at all; and that though we heard a lot from those who were in favour of sending relief through the

blockade, many people were strongly opposed to our doing so, I also reminded Mr.Steyne of the Prime Minister's statement of August 1940 and said that, unless and until our two Governments decided that the policy then enunciated should be changed, it would be wrong to hold out any hope of such a change. I added that while I would report Mr.Winant's views, I could not promise to redraft the statement in the sense desired, as in its present form it went quite as far as we were authorized to go.

(Intd) D.

The Parliamentary Secretary.

The Minister.

4th May, 1943.

Copies sent to :- Foreign Office.
Mr.Camps.
Mr.N.Hall.
Colonel Vickers.
Mr.Troutbeck.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

Draft.

H.M. Ambassador,
Washington.

Telegram.

No: 3220
May 12.

OUT FILE

51

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

Despatched 11/50 *M.*

12 May, 1943.

Cabinet have fully considered report of conversations with Lehman and have decided that there are no adequate grounds for changing the policy which they have followed hitherto of refusing to allow the despatch of foods through the blockade to occupied countries other than Greece. They ~~cannot~~ therefore ~~agree to British participation in any further examination of the matter and~~ propose to reply to future appeals and enquiries that H.M.G. are not prepared to modify their existing policy.

2. ~~Please so inform Mr. Hull and~~ U.S. Govt. should be informed, and may should be asked ~~make it clear to him~~ that, if any suggestion for relief in occupied territories ~~should~~ comes up for consideration, we may should ~~wish to be consulted~~ Consult us before any

commitments/

commitments are incurred. On the other hand, we hope that the U.S.G. will be prepared to return to any appeals or enquiries a reply similar to ours. ~~Please try to elicit assurance on this point.~~ Please ~~try to elicit earliest possible assurance on this point.~~

It might be well that the P.M. should discuss this matter with the President, and I shd. be grateful if you wd. suggest this procedure to him.

Ab.
May 12/43.

A.E. May 12

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

OUT FILE 53

(This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.)

[Cypher.] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

To UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 3220.
12th May, 1943.

D. 11.50 p.m., 12th May, 1943.

::::::::::::::::::

Cabinet have fully considered report of conversations with Lehman and have decided that there are no adequate grounds for changing the policy which they have followed hitherto of refusing to allow the despatch of foods through the blockade to occupied countries other than Greece. They therefore propose to reply to future appeals and enquiries that His Majesty's Government are not prepared to modify their existing policy.

2. United States Government should be so informed, and they should be asked that, if any suggestion for relief in occupied territories comes up for consideration, they should consult us before any commitments are incurred. On the other hand, we hope that the United States Government will be prepared to return to any appeals or enquiries a reply similar to ours. Please try to elicit assurance on this point.

3. It might be well that the Prime Minister should discuss this matter with the President, and I should be grateful if you would suggest this procedure to him.

O.T.P.

1943

GENERAL

W 6813 /G 54

5 - MAY 1943

9 - 4

W 6813 | ~~220~~ | e. 49

War Cab: Conclusions. 63 (43) May 2. May 5.

Relief for occupied Europe.

Extract (para 5) from W. Cab. Concls. 63(43) of May 2nd, regarding proposed joint Anglo-U.S. examination of relief problems. The Cabinet agreed to the proposal that a telegram to Washington, informing U.S. Govt. of this decision, should be on the lines that HMG's policy on this matter remained unchanged.

(Minutes.)

Last Paper.

W6643.

References.

W6580.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.) 8 July 43.

(Index.)

Next Paper.

W 7176

(W 10115/4480/44)

Unfortunately, this Conclusion does not furnish specific replies to the three points put forward by Lord Selborne in his paper. The paper, however, makes it abundantly clear that the proposed joint examination is the only way in which we can hope to prevent a change of policy on the part of the Americans. It is therefore presumably intended that the telegram to Washington which is now called for should be on the lines that, in informing the U.S. Government that we are prepared to undertake the joint examination on the lines of approach set out in Annex B. of the paper, we should stress that this is on the understanding that no change of policy on our part is implied, and that "if any suggestions for relief in occupied territories should come up for consideration /as a result of the joint examination/, we should wish to be taken fully into consultation before any commitments are entered into."

As regards the proposed basis for replies to appeals, W.6812 contains the record of a conversation between Lord Drogheda and Mr. Steyne of the U.S. Embassy. From this record it would appear that the Americans may wish to go considerably further in holding out hopes for the future. Mr. Winant, however, has subsequently informed Lord Drogheda that Mr. Steyne does not appear to have correctly interpreted his (Mr. Winant's) view, which is that the statement is too long and would be better if confined to a brief statement that the whole question was under review. It seems quite likely that the Americans may press us to make our basis for replies more forthcoming in tone, and I therefore think that we might act on Mr. Winant's suggestion and put an alternative shorter draft to the Americans through our Embassy at Washington. This might perhaps be on the following lines:-

/"The

25119 3/43 F.O.P

"The British and American Governments are aware of the grave sufferings of the Allied peoples in the territories occupied by the enemy. They deeply sympathise with these sufferings and wish to relieve them, and they have therefore kept the matter under constant review.

Neither Government considers, however, that it is advisable at this stage to change existing policy, but continuous consultation between the two Governments continues."

As regards the suggested draft for a reply to Parliamentary Questions, the wish of the Cabinet appears to be to say nothing more than is absolutely necessary, and presumably, therefore, there is no question at present of stimulating any question on this subject.

M.A., M.B.S.V. Dept. (with W 6500/9) E E Crowe

Mr Ronald May 5th 1943.

I am afraid I do not understand: the Cabinet have taken a decision which appears to me to turn down the whole of Lord Selborne's proposals as put to them, including the "Draft Statement"; it is no good therefore suggesting revision of the Draft, except as part of an alternative general plan to be submitted to the Cabinet, if Lord Selborne elects to return to the charge.

11 yes BE

N.M. Gallop 6/v

Telegram should go to Wilson to fulfil Cabinet decision.

— despatched on W6812 4/49. (No. 3220 9/12/5)

Extract from War Cabinet Conclusions 63(43) 2nd May 1943.

THE BLOCKADE.
--
Proposed Joint Anglo-American Examination of Relief Problem.

(Previous Reference: W.M.(42)71st Conclusions, Minute 4).

5. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Economic Warfare (W.P.(43) 186).

The Minister had had two discussions with Governor Lehman, Director of the United States Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, now in London, summarised in Annex 'A' to his Memorandum. In the light of these discussions, and in view of the danger that if we adopted an entirely negative attitude the Americans might act on their own, the Minister sought the approval of the War Cabinet to a joint examination, in Washington, of the practical possibilities, from the point of view of supply, shipping and control of distribution, of sending relief to Occupied Europe, if it were decided to modify existing policy.

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E 4 9

W6813.

It was contemplated that any scheme of relief would be confined to children, and possibly to expectant and nursing mothers, in certain specified big cities in Europe.

THE MINISTER OF ECONOMIC WARFARE explained that from his talks with Governor Lehman he was convinced that, with the general deterioration of conditions in Europe, we should not be able to hold the present position beyond Christmas. Moreover, there was a considerable risk that, unless we undertook a joint examination of the matter with United States representatives, the United States Government might pledge themselves to a concession in regard to some particular country, which might well have many unfortunate consequences for the blockade. At the same time he realised that examination of the matter would almost certainly show that very little could in practice be done.

The following were the main points made in discussion:-

(1) It had long been argued that we should have to make some concession, to meet the pressure to allow limited quantities of foodstuffs through the blockade for the relief of children in occupied territories. Nevertheless, we had been able to refuse all concessions except as regards Greece.

(2) Once a concession - however limited - had been made, there would be no firm ground on which we could resist extensions of it.

(3) In fact, little, if any, food could be made available for relief of occupied territories in Europe, except at the expense of ourselves or the Russians. But by holding out expectations that relief could be afforded, we should attract criticisms based on the limited amount of relief which could be made available.

(4) The position would shortly be improved by the harvest, and there could therefore be no special urgency in discussing what the position was likely to be in the following winter.

(5) On the other hand, emphasis was laid on the risk that the United States might take action in this matter without prior consultation with us.

The War Cabinet:-

Invited the Foreign Secretary to send a telegram to our Ambassador at Washington, informing him that our policy in this matter was unchanged; and that we should be glad if he would take a suitable opportunity of informing the United States authorities that, if any suggestions for relief in occupied territories should come up for consideration, we should wish to be taken fully into consultation before any commitments were entered into.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.

3rd May, 1943.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 6870

1943

Registry Number W 6870/4/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare) communicated

No. T 550/12/Z

Dated

Received in Registry 6th May: 1943

W.Co-ordination.

Relief for Norway from Sweden.+

Transmits copy of letter from Mr.Camps(Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Mitcheson (Stockholm) of April 30th giving instructions regarding despatch of relief supplies from Sweden to Norway.

Last Paper.

W6813

References.

(Minutes.)

Naltech Dept

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

mb 14/5/43

(Index.)

Alt 1 24/7

Next Paper.

W 6880

24994 2'43 F.O.P.

L.F.
T550/12/Z.

59

BY BAG

Copy for E.E.Crowe, Esq.,
F.O.

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley House,
Berkeley Square,
LONDON, W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL.

30th April, 1943.

6870
6 MAY 1943

Would you please refer to Barber's letter to Collins 139/24/43 of March 17th, to your letter of April 2nd, to your letter of April 7th, to your letter of April 13th and to our telegram No. 346 Arfar of April 24th, all about consignments received in Stockholm by air.

The misapprehension on the part of the Norwegians from which their troubles arose has, I understand, been explained meanwhile to you in another context. The problem of the goods which have already arrived in Stockholm has presumably also been settled by the arrangement described in your letter of April 7th and by our telegram No. 346 Arfar. We could have given you authority to deal with these particular consignments a month ago, but the Norwegians asked us to refrain, believing superstitiously and quite wrongly that they could untie the knot in which they had tied themselves.

The position now is perfectly clear, and is as follows:

(a) The instructions given in Collins' letter T550/12/Z of January 9th and quoted in your letter of March 17th stand, as they always have stood. See also my letters T550/12 of March 12th and April 3rd and my letter T550/12/A of April 15th.

(b) These instructions preclude you not only from "authorising" re exports of this kind, but also from turning a blind eye if the Swedes license re exports without consulting you. Ditleff should be held to his promise not to apply for licences without your approval. It has been made quite clear to the Norwegians that they have no authority, either from this or from any other department, to suggest to the Swedes that they can proceed in these matters without such approval.

(c)

J. Mitcheson, Esq., O.B.E.,
British Legation,
Stockholm.

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(c) If the Norwegians smuggle goods out of their country, and also smuggle them through Sweden into Norway(That is to say, without approaching or informing the Swedes at all), it does not seem that this need concern either you or me. Ditleff must accurately understand that it is no use evading our own controls at this end if he then goes to the Swedes for permission to pass through theirs, since the Swedes are obliged to refer to us before giving their permission, and we are constrained to hold them to their obligation. Perhaps I should add that the Norwegians have no permission from anybody to smuggle things out of England nor should you encourage Ditleff to adopt such a practice, but we obviously should find it difficult to prevent them if they tried.

Please let me know if you have any comments on this. I have dwelt on point (b) above because I imagine that you do not yourself want to see the Swedes forming bad habits, and, assuming this to be so, it is necessary to get Ditleff's ideas quite straight on the subject. If my supposition is wrong, please say.

(W.A. CAMPS)

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

61

W 6880

3 MAY 1943

Registry Number W 6880/4/49

FROM Mr. Hubert (Belgian Red Cross) to Mr. Callender

No. 1420

Dated 5th May, 1943.

Received in Registry 8th May, 1943.

W: Coordination

Relief for Belgium

Transmits a copy of a letter to Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) of 5th May giving text of telegram from Mrs. Hubert in Lisbon, enquiring whether certain quantities of coffee, chocolate powder and bottles of Argentine bouillon may be sent to Belgium in gift parcels.

Last Paper.

W 6870.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/Mr. A. Hubert (Belgian Red Cross) from Mr. Callender

Enclosure 7.

(Minutes.)

M. E. W. will discuss this down. There is nothing we can do.

Confidential Dept MEW 10/5

£10 05-

(Action completed.)

WC 11/5/43

(Index.)

Alt 26/7

Next Paper.

W 6888.

E/- 62

OFFICE DU COLIS ALIMENTAIRE
Organisme sans but lucratif.

DIENST VAN HET VOEDSELPAKET
Vereeniging zonder winstoogmerken.

84, EATON SQUARE, LONDON, S.W.1.

Réf. No 1420

Tél: SLOane { 8235 / 8236 / 8237

N.B.—Toute la correspondance, les chèques, postal-orders, avis de versement etc. nous concernant doivent être envoyés à l'Office du Colis Alimentaire à l'adresse indiquée ci-dessus.

N.B.—Alle briefwisseling, de checks, postal-orders, berichten van storting enz., ons aanbelangende, moeten gezonden worden aan den Dienst van het voedselpaket op het hierboven vermelden adres.

Date / Datum 5th May, 1943.

W 6880
6 MAY 1943

R.T.Callender Esq.,
Room 59,
Foreign Office,
WHITEHALL

Dear Mr.Callender,

Allow me to enclose herewith a copy of my today's letter to Mr.Camps, the contents of which are self-explanatory.

I should be very grateful if you could see your way to give this request the benefit of your usual kind support.

Yours sincerely,

a Hulbert

Copy for R.T.Callender Esq.

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1420

5th May, 1943.

A.Camps Esq.,
The Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

My dear Mr.Camps,

I have just received a telegram from Mrs. Hubert who, as you know, is now in Lisbon, reading as follows:-

CAN YOU STILL NEGOTIATE WITH BRITISH AUTHORITIES FOR OBTAINING AUTHORISATION (1) COFFEE DESTINED EXPORTATION WHICH WE PROPOSE TO DESPATCH IN FORM OF GIFT 200 GRAMMES PER CONSIGNEE (2) 1250 TINS OF CHOCOLATE POWDER GIFT TO THE OEUVRE OLD STOCK (3) 1000 BOTTLES ARGENTINE BOUILLON

The coffee it is proposed to send to Belgium is, you will note, destined for exportation in any case, and if the parcels are limited to 200 grammes per consignee the quantity involved will be very small.

I know of course that you were unable to accede to our recent request for the despatch of certain foodstuffs to Belgium, but in view of the very small quantities referred to in Mrs.Hubert's telegram perhaps you may be able to help us on this occasion.

If the answer is in the affirmative would you be good enough to telegraph the neces ary authorisation to your Embassy in Lisbon.

Yours sincerely,

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W.6880/4/49

Draft.

M. A Hubert

from Mr Callender

20.64

7th May 1943

CUT FILE

Dear M. Hubert.

I have passed your letter no 1420 of the 5th May to about the food parcels for Belgium to my colleague who I am sure will give it his best attention.

Yours sincerely

(Sd) R. T. Callender.

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OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.
7th May, 1943.

No. W 6880/4/49.

Dear Monsieur Hubert,

I have passed your letter No.1420 of the 5th May about the food parcels for Belgium to my colleague who I am sure will give it his best attention.

Yours sincerely,

(R.T.Callender)

Monsieur A. Hubert,
109, Eaton Square,
S.W.1.

182

66

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 6950
8 MAY 1943

Registry Number W 6950/4/49

FROM Censorship (communicated)

No.

Dated

Received in Registry 8th May, 1943.

W: Coordination +

Relief for Norwegian children

Transmits an extract from a letter from A. and H. Makinson of Vetiania, Sweden to Miss A. Crosby Rengate stating that large sums of money have been collected in Sweden to bring sick Norwegian children to Sweden to be kept in special hospitals during the summer. The Germans have now refused to allow the children to come.

Last Paper.

w 6888

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Filed for record.

Walthew 12.5

E.W.S. 10/5

(Action completed.)

mb 13/5/43

(Index.)

Alt 2b/7

Next Paper.

W 7052.

J.B.S. 3.5.43

W.6950
8 MAY 1943
67

P.C. 72

POSTAL & TELEGRAPH CENSORSHIP
UNITED KINGDOM

TYPE OF MAIL: TERMINAL Air

Submission No.: LON/25125/43

Date:

Reg. No.

Taken off S.S. at (port)

on (date)

FROM: A. & H MAKINSON.

KULLGATAN 23.
VETLANDA
SWEDEN

TO: MISS A.D. CROSBY.

35 CROYDON ROAD.
FLAT A.
REIGATE

Date of letter (or postmark): 18.4.43

Language: English

ORIGINAL LETTER:

Released

SUBMITTED TO:

Comment to: F/O INF
CHA ISR
D.R.W. PID
B.B.C.

Seen by: Naval Adviser | Air Adviser | M.I.12

Operating Unit	Section	Examiner	D.A.C.	Date
HOL/THA	6/VII	1785	H.C.H.	1.5.43

SUBJECT: FOLLOWING IS AN EXTRACT OF THE LETTER:

"Enormous efforts have been made in Sweden to scrape together money for Norwegian sick children to be brought here and kept in special hospitals over the summer and starving children in thousands to come here to be fed up this summer. A very large sum has been collected and now the Germans say no, No Norwegian children may be sent to Sweden!! Poor people they daily try to cross the frontier into Sweden after days of toil over the snow mountains but now the German soldiers shoot them at the boundary.

(21736D) Wt 50262/H470 200 M (2 Sorts) 3/43 H J R & L Gp 745/6

183.

68

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 7052

10 MAY 1943

Registry Number W 7052/4/49

FROM Field Marshal Sir P. Chetwode (British Red Cross)
No. to Mr. Eden

Dated 6th May, 1943.

Received in Registry 10th May, 1943.

W: Co-ordination.

Relief for occupied Europe

Refers to his letter of 31st March (W 5288/4/49).

The Red Cross Societies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa wish to associate themselves with the Resolution forwarded in letter under reference.

Last Paper.

W6950. (W5288)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/Field Marshal Sir P. Chetwode
from HJS. May 8

(Minutes.)

See minutes

E.C. 11/5

(Action completed.)

12/5/43.

(Index.)

Next Paper.

W7138.

1c

11~
69

WAR ORGANISATION
OF THE
BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY and ORDER OF ST. JOHN OF JERUSALEM

President :
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN.

Grand Prior :
H.R.H. THE DUKE OF GLOUCESTER, K.G.

Chairman :
THE HON. SIR ARTHUR STANLEY,
G.B.E., C.B., M.V.O.

Vice-Chairman :
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K.C.M.G., C.B.

Executive Committee :

Chairman :
FIELD-MARSHAL SIR PHILIP CHETWODE, BT., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

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F. C. DAVIES, ESQ., O.B.E. BRIGADIER W. B. G. BARNE, C.B.E., D.S.O.

TELEPHONE :
SLOANE 5191

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS :
"ASSISTANCE, KNIGHTS, LONDON"

PLEASE REPLY TO
THE JOINT SECRETARIES,
AND QUOTE REF.

W 7052
10 MAY 1943

14 GROSVENOR CRESCENT,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

6th May 1943.

Dear Eden

Referring to my letter of March 31st on the subject of relief for people who are suffering as a consequence of the occupation of their countries by the Germans and Italians, I am writing to advise you that the national Red Cross Societies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa have approached us on the matter, and desire to associate themselves with the Resolution forwarded to you in my above-mentioned letter.

Yours sincerely,

Philip Chetwode

Field Marshal
Chairman.

The Rt.Hon. Anthony Eden, MP.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Office,
SW.1.

General Dept
- enter 70

8th May, 1943.

I write to thank you for your letter of May 6th in which you were good enough to inform me that the national Red Cross Societies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa desire to associate themselves with the resolution on the subject of relief for the people of Occupied Europe, which you forwarded to me in your letter of March 31st.

(Sd.) ANTHONY EDEN.

Field-Marshal
Sir Philip Chetwode, Bt.,
G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 7138

12 MAY 1943

Registry Number W 7138/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated).

No.

Dated

Received in Registry 12th May, 1943.

W : Co-ordination.

Food situation in Belgium.

Transmits a copy of letter am from Monsieur Borel de Bitche (Belgian Legation) to Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) of 5th May giving details of the general food position in Belgium. Encloses also copy of minute containing Miss Dennys' comments on this letter.

Last Paper.

W 7052

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

This is the same story as was told to the Sec. of State by Mr. Spaak.

Certified Dept

16/5

E. E. Cleverly

13/5

(Action completed.)

Mr 17/5/43

(Index.)

Alt 26/7

Next Paper.

W 7140

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Central Dept. 13

N. American Dept.

I attach a further telegram on the subject of the food situation in Belgium, containing ~~the~~ comments on M. Spaak's recent intervention with the Secretary of State.

May 13th 1943.

LEGATION DE BELGIQUE
EN POLOGNE.

36, South Lodge,
Grove End Road,
N.W.8.

5th May, 1943

No. 212.

S 1573

W. 7138

12 MAY 1943

Dear Mr. Camps,

I would like to communicate to you and your colleagues the latest information which we have received through Geneva, from most reliable sources in Belgium, concerning the general food position in our country.

A) From the beginning of this month, the food question in Belgium will be extremely difficult, particularly with regard to bread. B) From the 10th May, the Belgian population will have no bread whatsoever. C) Since the 28th April, there has been no corn in the mills and up to the 10th of this month the bread distributed to the population will be drawn from small quantities remaining in the bakeries.

D) Belgium is short of 128.000 tons of corn. E) The occupying authorities have more or less agreed to the importing of 50.000 tons, admitting that they are not in a position to import the remaining 78.000 tons.

F) The poor people and their children depend practically exclusively on the supplies sent by us. In the poorer quarters of Brussels, visitors have been struck by the state of complete deprivation of the people and by the faces of the children, like mere skeletons, such as one sees today among the children of Greece.

This is bad news indeed....

Yours sincerely,

(signed H. Borel de Bitche)

W. A. Camps, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

74

MINUTE.

Miss Dennehy has commented as follows on Monsieur Borel de Bitche's letter:

A. No information on this point but she considers it extremely unlikely.

B. Very improbable.

C. No information.

D. The probable shortage in Belgium has been estimated between 50/200,000 tons, therefore this estimate is likely to be correct. This shortage would amount to at least the figure given.

E. No information but it seems on the whole unlikely that the occupying authorities will not allow full imports.

F. Quite untrue though it would be true to say the poorer classes depend on such supplies for whatever they receive over and above the official rations.

Miss Dennehy does not anticipate a cut in rations but as yet has no positive information regarding imports. She considers the picture of starving children considerably over coloured. There is no reason why they should starve given the existing rations. Censorship material seems to show a partial improvement.

10th May, 1943.

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GENERAL

1043

CO-ORDINATION.

W 7140

12 MAY 1943

75

Registry Number W 7140/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated).

No. T 550/12/4.

Dated 8th May, 1943.

Received in Registry 12th May, 1943.

W : Co-ordination.

Allied Relief purchases in neutral European countries.

Transmits a copy of telegram to Washington No.639 Arfar Saving of 8th May stating that Norwegians have approached Ministry of Economic Warfare regarding a proposed purchase of orgnges in Spain. As a payment of dollars was required the Norwegians were told to apply to the United States authorities. Enquires whether United States Released funds for Dutch purchases of orgnges.

Last Paper.

W 7138 (W 4849)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Neutrality Dept
Mins 13.5

E.W.R. 13/5

~~See within~~

~~Copy of tel from W'ton to 1669 Arfar Immy 12~~

~~Copy of tel to W'ton no 2012 Arfar Immy 17~~

See within copy of tel from W'ton no 228 Arfar Saving Immy 21

E.W.R. 21/5

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
14/5/43	

Next Paper.

W 7176.

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T550/12/4 O.B.

W.7140

12 MAY 1943

S A V I N G R A M

From: Ministry of Economic Warfare.
To: H.B.M. Embassy, WASHINGTON.

MEFAR SAVING NO: 639 (En clair) 8th May, 1943.

Camps's letter to Murray T550/2 of March 29th about Allied Relief purchases in neutral European countries.

1. The Norwegians have approached us regarding a proposed purchase of oranges in Spain to the value of about £40,000 or equivalent.

2. It appeared however that a payment of dollars was required. We therefore said that it would be best for the Norwegians to apply to the U.S. authorities, who would consult us as necessary. We understand that the Norwegians are proceeding accordingly.

3. They mentioned incidentally that they had heard that the Dutch had succeeded in buying oranges for 4 million pesetas (see last paragraph of letter under reference). Did U.S. release funds for this?

Copy
Treasury.

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/12/4
COPY FOR H. Penrose Esq
DATE 8.5.43 F.O

Copy sent to.
W. Fraser.

(22) INDEXED (2)

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/12/14
COPY FOR Hon. W. Hogg.
DATE 15.4.43
ARFAR (O.B.)

77

W

S A V I N G R A M

From: British Embassy, Washington, D.C.
To: Ministry of Economic Warfare

W 7140/4/49

No.228 SAVING By Bag

D: 2nd July 1943
R: 14th July 1943

Your Arfar Saving No.639.

State Department say that so far as they can ascertain no application has as yet been made by the Norwegians for the release of dollars to purchase oranges in Spain. If an application is made it will be considered in the light of the United States financial position in Spain.

Treasury Department are said to have authorised transfer of funds for the purchase of oranges by the Dutch. The amount mentioned was $400,000, which would be about 4,000,000 pesetas.

HALIFAX

1943

GENERAL

W7176 /G 78

I 2 MAY 1943

10 - 4

W7176 /220/ 49

Belgian Foreign Secretary.

Conv: with SOS.

May 11.
- 12.

Rel: of for Belgium.

Record of conv: on May 11th, between SOS and Belgian Foreign Secretary, who referred to distressing reports from International Red X in Belgium about the food situation, and put forward 3 proposals by which relief could be given to the Belgian people.

(Minutes.)

Despatch to Sir L. Oliphant: quoted Min. of War Cabinet.

These proposals strike me as very disingenuous.

According to the M.E.W.'s information, the situation in Belgium, though bad, is not as serious as M. Spaak tries to make out; and it is indeed hard to believe that the Germans would allow real starvation conditions to develop in Belgium, which is working for the Axis war-machine. Moreover, it is scarcely credible that, if M. Spaak really believed that Belgium was to get no bread until August, he would rest content with asking for the three concessions which he put forward and which, if granted, would have no effect in remedying such a situation.

As regards the three requests:-

(1) Our consent to the acquisition of the "Caritas" by the I.R.C. from the Belgians was given on the express understanding that she was to be used only for prisoner of war parcels and supplies. This was accepted by the Belgians.

In any case, this is in direct contradiction with the Cabinet's latest decision that our policy must remain unchanged

(2) The Belgians at present get £250,000 worth of escudos (about 25,000,000 escudos) a month, and are the only occupied country to enjoy this concession. The Treasury would never agree to an increase.

(3) "Banaco" is a product of bananas and cocoa. It falls, of course, within the scope of the ban on relief through the blockade.

/Altogether

Last Paper.

W6813.

References.

W6812 | 4 | 49.
W4823.
W2551.
~~W3904.~~

(Print.)

W14825 | 62 | 49: 1942.

(How disposed of.)

Desp. to Sir L. Oliphant No. 124 May 11th.

(Action completed.)

25/5/43

(Index.)

Next Paper.

W8029.

25119 3/43 F.O.P

79

Altogether, it looks suspiciously as if the Belgians, having heard of the Prime Minister's visit to Washington, are deliberately trying to take advantage of it.

E.R. Crowe.

May 12th 1943.

I agree, but see no reason why good use should not be made of this intervention. A short summary might be embodied in a telegram to Lord Halifax for the information of the Prime Minister. I attach a draft* which should go to M.E.W. ~~for concurrence~~, with a copy of this despatch.

M. Lloyd Kerr.

W.B. 14/v

N. American Dept. May 12th 1943.

Central Dept.

* [M.E.W. are preparing a telegram commenting on these proposals which might go as chaser to this one. They will be submitted together.

13/5.

A.C. May 14. 1943.

Agd May 16

I think they asked for an interview before they can possibly have known P.M. was going to the States.

A.W. 14/v.

80

Relief through the Blockade.

Food situation in Belgium.

I attach two draft telegrams to Washington.

The first is a summary of Foreign Office despatch No. 124 to Sir Launcelot Oliphant, regarding the representations made to the Secretary of State by M. Spaak on May 11th with regard to the aggravation of the food situation in Belgium. The second draft contains comment on M. Spaak's proposals, which has been prepared by M.E.W. In it the view is expressed that M. Spaak's account of conditions in Belgium is probably greatly exaggerated, and reasons adduced for turning down his suggestions.

As the Belgian Ambassador in Washington is being instructed to discuss this matter with President Roosevelt it seems advisable that the Prime Minister should be fully informed, and I have therefore addressed the telegram to him.

H. McPhail.

May 13th 1943.

AG.
May 16.1943.

May 16

See minutes. Tel to Britmar (Washington) No. 263. Alcone. 17/5.

Ditto. No 264. Alcone. 17/5

19/5

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ARCHIVES

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81

MOST SECRET.

Copy No. 8

[**W 7176/220/G**]

Mr. Eden to Sir L. Oliphant.

(No. 124.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 11, 1943.

THE Belgian Foreign Secretary came to see me this afternoon, when he said that his Government had recently received some most disturbing reports about the food situation in Belgium. These had now culminated in a message from Burkhardt, the representative of the International Red Cross in Belgium, who said that all supplies of bread in Belgium had now been consumed and that from the 10th May onward no bread would be available. Nor would it become available again until after the harvest in August. Last year the Germans had sent sufficient wheat or other crops to enable the supply of bread to be eked out. This time they had not done so, whether on account of their own shortages or difficulties of transport or because they would not. In any event, the result was that the situation in the cities in Belgium was now terrible. The Belgian Government had considered whether they should approach us and ask for supplies of wheat to be sent to Belgium. They realised, however, from what I had previously told them, that such requests could not possibly be accepted. None the less, they must press most earnestly for some action to be taken, for a situation was now developing like that which had prevailed in Greece, and the population, lacking bread, which was the only staple food that they had hitherto still enjoyed, would soon be dying of starvation as in Greece.

10916—528 [25380—7]

2. The Belgian Government had three suggestions to make: First, that milk and vitamins should be sent in small quantities by the ship *Caritas* in accordance with the proposals made to us some time ago. This would serve only to keep the children alive. Secondly, we had helped the Belgians with Portuguese exchange to enable them to buy certain food-stuffs within the blockade. These were mostly dried fish and other minor items of diet. They had, however, considerably helped the situation in Belgium. Could we increase the allotment of exchange to enable the Belgians to increase their purchases? The Belgian Foreign Secretary emphasised that this was from within the blockade area. His third proposal he understood was more difficult. The Congo manufactured a certain commodity known as "banaco," and the Belgian Government would like to send certain supplies of this product in Portuguese ships to Belgium under the supervision of the International Red Cross. His Excellency continued that the Belgian Prime Minister had intended to approach Mr. Churchill this week formally with a request for consideration of these proposals. Since, however, he now learnt that the British Prime Minister was in America, the Belgian Government proposed to ask their representative to see the President and, if possible, the Prime Minister also to put their case forward.

I am, &c.
ANTHONY EDEN.

Registry No.

J.H.Le R.

Draft. ~~TELEGRAM~~.

Lord ~~Halifax~~,
~~WASHINGTON~~.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

No.....

Cypher.

Copies sent to W.O. for despatch.

Copy ~~for concurrence~~ to:

Mr. Troutbeck, M.E.W. (a.a.)

Central Dept. W.O.

N. American Dept.

Sir A. Cadogan.

Alcove.

May 1943.

Important - from Foreign Secy.

Following for Prime Minister.

Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs came to see me ~~yesterday~~ on May 11th and gave me a most disturbing account of the food situation in Belgium. Representative in Belgium of International Red Cross has telegraphed that all supplies of bread in Belgium have now been consumed, and that from May 10th no further supplies of bread will be available until after the harvest. Germans had refused to supplement the grain stocks as in previous years. Situation in Belgian cities was now terrible, and population would soon be dying of starvation as they had in Greece.

2. M. Spaak said that the Belgian Government had considered asking us for supplies of wheat, but realised that from what I had previously told them such requests could not be conceded. They must, however, press most earnestly for some action to be taken, and suggested that milk and vitamins should be sent in small quantities by s.s. "Caritas" as previously suggested; that the allowance of Portuguese exchange for purchase of foodstuffs within the blockade be increased; and that facilities be afforded for the shipment of banaco from the Congo to Belgium, under the supervision of the International Red Cross.

3. M. Spaak explained that the Belgian Prime Minister had intended to approach you formally this week with a request for the consideration of these proposals, and that the Belgian

/Ambassador

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Ambassador in Washington had been instructed to see the President and to draw his attention to the urgency of Belgium's need.

4. I am commenting on M. Spaak's representations in my immediately following telegram.

AB.
May 14/43.

AK May 16

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

85

Registry
No.W.

J.H.Le R.

Following for P.M. from Foreign Sec.

May 1943.

Draft, ~~TELEGRAM~~.

Lord Halifax,

WASHINGTON.

No.....

Cypher.

Copies sent to WCO for despatch

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

My immediately preceding telegram.

1. After consulting Minister of Economic Warfare I offer the following comments on the Belgian Ambassador's representations.

2. If it is the case that all supplies of bread ran out on May 10th it is surprising that we were given no previous warning. I think report, if not entirely baseless, is greatly exaggerated. Whether the Germans will in fact refuse to bridge gap between 1942 and 1943 harvest, amounting to between 100,000 and 200,000 tons, it is impossible to say. I am inclined to doubt it, more particularly as Belgium is made bursting for Axis war machine. But if they do, conditions analogous to those of Greece in the winter of 1941-2 might be expected to develop in Belgian cities between now and the Autumn. At the same time the measures now proposed by the Belgian Government could not appreciably mitigate such a situation.

3. Of these measures the least objectionable is the suggestion of an increase of purchases in Portugal. This would involve no breach of the blockade and would probably in any case be of small dimensions as it is doubtful whether the Portuguese market could meet any great increase. On the other hand, the most likely commodity to be bought would be sardines, and this might interfere with our own purchasing arrangements. Moreover, the U.S. Government have often expressed concern at the large purchases in Portugal already being made by the Belgians, to

/which

which we agreed long ago, and they would probably object strongly to any increase. It must also be doubtful whether the Portuguese Government would agree to the necessary financial arrangements for any substantial increase in purchases, which might moreover have to be extended to other occupied countries if we agreed to Belgian request. The whole question would require technical study both with our own departments and with U.S. authorities before we should agree even in principle.

4. Apart from the threatened disappearance of the bread ration the Belgian Government's report reveals no change of the situation in the knowledge of which the Cabinet's recent decision to maintain the blockade was taken. Briefly, we believe the situation is that throughout Occupied Europe the country dwellers are adequately provided while severe distress prevails among certain sections of the urban population. The position of Belgium in that respect does not differ from that of other occupied territories in principle, though Belgium's position is particularly difficult because in normal times she depends so much on imports of food. But it would be almost impossible to make any concession to Belgium without granting it to our other Allies.

AG.
May 14/43.

AK May 16

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

ALCOVE NO...

Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary.

Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs came to see me on May 11 and gave me a most disturbing account of the food situation in Belgium. Representative in Belgium of International Red Cross has telegraphed that all supplies of bread in Belgium have now been consumed, and that from May 10th no further supplies of bread will be available until after the harvest. Germans had refused to supplement the grain stocks as in previous years. Situation in Belgium cities was now terrible, and population would soon be dying of starvation as they had in Greece.

2. M. Spaak said that the Belgian Government had considered asking us for supplies of wheat, but realized from what I had previously told them that such requests could not be conceded. They must, however, press most earnestly for some action to be taken, and suggested that milk and vitamins should be sent in small quantities by s.s. "Caritas" as previously suggested; that the allowance of Portuguese exchange for purchase of foodstuffs within the blockade be increased; and that facilities be afforded for the shipment of banaco from the Congo to Belgium, under the supervision of the International Red Cross.

3. M. Spaak explained that the Belgian Prime Minister had intended to approach you formally last week with a request for the consideration of these proposals, and that the Belgian Ambassador in Washington had been instructed to see the President and to draw his attention to the urgency of Belgium's need.

4. I am commenting on M. Spaak's representations in my immediately following telegram.

ALCOVE NO...

Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary.

My immediately preceding telegram.

1. After consulting Minister of Economic Warfare I offer the following comments on the Belgian Ambassador's representations.

2. If it is the case that all supplies of bread ran out on May 10th it is surprising that we were given no previous warning. I think report, if not entirely baseless, is greatly exaggerated. Whether the Germans will in fact refuse to bridge gap between 1942 and 1943 harvest, amounting to between 100,000 and 200,000 tons, it is impossible to say. I am inclined to doubt it, more particularly as Belgium is made to work for Axis war machine. But if they do, conditions analogous to those of Greece in the winter of 1941-2 might be expected to develop in Belgian cities between now and the Autumn. At the same time the measures now proposed by the Belgian Government could not appreciably mitigate such a situation.

3. Of these measures the least objectionable is the suggestion of an increase of purchases in Portugal. This would involve no breach of the blockade and would probably in any case be of small dimensions as it xix is doubtful whether the Portuguese market could meet any great increase. On the other hand, the most likely commodity to be bought would be sardines, and this might interfere with our own purchasing arrangements. Moreover, the U.S. Government have often expressed concern at the large purchases in Portugal already being made by the Belgians, to which we agreed long ago, and they would probably object strongly to any increase. It must also be doubtful whether the Portuguese Government would agree to the necessary financial arrangements for any substantial increase in purchases, which might moreover have to be extended to other occupied countries if we agreed to Belgian request. The whole question would require technical study both with our own departments and with U.S. authorities before we should agree even in principle.

4. Apart/

4. Apart from the threatened disappearance of the bread ration the Belgian Government's report reveals no change of the situation in the knowledge of which the Cabinet's recent decision to maintain the blockade was taken. Briefly, we believe the situation is that throughout Occupied Europe the country dwellers are adequately provided while severe distress prevails among certain sections of the urban population. The position of Belgium in that respect does not differ from that of other occupied territories in principle, though Belgium's position is particularly difficult because in normal times she depends so much on imports of food. But it would be almost impossible to make any concession to Belgium without granting it to our other Allies.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No. W7176/220/G

A.E.

Draft.

Sir L. Oliphant.

No. 124

k & b.c.

Copy with Secret Dept. Sho can deal if asked for

P.M. 11 May

N.P.

W

W7176/G

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

12 MAY 1943

90

SECRET.

11th May, 1943.

Sir,

The Belgian Foreign Secretary came to see me this afternooon when he said that his Government had recently received some most distmbing reports about the food situation in Belgium. These had now culminated in a message from Burkhardt, the representative of the International Red Cross in Belgium, who said that all supplies of bread in Belgium had now been consumed and that from the 10th May onward no bread would be available ~~in Belgium~~. Nor would it become available again until after the harvest in August. Last year the Germans had sent sufficient wheat or other crops to enable the supply of bread to be eked out. This time they had not done so, whether on account of their own shortages or difficulties of transport or because they would not. In any event the result was that the situation in the cities in Belgium was now terrible. The Belgian Government had considered whether they should approach us and ask for supplies of wheat to be sent to Belgium. They realized, however, from what I had previously told them, that such requests could not possibly be accepted. None the less they must press most earnestly for some action to be taken, for the a situation was now developing like that which had prevailed in Greece and the population, lacking bread which was the only staple food that they had hitherto still enjoyed, would soon be dying of starvation as in Greece. 2. The Belgian Government had three suggestions to make. First that milk and vitamins/

W503.6
4
49

vitamins should be sent in small quantities by the ship "Caritas" in accordance with the proposals made to us some time ago. This would serve only to keep the children alive. Second we had helped the Portuguese exchange to enable them to buy certain foodstuffs within the blockade. These were mostly dried fish and other minor items of diet. They had however considerably helped the situation in Belgium. Could we increase the allotment of exchange to enable the Belgians to increase their purchases? The Belgian Foreign Secretary emphasized that this was from within the area blockade. His third proposal he understood was more difficult. The Congo manufactured a certain commodity known as banaco and the Belgian Government would like to send certain supplies of this product in Portuguese ships to Belgium under the supervision of the International Red Cross. His Excellency continued that the Belgian Prime Minister had intended to approach Mr. Churchill this week formally with a request for consideration of these proposals. Since however he now learnt that the British Prime Minister was in America the Belgian Government proposed to ask their representative to see the President and if possible the Prime Minister also to put their case forward.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Uncorrected. 92

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

A.E.

11th May, 1943.

Sir,

Sir L. Oliphant.

The Belgian Foreign Secretary came to see me this afternooon when he said that his Government had recently received some most distumbing reports about the food situation in Belgium. These had now culminated in a message from Burkhardt, the representative of the International Red Cross in Belgium, who said that all supplies of bread in Belgium had now been consumed and that from the 10th May onward no bread would be available in Belgium. Nor would it become available again until after the harvest in August. Last year the Germans had sent sufficient wheat or other crops to enable the supply of bread to be eked out. This time they had not done so, whether on account of their own shortages or difficulties of transport or because they would not. In any event the result was that the situation in the cities in Belgium was now terrible. The Belgian Government had considered whether they should appr[oach] us and ask for supplies of wheat to be sent Belgium. They realized, however, from what had previously told them, that such requests could not possibly be accepted. None the le they must press most earnestly for some acti to be taken, for a situation was now developing like that (which had prevailed) in Greece and the population, lacking bread which [was] staple food that they had hitherto enjoyed, would soon be dying of sta[rvation] as in Greece. No. 2 The Belgian Government h[ad] suggestions to make. First that milk

vitamins should be sent in small quantities by the ship "Caritas" in accordance with the proposals made to us some time ago. This would serve only to keep the children alive. Second, we had helped the Belgians with Portuguese exchange to enable them to buy certain foodstuffs from within the blockade. These were mostly dried fish and other minor items of diet. They had however considerably helped the situation in Belgium. Could we increase the allotment of exchange to enable the Belgians to increase their purchases? The Belgian Foreign Secretary emphasized that this was from within the blockade area. His third proposal he understood was more difficult. The Congo manufactured a certain commodity known as banaco and the Belgian Government would like to send certain supplies of this product in Portuguese ships to Belgium under the supervision of the International Red Cross. His Excellency continued that the Belgian Prime Minister had intended to approach Mr. Churchill this week formally with a request for consideration of these proposals. Since however he now learnt that the British Prime Minister was in America the Belgian Government proposed to ask their representative to see the President and if possible the Prime Minister also to put their case forward.

Mr LeRougetel

Foreign Sec
W7176. 94

Unparaphrased version of a Most Secret Cypher Telegram not One Time Table.

ALCOVE No. 263.

TOO 1305Z/17.
TOD 1340Z/17.

MOST SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM.

From:- Air Ministry.

To:- Britman, Washington.

ALCOVE No. 263. 17th May, 1943.

Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary.

Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs came to see me on May 11 and gave me a most disturbing account of the food situation in Belgium. Representative in Belgium of International Red Cross has telegraphed that all supplies of bread in Belgium have now been consumed, and that from May 10 no further supplies of bread will be available until after the harvest. Germans had refused to supplement the grain stocks as in previous years. Situation in Belgian cities was now terrible, and population would soon be dying of starvation as they had in Greece.

2. M. Spaak said that the Belgian Government had considered asking us for supplies of wheat, but realised from what I had previously told them that such requests could not be conceded. They must, however, press most earnestly for some action to be taken, and suggested that milk and vitamins should be sent in small quantities by s.s. "Caritas" as previously suggested; that the allowance of Portuguese exchange for purchase of foodstuffs within the blockade be increased; and that facilities be afforded for the shipment of banaco from the Congo to Belgium, under the supervision of the International Red Cross.

3. M. Spaak explained that the Belgian Prime Minister had intended to approach you formally last week with a request for the consideration of these proposals, and that the Belgian Ambassador in Washington had been instructed to see the President and to draw his attention to the urgency of Belgium's need.

4. I am commenting on M. Spaak's representations in my immediately following telegram.

T.O.O. 1305Z/17.

Circulation.
Deputy Prime Minister.
Foreign Secretary.
Mr. Troutbeck.
Mr. Peck.
Captain Clifford.

Foreign Sec

W Le Rougetel

W7176.

95

Unparaphrased version of a Most Secret Cypher Telegram
not One Time Table

ALCOVE No. 264

TOO 1310Z/17
TOD 1510Z/17

MOST SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM

From:- Air Ministry

To:- Britman Washington

ALCOVE No. 264 17th. May, 1943.

Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary.

My immediately preceding telegram.

1. After consulting Minister of Economic Warfare I offer the following comments on the Belgian Ambassador's representations.

2. If it is the case that all supplies of bread ran out on May 10th. it is surprising that we were given no previous warning. I think report, if not entirely baseless, is greatly exaggerated. Whether the Germans will in fact refuse to bridge gap between 1942 and 1943 harvest, amounting to between 100,000 and 200,000 tons, it is impossible to say. I am inclined to doubt it, more particularly as Belgium is made to work for Axis war machine. But if they do, conditions analagous to those of Greece in the winter of 1941-2 might be expected to develop in Belgian cities between now and the Autumn. At the same time the measures now proposed by the Belgian Government could not appreciably mitigate such a situation.

3. Of these measures, the least objectionable is the suggestion of an increase of purchases in Portugal. This would involve no breach of the blockade and would probably in any case be of small dimensions as it is doubtful whether the Portuguese market could meet any great increase. On the other hand, the most likely commodity to be bought would be sardines, and this might interfere with our own purchasing arrangements. Moreover, the U.S. Government have often expressed concern at the large purchases in Portugal already being made by the Belgians, to which we agreed long ago, and they would probably object strongly to any increase. It must also

/be doubtful

be doubtful whether the Portuguese Government would agree to the necessary financial arrangements for any substantial increase in purchases, which might moreover have to be extended to other occupied countries if we agreed to Belgian request. The whole question would require technical study both with our own departments and with U.S. authorities before we should agree even in principle.

4. Apart from the threatened disppearance of the bread ration the Belgian Government's report reveals no change of the situation in the knowledge of which the Cabinet's recent decision to maintain the blockade was taken. Briefly, we believe the situation is that throughout Occupied Europe the country dwellers are adequately provided while severe distress prevails among certain sections of the urban population. The position of Belgium in that respect does not differ from that of other occupied territories in principle, though Belgium's position is particularly difficult because in normal times she depends so much on imports of food. But it would be almost impossible to make any concession to Belgium without granting it to our other Allies.

T.O.O. 1310Z/17

Circulation.

Deputy Prime Minister.
Foreign Secretary.
Mr. Troutbeck.
Mr. Peck.
Captain Clifford.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

97

W 7305

15 MAY 1943

Registry Number W 7305/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare

No. (communicated)

Dated

Received in Registry 15th May; 1943

W; Co-ordination

Blockade relief policy.

Transmits a minute by Mr. Troutbeck of May 10th recording the discussions which have taken place with United States authorities on blockade relief policy during the last six months.

Gives details of conclusions reached during conversations with Governor Lehman and of War Cabinet's views on these conclusions.

Last Paper.

W 7176

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

A useful summary to record.

[illegible] 18/5

(Action completed.)

vmb 18/5/43

(Index.)

AEH 27/7

Next Paper.

W 7366.

(W 8074).

W 7305
15 MAY 1943

R E L I E F

Washington telegram No:5112

1. On October 15th, 1942, a long conversation was held with Mr. Long at the State Department about relief. Mr. Long asked for confirmation that H.M.G. agreed with the U.S.G. that the blockade should be rigorously maintained and that neither government should make any concessions without the agreement of the other. If these two points were agreed, Mr. Long suggested that the next step was to examine all existing arrangements under which supplies were permitted into occupied territories and that no further concessions should be made until this joint examination had been carried out.

To Washington No: 6431

2. We accepted Mr. Long's proposals, and said that as a first step we would prepare, in consultation with Dr. Riefler, a comprehensive statement of existing policy. We suggested that <u>the next step would be to review policy in the light of our statement.</u>

3. A draft statement was sent to Mr. Riefler on the 7th December, (it was not finally agreed till the middle of February), but the joint examination of the problem suggested by Mr. Long became caught up with discussions on a very high level about an experimental relief scheme for Norway. This was proposed on the American side on instructions from the White House, and we objected that it ought not to be proceeded with in advance of the joint examination of the whole problem.

To Washington No: 7544

The "ill-informed White House intervention" appears to have discouraged the State Department and they became reluctant to pursue the conversations further.

Washington No: 6204

4. At the beginning of February Governor Lehman was given charge of current (in addition to post-war) relief questions under the State Department, and, while promising not to assume any commitments without our agreement, he announced his intention of making a thorough examination of the

practical/

C.O.F. 15 MAY 1942

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practical possibility of giving relief through the blockade to Washington children in the occupied territories. The Embassy urged that we should co-operate in the examination of the problem. Their view was supported by the Minister in a letter to Mr. Eden of February 16th to which no reply was ever received. The Foreign Office would merely agree to our sending a telegram to Washington saying that we had no reason to object to the Americans proceeding to a detailed examination on their own account and that the Embassy should keep in touch with current American deliberations on the question and emphasise the more important practical difficulties.

telegram No: 446 Arfar

To Washington No: 639 Arfar

5. This negative attitude was later felt to have dangers and the instructions were accordingly modified in a telegram sent by the Foreign Office on March 1st which authorised the Embassy to be prepared to consider on their merits any reasonable proposals which Dr. Lehman might put forward, on the understanding that they could not commit themselves without prior reference to London.

To Washington No: 1362

6. At this point we learnt that Dr. Lehman had (at British invitation) agreed to visit London to discuss post-war relief questions and on the 15th March the Minister wrote to the Prime Minister (who was temporarily in charge of the Foreign Office) suggesting that we should take advantage of his visit to discuss his views on immediate child relief problems. The Prime Minister agreed to our sending a telegram to Washington in that sense.

To Washington No: 1088 Arfar

JOH

7. On the 30th March Lord Halifax reported that Mr. Hull had informed him by telephone that he was being pressed by the Norwegians and Belgians for relief concessions and asked for a reply as soon as possible. We instructed Lord Halifax to remind Mr. Hull of the impossible position in which we should be placed if we allowed relief for one country and not for another, and <u>also of our anxiety (of which the State Department had been informed many months ago) to embark at the earliest possible moment on a joint examination of the realities of the situation. These points were put to Mr. Hull by Lord Halifax in writing.</u>

Washington No: 1507

To Washington No: 2284

Washington 1260 Arfar

8. Our instructions crossed a telegram from Washington reporting the receipt of a letter from Mr. Hull suggesting that as Mr. Hall was shortly leaving for London, he should there take up with Dr. Lehman the question of relief for Norway and Belgium. The letter by implication restricted the discussions in London to the details of possible schemes and reserved the question of principle. Subsequently Mr. Hull

Washington 1689

authorised Dr. Lehman to examine in London not merely the Norwegian and Belgian schemes but the practical possibilities of a general relief to all Allied occupied territories.

9. Conversations duly took place with Dr. Lehman on the 19th and 22nd April, it being made clear on both sides that the results were ad referendum to the two governments. With this reservation it was agreed that:

(a) it might prove desirable to initiate a small and experimental relief scheme in the autumn,

(b) a small committee should examine the possibilities in Washington and submit their recommendations to the two governments,

(c) it was desirable that the general line of replies to enquiries and applications should be agreed,

(d) the possibility of child evacuation schemes should be further explored.

10. Dr. Lehman was given some notes prepared in M.E.W. on the suggested approach to the examination of the problem and a draft statement to form the basis of replies to appeals.

11. On the 30th April the Minister submitted a paper to the War Cabinet reporting the result of the conversations with Dr. Lehman and asking approval of:

(i) the suggested joint examination in Washington,

(ii) the general line of approach proposed,

(iii) the draft basis for replies to relief appeals,

(iv) a draft reply to parliamentary questions.

12/

12. The War Cabinet's decision on this request was as follows: They "invited the Foreign Secretary to send a telegram to our Ambassador at Washington, informing him that our policy in this matter was unchanged; and that we should be glad if he would take a suitable opportunity of informing the U.S. authorities that, if any suggestion for relief in occupied territories should come up for consideration, we should wish to be taken fully into consultation before any commitments were entered into".

13. It is understood that Mr. Eden has interpreted this decision as a refusal to allow our Embassy to take part in the further examination proposed at Washington. It will no doubt be embarrassing for Lord Halifax so to inform Mr. Hull in view of the communication he made to him last month, as recorded in paragraph 7 above.

14. The question also arises of the replies we are now to give to appeals and enquiries. Mr. Winant commented on the draft given to Dr. Lehman that it was too long. But the whole basis of it is now destroyed. The whole problem will no longer be "the subject of continuous consultation between the two governments".

(Signed) J.M. Troutbeck

10. 5. 43.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 7366

17 MAY 1943

Registry Number W } 7366/4/49

FROM Monsieur Zarine (Latvian Legation) to Mr. Warner.

No. D 130/502.

Dated 14th May, 1943

Received in Registry 17th May, 1943

W: Co-ordination

Medical supplies for Latvia.

Certain medical supplies have been despatched to Latvia through the British Red Cross and International Red Cross. A bill for £1754:19:8d. has now been received from the British Red Cross. Requests that this sum may be paid out of the blocked funds of the Latvian State.

Last Paper.

W 7305 (W 4420)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

15 Treasury May 21.

(Minutes.)

Before we write to Treasury about this with N. Dept please advise us to whether there would be political objection to the use of the Latvian State funds!

N. Dept

E. Coun- 18/5

The Treasury have always opposed the transfer of sterling to anywhere outside the sterling area and last January refused a proposal for the transfer of £5000 to the International Red Cross for just this purpose (N 345/345/59). If the Treasury waived their objections, we might be prepared to waive any political objections (cf. N 246/346/59).

But

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
8/6/43	Alth 27/7

Next Paper.

(W 7902)

W 7384

24994 2'48 F.O.P.

But it is no use considering this till we know.

what the Tsy attitude is.

Stenlamber
20/5

Pleas copy Tsy for obs

20/5

1 C of each letter

Enter 104

LATVIAN LEGATION.

W 7366

17 MAY 1943

No. D.130/502.

London, 14th May, 1943.

Dear Mr Warner,

Since the German occupation of Latvia my Colleague in Geneva, Monsieur J. Feldmanis, began to send me very sad information about the position of the Latvian children in our country, and he insisted in his demands for help for the poor innocent small children. In everything, of course, they are suffering privations, but most of all is felt the lack of medicaments, which had created a very bad, if not to say castrophical position. I had several talks about this matter with the British Red Cross Society, and their attitude to all this distress was very sympathetic indeed. They had to point out, however, that as Britain is herself at war and as her needs and those of numerous allies in difficult circumstances were very great, they could not send medical supplies to Latvia without payment; a second obstacle being that they were afraid that such supplies would come into the hands of the Germans and not reach the Latvian children at all. Mr. Feldmanis energetically interested himself in the latter point and got into telegraphic touch with our organisations in Latvia, and I believe that the International Red Cross in Geneva have written to the British Red Cross that they undertake that the supplies should reach the Latvian children. Meanwhile my Geneva Colleague succeeded in getting in touch directly with the Latvian Relief Committee at the head of which are pure Latvians, national-minded men, such as Mr. Spricis Paeglis whom I know, from my part of the country, and Mr. Pavasars, our last Consul in Amsterdam, and they telegraphed to Geneva that if some supplies should come through the intermediary of the Red Cross the children was get them. All this information the British Red Cross Society has and there were several conferences at the Offices of the Society in which took part the representative of the Ministry of Supply and also of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, copies of whose letters to the Red Cross of the 10th November and 2nd October last, respectively, I add hereto.

The medical supplies have already been despatched, in 36 cases and the bill for £1754. 19. 8 has been rendered to me by the British Red Cross who naturally require it to be paid, and I have promised that I will see that it is paid. May I therefore ask you, Dear Mr. Warner, if you could come in touch with the respective authorities with a view to this sum

C.F.A.Warner, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

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being paid out of the blocked funds of the Latvian State? The alternative is that the sum should be paid out of the Latvian Legation moneys at my disposal, but, as you know, I have until now drawn from this account only for the running of the Legation. God give that the victory will come soon and then it will not be necessary to retain this money, but we cannot see the future and for the moment I should prefer not to have to use it except for the upkeep of the Legation. The blocked funds represent money really belonging to the Latvian people and I hope it may be found possible that they should have this much use of it in their time of trouble and distress. I commend this question, therefore, to your benevolence and should be very glad if you would take it up with the authorities concerned. If there is some other information which you would like to have, either orally or in writing, I shall be only too glad to give it to you. I hope very much that the matter can be settled in the way which I have indicated would be more satisfactory, especially as there is another consignment of supplies in preparation. The bill above referred to is enclosed herewith.

Believe me,

Dear Mr Warner,

Yours very sincerely

Rhodes Farmer

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GENERAL

1943

W 7384

17 MAY 1943

CO-ORDINATION

Registry Number } W 7384/4/49.

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No. T 550/7.

Dated

Received in Registry } 17th May, 1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Relief for French children.

Transmits a copy of letter from Mr.Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr.Thorold (Washington) of the 15th May enclosing a letter from Mr.Mitcheson (Stockholm) of the 21st April forwarding correspondence with M.Stahle (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs) regarding supplies from Argentine for a canteen in the South of France for French children.

Last Paper.

W 7366.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/Mr. Camps (M.E.W.) from Mr. Howe

✓ May 21

(Minutes.)

This proposal is such irreconcilable with our blockade policy + will have to be turned down.

To me the Mitcheson's description of the food position in France is surprising and if true most alarming. I think I might ask Mr. Camps if M.E.W. information agrees with this account.

French Dept

✓

E.C.
18/5

I entirely agree. It is true that a good deal can be done by those with the right connexions + a lot of money - but only a handful of profiteers + gourmets have these. It is absurd to suggest that the situation has improved because Laval's friends can still do themselves well.

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

I all

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
nil. 16/5/43	All 28/7

Next Paper.

W 7536.

All our reps: show that for 9/10 ths
of the Swedish population the food situation
is desperate & getting worse (The peasants can at least
keep themselves
from starving)

R.L. Speyer
19/5

I think we should emphasize M. Speyer's
point when commenting on this concession to N.E.W.
~~[illegible]~~

J.H.L.
19/5.

See within letter from Mr. Quennell (N.E.W.)
to Mr. Crowe. T 550/7 May 25th.

French Dept
gp. 31/5

E.R.C.
29/5

The Americans have instructed their
representative to concert a refusal with ours

W.W.
29/5
16.

See within copy of tel to Stockholm No 59 Confidential
Saving of July 1st

W.A.R.
1/7.

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Copy to: E.E.Crowe, Esq., Foreign Office, S.W.1. **BY BAG.**

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

W 7584
17 MAY 1943

T.550/7

15th May, 1943.

I enclose a copy of a letter from Ståhle of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other papers which have been forwarded us by Mitcheson. We observe from his covering letter that "the support of the American authorities has also been requested". We suggest, therefore, that it might be as well if His Majesty's and United States Legations in Stockholm were to reply jointly when the Swedes revert to the matter. We should propose replying to the effect that, for the usual blockade reasons, we can only return a regretful negative.

Please let us know the United States Government's views.

(signed) W. A. Camps.

G. Thorold, Esq.,
War Trade Department,
British Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

JM/B
143/43

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BRITISH LEGATION,

STOCKHOLM.

21st April, 1943.

Dear Camps,

As the following matter concerns relief activities in enemy occupied territory I presume that I am right in addressing my letter to you rather than to Collins, but I feel sure that his Department would also be interested, and I leave it to you to see that the correspondence is seen by all concerned.

I enclose copy of a letter addressed to me on the 15th instant by Stahle of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, about proposed Swedish relief activities in the South of France, together with a copy of my reply which was shown to the Minister before being sent on.

You will see that Stahle has requested my support for the plan of the Swedish Red Cross to import certain foodstuffs from Argentina, via Lisbon, to the South of France for the use of a canteen which the Swedes propose to establish for feeding French children. The foodstuffs would, according to the Swedish suggestion benefit by the transport arrangements of the International Red Cross through Lisbon.

I understand that the Swedish Legation in London have been asked to approach you in this matter, and that the support of the American authorities has also been requested.

In my reply to Stahle, I did my best to make it clear that I could not personally support the Swedish proposal, not for lack of any humanitarian feelings,

W. C. Camps, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare,
London, W.1.

but/

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but on purely practical grounds. I have also mentioned orally to Stahle that in my opinion there is little likelihood of our being able to approve his proposals, and he gave me the impression that he fully appreciated the objections and that he was rather sorry that he had not consulted me privately before communicating with the Swedish Legation in London and with the American authorities. As regards the latter, I have explained my point of view to my American colleague, and I think that he agrees with me on the whole though he has so far been rather non-commital.

I shall probably receive a further letter on this subject from Stahle in the near future, in which case a copy will be sent to you at once. In the meanwhile, however, I should very much appreciate your comments. Perhaps you may care to send me a short telegram to reach me before I leave for London, probably in about ten days, in connection with the forthcoming trade negotiations.

Yours ever,

J. Mitcheson.

Copy.

Stockholm, 15th April 1943. 111

Royal Swedish Ministry for
Foreign Affairs.

Dear Mitcheson,

The Swedish Red Cross is planning to establish a canteen in South France for French children.

The canteen will be organised by a representative of the Swedish Red Cross, who will go down to France for this purpose. The Swedish consuls and consular officers as well as the members of the Swedish Colony have also promised their collaboration in the carrying out of the scheme. The foodstuffs will be distributed in special premises in the form of hot meals under effective control.

As it has proved difficult to obtain the foodstuffs necessary for the above organisation in Europe the Swedish Red Cross has taken up the idea of importing same from Argentine. They point out that all foodstuffs necessary can be purchased on very favourable terms in Buenos Aires. They also state that there is a regular traffic between Buenos Aires and Lisbon and that the goods could be sent from Lisbon to Marseille by train. However, they express the wish that the transport of the goods from Lisbon to Marseille could be arranged to take place with steamers that take foodstuffs to the Allied prisoners of war/

war in Germany within the frame of the International Red Cross organisation for this purpose. The International Red Cross has stated that the 200 tons of foodstuffs which would be necessary for the realization of the Swedish plan during six months should be transported in this way. The Portuguese Red Cross has promised their collaboration for the transit arrangements in Portugal.

The Swedish Red Cross has undertaken to cover all costs for the purchase, transport and distribution of the foodstuffs. The Spanish Red Cross has, however, recently offered to assist in this scheme. This assistance would probably take the shape of an export from Spain of fresh fruit.

As stated above the quantity of foodstuffs needed amounts to 200 tons for a period of six months. You will find attached a list of the foodstuffs requested.

May I ask you to forward the contents of this letter to London for favourable consideration. I have sent a copy of this letter to the Swedish Legation in London with a request that they also take the matter up with the authorities concerned.

Yours sincerely,

Sgd. Nils K. Stahle.

J. Mitcheson, Esq.,
Commercial Counsellor to the British Legation,

Specification

of foodstuffs considered most suitable for the planned Swedish Red Cross canteen in South France.

Preserved butter	10 tons
Sugar	10 tons
Dried vegetables	10 tons
Macaroni	10 tons
Rice	10 tons
Meat preserves	10 tons
Soup powder	5 tons
Meat extract (bouillon)	5 tons
Wheat-flour	30 tons
Milk powder	15 tons
Fish preserves	5 tons
Marmalade	15 tons
Dried fruit	5 tons
Cocoa, chocolate	5 tons
Egg powder	5 tons
Yeast, salt, pepper	5 tons
Various foodstuffs, onions etc.,	5 tons
Potatoes	30 tons
Cheese	10 tons
	200 tons

Stockholm, 15th April 1943.

Copy.

JM/B

143/43

114

19th April, 1943.

Dear Stahle,

Your letter of the 15th instant about the proposed Swedish canteen for feeding children in the South of France. I am extremely interested to read your letter and, of course, we are all very anxious to help in any humanitarian proposal of this kind. At the same time I am not at all convinced that the plan for obtaining the 200 tons of foodstuffs from Argentina and sending them via the International Red Cross would really be the best arrangement for the following reasons.

Most of the foodstuffs listed in your specification should be available without difficulty in Europe. Potatoes for instance are definitely not in short supply. There are plenty of potatoes in Germany and adjoining countries. Butter, sugar, egg powder, etc. are plentiful in Denmark. Would it not be much easier to arrange for certain supplies to be sent from Denmark to the proposed canteen in France? In this connection I cannot help thinking of the triangular arrangement by which Sweden finances the export of foodstuffs from Denmark to Finland, on a very much larger scale.

I also venture to point out that the food situation in the South of France has considerably improved during recent weeks, especially in regard to potatoes and fruit, also that, generally speaking, there is no real shortage of foodstuffs in France for those able to pay high prices. It is possible today to obtain meals in France at restaurants on a scale quite out of the question in Sweden or even in England at the present time, but the prices for such meals in France are extremely high. Meat in France is particularly plentiful, subject to prices.

Perhaps/

Byrachefen Nils K. Stahle,
Kungl. Utrikesdepartementet,
STOCKHOLM.

Perhaps more important even than the above considerations is the fact that the transport facilities available to the International Red Cross are so limited that the Polish and Yugoslavian Governments are complaining that they are unable to arrange for adequate supplies of food parcels to come through via Lisbon to their prisoners of war in Germany. If the Red Cross should allot space and facilities for 200 tons for the Swedish canteen in France, would this be fair to the Yugoslavian and Polish prisoners of war?

In view of the above points, you may care to let me have your further observations before I communicate with London.

J. Mitcheson.

Registry
No. W 7384/4/49

Draft.

M. Camps

M.E.W.

Grant

M. Crowe

21 m

116

21st May, 1943.

[Dear Camps]

You sent me a copy of your letter of the 15th May to Thorold at Washington (T 5350/7) about the Swedish plan to set up canteens in France.

We agree that our blockade policy

TTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

policy makes it impossible to agree to the proposal, but we were rather surprised at Mitchesons description of the food situation in Vienna. Our information indicates that although people with the right connexions and a great deal of money can live comfortably the food situation for

TTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRIT

118

far & more tenths of the urban population is desperate and getting worse. Is that your impression?

LLC 25/5

Yours ever

(Sgd.) E. E. CROWE.

OUT FILE

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FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.

(W 7384/4/49).

21st May, 1943.

My dear Camps.

You sent me a copy of your letter of the 15th May to Thorold at Washington (T 550/7) about the Swedish plan to set up canteens in France.

We agree that our blockade policy makes it impossible to agree to the proposal, but we were rather surprised at Mitcheson's description of the food situation in France. Our information indicates that although people with the right connexions and a great deal of money can live comfortably the food situation for nine tenths of the urban population is desperate and getting worse. Is that your impression?

Yours ever

(E.E. Crowe)

W.A. Camps, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

T.550/7

W7384/4/69

INDEXED

W7384/4/49

Mr 120

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

25th May, 1943.

My Dear Crowe,

Thank you for your letter of May 21st (to which I am replying on behalf of Camps) with regard to the Swedish plan to set up canteens in France.

I have discussed the point you raise about general conditions in France with our food people here, and read them the relevant passages in your and Mitcheson's letters. They tell me that, according to their information, the truth is somewhere between the two. They think that the figure you give - "nine-tenths of the urban population etc" - is too high, but that Mitcheson's reference to the parts of France (where severe shortage undoubtedly does prevail) is somewhat unfortunate. Conditions are worst in such districts as the Bouches de Rhone and the Alpes Maritimes, which formerly imported most of their food, and in northern industrial towns among persons who cannot afford the Black Market and have no helpful uncle or cousin in the country.

If you would like a fuller estimate of conditions, please let me know.

Yours ever,

R. K. Dennell

E.E.Crowe,Esq.,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall.
S. W. 1.

W7384/4/49

INDEXED

T550/7 O.B. BY BAG

S A V I N G R A M

From: Ministry of Economic Warfare.
To: H.B.M. Legation, STOCKHOLM.

ARFAR SAVING NO: 59 (En clair): 1st July, 1943.

Mitchesson's letter to Camps of April 21st
[Swedish relief activities in the South of France]

U.S. Minister has been instructed to concert refusal with you based on following points, in which we concur

1) In spite of sympathy felt by H.M. and U.S. Governments, we cannot relax blockade policy

2) Under international law and ordinary considerations of humanity, it is incumbent on occupying power to feed population, whose condition is ~~maximum~~ primarily due to depredations of enemy.

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/7
COPY FOR E Brooke, Esqre
DATE 5/7/43

190

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 7536 /122

20 MAY 1943

Registry Number W 7536/4/49

FROM Parliamentary Question (Sir F.Sanderson)

No.

Dated 19th May 1943

Received in Registry 20th May 1943

W : Co-ordination

Food supplies for occupied Europe.

Sir F. Sanderson asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare whether he would permit dried milk and vitamin concentrates to be sent to Greece, Belgium, France and Poland for children and expectant mothers and whether he was aware that the supplies, money and shipping were available. Mr. Foot referred to his reply to Mr. Harvey of 11th May (W 7199/3/49) and stated that otherwise the policy of His Majesty's Government remained as laid down by the Prime Minister in 1940. Sir F. Sanderson, Mr. Mathers, Mr. Molson, Mr. Rhys Davies and Sir A. Southby asked supplementary questions.

Last Paper.

W 7384

References.

(*Minutes.*)

19.21/6.

(*Print.*)

(*How disposed of.*)

(Action completed.)

21/5/43

(Index.)

AEH 28/7

Next Paper.

(W 7557)

W 7537

24994 2 43 F.O.P.

GENERAL. 123

Parliamentary Question

W. 7536

20. MAY 1943

MEW.

* 36. Sir Frank Sanderson,—To ask the ~~Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs~~, whether he will permit dried milk and vitamin concentrates to be sent to Greece, France, Belgium and Poland to provide children under 16 years of age, nursing and expectant mothers with a daily ration sufficient to ward off the worst deficiency diseases; and is he aware that the money, supplies and shipping are available and that the International Red Cross would be able to provide for full control of the distribution.

U.

(2nd. Sitting Day after 10th May).

This has been transferred to MEW.

16/5

Library & attach reply

16/5

ANSWERED 19 MAY 1943
REPLY ATTACHED.

1094/6

F.O. REGISTRY

19 MAY 1943

ENEMY-OCCUPIED EUROPE (FOOD SUPPLIES)

35. **Sir Frank Sanderson** asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare whether he will permit dried milk and vitamin concentrates to be sent to Greece, France, Belgium and Poland to provide children under 16 years of age, nursing and expectant mothers with a daily ration sufficient to ward off the worst deficiency diseases; and is he aware that the money, supplies and shipping are available and that the International Red Cross would be able to provide for full control of the distribution?

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare (Mr. Dingle Foot): As regards the shipment of milk and vitamin concentrates to Greece, I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer which I gave on 11th May to my hon. Friend the Member for the English Universities (Mr. Harvey). Otherwise the policy of His Majesty's Government remains as laid down by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on 20th August, 1940. After the fullest consideration, and with the deepest sympathy for the Allied peoples of Europe in their sufferings under German rule, His Majesty's Government are convinced that a general action of the kind described would inevitably be exploited by the enemy for his own advantage. Moreover, such action could hardly be confined to the countries named in the Question, and the provision of foodstuffs for children and nursing and expectant mothers throughout Occupied Europe would involve a very serious breach in the blockade. I regret, therefore, that except in the case of Greece the answer to the first part of the Question must be in the negative. As regards the second part of the Question, no information has been received by His Majesty's Government to show that money, supplies and shipping are now available for this purpose. Nor does there exist in France, Belgium or Poland any machinery of control which we could possibly accept as adequate. As I have frequently pointed out in answers to Questions on this subject, neutral control of imported foodstuffs is an insufficient guarantee unless it is accompanied by control over the domestic food supplies of the countries in question.

Sir F. Sanderson: In view of the fact that vitamins and dried milk could only be used for expectant mothers and children, is it not a fact that they could be of no value to the enemy?

Mr. Foot: I do not agree. Local supplies of milk are one of the commodities which the German occupying troops are most liable to seize, and, if we sent in any substantial quantities of dried milk we should merely be adding to the pool of foodstuffs available to them.

Mr. Mathers: In view of the fact that the Minister made an exception in respect of control as far as Belgium is concerned, is it not possible for this action to be taken experimentally with Belgium in order to do something at least to alleviate this very serious position?

Mr. Foot: If the hon. Gentleman looks at the original answer he will see that I made no exception as regards control in Belgium.

Mr. Molson: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that his reply will be read with very great satisfaction by many people who do not sympathise with the humanitarian agitation against the enforcement of the blockade?

Mr. Rhys Davies: Is there any evidence that the Germans have actually seized any of these foods which have been allowed in?

Mr. Foot: The only case in which they have been allowed in is that of Greece. For a considerable time throughout last summer when the first emergency shipments were going to Greece the German and Italian occupying forces were laying their hands as hard as they could on Greek domestic produce.

Sir A. Southby: Will the hon. Gentleman appreciate that the best service we can do to the people in the occupied countries is to win the war as quickly as possible and that, to achieve that end, it is desirable that we should apply the very potent weapon of blockade? Further, is it not significant that just at the time when the weapon of the blockade is becoming most effective there is the strongest possible agitation to lift it?

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No.

Draft.

Sir F. Sanderson's P.Q.

18/3.

DRAFT M.E.W. REPLY

As regards the shipment of milk and vitamin concentrates to Greece, I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer which I gave on 11th May to my hon. Friend the Member for the English Universities. Otherwise the policy of H.M.G. remains as laid down by my Rt. Hon. Friend the Prime Minister on the 20th August, 1940. After the fullest consideration and with the deepest sympathy for the allied peoples of Europe in their sufferings under German rule H.M.G. are convinced that a general action of the kind described would inevitably be exploited by the enemy for his own advantage. Moreover, such action could hardly be confined to the countries named in the question and the provision of foodstuffs for children and nursing and expectant mothers throughout occupied Europe would involve a very serious breach in the blockade. I regret, therefore, that the answer to the first part of the

question/

question must be in the negative.

As regards the second part of the question, no information has been received by H.M.G. to show that money, supplies and shipping are now available for this purpose. Nor does there exist in France, Belgium or Poland any machinery of control which we could possibly accept as adequate. As I have frequently pointed out in answers to questions on this subject, neutral control of imported foodstuffs is an insufficient guarantee unless it is accompanied by control over the domestic food supplies of the countries in question.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 7537

20 MAY 1943

Registry Number W 7537/4/49

FROM Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare)

No. T 550/25

Dated 19th May 1943

Received in Registry 20th May 1943

W : Co-ordination

Relief for Belgrade.

Transmits a copy of letter from Dr. Carl Burkhardt (International Red Cross Committee) to Lord Drogheda (Ministry of Economic Warfare) of 1st May and of Lord Drogheda's reply of 15th May regarding relief supplies for the civilian population of Belgrade.

Last Paper.

W 7536.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Sam. Hoare 24/5.

Sam. Hoare 23/5

Eve 24/5

(Action completed.)

26/5/43

(Index.)

A(K) 2B/7

Next Paper.

W 7550

24994 2 /43 F.O.P.

B.L.
T.550/25.

Copy for F.O for observations with comps of mpearings (MEW)

W 128

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

19.5.43

W.7537

20 MAY 1943

15th May, 1943.

Dear Dr. Burckhardt,

Thank you for your letter of May 1st in which you were kind enough to bring to my attention a proposal for the relief of civilians in the town of Belgrade.

This proposal will be examined with care, and, as I need hardly assure you, with sympathy also. I fear however that for reasons which you evidently yourself appreciate, I cannot hold out the prospect of a favourable decision.

Yours very sincerely,

Drogheda.

Dr. Carl J. Burckhardt,
International Red Cross Committee,
Geneva.

D.H. T550/25. 129

COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE
AGENCE CENTRALE DES PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE.
GENEVE.

DELEGATION A LISBONNE

LISBONNE, R. CORPO SANTO 6-3 May 1st, 1943.
TEL. 29946. ADR. TELEGR: INTERCRUZ.

Dear Lord Drogheda,

Concerns: Relief for Serbia.

For the last few months we have received much information concerning the critical situation in Yugoslavia. Our Delegate in Belgrade has emphasized the urgency of sending relief to the civilian population. Health and food situation have so worsened following last year crop failure and inadequecy of communications, that the urban and refugee population is in prefamine stage. The presence of 300,000 refugees in Belgrade makes the situation particularly acute. The present daily food intake amounts to 700 to 800 calories. As a rough estimate 100,000 adolescents and children are in particularly urgent need of relief. Therefore our delegate urges a plan to provide a daily balances ration to supply about 1600 calories at least for these young people. According to the information collected here, the minimum global requirements for 100,000 people for eight months would be :-

5,000 tons of wheat flour.
3,600 tons potatoes.
1,500 tons beans.
360 tons sugar.
1,100 tons dried meat or fish.
1,100 tons dried milk.
360 tons fats or oil containing unsaturated fatty acids and reinforced to contain around 3,000 international units Vitamin A and 300 D per ounce.

This plan recommends these products or suitable alternates with possible supplements of concentrated protective foods or pharmacological vitamins to achieve physiological balancing. Futhermore the clothing situation is particularly bad. 85,000 refugees are children who are suffering cruelly particularly from exposure due to lack of shoes and clothing. In case this relief scheme could be accepted by your Government we should commend to your attention the possiblity of including clothing

Lord Drogheda,
Ministry of Economic Warfare,
LONDON.

/in

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in the relief shipments.

A proper distribution would be technically vouchsafed through communal feeding allocating weekly instalments to existing nurseries and schoolcanteens operated by the Serbien refugee commissioner and the Serbien Red Cross. Furthermore these distributions would be supervised to our delegate assisted, if necessary, by other Swiss citizens, a reinforcement of our delegation being accepted in principle.

I fully realize the very intricate questions raised by this proposal, one of them being the difficulty of making another exception to the blockade policy of the British Government. But the situation in Belgrade is now as critical as it was in Greece at the beginning of the relief action.

On the other hand there remains the problem of transportation, very difficult to solve.

I would appreciate it very much to know your personal view on this matter.

Very sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) Carl J.Burckhardt.

192.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 7550

20 MAY 1943

Registry Number W 7550/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No. T 550/12/A

Dated 19th May 1943

Received in Registry 20th May 1943

W : Co-ordination

Medical supplies for Norway.

Transmits copies of letter from Mr. Caspersen (Norwegian Ministry of Social Welfare) to Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) of 27th April and of Mr. Camps' reply of 19th May regarding medical supplies for Norway.

Last Paper.

W 7537.

References.

(Minutes.)

Stffr 2 times.

Norwegian dept.

21/5.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
W 31/5/43	AEH 24/5

Next Paper.

W 7554.

24994 2'43 F.O.P.

Copy to:
E.F. Crowe Esq.
Foreign Office.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

CK

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T.550/12/A.

W 7550

20 MAY 1943

10th May 1943.

Would you please refer to your letter of April 27th on the subject of medical supplies for Norway?

The list you were kind enough to enclose has now been considered in detail from the blockade point of view. I am afraid that, as I foresaw at the time of our interview, none of the items on the list falls into the category of "strictly medical supplies" as they are defined for blockade purposes.

In view of the relatively small amounts involved we should find it possible to make an exception for the following:

Flannel	1000 yards
Plaster Hospital neck pools	500 spools
Surgical silk	25 kilos
" Linen	25 "

But I am sorry to have to confirm that the other items could not be sent through the blockade.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Mortimer at the Ministry of Supply, who would be able to tell you whether the amounts mentioned above of flannel, plaster and ligatures could be supplied from this country.

(Sgd.) W.A. Camps.

Dr. J. Caspersen,
Norwegian Ministry of
Social Welfare,
Kingston House,
Prince's Gate,
London, S.W.7.

EB.

DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF SOCIAL WELFARE

133

Copy to:
E.E.Crowe Esq.
Foreign Office.

KINGSTON HOUSE,
PRINCES GATE,
LONDON, S.W.7.

Jnr.M.D. 1510/43

April 27th 1943.

JC/AR

Mr. Antoine Camps,
Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
W. 1.

Dear Mr. Camps,

I refer to the conference at your Office on April 23rd, in which also Mr. Carl Semb took part.

As mentioned in the conference there is at present great difficulties in Norway in order to supply the hospitals with adequate equipment. The first months after the occupation the hospitals were relatively well off as to equipment owing to large stocks obtained before the war. Lately however, the difficulties have increased, as the stocks mostly have been used up. We constantly receive reports from Norway as to the fact that the conditions now are very serious respecting such equipment. I particularly attach importance to the information which Mr. Semb gave, as Chief of the Surgical Department of the largest hospital in Norway (Oslo Municipal Hospital, 2500 beds), and as President of the Norwegian Surgical Association, Mr. Semb has a thorough knowledge of the conditions, and considered it as one of his tasks, when he a short time ago left Norway, if possible to assist in procuring some of the most essential equipment to Norway as soon as possible.

After the conference at your office, I have in conjunction with Mr. Semb set up the following list of equipment which we regard as very important to be sent to Norway. The shipment may take place in the same way as the medical supplies, and in this connection I would like to mention that up till today all the goods

which/

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which have been sent to Norway with the permission of the Ministry of Economic Warfare have been distributed according to plan without interference from German or Nazi authorities.

Plain gauze 1½ mill. yards.

This quantity equals approx. one year's requirements. One has only counted hospital requirements, and not what is needed of gauze outside the hospitals. If your Ministry hesitates in giving permission for this quantity to be sent, it would be of great help if also a somewhat reduced quantity could be sent.

Flannel 1000 yards

Plaster hospital reck-pools 30 cm. x 10 m. 500 spooles

Surgical silk (Ligatures) 25 kilo

Surgical Linen (Ligatures) 25 kilo

Surgeons rubber gloves No. 6½-2000 pairs, No. 7 - 7000 pairs; 7½ - 14000 pairs, No. 8 - 7000 pairs. (Equals approx. ¼ year' requirements).

Clinical thermometer 2000 dozen

Hospital soap 20,000 pieces.

Ordinary soap (Sunlight type) for hospital use 20,000 pieces.

Toothbrushes 10,000

Nailbrushes 10,000

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed)

John Caspersen

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 7554

20 MAY 1943

Registry Number } W 7554/4/49

FROM Mr. Robertson M.P. to Secretary of State.

No.

Dated 17th May

Received in Registry } 20th May 1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for Europe.

Encloses a leaflet announcing a meeting about relief for Europe, which he received from one of his constituents.

Considers that this harmful propaganda should be strongly put down by the Government.

Last Paper.

W 7550

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/ L. Campo (M.E.W.)
from Mr. Crowe.
May 20

(Minutes.)

[redacted].
See W. 7910.

11
16.

(Action completed.)

MB 3/6/43

(Index.)

ACH 28/5

Next Paper.

(W 7910)
W 7644

24994 2 43 F.O.P.

ACKNOWLEDGED
18.5.43.

W 7E54

20 MAY 1943

17th May, 1943.

The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

My dear Eden,

I enclose herewith a leaflet which I have received from a woman constituent today.

I telephoned to your Secretary in the hope that your Department could take some steps to have notes taken of all that was said at the meeting. My constituent is employed in the principal War Factory in Streatham, and I imagine that similar leaflets were given to all the other workers.

I am of opinion that this harmful propaganda should be strongly put down by the Government. It can only have a harmful effect, and surely it is undesirable that Belgian subjects such as Madame Magda Yoors-Peeters should abuse the hospitality which she enjoys by telling British audiences that their Government is at fault in failing to feed the children of parents who are working full time for the enemy.

Yours sincerely,

David Robertson

Encl.

① Ref. Asks 136
② Judicial Dept.
Mr Robertson spoke to me shortly before that meeting. He was very indignant, but I didn't see what we could or should do if Cop the meeting
EE 18/5

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WILL YOU STAND BY

WHILE

THE CHILDREN

OF

Occupied Europe

STARVE

?

in the

Sports Hall

New Rd. Mitcham Junction

at 6.0 p.m.

on

Monday, May 17th

Come and hear the Case for Controlled Food Relief

Speakers :

Mrs. Barbara Duncan Harris
J.P.

Madame Magda Yoors-Peeters
from Belgium

Ray Challis
from Mitcham Works

who will tell you how practical help can be sent before it is too late

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W 7554/4/49

Draft.

Mr Camps
to E.W.
from
Mr Crowe

20 4

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20. May, 1943.

OUT FILE.

[My dear Camps]

I enclose a/p mail for perusal & eventual return, a letter addressed to the F/S by an "anti-ship" M.P.

Can you suggest a suitable line for a reply?

E.E.C.
20/5

Yours ever

(Sgd.) E. E. CROWE.

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FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.

OUT FILE

20th May, 1943.

(W 7554/4/49)

My dear Camps.

I enclose in original for perusal and eventual return, a letter addressed to the Secretary of State by an "anti-relief" M.P.

Can you suggest a suitable line for a reply?

Yours ever

(E.E. Crowe)

W.A. Camps, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 7644

22 MAY 1943

Registry Number } W 7644/4/49

FROM Censorship (communicated)

No.

Dated

Received in Registry } 22nd May 1943

W : Co-ordination

Office du Colis Alimentaire.

Transmits extracts from a letter from M. Hubert to Madame Hubert (Lisbon) of 8th May enclosing a copy of the projected statute of the Office du Colis Alimentaire and minutes of the meeting at which it was discussed.

Last Paper.

W 7554

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Censor & record

Central Dept

MAB 25/5

L.C. 24/5

See within P. & T. Censorship Intercept June 16

25/5/16.

Central Dept.

MAB 25/5

(Action completed.)

mk 26/5/43.

(Index.)

A11 28/7

Next Paper.

W 7757

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

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W.7644

22 MAY 1943

M. Crowe
Air
19/5

VB.
~~14.5.43.~~

P.C. 72.

POSTAL & TELEGRAPH CENSORSHIP
UNITED KINGDOM

TYPE OF MAIL: TERMINAL. Air.

Submission No.: LON/28907/43.

Date:

Reg. No.

Taken off S.S. at (port)

on (date)

FROM:
A. HUBERT
109, EATON SQUARE
LONDON,
S.W.1.

TO:
MADAME HUBERT
39, RUA ESTRELA
LISBON
PORTUGAL.

MAY 1943

Date of letter (or postmark) 8.5.43.

Language: French.

ORIGINAL LETTER:
Photographed and Released.

SUBMITTED TO:
Comment and Photostat to F.O.
Copy " " " M.E.W.
" " " " T.E.D.
" " " " C.P.C. (Miss Gregory
" " " " A.C. Red I. I.R.B.

Seen by: Naval Adviser | Air Adviser | M.I.12

Operating Unit	Section	Examiner	D.A.C.	Date
~~PAI/BOL.~~	T.7./4	1561.	E.M.S.	13.5.43.

Enclosures: (1) REPORT OF MEETING.
(2) COPY OF PROJECTED STATUTE.

Further to desire expressed by writer in previous correspondence that the O.C.A. be put on an official basis, the LONDON head of the organisation encloses copy of projected Statute, together with minutes of the meeting at which it was discussed.

In a private covering letter he emphasises that the PRO-ARTE SOCIETY in PORTUGAL must have the assistance of the O.C.A. and of the Belgian Authorities.

A suggestion is recorded in the minutes of this meeting that military parcels should be dealt with under a separate scheme, the O.C.A. confining its activities to civilian parcels.

Translation of extracts from covering letter:

"Concerning the O.C.A. - we are going to draw up a Statute to obviate the inconveniences we have noticed in this organisation. As Founder Member you are entitled to receive the reports of the meetings.

I shall immediately propose to assist PRO ARTE within reason. Then I shall get in touch with the Ministry of Education concerning the Quatuor (Ex. Note: Belgian String Quartet).

PRO ARTE can do nothing without help. The O.C.A. must assist in the first place. This the logical solution. PRO ARTE must have the assistance of the Belgian Authorities. I shall ask the Government to act accordingly."

(20721D) Wt 44128/H450 50000 1/43 H J R & L Gp 748/6
(21601D) Wt 49095/H466 250000 3/43

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1) Les fondateurs; ~~sont;~~ Monsieur A.HUBERT, Madame A.HUBERT, le Baron de WAHA-BAILLONVILLE, le Ministre Plénipotentiaire Ch.BASTIN, Monsieur LAURENT.

2) De nouveaux membres qui, pour pouvoir être désignés, doivent être présentés par le Président et élus par le conseil d'administration.

3/ Le directeur du bureau de fonds assiste aux réunions du conseil d'administration.

art. 10. Le conseil d'administration est investi des pouvoirs les plus étendus pour l'administration de l'Office, de ses sièges d'exploitation, pour la direction de ses agents et la réalisation de son but.
Il nomme et révoque les membres du personnel de l'Office, détermine leurs attributions.
Il établit des règlements d'ordre intérieur de l'Office, des sièges d'exploitation et des agences.
Il contrôle et vérifie les renseignements statistiques fournis par les bureaux d'exploitation et les agents.
Toutes les affaires sont traitées sous la seule signature du Président. Le Président peut déléguer tout ou partie de ses pouvoirs. Il représente l'Office en justice.

art. 11. La correspondance ayant pour objet des retraits de fonds en banque devra porter deux signatures autorisées.
Dans les pays ou un siège d'exploitation sera établi s'occupant de l'expédition de colis, le conseil d'administration confiera la gestion journalière de ce siège à un comité local, désigné après consultation avec les autorités belges locales.

art. 12. Les décisions du conseil sont prises à la majorité des voix, trois membres au moins étant présents ou représentés. Le Président à voix prépondérante.

CONCOURS ~~DELEGUES~~ DU GOUVERNEMENT BELGE.

art. 13. L'O.C.A. entend poursuivre son action en plein accord avec le Gouvernement Belge et avec son appui.
Le département des Affaires Etrangères sera prié de désigner un fonctionnaire supérieur qui fera partie du conseil d'administration, avec voix consultative, et qui à ce titre sera chargé d'assurer la liaison avec le Département en vue d'obtenir l'appui officiel le plus complet et le plus efficace.
~~Ce délégué recevra régulièrement copie des situations périodiques pour être remises au Département.~~

Dans les pays ou un organisme d'exécution sera créé, le Département des Affaires Etrangères sera invité à désigner un membre de la représentation diplomatique ou consulaire, qui vis-

avis du comité local, par [illegible] délégué gouvernemental, [illegible] conseil d'[illegible]

[illegible]

DÉFAUTS [illegible]

art. [illegible] Tous les mandats sont gratuits, tant au conseil d'administration que dans les organismes d'exécution.

Les membres du conseil d'administration et des comités des organismes d'exécution n'encourent aucune responsabilité du chef des opérations effectuées par les bureaux d'exécution, sauf en cas personnel de délit de droit commun.

LIQUIDATION.

art. [illegible] En cas de liquidation, le solde éventuel disponible, sera, après avis du Département des Affaires étrangères, affecté à une ou plusieurs œuvres humanitaires ou culturelles.

MI

W7644/4/49

W

W 7644/4/49

INDEXED

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17/6

P.C. 72
DLR 15.6.43.

POSTAL & TELEGRAPH CENSORSHIP
UNITED KINGDOM

TYPE OF MAIL
TERMINAL. AIR

Submission No.: LON/38299/43

Date:

Reg. No.

Taken off S.S. at (port)

on (date)

FROM:
A. HUBERT

109 EATON SQUARE
LONDON. S.W.1

TO: MADAME G. HUBERT

39 RUA ESTRELA
LISBON
PORTUGAL

16 JUN 1943

Date of letter (or postmark) 2.6.43.

Language: FRENCH

ORIGINAL LETTER:

RELEASED.

SUBMITTED TO:
Comment to F/O ~~—~~ M.E.W.
T.E.D.
C.P.C. (Miss Gregory)
A.C. Red Cross

Seen by: Naval Adviser | Air Adviser | M.I.12

Operating Unit	Section	Examiner	D.A.C.	Date
PRI/HOL	T7/4.	1561	E.M.S.	10.6.43.

ASSENT GIVEN BY BELGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO PROPOSED STATUTE OF THE O.C.A.

(Copy of Statute previously submitted LON/28907/43).

EXTRACT FROM COVERING LETTER: "The Statutes of the "Office" are accepted. The text is enclosed, also a copy of the Minister's letter of acceptance" - - - -

EXTRACT FROM COPY OF MINISTER'S LETTER: "I have no objection to make to the Statute of the O.C.A. which you have drawn up with your colleagues, and which you have been good enough to send me. I believe that it will promote the development of this organization in which the Government has always taken a great interest.

As you point out, the Statute defines the position of the Administration of the O.C.A. in relation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This position is as we defined it formerly, close collaboration but complete independence, so that the O.C.A. may preserve absolutely its character of a private concern and the Foreign Ministry its freedom of action and of judgment concerning circumstances which may arise.

I am forwarding a copy of the Statutes of the O.C.A. and also a copy of this letter to our legation in LISBON".

(20721D) Wt 44128/H450 50000 1/43 H J R & L Gp 745/6
(21601D) W 49695/H466 250000 3/43

195

150

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 7757

25 MAY 1943

Registry Number } W 7759/4/49

FROM Lord Drogheda (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Le Rougetel

Dated 21st May:1943

Received in Registry } 25th May:1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for occupied Europe.

Transmits a record of a conversation between the Netherlands Ambassador and Lord Drogheda on 21st May when the Netherlands Ambassador drew attention to the replies returned by the Parliamentary Secretary on 19th May to a question by Sir F. Sanderson about relief for occupied countries.

Last Paper.

W)644(15)536)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Confidential Dept

26/5

26/5.

E. Cross 25/5

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
W.E. 27/5/43	All 28/7

Next Paper.

W 7813.

151

W 7757
25 MAY 1943

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

21st May, 1943.

WITH LORD DROGHEDA'S COMPLIMENTS.

J.H.Le Rougetel, Esq., C.M.G., M.C.,
Foreign Offcie.

P.-Foot
Eden

The Netherlands Ambassador called to-day to draw attention to the replies returned by the Parliamentary Secretary in the House of Commons on the 19th May to a question by Sir Frank Sanderson, and to supplementary questions by other Members, about milk and vitamin products for various occupied countries. M.Michiels said that he had been asked by his Government how he could reconcile these replies with his report of his interview with Lord Selborne and myself on the same day, when he had been told that the whole question of relief was under consideration with the U.S.Government.

I said that there was nothing in what Mr.Foot had said which was incompatible with what Lord Selborne had told M.Michiels and M.Kerstens. Mr.Foot had stated that the policy of H.M.Government remained as laid down by the Prime Minister in August 1940. That did not mean that we were precluded from reviewing our policy from time to time in consultation with our Allies. We had to answer questions in the House of Commons and could only tell them what in fact was our present policy.

The Ambassador said that he understood that, but that he would have thought that we could have said that our policy was now being reviewed. I replied that no doubt we could have said something of the sort, but that it was by no means certain that our examination would result in any change of policy. That being so, it would in my opinion be wrong to make any public statement that could give rise to hopes and expectations that might never be fulfilled.

M.Michiels did not dissent from this view, and merely said that he would report to his Government what I had told him.

(Intd.) D.

The Minister.
Mr. Foot.
Mr.Troutbeck.
Mr. Camps.
(Copy sent to Mr. Le Rougetel, F.O).

21st May, 1943.

196.

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W. 7813

26 MAY 1943

153

Registry Number } W 7813/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No. T 550/9

Dated 24th May, 1943.

Received in Registry } 28th May, 1943.

W: Coordination +

Relief for Belgium

Transmits a copy of telegram to Washington No. 2071 Arfar of 20th May stating that a member of the International Red Cross now on a visit to Lisbon has approached His Majesty's Embassy about the critical wheat situation in Belgium and asked if Blockade authorities would allow importation of wheat from overseas provided I.R.C. could find necessary shipping. If United States authorities agree, proposes to reply that blockade policy remains unchanged.

Last Paper.

W7757.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Hagg 28/5.

Contract dept. M.O.S. 31/5

E.C. 28/5

See within copy of tel to W'tan No 2207 Arfar. May 29

H. 4/6.

See within copy tel from W'tan No 1909 Arfar 2 June 2 W

See within copy of tel to W'tan No 2312 Arfar 2 June S

23/6.

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
Mle 3 | 6 | 43.	All 26/7

Next Paper.

W 7832.

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

W 7813

26 MAY 1943

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/19.
COPY FOR E E Crowe, Esq.
DATE 24/5/43.

(T.550/19)

[CYPHER]

LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 2071. ARFAR.

D. 1.05 p.m. 21st May 1943.

20th May, 1943.

Repeated to Lisbon (Mission) No. 990 ARFAR.

q q q

Member of International Red Cross now on visit to Lisbon has approached His Majesty's Embassy about critical wheat situation in Belgium and asked if Blockade authorities would allow importation of wheat from overseas provided International Red Cross could find necessary shipping. Distribution of wheat could if necessary be confined to children.

2. According to information received from International Red Cross by His Majesty's Legation at Berne Swiss authorities would be willing to allocate shipping space for 10,000 tons for despatch from Philadelphia this month.

3. If United States authorities agree, I propose to instruct Sir R. Campbell to reply that our policy in these matters is unchanged and that we therefore cannot agree to this proposal.

4. In this connexion please ask Prime Minister to show you telegrams Nos. T.O.O. 1305Z and 1310Z/17 from Foreign Office.

W 7813/4/49

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

155

T.550/19/29/5

[Cypher].

INDEXED

LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON

No. 2207 Arfar
29th May, 1943.

D. 11.00 p.m. 29th May, 1943.

////////

IMPORTANT

My telegram No. 2071 [Arfar of May 20th: Relief for Belgium].

We are anxious to send a early answer to the enquiry of the International Red Cross, lest delay may encourage the Germans to blackmail.

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/19/29/5
COPY FOR Hon. W. Hogg
DATE 1.6.43.

[CYPHER] W 8813/4/49

156

ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Viscount Halifax
No. 1909 ARFAR
2nd June, 1943,

D. 1.01 a.m. 3rd June, 1943.
R. 9.50 a.m. 3rd June, 1943.

sssss

IMPORTANT

Your telegram No. 2207. W 8813/4

Lehman, pressed yesterday and again to-day for an immediate reply, greatly regretted that he could not give one as he has not yet been able to get in touch with the President.

2. Could you in meanwhile explain reference to German blackmail, in your telegram under reply?

3. From information received by American Red Cross it may (repeat may) prove to be true that Germans have cut off wheat supplies in Brussels (repeat Brussels) but not Belgium as a whole.

M.E.W. FILE No. 1550/19.
COPY FOR [illegible] Office
DATE 9/6/43

W 157

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

W 7813/4/49

T 550/19/Z

[CYPHER]. ARFAR (SECRET).

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 2312 ARFAR. D. 11.10 p.m. 5th June, 1943.
5th June, 1943.

*** * ***

IMPORTANT.

Your telegram No. 1909 [Arfar of 2nd June: Relief for Belgium], paragraph 2.

1. Our point was that the longer our reply is delayed the more we give the impression that our minds are not made up and that we may be prepared to accede to the request. Our apparent hesitation might well be used by the Germans as an excuse for tightening up their policy.

2. We do not see how we can possibly agree to request of International Red Cross in view of decision arrived at by President and Prime Minister. Therefore we urgently require American consent to refusing their application as soon as possible.

O.T.P.

M.E.W. FILE No. 1550/19/Z
COPY FOR Foreign Office (PS)
DATE 9/6/43

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 7832
26 MAY 1943

Registry Number } W 7832/4/49

FROM Netherlands Ambassador (conversation)

No.

Dated 25th May, 1943.

Received in Registry } 26th May, 1943.

W: Coordination +

Food situation in Netherlands

During a conversation with the Secretary of State the Netherlands Ambassador referred to the food position in Holland and said that he had been in communication with the Ministry of Economic Warfare. He added that there was no doubt the position of the children was seriously deteriorating. His Government understood the position but he feared that he would shortly have to send a further communication on the subject.

Last Paper.

W 7813. (W 6222)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Sir H. Bland No 113. May 25.

M.E.W. June 1st

(Minutes.)

Being printed K & W. C.

Sir H. Bland 21/5

W.H. 29/5
Central dept.

Copy to E.W.

E.E. 27/5

Draft to Sir H. Bland
The King
War Cabinet

(Action completed.)

MB 1/6/43

(Index.)

A.H. 27/7

Next Paper.

(W 8152)

W 7902

24794 12/42 F.O.P.

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

159

MOST SECRET.

Copy No. 8

ARCHIVES

[W 7832/4/49]

OUT FILE

Mr. Eden to Sir N. Bland.

(No. 113.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, 25th May,* 1943.

THE Netherlands Ambassador referred to the food position in Holland when he came to see me to-day and said that he had been in communication with the Ministry of Economic Warfare on the matter. He added that there was no doubt that the position of the children was seriously deteriorating. His Government understood the difficulties of our position, but none the less he feared that he would shortly have to send me a further communication on the subject.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

10916—539 [25380—18]

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W 7832/4/49

A.E.

Draft.

Sir N. Bland.

No. 113.

K 4
5 C.

MAY 28 1943
F.O. REGISTRY

160

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

25th May, 1943.

SECRET

Sir,

The Netherlands Ambassador referred to the food position in Holland when he came to see me to-day and said that he had been in communication with the Ministry of Economic Warfare on the matter. He added that there was no doubt that the position of the children was seriously deteriorating. His Government understood the difficulties of our position but none the less he feared that he would shortly have to send me a further communication on the subject.

W 7832
26 MAY 1943

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 7902

27 MAY 1943

Registry Number W 7902/4/49

FROM Mr. Mynors (Treasury) to Mr. Hogg.

No. F 18110

Dated 26th May, 1943

Received in Registry 27th May, 1943

W : Co-ordination

Medical supplies for Latvia.

Refers to Foreign Office letter of 21st May (W 7366/4/49). As Monsieur Zarine has already spent £1,754.19s.8d., on medical supplies he will have to be allowed to reimburse the Red Cross and the simplest course seems to be for the money to come from his Legation account. Copied to Mr. Henriques (Trading with the Enemy Department).

Last Paper.

W 7832 (W 7366)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

D of/h. Zarine
for m. Crowe
Lucy. May.

(Minutes.)

RH
Eve 29/1.

(Action completed.)

rule
2/6/43

(Index.)

Aet 1
27
7

Next Paper.

W 7910

24794 12/42 F.O.P.

Enclr

Your Reference W 7366/4/49.

Treasury Reference F.18110

TREASURY CHAMBERS,
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON, S.W.1.

162

7902

26th May, 1943.

Dear Hogg,

I see from your Department's printed letter of the 21st May that Monsieur Zarine of the Latvian "Legation" has gone ahead and spent £1,754.19. 8. on medical supplies for Latvian children, in spite of the rather discouraging letter he had from Warner last 12th August (W 9156/62/49). That having been done, he will have to be allowed to reimburse the Red Cross, and the simplest course seems to be for the money to come from his Legation account in this instance. I have

The Hon. W.N.M. Hogg,
Foreign Office.

/mentioned

mentioned this to Henriques of T.W.E.D. (to whom I am sending a copy of this) and he agrees.

Yours sincerely,

R.A.B. Leyland

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No. W7902/4/49.

Draft.

M. Lascia
for
the Crown

GRAS 30/5.
by Warner

310

164

1 June. May. 1943.

Dear Laiene

Warner has passed to me your letter of No D 135/602 of May 14th regarding payment for certain medical supplies sent to Latvia.

I have consulted the Treasury who regret that they cannot see their way to authorizing the use of Latvian blocked funds for this purpose; but there is no objection to payment being made out of the Legation funds.

I return the bill of the Red X.

(Sgd.) E. E. CROWE.

EEC 31/5

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.,

1st June, 1943.

No.W 7902/4/49.

165

Dear Zarine.

Warner has passed to me your letter No. D 138/502 of the 14th May regarding payment for certain medical supplies sent to Latvia.

I have consulted the Treasury who regret that they cannot see their way to authorizing the use of Latvia blocked funds for this purpose; but there is no objection to payment being made out of the Legation funds.

I return the bill of the Red Cross.

Yours sincerely

(E.E. Crowe)

His Excellency
Monsieur Charles Zarine,
87, Eaton Place,
S.W.1.

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GENERAL

W 7910

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

27 MAY 1943

Registry Number } W 7910/4/49

FROM Mr. Camps Ministry of Economic Warfare, to Mr. Crowe.

No. T 550/1F

Dated 25th May:1943

Received in Registry } 27th May:1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for occupied Europe.

Refers to Mr. Crowe's letter of 20th May (W 7554/4/49). Returns the letter from Mr. Robertson M.P. Suggests that Mr. Robertson should be told that although the propaganda in question is harmful and frequently misleading, administrative action against expression of opinions by private people is not justified.

Last Paper.

W 7902 (W 7554)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft/Mr. Roberts M.P. from S of S May 31

& le. Camps (M.E.W) Dft/me 1.

(Action completed.)

me 31/6/43

(Index.)

All 28/5

Next Paper.

W 7915

(Minutes.)

See within

24794 12/42 F.O.P.

167

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

T.550/A

25th May, 1943.

W.7910
27 MAY 1943

Dear Crowe,

Many thanks for your letter No.W.7554/4/49 of May 20th, with which you enclosed a copy of a letter from a member of Parliament complaining of the agitation which is being conducted in favour of Relief. As you asked, I am returning this letter herewith.

We feel that we have legitimate grounds for complaint if Belgian or other nationals in this country occupying official positions take part in agitation against the British Government's policy. But as far as we know Madame Yoors-Peeters does not occupy an official position. So we suppose that she enjoys the same rights of free speech as British subjects do, and though these rights are frequently abused by British subjects and others for the dissemination of foolish and uninformed opinions, we do not think that that alone is a reason why these rights should be denied. Deliberate sabotage of the War effort would be another matter, but there is no proof of that in the present case.

We suggest therefore that the reply to this correspondent might express an agreement that the propaganda in question is harmful and frequently misleading, but add that you would not feel justified in taking administrative

action/

E. E. Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

action against the expression of opinions by private people, which however misguided, are no doubt honestly held. You might wish to add that the Government's position was clearly stated in the reply given by Mr. Foot to Sir Frank Sanderson in the House of Commons on May 19th.

Yours ever

Anthony Campos.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W7910/4/49

Draft.

Re: David Robertson M.P.

from

Mr Eden

Priv. Sec.

Copy to Campbell

27a

Confidential

OUT FILE 169

My dear Robertson.

Thank you for your letter of May 17th about the relief meeting in Streatham

I agree with you that propaganda of this kind is harmful and frequently misleading. But that is quite a different thing from taking administrative action to prevent the expression of such views by private persons; and, of course, in this respect we have to treat aliens resident in this country on the same footing as our own people

people as long as they are
private individuals like
Mr. Gorrs. Peerts, and an expression which
however misguided
are doubtless honestly held

While however I repeat
as much as you do
outbursts of this kind I
fear that there is nothing
to be done about it; and that
the attitude of the Govt on the question of relief
has recently again been made
clear in Mr Foot's reply
(in the House)
to Sir T. Sanderson on
May 19th., a copy of which
I enclose for convenience
of reference.

Yours sincerely

Sd) Anthony Eden.

27/5

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

171

(W 7910/4/49)
Confidential.

OUT FILE

31st May, 1943.

My dear Robertson

Thank you for your letter of the 17th May about the relief meeting in Streatham.

I agree with you that propaganda of this kind is harmful and frequently misleading. But that is quite a different thing from taking administrative action to prevent the expression of such views by private persons; and, of course, in this respect we have to treat aliens resident in this country on the same footing as our own people as long as they are private individuals like Madame Yoors-Peeters, and are expressing views which however misguided are doubtless honestly held.

While therefore I regret as much as you do outbursts of this kind I fear that there is nothing to be done about it; but the attitude of the Government on the question of relief has recently again been made clear in Mr. Foot's reply to Sir Frank Sanderson in the House on the 19th May, a copy of which I enclose for convenience of reference.

Yours sincerely

(Sd) Anthony Eden.

D. Robertson Esq., M.P.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

W 7915

28 MAY 1943

172

Registry Number W } 7915/4/49

FROM Parliamentary Question (Mr. Silkin)

No.

Dated 26th May 1943

Received in Registry } 28th May 1943

W : Co-ordination

Food supplies for Belgian children.

Mr. Silkin asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare whether he was aware of the heavy mortality among Belgian children due to serious shortage of food; and whether he would grant navicerts to permit the entry into Belgium of 2,000 to 3,000 tons a month of vitamins, milk and medicine for children and mothers.

Mr. Foot referred to the reply to Sir F. Sanderson on 19th May (W 7536/4/49) and stated that medical supplies were always allowed to pass through the blockade.

Last Paper.

W 7910.

References.

(Minutes.)

Central Dept

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

wb 3/6/43

(Index.)

AC 26/7

Next Paper.

W 8021.

GENERAL.

PARLIAMENTARY

QUESTION.

173

* 47. Mr. Silkin,—To ask the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, whether he is aware of the heavy mortality among Belgian children due to serious shortage of food; and whether he will grant navicerts to permit, under proper control as to its distribution, the entry into Belgium of say 2,000 to 3,000 tons a month of vitamins, milk and medicine, to be supplied to children under 16 years of age and nursing and expectant mothers. [*2nd Sitting Day after 23rd May.*]

LAB.

F.O. ARE NOT ASKED TO ADVISE.

W.79.5

28 MAY 1943

ANSWERED 26 MAY 1943

REPLY ATTACHED.

1562/3

Library to obtain supply please

BELGIAN CHILDREN (FOOD SUPPLIES)

31. **Mr. Silkin** asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare whether he is aware of the heavy mortality among Belgian children due to serious shortage of food; and whether he will grant navicerts to permit, under proper control as to its distribution, the entry into Belgium of say 2,000 to 3,000 tons a month of vitamins, milk and medicine, to be supplied to children under 16 years of age and nursing and expectant mothers?

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare (Mr. Dingle Foot): While it is, I regret to say, true that the food shortage in Belgium is felt severely by the child population, my information does not confirm that, taking the country as a whole, these conditions have caused any striking increase in child as distinct from infant mortality. According to statistics recently published in Belgium there was, last year, a fall in the death-rate of infants under one year of age. The figures for deaths per thousand live births were in 1939, 73; in 1940, 89; in 1941, 85; and in 1942, 78. As regards milk and vitamins I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply which I gave on 19th May to my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing (Sir F. Sanderson). Medical supplies in the strict sense of the term are and always have been allowed to pass through the blockade.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 8021

29 MAY 1943

Registry Number W 8021/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare, communicated.

Dated 24th May,
Received in Registry 29th May, 1943.
W : Co-ordination

Dutch purchase of oranges in Spain.

Transmits copies of telegram from Washington No. 1669 Arfar of 12th May and telegram to Washington No. 2012 Arfar of 17th May regarding proposed Dutch purchases of oranges in Spain.

Last Paper.

W 7915

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Hmm Kagg 8/6.

Contraf dept.

Kcb 4/6

(Action completed.)

4/6/43

(Index.)

A 4/4 27/7

Next Paper.

W 8029

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

W W

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

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INDEXED

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/20
COPY FOR E E Grove.
DATE 24/5/43.

W 7140/4/49

T 550/20

[CYPHER]

26 MAY 1943

ARFAR O.B.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 2012 ARFAR.
17th May 1943

D. 12.05 a.m. 18th May 1943

W 8001

29 MAY 1943

Your telegram No. 1669 [Arfar of May 12th: proposed Dutch purchase of oranges in Spain.]

See last paragraph of letter T550/Z to Murray of March 29th. We replied that neither Ministry of Economic Warfare nor Treasury was able at present time to sanction so large a transfer of sterling to Spain for the purpose in question.

2. We were informed of subsequent Dutch approach to United States Treasury, but have not commented on it.

3. We have no objection if United States allow purchase of pesetas against dollars in this case, assuming firm involved is respectable. Oranges are genuine surplus produce of Spain. Our own refusal of funds was due solely to financial circumstances, though our reply was on purpose rather vaguely phrased.

4. If United States agree, we assume their Embassy at Madrid will control transaction, and should be grateful to be kept informed.

W 7140/4/49

5. See also our savingram No. 639 [Arfar of May 8th] about a Norwegian application.

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[CYPHER] ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Viscount Halifax
No. 1669 Arfar
12th May, 1943

D. 3.30 a.m. 13th May, 1943
R. 10.00 a.m. 13th May, 1943

ddddddd

We understand that United States Treasury has received request from Dutch Government for release of funds for purchase of oranges in Spain. Can you give us particulars of this and if Dutch have already approached you, information as to attitude you have taken?

1943

W 8029 /G 177

29 MAY 1943

GENERAL

W. 4

W 8029. ~~220~~ 49

Mr. N. Hall (Wilson) (Comm'd).

May 17.

May 29.

Blockade relief policy

Comments on difficulties of handling relief matters, and encloses copy of minute for the P.M. dated May 15, hoping that he will discuss the question with the President, and suggesting lines on which this should be done.

Last Paper.

W7176

(Minutes.)

See minute. Tel. from Brit Com (Wilson) No. Pencil 187. May 21.

References.

W6812/4/49.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel. Wilson No. 3488 25/5. c'd. Com. Stockholm (MEW) May 26.

(Action completed.)

2/6/43.

(Index.)

W/M.

Next Paper.

(W8074/4/49). W8822 W12522

W

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Relief through the Blockade.

After discussing the Prime Minister's telegram Pencil No. 187 with Lord Drogheda, I feel that we should do our best while the Prime Minister is still in Washington to secure a definite agreement with regard to (a) the proposed secret discussions with Governor Lehman, and (b) a definite form of reply to appeals.

I attach a draft telegram to Washington which I have concerted with Lord Drogheda. It is, I hope, self-explanatory, and if approved should, I submit, issue as soon as possible.

H. Dalton.

May 24th 1943.

J.M.Macdonald 24/v

AB. May 24.1943.

May 24

COPY.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

BY AIR BAG.

WASHINGTON.

17th May, 1943.

W8029.
29 MAY 43

SECRET.

Dear Henry,

I talked to the Ambassador since I got back about the Ministers' meeting with Lehman and the subsequent Cabinet meeting. Since our talk he has received Foreign Office telegram No.3220, and he had already got me to draw up a brief minute for the P. M. asking him to talk things over with the President. I attach copy of the Minute for you. I hope to see Cherwell today or tomorrow to keep him briefed.

Meanwhile, I am having rather a difficult time with the Governor, who is in a hurry to get on with his inquiry. He is, however, being patient, and will probably remain so as long as the two great men are in conference with one another in Washington. It would have been more difficult to deal with Lehman if the P. M. had not come over.

Lehman told me last night that he had had some talks with Riefler on the subject and that the Board of Economic Warfare was interested. This lets me out because it is Lehman and not us who have told the Board of Economic Warfare people about Hull's move in authorising Lehman to discuss the question in London. We should have had a fine outburst of temper if the leak to B.E.W. had taken place on our side. As things now are, I expect that Stone or somebody from B.E.W. will be included in any study that may be made. Should this occur I shall regard it as a welcome development.

Meanwhile, I am arranging to have a talk with Long, Lehman and B.E.W. about handling the detail on Prisoner of War Relief and similar matters. I ~~do~~ hope that they will agree to have these things dealt with in London direct with you and to become responsible for sending over here the information which the State Department wishes to have.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) Noel F. Hall.

The Right Honourable
The Earl of Drogheda, C.M.G.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House, W.1.

179A

SECRET.

15th May, 1943.

P.M.

Would you be willing to speak to the President about this:

He has been pressing us to agree to send a large number of food parcels for civilians into Norway and milk for mothers and babies into Belgium. This, in spite of the fact that we reached an agreement last November that the Blockade should be firmly maintained.

In order to hold him it seems desirable to get all the facts reviewed quickly and secretly by one of my people and one or two Americans. This review should bring out clearly:

i. That we cannot give way to one or two European allies without giving way to all.

ii. That the supply position makes it impractical to give way to all.

iii. That, therefore, until there is a marked change in the European war situation, there is nothing doing.

Months of work have got Hull to see that there is something in our three points. I am not sure that the President has got them straight.

If you and he could approve of the review, we here would be in a much stronger position to keep American agencies in line with our common policy and at the same time we could get something on the stocks that might be useful if a change in the situation made combined action at a later stage desirable and possible.

The essential thing now seems to be to keep the President in line with Cabinet policy.

Since this was drafted, I have had the attached telegram from Anthony. It is not much use trying to elicit the assurance asked for in paragraph 2 unless we are willing to take part in the secret review of all the facts which Hull authorized Lehman to discuss when he was in London.

Foreign Secy

180

W8029

Unparaphrased version of a Most Secret Cypher Telegram
not One Time Table

29 MAY 1943

PENCIL No. 187

TOO 2230Z/21
TOR 0138Z/22

MOST SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM

IMPORTANT

From:- Britman Washington

To:- Air Ministry

several days

PENCIL No. 187 21st. May, 1943.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.

Most Secret and Personal. Following is the text of a Minute which I addressed recently to Lord Halifax.

(Begins).

I had spoken to the President about the dispatch of food through the blockade to occupied countries other than Greece before I received your Minute of May 15. (N.B.) The conversation was entirely informal and should not of course be regarded as binding in any way upon the President. But he expressed his own personal view that Greece formed an entirely separate case; that the only safe line to take was that Germany was alone responsible for the plight of these countries; and that once we departed from this basic principle it would be very difficult to see what the end would be. The President added that the pressure in this country was certainly not greater now and was perhaps slightly less than it had been a year ago. In fact I can safely say that there is no chance of the President himself taking any strong line against our policy and views.

(Ends).

To make absolutely sure have read it over to the President who concurs.

T.O.O. 2230Z/21

Circulation.

Deputy Prime Minister.
Foreign Secretary.
Mr. Martin.
Captain Clifford.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

J.H.Le R.

Draft. TELEGRAM.

Lord Halifax,
WASHINGTON.

No. 3488
Cypher. May 25

Copy N.E.W. 246
(Mr. Tomkinson)

N. American Dept.

May 1943.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 3220.

From Prime Minister's telegram Pencil 187 it would appear that President and he are in complete agreement with regard to the maintenance of existing policy. We trust that you will be able to ensure that State Department are aware of the President's views. In these circumstances the proposed secret discussions with Lehman are presumably unnecessary at the present stage, and it is to be hoped that he will receive specific instructions to that effect. It is also important that early agreement should be reached in regard to the form of reply to be given to appeals. It would be particularly helpful if in returning negative answers either to Allied governments or in Parliament we could state that Americans agreed.

/2.

2. Please try to obtain a definite decision on these points before the Prime Minister leaves Washington.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

183

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYPHER]. WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

To UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 3488
May 25th, 1943.

D. 5.56 p.m. 25th May, 1943.

rrrrrr

MOST IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 3220.

From Prime Minister's telegram Pencil 187 it would appear that President and he are in complete agreement with regard to the maintenance of existing policy. We trust that you will be able to ensure that State Department are aware of the President's views. In these circumstances the proposed secret discussions with Lehman are presumably unnecessary at the present stage, and it is to be hoped that he will receive specific instructions to that effect. It is also important that early agreement should be reached in regard to the form of reply to be given to appeals. It would be particularly helpful if in returning negative answers either to Allied governments or in Parliament we could state that Americans agreed.

2. Please try to obtain a definite decision on these points before the Prime Minister leaves Washington.

OTP.

203

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 8070
31 MAY 1943

184

Registry Number W 8070/4/49.

FROM Mr.W.J.Brown,M.P. to Secretary of State.

No.

Dated 20th May,1943.

Received in Registry 31st May,1943.

W: Co-Ordination.

Relief for occupied Europe.

Encloses a resolution about relief for occupied Europe which was passed at a Public Meeting in Rugby.

Last Paper.

W 8029

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Off. to Mr. Brown M.P. from S/S 28 May.

(Minutes.)

See within copy of letter from Mr. W. J. Brown M.P. to Mr. Eden May 31st

1/6.

W 4/6.

(Action completed.)

MB 2/6/43

(Index.)

ACH 2/6

Next Paper.

W 8074

24994 2'43 F.O.P.

185

Mr Millard

We still have no
stock reply (we are once
again awaiting the
Americans!) and I think
in the meantime our
only course is to refer
the enquiries to the
reply to Sir J. Sandeman
on May 19th (attached)

E.E.C.
25/5

186

FROM
W. J. BROWN, M.P.

TELEPHONE:
SLOANE 3176-7246.

2, UPPER BELGRAVE ST.,
LONDON, S.W.1.

FO 800/0

31 MAY 1943

ACKNOWLEDGED
21/5/43.

20th May, 1943.

Ack.
(2). Immediate Dept.

Dear Anthony Eden,

Here is a copy of a resolution passed at a Public Meeting of my folk in Rugby, which I think you should see.

Have we yet devised a block against ugly?
Tony
21/5

Yours sincerely,

W. J. Brown

The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street,
S.W.1.

187

COPY OF RESOLUTION passed at Rugby Famine Relief Committee, on 18th March, 1943.

THIS PUBLIC MEETING of some three hundred citizens of Rugby, held on Thursday, 18th March 1943, is deeply moved by the well authenticated facts which it has heard regarding Famine in Europe, and is gravely concerned at the consequences of allowing this to continue unrelieved.

This Meeting, therefore, in line with a growing body of Public Opinion, supports the Government in the Measures of Controlled Relief already taken with success in respect of Greece, and claims that it is imperative that speedy action should be taken to relieve the other Occupied Countries also, in order that at least their children may be saved from starvation. According to the report of the Central Famine Relief Committee, such measures seem particularly urgent in Belgium and certain districts of France.

To this end this Meeting urges the Governmentto issue "Navicerts" permitting the Relief Plans already made to be carried into effect.

31a

188

28th May, 1943.

Thank you for your letter of May 20th, enclosing a copy of a resolution about relief for Europe passed at a meeting of your constituents in Rugby. You may perhaps care to refer them to the answer which Dingle Foot gave to Sir Frank Sanderson on this subject in the House on May 19th. I enclose a copy for convenience of reference.

(Sd.) ANTHONY EDEN

W.J. Brown Esq., M.P.

W

189

FROM W. J. BROWN, M.P.

TELEPHONE: SLOANE 3176-7246.

2, UPPER BELGRAVE ST., LONDON, S.W.1.

INDEXED

W 8070/4/49 MI

JUN 1943

31st May, 1943.

Dear Anthony Eden,

Thank you so much for your letter of the 28th instant, with enclosure, in regard to the question of the relief of famine in Occupied Europe.

I am very much obliged.

Yours sincerely,

W. J. Brown

The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street,
S.W.1.

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GENERAL

190

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 8074

31 MAY 1943

Registry Number W 8074/4/49

TELEGRAM FROM

Lord Halifax,

No. Washington 2490

Dated 29th May:1943

Received in Registry 31st May:1943

W: Co-ordination

Blockade relief policy.

Refers to Foreign Office telegram to Washington No.3488. (W 8029/220/G).

Points were taken up with Lehman and State Department, but it was too late to clear the matter up before the Prime Minister left.

Urged that matter be cleared up immediately so as to enable His Majesty's Government to make joint reply on behalf of both Governments to the Belgian request and the International Red Cross proposal.

United States Government were not in a position to make any reply and Welles was clearing the whole matter with the President.

Last Paper.

W8070 (W)305

References.

W7813. —

W8029/220/G.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

S.L. Troutbeck (M.E.W.) May 31

(Minutes.)

Mr Stewart

Copy to Mr Troutbeck. M.E.W.

This is little more than an interim reply but all should go well when the Americans have got together.

31/5.

N. American dept. 27/VI "

Central MAS 5/6

E.P. 31/5

I am afraid I cannot share Mr Hoggs optimism. The record of all his activities of recent months is exactly nothing.

31/5.

MLL

(Action completed.)

ml 23/6/43.

(Index.)

AHH 27/7

Next Paper.

W8152 (W8822).

191

W 8074

31 MAY 1943

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYPHER] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Viscount Halifax
No. 2490.
29th May, 1943.

D. 11.31 a.m. 30th May, 1943.
R. 8.30 p.m. 30th May, 1943.

JJJ

Your telegram No. 3488.

1. I took up your points with Lehman and State Department immediately, but it was too late to clear the matter before Prime Minister left. The President had not informed the Department about his talk.

2. I urged that matter be cleared immediately and that I be put in a position not later than this morning, Saturday, to enable you to make a joint reply on behalf of both Governments both to the Belgian request in your ALCOVE NOAM. 263 and to the International Red Cross proposal in Ministry of Economic Warfare telegram No. 2071.

3. Lehman sent a telephone message this morning to say the United States Government was not yet in a position to make any reply and that Welles was clearing the whole matter with the President, who at the moment is out of town.

202A

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 8152

1 JUN 1943

192

Registry Number W 8152/4/49

FROM Netherlands Ambassador

No. 1779.

Dated 31st May:1943

Received in Registry 1st June:1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for the Netherlands.

Requests that an early reply may be received to Netherlands Government's request for despatch of 1,500 tons of milkpowder to Dutch children. Requests also that some fish liver oil may be sent to the Netherlands from South Africa.

Last Paper.

W 8021 (W 7832)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Neth. Netherlands Ambassador June 15,

MR June 15.

(Minutes.)

The relief position is, briefly, that we maintain our refusal to allow supplies to pass through the blockade and are endeavouring to persuade the Americans to decide firmly on the same line. So far the Americans, distracted by many appeals and unwilling to consider the details of the situation, have been unable to reply. Mr Welles is now "clearing the whole matter with the President" (W. 8074).

Until we know the attitude of the U.S. there is nothing new that we can say to the Netherlands ~~Minister~~ Ambassador. He has been told that "the whole question of relief is under consideration with the U.S. Gov't" (see also W. 7759), and he must be satisfied with that. If the U.S. agree to adopt a common policy of refusal, we shall be armed to meet all appeals. If not, a new situation will

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
10/6/43	AH 22/7

Next Paper.

W 8180.

will arise and our present policy may need revision. W[illegible] for the moment I think we may leave the Netherlands Minister unanswered.

8/6

Sir Orme Sargent

We cannot answer this until we know the American attitude; and I see this question will form part of M. Pleven, Gen. de Gaulle and M. Massigli which are still outstanding.

E. Bevin
2/6

But we must reply to the point raised at X. My impression was that vitamins were to be considered as medicaments. We must ask R.E.W. for confirmation & embody the answer we get in our reply to the N'lands Embassador.

H. Dalton.
4/6

The re-classification of vitamin concentrates as "medical supplies" is under consideration by the C.R.D. & the Min. of Food; but no decision has been reached. ~~[illegible]~~ The C.R.D. are sending us an extract of their correspondence on this subject.

E. Bevin
4/6

Now 5/VI

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Now see W.C.O. correspondence attached

? Reply on the lines of Lord Brassey's minute of May 21st

E.R.Crowe. 11/6

See written letter from Mr. Quennell (Mr. Miller) to Mr. Crowe June 5.

21/6.

195

No. 1779.

London, 31st May, 1943.

Comm: Gen. Min. Amb.
June '1/43.
I promised a short note in due
course submitted to S.of.S.
AE.

W 8152
1 JUN 1943

Your Excellency,

I had the honour to inform Your Excellency of our conversations with Lord Selborne concerning the necessity to send a limited quantity of milkpowder, maximum 1,500 tons per month to expectant mothers and children in Netherlands occupied territory. Your Excellency knows how acutely we feel in this matter. There is no need to repeat that even this limited request that might mean a breach in the blockade, would never have been made by us if we were not convinced that under proper control no benefit of these imports could accrue to the enemy. At the Ministry of Economic Warfare I was told last week by Lord Drogheda that the matter was still under consideration with the United States of America and a reply might be expected later. As our request was made some months ago on the strength of reliable reports from the Netherlands that the undernourishment of our children was alarming and moreover considering that in this phase of the war the resistance in general would be still more strengthened by a gesture on our part, I beg to request your valued collaboration to obtain an early and, if possible, a favourable reply. I am not unaware of the difficulties this decision presents, but I may be allowed at the same time to state that so far no convincing argument has been mentioned, that through a compliance with our request,

The Right Honourable Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,
&c., &c., &c.,

any beneficial influence might accrue to our enemies war effort or retard our victory.

In the meantime, the general policy of blockade as exercised by the Ministry of Economic Warfare has in a special instance been manifested in a way that has bitterly disappointed my Government and seems hardly acceptable to us.

The London Committee of the Netherlands Red Cross Society acquired in South Africa from the Ocean Products Company a quantity of two million Units Vitamin A (fish and sealiver oil) and 545 gram calciferol for mixture, to export from South Africa to the Netherlands by the intermediary of the Commission Mixte of the International Red Cross in Geneva which would also control the distribution of these vitamins to the children in the Netherlands.

The South African Government gave its permission and promised its assistance on condition that the Ministry of Economic Warfare would also approve. The Ministry did not approve.

These vitamins take up a negligible shipping space. They are indispensable for the undernourished youth of my country and can be considered as medicaments to alleviate or prevent suffering for our children. The efficient control by the Commission Mixte of Geneva has been guaranteed.

Under these circumstances and pending the

decision on the major issue, I must earnestly request Your Excellency to give your kind consideration to this request in the hope that you will share my opinion that permission for this single shipment ought no longer to be withheld.

I have the honour to remain
with the highest consideration
Your Excellency's obedient Servant,

L. Rückert

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W8152/4/49.

Draft.

Netherlands
Ambassador

Central Registry 11/6.

Copy legation. 11/6

15~

198

OUT FILE

+IC.

15th June, 1943.

Y.E.

I have the honour to refer to
Y.E.'s note No 1779 of May 31st
& which you sent the agreement
of H.M.G. & the despatch of
certain quantities of ~~Vitamin A~~
vitamin products
and ~~Cabelfood~~ from the Union of
S. Africa & Jersey & to certain
persons on which the Netherlands
Government has already been brought & the attention
of ~~the~~ H.M.G. by the London Office
of the Netherlands Red & Society
and has been most carefully
considered. H.M.G. are fully
aware of the sad conditions
which prevail in ~~the~~ occupied
countries of Europe including the
Netherlands and they have every
sympathy with the desire of Y.E.'s
Govt

Govt to relieve them. The exigencies of war have, however, compelled them to ~~lay down stringent rules~~ adopt a policy of the strictest possible blockade of all enemy & enemy-occupied territory and unfortunately this proposal, if accepted, would entail a departure from that policy. While the entire problem of relief for occupied Europe is under constant consideration, no change of policy can be made and in the circumstances I regret to have to inform Y.E. that H.M.G. cannot agree to the despatch of these supplies from S. Africa. This decision has also been conveyed to the Union Govt by the United States Govt.

W.S.C. 12/6.

(Sgd.) E. E. CROWE.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

15th June, 1943. 200

No. W 8152/4/49

CUT FILE

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to Your Excellency's note No. 1779 of 31st May in which you seek the agreement of His Majesty's Government to the despatch of certain quantities of vitamin products from the Union of South Africa to Geneva to be distributed as relief in the Netherlands.

2. This proposal has already been brought to the attention of His Majesty's Government by the London Committee of the Netherlands Red Cross Society and has been most carefully considered. His Majesty's Government are fully aware of the sad conditions which prevail in the occupied countries of Europe including the Netherlands and they have every sympathy with the desire of your Government to relieve them. The exigencies of war have, however, compelled them to adopt a policy of the strictest possible blockade of all enemy and enemy-occupied territory and unfortunately this proposal, if accepted, would entail a departure from that policy. While the entire problem of relief for occupied Europe is under constant consideration, no change of policy can be made and in these circumstances I regret to have to inform you that His Majesty's Government cannot agree to the despatch of these supplies from South Africa. This decision has also been conveyed to the representatives of the Netherlands Red Cross Society.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration,
Your Excellency's obedient Servant,
(For the Secretary of State)

His Excellency
Jonkheer E. Michiels van Verduynen,
etc., etc., etc.,
21a, Portman Square,
W.1.

201

Telephone: GROSVENOR 4060.

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No.

and address,

not to any person by name,

but to—

The Director-General,
Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square, W.1.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

INDEXED

5: 6: 43

M1 27/7

Your Reference

W8152 / 4 / 49.

My dear Grove,

As we arranged on the telephone, I enclose copies of papers dealing with the Dutch request for permission to send vitamin products from S. Africa to Holland. I hope that they make the position clear.

Yours ever,

R. K. Gronnell

COPY.

T.550/20.

Please see this letter from the South African High Commissioner's Office about a proposed despatch of fish liver oil from South Africa to Holland. It will be observed that the Union Government have turned this proposal down.

I take it that Lord Drogheda or the Minister will not wish to send any further reply to the Dutch Red Cross. The Union Government's action confirms what Lord Drogheda told the Dutch on May 21st.

The question of vitamin D concentrate still awaits the considered views of the Ministry of Food, after which it would have to be taken up with the Americans (the fish liver oil is chiefly vitamin A, the calciferol mentioned in the Dutch memorandum is vitamin D. It was proposed to obtain the latter product from this country.)

(signed) W.A.Camps.

2nd June, 1943.

Mr. Troutbeck.

(initialled)

Lord Drogheda.

I don't think we need say anything further about this to the Dutch at the moment.

D.
3.6.43.

COPY.

203

FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE.

Ref: 106/52.

Dear Froude,

With further reference to your letter of the 24th May, W.T.629/1/1, about food supplies for the Netherlands, I write to let you know that the Union Government have informed the Netherlands Minister that they cannot agree to the proposed shipment of Fish Liver Oil from South Africa to Holland as such action would be contrary to the present principles of blockade policy.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Camps.

Yours sincerely,

B.G.Fourie.

A. Froude, Esq.,
Dominions Office,
Downing Street,
S.W.1.

BGF/JH

MEMORANDUM.

The London Committee of the Netherland Red Cross Society acquired in South Africa from the Ocean Products Company a quantity of two million million units Vitamin A (fish and seal-liver oil) and 545 gram calciferol for mixture, to export from South Africa to Holland by the intermediary of the Commission Mixte of the International Red Cross in Geneva which would also control the distribution of these vitamins to the children in Holland.

The South African Government gave its permission and promised its assistance on condition that the Ministry of Economic Warfare would also approve.

As the children in Holland are sadly needing these vitamins and as the control of the distribution in Holland by a delegate of the Commission Mixte of Geneva would certainly form a sufficient guarantee, the Netherlands Government requests the Ministry of Economic Warfare to grant the permission asked by the London Committee of the Netherlands Red Cross Society for the exportation of these vitamins from South Africa.

This memorandum was handed me today by Mr. Lemping and Baron van Harinxma of the Dutch Red Cross. I told him that the import of vitamin preparations into occupied territory

was/

was bound up with the relief problem as a whole; that, while the entire problem was under consideration, no change of policy could be made; and that I regretted that in present circumstances we could not therefore facilitate the shipment of the vitamins in question. I added that our records do not confirm the statement that the Union Government had approved the shipment subject to our permission.

Mr. Troutbeck. (initialled)

Mr. Camps (initialled).

D.
21.V.43.

205 (last 204A)

GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 8180

2 JUN 1943

206

Registry Number: W 8180/4/49

FROM: Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated).

No.

Dated

Received in Registry: 2nd June, 1943.

W : Co-ordination.

Relief for Norway.

Record of a conversation between Monsieur Hagglof, Monsieur Wallenberg, [illegible] Mr. Riefler and Mr. Dingle Foot on 29th May regarding relief supplies for Norway from Sweden and evacuation of Norwegian children to Sweden.

Last Paper.

W 8074 (last)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Mr. Dingle Foot.
From Sir A. Cadogan.
June 17.

(Minutes.)

The idea of supplying Norwegian child refugees in Sweden sounds quite practicable. Politically it might have some advantage, though I am sure that the Norwegian children in Sweden are not allowed to starve anyway, and the Swedes would get most of the kudos for offering to take more of them.

3/6.

Northern dept.

We have for a long time been trying to get the Americans interested in such a scheme; hitherto without success. Perhaps Mr Riefler will succeed where we have failed.

3/6

Now see also letter from Mr Dingle Foot

(Action completed.) 29/6/43

(Index.) AEH 1/7

Next Paper.

W 8231 (W8) 60)

24994 2'43 F.O.P.

Foot to Sec A. Cabinet of June 2nd

I do not think that any approach to the Cabinet as to P.W. is required. The children are already covered under our child evacuation scheme; and, subject to the views of the Refugee Dept, it seems clear that the adult refugees come within the scope of the report of the Bermuda Conference which has been approved by the Cabinet. One provision of the report is that the U.K. will make themselves responsible for the maintenance of refugees for the duration of the war.

Refugees Dept to do

R. E. Cross
146

a.) We are committed by the Bermuda Meeting (see report, VII, (13) (D) to consider the provision of food & finance for refugees in neutral countries. H.M.G. & the U.S.S. have approved the report & we should therefore have no hesitation in principle to the acceptance of the responsibility for the provision of a certain amount of food

food through the blockade
for Norwegians in Sweden?

b) In the same way
there can be no objection
in principle to taking
children to Switzerland,
but would not M.W.T.
have to sanction the
despatch of extra food through
the blockade?

A. Walker
11/6

M.E.W. recently agreed in
principle to sending Sweden extra
supplies if the Swedish Govt.'s
promised efforts to extract 20,000
Jewish refugee children from
Germany proved successful. Neither in
this case nor in that of Norwegian
refugees in Sweden does a further
approach to the Cabinet seem necessary.
but I presume agreement with the
U.S. is required.

A.D.R.
9/VI

This is the child evacuation scheme
in a slightly different form. The
Americans have never thought much
of it but, as far as I know, they
have no objection of principle

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

food through the blockade
for Norwegians in Sweden? 28

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there can be no objection
in principle to taking
children to Switzerland,
but would not M. W. T.
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Jewish refugee children from
Germany proved successful. Neither in
this case nor in that of Norwegian
refugees in Sweden does a further
approach to the Cabinet seem necessary.
but I presume agreement with the
U. S. is required.

A. M. R.
12/VI

This is the child evacuation scheme
in a slightly different form. The
Americans have never thought much
of it but, as far as I know, they
have no objection of principle

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

I see no reason why it should not be put up to them in a somewhat (different and) more concrete form. I dont think we need ask for further authority to do this.

FEE 14/6

↑ American Dept

Nothing Dept (a.a.)
Mlle. 26.6

J Eyre Crowe
12/6.

M Dept wants his reply urgently this morning. So after discussing with the Secretary I have omitted the ~~[illegible]~~ paragraph about influence & W[illegible] and compliments. The Dft telegram

E.C.
17/6

See within copy of tel to Washington No 2624 Confer June 25

Thos Hagg 9/7.

N. Adelphi 5/VII

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

749/5

SECRET

COPY FOR E.E. CROWE Esq., FOREIGN OFFICE

W 8180

2 JUN 1943

Ends 210

Messrs. Hagglof and Wallenberg called this morning to discuss the question of relief for Norway with Mr. Riefler and myself. I previously explained that we preferred to deal with this matter separately, and not as part of the commercial negotiations.

M. Wallenberg did not appear to think that there had been any striking deterioration in conditions recently. But the problem was largely one of transport. It would be much easier to supply Northern and Middle Norway from Sweden than from Oslo. Formerly these areas were supplied by sea. The number of Norwegian refugees now in Sweden was about 16,000, consisting of approximately 10,000 men and 6,000 women and children. Mr. Riefler pointed out that this did not appear to shew that a condition of great distress existed in Norway. If there had been anything approaching famine it would have been impossible for the occupying authorities to prevent a much larger exodus over the Norwegian-Swedish frontier.

I then referred to the memorandum which the Swedes left with me earlier in the week. I said that we could not possibly agree to a repetition of the Greek relief scheme in Norway, or to an arrangement by which the Gothenberg ships carried cargoes of foodstuffs earmarked for transmission to Norway. As regards the third proposal (i.e. the relaxation of the War Trade Agreement so as to enable individual Swedes or Swedish organisations to send contributions of foodstuffs to Norway) it was contrary to our policy to allow a neutral country to export to occupied territory goods of a type which they imported through the blockade. I would, however, consider, although I could give no promise, whether it was possible for us to connive at some slight relaxation of our regulations. M. Hagglof suggested that we might permit the War Trade Agreement to be relaxed in this way if and when the Gothenberg traffic was stopped. There could then be no question of making good such exports by imports through the blockade.

We then discussed the possibility of an evacuation scheme. I said that I thought it might be possible to obtain permission for an additional consignment of food to be despatched to Sweden for the express benefit of Norwegian refugees in Swedish territory. The Swedes replied that this would not be of much avail, since during the next three or four months the cargo space on the Gothenberg ships would be fully taken up. I then made the

tentative/

0818 W
2 JUN 1943

tentative suggestion that it might be possible to arrange for a Swedish ship to leave the Baltic on the same terms as the Greek relief ships. She would carry cargoes of foodstuffs for Norwegian child refugees, and the Swedes, I suggested, should offer asylum to more Norwegian children. Here again, I made it clear that I was merely thinking aloud, and that I might be unable to proceed with this proposal.

The Swedes appeared to take a favourable view. They said, however, that their Government might be open to the reproach of using the necessities of the Norwegians in order to enlarge their own food imports. It might therefore make things easier for them if the suggestion was made public in London as coming from the British, United States and Norwegian Governments. I did not think this would present any difficulty.

Mr. Riefler is of opinion that this idea would be worth pursuing.

(Sd.) DINGLE FOOT.

29th May, 1943.

Mr. Tewesbeck
The Director-General
The Minister.
(Copies to Mr.Riefler
Mr.E.E.Crowe(F.O.)
Mr.Villiers
Mr. Camps
Mr, Sperberg).

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W 8180 / 4 / 49

TEL. No.: GROSVENOR 4060.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE,
LONDON, W.1.

SECRET INDEXED

has not seen. General staff P.C. 3/6.

Dear Cadogan,

2nd June, 1943.

I am writing to you in Law's absence. As you know, we are engaged in negotiations with a Swedish delegation for a new War Trade Agreement which will, we hope, result in a substantial reduction of Swedish exports to the enemy. During our conversations the Swedes have on more than one occasion raised the question of consignments of foodstuffs to Norway. They presented us with a memorandum containing the three following suggestions:-

(1) A relief scheme for Norway in the same way as for Greece;

(2) The importation on the Gothenberg ships of a certain quantity of foodstuffs every month, to be reserved for distribution to the children and the sick in Norway;

(3) The relaxation of the existing War Trade Agreement so as to permit certain quantities of foodstuffs of Swedish origin to be sent to Norway.

Last Saturday Riefler and I discussed this matter with the two leading Swedish delegates. (I sent a copy of the minute to Crowe). We said that we could not possibly accept (1) and (2) and that as regards (3) we would consider whether, in certain cases, we could turn a blind eye to minor breaches of the War Trade Agreement.

We then discussed the question of Norwegian refugees in Sweden. The Swedes told us that these numbered about sixteen thousand, consisting of ten thousand men and six thousand women and children. (Incidentally, this modest number does not indicate a state of acute distress in Norway). I said that I was speaking without authority, but that I thought it might be possible to allow additional imports of foodstuffs to reach Sweden through the blockade, earmarked for Norwegian refugees. I suggested that the Swedes, on their side, should express their willingness to take in a fresh influx of Norwegian children. The Swedes seemed to think that accommodation should not present any great difficulty. They pointed out, however, that the space on the Gothenberg ships would be fully taken up

The Hon.Sir Alexander Cadogan, GCMG.,KCB.,
Foreign Office.

for/

for the next few months, and that in the autumn the traffic might again be closed down by the Germans. I said that we might consider allowing an extra ship to leave the Baltic on the same terms as the Greek relief ships, namely that she would not be used for any other purpose, and would be allowed to return to the Baltic if the scheme came to an end. The Swedes seemed favourably disposed to this idea.

In view of the recent Cabinet decision on relief for occupied territories, you may think it desirable to obtain the consent either of the War Cabinet or of the Prime Minister, even for sending to neutral countries relief for evacuees. This would seem, however, to be rather more a matter for the Foreign Office than for M.E.W., and I should be grateful if you would consider obtaining the necessary authority. At the same time it might be worth while mentioning the proposal for sending Belgian children and children from other occupied territories to Switzerland. You may remember that I discussed this with the Swiss Minister several months ago, but that it has been held up because we have never managed to get a decision from Washington. But Riefler thinks there is now some prospect of obtaining approval for both schemes.

I should perhaps add that the Swedes would prefer that the scheme should be proposed from London. Presumably we should try to enlist the support of the Norwegian Government, and it might help to pacify the Norwegian seamen who, during recent months, have been shewing occasional signs of restiveness over the food blockade.

Yours sincerely,

Hugh Dalton

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. W 8180/4/49

N.H.

Draft.

Mr. Dingle Foot.

(From Sir A. Cadogan)

Refugee Department.
Northern " 26.6
N.A.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

June 17 1943.

Dear Foot.

In your letter of the 2nd June you asked for our views on the Swedish proposal that additional food imports should be allowed through the blockade for the relief of Norwegian refugees in Sweden.

Since we are committed by the Bermuda meeting - see VII (13) (D) of the Report, - to consider the provision of food and finance for refugees in neutral countries we think that unless you feel that the chartering of a special ship for this purpose will prove an awkward precedent so far as the maintenance of our general blockade policy is concerned, we can approve the plan in principle without referring it to the War Cabinet. ~~Subject to the above, I think~~ our next step should be to find out what the Americans think about it and I suggest that we (or you) telegraph to Washington on the ~~lines of the enclosed draft.~~

As regards the evacuation of children to Sweden and Switzerland, we are all in favour/

favour of trying once again to get a considered answer from Washington in spite of the fact that the Americans have shown no interest so far. Perhaps Mr. Riefler will be able to stir them up.

K.C. 17/6

ab. 17/6/43.

Yours Sincerely,

Sd/ Alexander Cadogan.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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OUT FILE

17th June, 1943.

(W 8180/4/49)

Dear Foot.

In your letter of the 2nd June you asked for our views on the Swedish proposal that additional food imports should be allowed through the blockade for the relief of Norwegian refugees in Sweden.

Since we are committed by the Bermuda meeting - see VII (13) (D) of the Report, - to consider the provision of food and finance for refugees in neutral countries we think that unless you feel that the chartering of a special ship for this purpose will prove an awkward precedent so far as the maintenance of our general blockade policy is concerned, we can approve the plan in principle without referring it to the War Cabinet.

As regards the evacuation of children to Sweden and Switzerland, we are all in favour of trying once again to get a considered answer from Washington in spite of the fact that the Americans have shown no interest so far. Perhaps Mr. Riefler will be able to stir them up.

Yours sincerely

(Sd) R Cadogan.

D.M. Foot, Esq., M.P.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM.

W8189/4/49

T 550/12/13A.

[CYPHER].

INDEXED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

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1972

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

3134

No.2624. ARFAR. D. 3.35 a.m. June 26th 1943.
June 25th 1943.

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

W1972 3134.

My telegrams Nos. 405 and 690 [Arfar of February 1st and February 20th: evacuation of children from occupied countries to Switzerland].

If and when United States Government agree to child evacuation proposals contained in Swedish Agreement we propose to take up with them again plan for evacuation to Switzerland.

2. We have also informed Ricfier.

Copies sent M.S.
M.T.
Treasury
Sir J. Leith Ross

M.E.W. FILE No. T550/12/13A.
COPY FOR Foreign Office
DATE 28/6/43.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]

T.550/19/28.

no need to index as already entered.

[CYPHER]

LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No. 690 ARFAR.
20th February, 1943.

D. 1. 0 p.m. 20th February, 1943.

JJJJ

IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 672 [Arfar of February 18th], paragraph 2(b).

Swiss Minister has again referred to the proposed child evacuation scheme in which his Government is now evidently keenly interested. He suggested that a proportion of Jewish children might with advantage be included.

2. Please mention this to United States authorities, as they may share our view that this is a valuable opportunity of bringing some relief to the suffering Jewish population of Europe, for whom much sympathy is felt both here and in United States.

3. You might also point out that in our view the inclusion of Jewish children who are in particular distress deserves to be considered, whether they are in Germany or in the occupied territories.

4. Swiss Minister is anxious for early progress to be made with the scheme. He was told of course that no definite decision had yet been taken.

OTP.

RMW.COPY OUTWARD TELEGRAM (T550/18/28) 219

[COVER] LIMITED ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO WASHINGTON.

No.405 Arfar D. 4.40 a.m. 2nd February, 1943
1st February, 1943.

already sailed

Repeated to Berne No. 522 Arfar

ddddddddd

My telegram No. 241 to Berne [Arfar of 15th January: evacuation of children from occupied countries to Switzerland].

1. Scheme clearly cannot be discussed in detail at Berne or at all with Allied Governments until President has replied to Prime Minister's message of 1st January. We have nevertheless been considering practical arrangements and should like you to discuss them with United States authorities on the assumption that the scheme will be approved by the President in principle.

2. Instructions we should then suggest sending to Berne, after seeking concurrence in principle of Belgian Government, which is Allied Government chiefly concerned, are as follows:-

(a) Plans should be made to receive in Switzerland an eventual total of about 100,000 children to be drawn gradually according to need and transport possibilities from all occupied countries except Denmark and Norway, the latter country being covered by evacuation to Sweden. Greatest number should come from Belgium, as worst off accessible country except Greece, which is being relieved direct. (If we were pressed to do so we should be willing to include French children).

(b) Swiss Government should be invited to undertake entire operation of housing clothing and feeding children and to submit total cost to British Government. While Swiss Government might be willing to bear part of cost (e.g. for accommodation) themselves, incidence of the remainder would have to be discussed between His Majesty's Government and Allied Governments. It must however be made clear that in view of difficulty of obtaining Swiss francs, His Majesty's Government could not proceed with this scheme on any basis which did not provide for full cover by the Allied Governments concerned on any foreign exchange commitment. As far as we can see this could only be secured if the Allied Governments concerned made arrangements themselves with the Swiss Government for procuring necessary francs, not against sterling and not against any deposit of gold falling within the scope of the proposed Anglo-Swiss financial agreement. Similar considerations would apply if in the event other difficult foreign currencies are required to any material extent, e.g. for shipping or the purchase of supplies.

(c) /

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(c) We estimate that 100,000 children would require approximately 20,000 tons of foodstuffs and 1,000 tons of clothing and footwear a year. Any part of these goods that would need to be imported through the blockade would not be counted against Swiss quotas. Part of foodstuffs such as milk, cheese and vegetables should be obtained in Switzerland itself, and in such cases we could agree to certain compensatory imports outside the quotas, e.g. fodder against milk. As regards clothing, raw materials should be imported into Switzerland rather than finished goods, and should be made up locally. All purchases made from outside the blockade would be undertaken by the Swiss except purchases of such goods as are normally bought for the Swiss by British supply departments.

(d) Scheme would be put to German and Italian Governments by the Swiss Government, who should also be invited to undertake the allocation and collection of the children in the occupied countries in such a way as to ensure impartial selection. For this purpose we suggest they should adopt health as sole criterion of priority i.e. the children most under-nourished or most prone to tuberculosis etc., should be chosen. Some such principle is essential if we are to avoid pro-German families getting priority. For the same reason it is desirable that Swiss Government as distinct from any Red Cross organisation should have responsibility for selection.

3. If scheme is approved in principle by the President and by Belgian Government we hope that United States Government will instruct their Minister in Berne to concert with His Majesty's Minister the approach to Swiss Government.

O.T.P.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 8231

3 JUN 1943

Registry Number W 8231/4/49

FROM Ministry of Economic Warfare (communicated)

No.

Dated

Received in Registry 3rd June, 1943.

W: Coordination +

Polish relief purchases in Switzerland

Transmits copies of letter from M. Mohn (Polish Embassy) to Mr. Camps of 6th April and of Mr. Camps' reply of 20th April regarding proposed Polish relief purchases in Switzerland.

Encloses copies of telegram to Berne No. 1960 Arfar of 27th April and telegram from Berne No. 2781 Arfar of 25th May.

Last Paper.

W8180.

References.

(Minutes.)

Hoggs 5/6

Dep 10/6 Central dept.

E.J.C. 7/6

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

W.G. 10/6/43

(Index.)

ACH 28/7

Next Paper.

W8294

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

KGD (copy)

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

Enter 222

T.550/10

20th April, 1943.

W 8231
3 JUN 1943

I am writing with reference to your letter No.1968/40/43 of April 6th, and to our subsequent telephone conversation about relief purchases which you would like to make in Switzerland.

I quite agree with the suggestion in the last paragraph of your letter that our respective Legations at Berne should consult to ensure that the firms supplying the goods are approved. The same procedure will conveniently serve as regards the nature of the goods themselves, but in this case we shall probably have to send special instructions regarding individual transactions.

I have discussed with the Treasury the question whether financial considerations would allow purchases up to a total of 700,000 Swiss francs in the current year, instead of 350,000 Swiss francs which I had previously understood to be the figure in your mind. We do not foresee any insuperable difficulty if approved goods should be available for purchase up to this amount, though I think it would be extremely difficult to go beyond it. We should prefer to

wait/

Monsieur W. Mohl,
Polish Embassy,
47, Portland Place,
W.1.

wait and see how far the 350,000 francs lasts, before making any final arrangement about the extra money, but for planning purposes you could reasonably count on the remainder being available when required.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Fraser at the Treasury.

(W.A.CAMPS)

B.L.
T550/10

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POLISH EMBASSY
Financial Counsellor.
No.1968/40/43.

40, Portland Place,
London, W.1. 6th April, 1943.

Dear Mr. Camps,

Thank you for your letter of the 30th March 1943.

I understand that, assuming the Swiss francs to be available, and agreement reached with the Treasury on that point, the Ministry of Economic Warfare would have no objection to certain goods being purchased in Switzerland and despatched as relief to occupied Poland.

It is of course too early to speak about the precise amount which such purchases could reach during the year. You mentioned the figure of Sw.frs.350,000. As far as I recollect, Monsieur Luba when discussing the matter with you, had in mind the possibility of making, up to the end of the year, two purchases each amounting to approximately Sw.frs.350,000, which would make a total amount of Sw.frs.700,000.

I am afraid that there has been a slight misunderstanding on this point, and I should be grateful if you would let me know whether your agreement in principle as expressed in your letter would eventually cover this higher amount.

I note also that you wish to be consulted when actual remittances are made for purchases, as the range of goods to the export of which from Switzerland you are able to agree, varies from time to time. We shall, of course, be glad to follow this suggestion.

As concerns the firms which will be supplying the goods do you not think that this point could be agreed in each case directly between the British and Polish Legations in Switzerland, in order to avoid cabling on each occasion?

Yours sincerely,

A.Camps, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,W.1.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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T550/10.

[CYPHER] ARFAR (O.B.)

FROM MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE TO BERNE

No. 1960. Arfar D. 5.5 p.m. April 27th, 1943.

April 27th, 1943.

bbbb w6472.

My telegram No. 1768 [Arfar of April 15th: Allied relief purchases in Switzerland].

Polish Legation is likely to approach you about relief purchases. We have promised limited remittances to Finance such purchases as may eventually be approved.

2. In paragraph 6 last sentence. For (a) read (b).

O.T.P.

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[CYPHER] A R F A R (O.B.)

FROM BERNE TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Mr. Norton
No. 2781 ARFAR
25th May, 1943.

D. 8.19 p.m. 25th May, 1943.
R. 5.15 a.m. 26th May, 1943.

0 0 0 0

Your telegram No. 2402.

Misunderstanding arose through Polish Legation approaching the wrong department. Position has now been explained and Poles will submit.

(a) Programme for purchases envisaged.

(b? Specification of proposed transactions to be reported for your approval as and when they arise.

2. It appears that question of a loan of Swiss francs 700,000 was discussed in London but that the matter was not put to the Legation here as one remittance from funds in the United Kingdom.

O.T.P.

M.E.W. FILE No. T550 1.0
COPY FOR Hon. W Hogg.
7.6.43. F.O

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION

227

W 8294

3 JUN 1943

Registry Number W 8294/4/49

FROM Lord Selborne (Ministry of Economic Warfare)

No. -

Dated -

Received in Registry 3rd June:1943

W: Co-ordination

Relief for occupied Europe.

Transmits a copy of a letter from Lord Selborne (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to the Archbishop of Canterbury of 1st June regarding despatch of relief supplies to occupied Europe.

Last Paper.

W8231

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Hume Wrigg 4/6

An excellent letter

See below

E. R. Cunn. 4/6

N. A. Dept.

Canterbury 5/6 16/6

9/6.

I presume M.E.W. will cope this
2/0 Washington. If there is
any question of publication, the
British Info. Services should
have it in advance.

Jas Malcolm 11/6

I have spoken to Mr Lascelles
11/6

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
KW. 19/6.	A(1) 28/7

Next Paper.

W 8333.

24994 2'43 F.O.P.

Finance dept 28
4 2 June

WITH LORD SELBORNE'S COMPLIMENTS.

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

W 8234
3 JUN 1943

Copy for the Foreign Office

229

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

1st June, 1943.

My dear William,

During the course of our recent talk, I referred to a pamphlet issued by the Famine Relief Committee on the 3rd March last, which sets forth certain proposals for sending relief to occupied Europe through the blockade and quotes on its front page a statement attributed to you on the subject of relief in general. You told me that you would like to have any documents on the various issued raised.

Let me begin by saying that some of us here can do otherwise than fully share the sympathy you express for the suffering peoples of Europe, and in the anxiety you feel lest these sufferings may be reflected in the conditions of the post-war world. You, for your part, will certainly agree that the problem is an exceedingly difficult one, and that the solution must depend on a very careful study of the facts. I am bound to add that some of the statements in the Famine Relief Committee's pamphlet do not correspond with the information in my possession; and I regret this all the more since, when I had the pleasure of meeting members of the Famine Relief Committee last summer, I

particularly /

particularly invited them to apply to me for any information they might require in their study of the question. Unfortunately they have not yet done so. A full statement setting out the weekly rations of the principal foodstuffs in enemy and occupied countries, was made in answer to a recent Parliamentary Question and I enclose a copy.

Reports of bitterness against this country, which you mention, would certainly be of concern to me; but I am glad to be able to assure you that my information on the subject (which is considerable) does not bear them out. I should be grateful, however, if you could place at my disposal any evidence you may possess. At the same time, it is, I think, clear that our actions can be determined only by practical possibilities, and that, if we were to change our blockade policy we should do so because we were convinced that there was a real opportunity of materially assisting our friends without aiding our enemies, and not because we lacked the courage to formulate a refusal. Moreover, it cannot be seriously contended that the Allied peoples, when the moment comes, will decline to co-operate with the forces of liberation, whether or no the Famine Relief Committee's scheme should have been adopted meanwhile. That the scheme proposed could not affect the physical capacity of the population to co-operate with us is apparent

from /

from its nature.

I do not know the source of your information that the women and children of Belgium are receiving only 700-900 calories of nutrition daily. If this were true, the position would indeed be grave; but fortunately I have received no evidence whatsoever that conditions approaching starvation prevail in Belgium. The position is more correctly reported in the Parliamentary answer referred to above. It is difficult, in any event, to see what serious improvement can be expected from the Famine Relief Scheme which provides for a daily supplement of not more than 135 calories for each person - an addition which, even if it were sufficient to make an appreciable difference, could be counteracted at any moment by a trifling reduction of the rations at present available.

Exactly what stocks may now be available in the United States I do not know, but I can tell you that there is an acute shortage in the world today of dried milk, vitamin products and other foodstuffs of the type most needed, and that is is only with the greatest difficulty that we can meet our existing, and provide for our future, commitments.

As regards the effectiveness of international control in Greece, the information I am receiving is not as full as I could wish, and such information as I have relates only to the control of the wheat and pulse which have been sent to that country. We have still to see

what /

what success has been achieved in preventing the Germans abstracting other food from Greece or applying it to feed the limited number of Greeks who are working for them, to the detriment of others. No "international" control was ever, so far as I am aware, exercised over relief work in France, and, though we must all of us feel the highest admiration for the wonderful work done by the International Red Cross on behalf of prisoners of war, and complete confidence in the good faith with which it goes about its task, its powers of supervision are necessarily limited and I doubt if the technical difficulties of effective supervision over a wide area and among large populations are fully realised.

Pray forgive me for writing to you at such length, but we feel that many of the schemes put forward (though inspired by the noblest motives) are not always framed either in the light of correct information or with due regard to the realities of the situation. I have not dwelt in this letter on the several grave dangers and difficulties that would attend any change of our blockade policy, but I should be ready to go into them if at anytime you should so wish.

Yours ever,

(signed) Selborne

His Grace The Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, D.D.,
Lambeth Palace,
S.E.1.

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GENERAL

1943

CO-ORDINATION.

W 8333

4 JUN 1943

Registry Number } W 8333/4/49

FROM Mr. Camps (Ministry of Economic Warfare) to Mr. Crowe

No. T 550/19

Dated 2nd June, 1943.

Received in Registry } 4th June, 1943.

W: Coordination +

Food situation in Belgium

Encloses extracts from Belgian correspondence about food conditions in Belgium.

Last Paper.

W8294

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

very surprising

Jun 19 6/6

Central dep't.

MAIS 7/6

(Action completed.)

nde 8/6/43.

(Index.)

Alt 2b/7

Next Paper.

W8579

24994 2/43 F.O.P.

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W 8334

T.550/19

14 JUN 1943

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
W.1.

2nd June, 1943.

My dear Crowe,

You may be interested in these extracts from Belgian correspondence which one of our people has shown me.

Yours ever

Archie Camps

E. E. Crowe, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
London,
S.W.1.

64/Q182326

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Date of letter: 6.4.43.

Authentic account of recent conditions in Belgium.

We still don't starve - the bread ration remains at 225 gr. and potatoes are easy to find. In some respects there is an improvement in this matter, but there is a dearth of fats - 300 grs. are obviously too little, and in the black market they cost 400 grammes (sic:?Francs) a kilo. Now that is not within the reach of everyone's purse, and most employees have only had their salaries raised by 8%.

42/Z179482

Extract from a letter from Namur to Co. Carlow dated 6.4.43.

We all keep very well and manage to get along in spite of all. The spuds are plentiful - and nourishing - so we can't complain, all are much better off than we thought after nearly 3 years of war. This winter herrings have been plentiful - very small and boney - but even so! they help to make up for the meat which is so scarce - and anything eatable is welcome!

School goes on as usual - the children keep well - surprisingly so when one realizes they get little milk or butter or sweets!

42/Z189117

Extract from a letter from Portugal to Dublin dated 25.3.43.

"The winter was very mild...the food question was better organised....Above all, it was the fish that they liked so much. In BELGIUM a really miraculous haul of fish was obtained, they reckon about 45 million KGR HARENG (herring), which has allowed a generous

sale/

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end

sale, even in the villages, 1½ KG were allowed per head. That will have brought about a small change in the meagre war menu, for when wicked wolves occupy a country, they never leave much for the in habitants."